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A Note on the Interviews
Some of the data for this study were collected through observation of the
committee in action. Other information came from scheduled, semistruc-
tured interviews. Additional material was gathered informally, by asking
staff members and occasionally committee members questions as they
arose.
I conducted semistructured interviews with eight current and former
House members: Chairman Carl D. Perkins, six others who were on the
Committee on Education and Labor, and one other member. In addition, I
interviewed the chairman's son, Carl C. Perkins, who was elected to fill his
father's seat in 1984 and who sat on Education and Labor until his retire-
ment in 1992. Several other I louse members told me personally that they
could remember little about the periods under study or that they were
reluctant to talk about their colleagues. As a result of this reluctance, the
persons who were interviewed were guaranteed anonymity.
I also conducted semistructured interviews with eight high-ranking
professional staff members who had worked on or around the committee
during the chairmanships of Carl D. Perkins and Adam Clayton Powell,
Jr., and were close to the chairmen or to other key members. Several were
interviewed two or three times. One person interviewed had worked for
Powell during the chairmanships of both Graham Barden and Powell and
later worked for Perkins. I also conducted formal interviews with at least
three of the support staff who worked for the committee during at least two
of the three periods. The semistructured interviews lasted between forty-
five minutes and two and a half hours each.
Informal interviews were conducted on an irregular basis with at least
thirty-five different staff members in addition to one or two committee
members and some of Chairman Perkins's office staff. Several of his
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constituents also were questioned. I returned to the staff frequently to ask
more questions, since one person's comments usually led to further ques-
tions or to the need for verification. Many of the top staff members and
some of the support staff on the committee since 1982 were questioned
numerous times. On a few occasions group discussions added to insights
into committee operations and leadership. The informal interviews lasted
from five minutes to two hours.
As a result of my father's employment as a top staff member of the
committee and adviser to the chairman, Mr. Perkins and the committee
staff were unusually helpful in my endeavors and tolerant of my frequent
presence. My internships on Capitol Hill gave me a prime opportunity to
view the committee and to discuss it with the staff and committee members.
Introduction
Scene 1: After a roll-call vote on the floor of the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives that had interrupted a committee meeting, a prominent chairman
hurries, almost at a trot, to get back to the committee chamber ahead of his
colleagues. He beats them by a furlong. Finding no other members present
in the committee room, the chairman exercises his prerogative, declares the
absence of a quorum, and adjourns the meeting. The major legislative
proposal under consideration is put off—again. The same chairman, on
several occasions, lines up with the opposition party on his committee to
defeat a major federal aid to education bill sponsored by fellow party
members.
Scene 2: Another chairman, newly designated, begins his tenure by delegat-
ing substantial authority to his subcommittee chairmen, thus facilitating
passage of major legislation. Later he pockets a bill ordered reported by his
committee and holds it hostage until the House and Senate act on other
measures.
Scene 3: A third chairman finds himself stymied by minority party members
on his committee who block a vote on major legislation by staying holed up
in their lounge—twenty feet away from the main committee chamber,
where the majority members are waiting for the executive session to begin.
The chairman declares the meeting open to the media and the public. When
the doors open and reporters and photographers swarm into the chamber,
they are followed in short order by the minority members, who file in like
little gentlemen to take their places on the dais. It is the beginning of the
open meeting policy, which soon spreads throughout the other congres-
sional committees.
2 Congressional Committee Chairmen
Strangely enough, all of these chairmen headed the same committee—the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor. Each
chaired the committee at a different stage of its organizational development
and in his own way left a lasting impression on the committee, the House,
and education and labor policy.
The first of these chairmen, Graham Arthur Barden, Democrat of the
Third District of North Carolina, was almost a caricature of the southern
conservative committee chairman. By virtue of the powers concentrated in
the hands of the chairman, he had the power to strangle any legislation that
could be considered liberal or progressive. Although he was a strong
advocate of education, he feared federal involvement because he saw it as
federal interference in state and local control of the school system. Taking
the traditional southern position, he also opposed organized labor and set
about to rein it in at every opportunity. Many committee members, par-
ticularly those in the Democratic party, were frustrated by these actions.
Under Barden's leadership members had little opportunity to exercise their
creativity, and some found themselves denied chances to influence public
policy. In a rare display of unity, Democrats forced the adoption of
committee rules diminishing Barden's power.
The second chairman was Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Democrat of
New York's Twenty-second District. A Baptist preacher from Harlem, he
had been denied a subcommittee chairmanship by Barden despite his
position as the second-ranking Democrat. When he became chairman, he
encouraged participation by his fellow Democrats, rewarding them with
subcommittee chairmanships and making sure their names appeared as
sponsors of important committee bills. He facilitated the passage of land-
mark federal aid to education legislation requested by the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations. Initially, his colleagues regarded him as a good
chairman. Later, however, his personal conduct interfered with the con-
duct of committee and House business and embarrassed his colleagues.
Ultimately, the committee acted to restrict his discretion. The House went
so far as to strip him of his chairmanship and subsequently to deny him his
seat in Congress, an action that later was overturned by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Carl Dewey Perkins, the third chairman, represented the generally
poor, mountainous Seventh District of Kentucky. He inherited a fully
developed set of committee rules governing the conduct of the committee
and limiting the power of the chairman. Nevertheless, his calculated use of
personal resources ensured that he made a lasting impact on federal social
policy. By pleading, bargaining, and dogged, unembarrassed persistence,
Perkins was able to overcome the obstacles in House and committee rules
and to steer major measures through the committee and through Congress.
Faced with a less favorable environment than his predecessor, who chaired
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the committee under conditions ripe for big social welfare programs,
Perkins was able to preserve much of Powell's legacy by his tenacity and
skillful manipulation of opportunities.
The conduct of these chairmen during various periods of the commit-
tee's history changed not only the committee's operations and output but its
function and development. Moreover, some of their maneuvers resulted in
changes in both House and committee procedures. The actions of these
men as chairmen influenced the path national education policy and labor
policy took for years to come. The contrasts in the ways these chairmen
conducted the business of the committee raise important questions for
those interested in how governments operate. What have been the effects of
disparate committee leadership on the structure, operations, and output of
the committee? How did each chairman operate in the context of the
committee? How did he lead? How did the committee evolve? What factors
have been important in its evolution? Have committee functions remained
constant over the years? Have the amount and character of committee
output changed?
This study will argue that the chairmen made a difference in the
structure, operations, output, and function of the committee, each leading
in a different way. While institutional environment influences leadership,
the way the chairman uses the resources at hand—both institutional pre-
rogatives and personal resources—also has an impact on the institution and
its outputs. In large part as a result of the differences in leadership, the
committee was a different organization under each chairman.
In recent decades, political scientists have considered leadership as a
function of its institutional context (e.g., Fenno 1978; Cooper and Brady
1981a; Jones 1981; Sinclair 1983). The current study regards leadership as
influenced by institutional context but also as proactive: leadership is also
an independent variable. The chairman's orientation determines, to a large
extent, how he operates the committee and how he treats the issues that
come before it. His ideological proclivities affect the content and form of
legislation reported by the committee and often determine its outcome. His
orientation and his use of resources help determine committee operations
and outputs, thus leaving their mark on public policy. Examining three
chairmen of a single committee reduces variations in external influences so
the effects of the chairmen can be highlighted.
The Committee on Education and Labor
The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor was
created by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601), which
combined the Committee on Education and the Committee on Labor that
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had operated separately since 1883 (House Rules, 96th Cong.). Mc-
Conachie reported that efforts to combine the two committees earlier had
met with "quick and angry opposition from the dominant Southerners"
(1898, 41n).
In the 80th Congress (1947-48), when the reorganization act took
effect, the Republicans had control of the Congress. Fred A. Hartley of
New Jersey became the first chairman of the new Committee on Education
and Labor. MacNeil referred to him as "one of the seniority system's
failures" and alleged that the previous chairman of the Education Commit-
tee, Mary T. Norton (D-NJ), resigned because of Hartley's neglect of the
committee (196 3, 168; see Goodwin 1970, 120). Hartley's tenure, however,
was short-lived, because in the next Congress (81st, 1949-50) the Demo-
crats regained control. John Lesinski, Sr., of Michigan became the chair-
man. His reign was cut short when he died in May 1950. Graham A.
Barden (D-NC) assumed the chairmanship until 1953, when the Republi-
cans again ruled Congress, promoting Samuel K. McConnell, Jr., (PA) to
the chairmanship. He held the post for only one term, since in the 84th
Congress (1955-56) the Democrats once again were in power. Barden took
up where he left off and stayed until his retirement at the end of 1960.
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., (D-NY) became chairman of the committee at
the beginning of the 87th Congress (1961-62), where he remained until he
was deposed and then excluded from membership in the House at the
beginning of the 90th Congress, in February 1967. Carl Dewey Perkins, a
Kentucky Democrat, became chairman and stayed until his death in Au-
gust 1984. Augustus F. Hawkins, Democrat of California, succeeded
Perkins as chairman, followed by William D. Ford, Democrat of Michigan,
in 1991.
Of all the committees in the U.S. Congress, the House Committee on
Education and Labor is one of the most fascinating. It is important in the
policy process as the authorizing committee for major legislative programs
involving issues such as labor, manpower, poverty, school lunch, and other
aid to education. Its style, along with its importance, intrigues the student
of congressional committees. It is fractious. It is raucous. It has had colorful
leadership throughout its history. It authorizes big-money programs and
subscribes least to Sam Rayburn's philosophy of "to get along, go along."
Education and Labor epitomizes not only the fundamental party and
liberal-conservative dichotomies but those aspects of the legislative process
that reflect the divisions in society. It is never dull. It might be described as
the naughty child of Congress. Some committees conform and act in the
prescribed fashion. They are concerned with their images in Congress
(Fenno 1973;Manley 1970). But Education and Labor tends to be rebellious
and sometimes rambunctious. Neither the committee nor its membership is
House-broken. It acts unconventionally, and this unconventional behavior
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has come to be expected of it. Perhaps it is even institutionalized. The
consensus among scholars who have studied Education and Labor is that it
is a highly partisan "policy-oriented" panel that exhibits little integration.
Education and Labor probably is the most frequently employed example
when these characteristics are discussed.
Cross-committee studies, such as Fenno's (1973), have shown that
because of the loyalties and linkages based on ideological interests that most
members have, the Education and Labor Committee is unusual in the
extent to which it is divided along partisan and interest group lines. Eenno
treated Education and Labor in his exploration of member goals, environ-
mental constraints, strategic premises, decision-making processes, and
decisions of six I louse committees. Me found the Education and Labor
Committee to be characterized by the member goal of making good public
policy, high partisanship, and a high degree of conflict and as being
pluralistic and party-led. It is the type of committee identified by "its
extra—House-oriented decision rules, the permeability of its decision-
making processes, the de-emphasis on committee expertise, its lack of
success on the House floor, the absence of any feeling of group identifica-
tion, and the relatively higher ratio of non-member to member satisfaction
with its performance" (Fenno 1973, 278-79). Munger and Fenno (1962),
Fenno (1973), and Manlev (1965, 1970) began the tradition of depicting
Education and Labor as the model of partisan conflict and low integration
when an example of the antithesis of a well-integrated committee was
needed. Feig's mathematical models (1979, 1981) substantiated Manley's
and Fenno's findings concerning integration and partisanship on this com-
mittee.
Smith and Deering (1984), like Fenno (1973), characterized Education
and Labor as a policy committee in their cross-sectional analysis of the
significance of changes in committee environments and in formal struc-
tures and procedures. Members were motivated by their interests in the
policies under the committee's jurisdiction. The authors noted that the
committee's appeal among members diminished after the 1960s, a decade
when its programs were at the top of presidential agendas. The protection
of established programs became the committee's focus. Unekis and Rie-
selbach (1984) studied Education and Labor as part of their study of the
politics of congressional committees based on committee roll calls. Re-
searching participation-specialization, partisanship, and leadership, they
depicted Education and Labor as the epitome of a policy-oriented commit-
tee. Parker and Parker (1985) used Education and Labor in their investiga-
tion of factions in committees as exhibited by voting behavior on committee
roll calls taken between 1973 and 1980. They characterized the committee
as having a bipolar factional alignment and as being dominated by party-
led policy coalitions. They identified organized labor as one of the most
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important constituency groups operating in Education and Labor's envi-
ronment.
If committees and subcommittees are the most influential decision
makers, as has been posited for years in the literature on Congress (see
Wilson 1885; Galloway 1953a; Goodwin 1970; Fenno 1973; Davidson
1981b; Smith and Deering 1984), why is so little "known about the ways
that committee leaders operate and the effects that their actions generate?"
(Unekis and Rieselbach 1983, 251). Although a number of scholars have
examined the seniority system and the acquisition of leadership positions
(Follett 1896; Brown 1922; Peabody 1966, 1976; Hinckley 1969, 1970,
1971; Parker 1977; Parker and Parker 1979; Bach 1984), only a few have
addressed the exercise of committee leadership directly (Jones 1968; Man-
ley 1969; Parker 1977; Berg 1978; Unekis and Rieselbach 1983; McCormick
1985; Evans 1986; Strahan 1990; Evans 1991). Their studies have focused
on a number of leadership facets—power, style, voting patterns, and the
impact of reform. Some have examined a single chairman; others have done
comparative studies.
Huitt (1965), Jones (1968), Manley (1969) and Evans (1986) concen-
trated on the exercise of power. Huitt, in discussing "ideal types of
chairmen," noted the importance of committee leaders in the internal
distribution of power in the Senate. Jones used the examples of Speaker
Joseph Cannon (R-IL) and Rules Committee chairman Howard W. Smith
(D-VA) to analyze excessive use of leadership power and its consequences
when such power was independent of the leader's procedural majorities.
Manley examined the influence of Wilbur Mills, chairman of the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, conceptualizing leadership via the chairman's
relationship to his committee colleagues. Drawing on literature from psy-
chology, he studied five bases of a chairman's influence—expertise, legit-
imacy, rewards, reference, and sanctions—and determined that Mills was
effective in all five areas. Evans compared leadership in four Senate com-
mittees to determine whether influence over legislation was widely dis-
persed or concentrated in the hands of formal leaders. He found senators in
leadership positions more likely to influence the process and outcome,
particularly at the bill-drafting stage.
Bibby and Davidson (1967), Evans (1986, 1991), and Burns (1978)
looked at leadership styles. Comparing the styles of two chairmen, Bibby
and Davidson argued that "the legislative styles of chairmen are varied, but
they dramatically affect the capacity of committees to perform legislative
functions such as oversight" (173). They concluded that the styles of the
two chairmen gave credence to the dictum that "committee functioning
depends heavily on the chairman's style of leadership" (179). In com-
parative studies of leadership styles, Evans examined the role of formal
leadership in Senate committees to determine how leadership influences
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the outcome of bills. He studied the behavior of committee leaders, the
effects of their actions, and how and why their tactics varied in an effort to
determine whether influence over legislation was widely dispersed or
concentrated in the hands of chairmen and ranking minority members.
Although Burns paid tribute to committee leaders in his landmark study of
leadership, he dealt with them only peripherally.
In an effort to construct a theory of committee leadership and to
explain the causes and consequences of leadership patterns, Unekis and
Rieselbach (1983) scrutinized committee roll calls for nine committees to
identify patterns of committee leadership in voting alignments. They
found leadership stances to be related to the committee's partisanship,
integration, and success on the House floor. They determined that the
chairman's exercise of authority must be consistent with the goals of
committee members and the committee's decision-making premises and
structures.
Parker (1977), Berg (1978), Rieselbach and Unekis (1981-82), and
Strahan (1990) studied the relation of congressional reforms to committee
leadership. In the aftermath of the automatic election of chairmen by the
House Democratic Caucus, Parker looked at the criteria members used
in evaluating their committee leaders. He determined that concern for
the functioning of the committee, not personal factors, was the underly-
ing basis for the election of committee leaders. Berg questioned how
different the new chairmen were from the ones they replaced and asked
if the changes affected committee performance. Studying committee out-
puts from the 93d (1973-74) to the 94th (1975-76) Congress, he found
little difference, suggesting that the new chairmen were not markedly
different from those they replaced. Rieselbach and Unekis, studying the
same four committees as Berg, examined formal committee leaders to see
how they fit into the voting structure of the committee. They used roll
call votes to determine if leadership style had changed and if that made
any difference in the committee's performance. On three of the four
committees, they found that leadership change was symbolic. On the
Committee on Ways and Means, however, committee politics shifted
somewhat. But the effects of the chairmanship change were mediated by
external factors, such as enlargement and turnover, changes in House
Democratic Caucus rules, and a shift in the committee's agenda. Strahan's
case study of the Committee on Ways and Means assessed the effects of
reforms on the committee and compared the leadership styles of Al Ull-
man (D-OR) and Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL). He concluded that "leader-
ship proved to be a more important factor than one might have anticipated
from the emphasis that has been placed in recent years on contextual
factors as the primary determinants of leaders' styles and their effec-
tiveness" (171).
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Purpose and Theory of This Study
With the hope of contributing to the understanding of Congress and its
committees, especially their leadership and development, this study ex-
amines the Committee on Education and Labor as an organization as well as
a component of the Congress. The study focuses particularly on committee
leadership. Political scientists have yet to develop an accepted theory of
political leadership. As Cooper and Brady noted, "It remains a topic in
which our intellectual grasp falls far short of our pragmatic sense of the im-
pacts leaders have on organizational operations and performance" (1981a,
411). The best characterization to date is Neustadt's argument (1960, 1990)
that presidential power is the power to persuade. This statement can be
extrapolated to apply to all political leadership, including congressional
committee leadership. After the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon,
congressional leaders were left with few ways to compel compliance with
their wishes. Over the years several sets of reforms in the House stripped
committee chairmen of many of their institutional resources, leaving them
to rely largely on their own persuasive abilities. As Burns (1978) empha-
sized in discussing the transactional nature of legislative leadership, they
have had to depend on reciprocity, brokerage, and exchange. As the
current study shows, to play this game committee chairmen have had to
replace or augment a diminished set of institutional prerogatives with
whatever personal resources they could bring to the job. They have been
most successful when they relied on their personal abilities to persuade
rather than on techniques of control.
The other focus of this study is committee development via its com-
position, structure and operations, and function. On the theory that con-
gressional committees develop much as do other organizations and that the
operations of their leaders are important to their functioning, the present
study chronicles the evolution of the committee and the leadership of three
chairmen over three decades. It is the study of three who made an evolu-
tion. It examines the committee's major characteristics, delves into its
development, and analyzes the changes in its setting, composition, voting
patterns, structure and operations, work load, functions, and leadership
under the respective chairmen.
To advance understanding of congressional committees and committee
leadership, specific findings must be subsumed under more general state-
ments. One way of doing so is to draw questions and variables from
established theory, such as organization theory. A number of scholars have
approached the study of Congress from this perspective (Polsby 1968;
Froman 1968; Cooper 1977, 1981; Cooper and Brady 1981a, 1981b; and
Davidson and Oleszek 1976). The current study will draw questions and
some variables from organization theory but will not rely on it exclusively.
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Congressional committees are not business organizations, but democratic
institutions that cannot be controlled in the same manner as private entities.
They have to rely on democratic values precluding anything but a limited
tolerance for hierarchy; an inability to control the size or character of the
work force, the work load, or output goals; little ability to base decision
making on technology; and constraints on identifying or merging institu-
tional and individual interests (Cooper and Brady 1981b, 998). What is
more, they have no "bottom line" in the economic sense.
In recent years some political scientists have viewed leadership as being
molded by the institutional context and having little independent influence
on the institution. This view plays up organizational context and down-
plays the influence of personal factors (Cooper and Brady 1981a; Jones
1981; Sinclair 1983; Rohde and Shepsle 1987; Little 1991).
The present author disagrees with organization theory on this view of
leadership and argues that committee leaders often determine how the
committee operates and in some cases its structure, its function, and the
character of its outputs. Anyone who has worked or participated in an
organization knows that who is at the helm can make a great difference in
the operation of the organization, its relations with its internal and external
environments, and its success. Of course institutional context constrains
committee leadership, but other elements are influential also. A chairman
brings his personality and background with all its prejudices to bear on a
committee. How he sees his job and how (or whether) he behaves within
those limits affect the committee—and sometimes the House.
Although congressional committees are parts of larger organizations—
the Congress itself and either the House of Representatives or the Senate—
there can be little doubt that they themselves fall into the general category
of organizations. Every committee has a formal structure. Every committee
has a set of operating procedures, well defined or not. Every committee has
a formal leader and at least a minimal hierarchy. And every committee has
some standard by which it can be judged.
A congressional standing committee is much more an organization than
just a group. It is more formal. It has statutory standing. It has continuity
and formal powers. It has boundaries. If, as Miles defined it, an organiza-
tion is a "coalition of interest groups, sharing a common resource base,
paying homage to a common mission, and depending upon a larger context
for its legitimacy and development" (1980, 5), then congressional commit-
tees certainly fit the bill. They also conform to Haas and Drabek's char-
acterization of an organization as "a relatively permanent and relatively
complex discernible interaction system" (1973, 2). Certainly standing con-
gressional committees are relatively permanent and relatively complex, and
they are interaction systems. Cooper (1977, 140) broadly conceptualizes
organizations as rational, goal-oriented entities created and structured to
10 Congressional Committee Chairmen
perform certain functions or tasks. As such, committees are vehicles set up
to satisfy Congress's needs for division of labor; each is designed to deal in a
particular area of legislation, although many of these jurisdictions overlap.
Considering the Committee on Education and Labor as an organization
does not deny its uniqueness. There is only one such committee in the
House of Representatives or in all of Congress. It has had a distinct set of
members over the years. No other committee has had exactly (or even
approximately) the same membership. No other committee has had the
same leaders. No other committee in the House, with the possible excep-
tion of the Rules Committee, has had to deal with the issues under this
committee's jurisdiction. Over the years education and labor issues have
proved to be some of the most controversial matters handled in Congress,
although certainly other committees have jurisdiction over divisive legisla-
tion. Because of its composition and the issues under its jurisdiction, this
committee has had to endure a unique set of pressures and internal turmoil.
More important for theory building, however, are the elements that
this committee shares with other standing committees. All congressional
standing committees are creatures of the Congress and would not exist
without the statutory approval of Congress. They all have similar struc-
tures, with defined leadership consisting of a majority party chairman and a
ranking member from the minority party. For purposes of organizing the
committee and distributing power, committees are administered by and
mainly composed of members of the political party holding the majority of
seats in the appropriate chamber, with the remaining vacancies filled by
members of the minority. All committees have some kind of operating
procedures. They are all subject to the rules, procedures, norms, and
reforms of the parent chamber, and all abide by some semblance of the
seniority system. As part of the larger organization of the Congress,
committees share with it an institutional context or environment. They are
subject to the same constraints that the Congress faces, though these
limitations are exaggerated in committees. In many ways, this institutional
context affects developmental patterns in committees, as environment does
in other organizations, although individual committee leaders have been
responsible for a great deal of change in committee structure, operations,
and output.
Committee development is influenced by a number of factors, in-
cluding committee leadership, the committee's environment, the way the
committee adapts to environmental demands, the composition of the com-
mittee, the salience of the issues under the committee's jurisdiction, and the
committee's function. This study addresses the influence of these factors on
development.
Neither political science nor organization theory has paid much atten-
tion to the role of the chairman in determining changes in congressional
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committees. But by virtue of his official position, the chairman is more
important than any other member of the committee. His visibility, his
seniority, his influence with both members and the House leadership, his
orientation, his perquisites, his control of the agenda, and his experience
contribute to his dominance. Only a few studies have investigated the
relationship between the chairman and his committee (Manley 1969;
Rieselbach and Unekis 1981-82; Unekis and Rieselbach 1983, 1984; Bibby
and Davidson 1967, 1972; Evans 1986; Strahan 1990). The current study
examines the role of the chairman in shaping the structure and operations,
function, and output of the committee. It seeks to rectify the previous
neglect of the chairman as an important actor in committee politics. It tries
to determine to what extent each chairman was a unique leader and had a
different impact. It attempts to examine leadership within an institutional
context by considering the chairman in conjunction with his committee and
in light of developments internal to and external to the committee.
From organization theory comes an emphasis on the environment as an
independent variable or catalyst in determining changes in an institution.
Cooper and Brady (1981a) argued that institutional context determines
leadership style. Sinclair maintained that "the context of environment
shapes and constrains leadership styles and strategies" (1983, 3). Downs
(1967) emphasized that exogenous factors rather than internal develop-
ments are the primary agents of change in organizations. He proposed that
in early life, all bureaus must seek external sources of support to survive.
Cooper (1977) discussed the environment of the House as having two
primary segments, the electorate and the executive establishment. They
overlap to form the functional environment to which Congress must answer
in action and consent or else face loss of its domain, which is defined by its
actual outputs. Little (1991) viewed the nature of legislative leadership as a
function of the particular environment in which that leadership is per-
formed. The present study considers the environment as a major factor in
changes in the Committee on Education and Labor over the years, but not
the only determinant.
Another contributor to the way committees develop is the manner
in which they adapt to demands from the environment. Davidson and
Oleszek (1976, 39) argued that the roles of both internal and external
environments are sources of stimuli for change and that an organization
must adapt to both to survive. This study addresses the question of how the
Committee on Education and Labor adapted to internal and external
pressures. Did it develop in stages or by a smooth, incremental evolution?
Did its structure become more complex, its operations more decentralized,
and its members more reliant on formal rules to govern its procedures, as
organization theory would posit? Did all aspects of the committee—such as
procedures, work load, and voting behavior—change, or did some remain
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stable? This study argues that the committee developed in stages, roughly
concurrent with the tenures of various chairmen. Its structure became more
complex and more decentralized, and its members relied increasingly on
formal rules to govern committee procedures. Procedures changed as the
committee adapted to its internal and external environments and, par-
ticularly, to the behavior of its chairmen. Its work load shifted both in
quantity and importance, and its voting behavior varied from chairman to
chairman.
Committee composition is another variable affecting committee devel-
opment. In his studies on linkages between elections and policy changes,
Brady noted that critical elections, which replace large segments of both
houses with members not wedded to the old ways of doing business,
provide the conditions necessary for "clusters of policy changes" (1978, 81).
They diminish the two most important impediments to party government
in the House: party-constituency cross-pressuring and the nature of the
committee system. Critical elections enable the building of partisan major-
ities capable of enacting clusters of policy change. They also disrupt the
continuity of committees by drastic turnovers in membership and lead-
ership. Majority party voting and cohesion rise as a result of a realignment,
enabling the new majority to enact major policy changes. Subsequently,
Brady and Sinclair (1984) discussed whether replacement of members,
conversion of their issue positions, or both allowed the passage of nonincre-
mental legislation in the early to mid-1960s. For some issues, such as federal
aid to education, replacement was clearly responsible. For others, such as
the poverty program, conversion was important. They also found that both
replacement and conversion played roles in the building of majorities to
pass major legislation.
Elements of the Brady and the Brady and Sinclair theories are relevant
to committee development; however, there need not be a critical election to
change committee composition. It is true that policy output and operations
of a congressional committee may change only incrementally unless the
composition of the committee shifts and the issues before it become salient
enough to allow these changes to occur. Nevertheless, a shift in committee
composition does not necessarily have to be the result of a party realign-
ment. There only has to be a replacement of old members seeking to
maintain the status quo by new members wanting change or an augmenta-
tion of the committee by the addition of new members. This can be
accomplished by "packing" or "stacking" a committee with members pre-
disposed to change in one direction or another or by attrition of members
opposing change and their replacement with members in favor of change.
During the periods under consideration, the regional and ideological com-
position of the Committee on Education and Labor altered significantly,
contributing to the policy shifts that occurred. For example, membership
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changes in the early to mid-1960s helped alter the character and scope of
committee policy outputs from the Barden to the Powell years. In addition,
a chairmanship change enabled previously bottled up major legislation to
reach the floor.
The salience of the issues in a committee's dominion also affects a
committee's development. Salience could be the result of increasing unease
in the electorate over a particular problem, or it could be dramatized by an
event, such as an enemy satellite launch, a Supreme Court decision, a coal
mine disaster, a strike, or a war. Other events or developments may redirect
public attention, highlighting issues whose salience supersedes those before
a particular committee. These external developments largely determine the
pool of issues from which the committee selects its agenda. Whether that
agenda is pursued actively, ignored, or blocked is determined, to a large
degree, by the chairman.
Congressional committees, like other organizations, seek to increase or
alter their jurisdictions to make up for slack in the salience of existing
markets. They diversify. They adapt to shifts in the importance of the is-
sues under their jurisdictions in attempts to maintain their domains. If the
major issues under their jurisdiction are decided or are no longer salient, the
committees are in danger of being reorganized or possibly eliminated.
Education and Labor essentially followed the pattern outlined by organiza-
tion theory in diversifying its jurisdiction. The salience of the issues before
it ebbed and flowed, and the committee responded accordingly.
One of the coping mechanisms organizations use is a change in func-
tion. The function of Education and Labor changed concurrently with each
chairman and as the salience of issues under its jurisdiction waxed and
waned. It responded to internal and external pressures, particularly the
president's agenda, the increasing budget deficit, the interests of the chair-
men, and the goals of the committee's membership, which all affected the
salience of matters under the committee's jurisdiction and the committee's
function.
Approach and Methods
This study employs both a historical and a comparative analysis of the
Committee on Education and Labor from 1951 to 1984. The historical
approach provides an opportunity for assessing the impacts of certain
external and internal developments—reforms, changes in leadership, and
changes in membership—on the committee. The longitudinal comparison
of the development of the committee during various periods of its existence
facilitates comparison of committee development with what scholars as-
cribe to organizations generally. Although not pretending to be the firm
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basis for general theories, the case study can offer important contributions
to the formation of general propositions and thus to theory building (Lij-
phart 1971). Its details supply the foundation for later, broader generaliza-
tions and analysis of committee similarities and differences. It also can
furnish warning signals for avoiding miscalculations in future work.
Several characteristics drawn from the study of organizations and of
Congress will form the analytical framework for this study: setting, com-
position, voting patterns, structure, work load, function, and leadership.
Changes in each of these characteristics are examined from the 1950s to the
1980s, with the time periods divided according to the tenures of the
chairmen. Only those chairmen who served at least two consecutive terms
in that position will be considered; thus the chairmanships of Fred Hartley
(R-NJ), 1947-48; John Lesinski, Sr. (D-MI), 1949-50; and Samuel McCon-
nell, Jr. (R-PA), 1953-54, will be omitted. Only the legacies they left the
committee are discussed, such as major labor legislation coming out of the
committee during Republican-controlled Congresses. These men were not
chairmen long enough to establish discernible patterns of leadership or
differences in functions and structure. In short, there are not enough data
for these periods. Analysis in this study begins with the period from 1951 to
1960, when Graham Arthur Barden (D-NC) served as chairman, with the
exception of 1953-54. The second period covers the years between 1960 and
1967, when Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY) chaired the committee. The
era of Carl Dewey Perkins (D-KY) from 1967 to 1984 constitutes the third
time period.
Several questions derived from the literature on organizations, com-
mittees, leadership, and Education and Labor in particular are asked: What
was the role of the chairmen in shaping the structure, operations, function,
and output of the committee? To what extent did each employ a unique
leadership and have a different impact? Did the committee change dramat-
ically from Barden to Powell to Perkins? How did each chairman get the
committee to do what he wanted? What was it about each chairman that
made him effective or ineffective? To what extent did the committee reflect
the chairman's leadership?
The discussion of committee leadership is aimed at showing how the
chairman related to the rest of the committee and how well he fit the needs
of the committee at the appropriate time. In an attempt to answer the
questions, this study will treat the orientation of the chairman and his
leadership. The chairman's orientation, or the way he thought about the
committee and its legislation, is inferred from examination of several
aspects of each chairman: background, constituencies, reputation among
his constituents, ideological leanings, partisanship, predisposition on cer-
tain controversial issues, voting behavior in committee, and victories in the
committee. Each chairman's ideological leanings are gleaned by his scores
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on measures compiled by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA),
Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), and the AFL-CIO's Commit-
tee on Political Education (COPE), as well as various labor union measures
available in the 1950s when others were not. His partisanship is measured
by his party-unity scores compared with those of the other committee
members and by how often he voted with his party. The chairman's
predisposition on controversial issues is taken from interviews, biogra-
phies, and scholarly or newspaper articles. Constituency characteristics are
drawn from data in Congressional Quarterly publications, interviews,
biographies, and letters and articles on each chairman. Other information
concerning his orientation was gleaned from interviews with fellow mem-
bers and committee personnel.
The chairman's leadership is a different matter. The study is con-
cerned with how he operated—the way he used his resources. Burns (1978,
361) who defined leadership as a form of power, characterized the position
of the chairman as providing a bank of resources that could be used as
political currency. This currency is valuable in the committee as well as in
the House. The chairman's leadership is in part based on his power, which
Burns depicted as having two essentials: motive and resource. Motive is
almost impossible to measure, since often it is not announced and must be
inferred from other sources. In the present study, the discussions of the
chairmen's backgrounds and orientations provide hints about their motiva-
tions, as do some of their actions (e.g., Barden's blocking techniques).
A chairman's resources are both institutional and personal. As Wilson
and Jillson noted, "Legislative leadership must be rooted in institutional
rules and procedures if it is to be sustained over time" (1989, 5). While each
chairman's personal resources are unique and presumably long-lasting, his
institutional resources may change over time. The present study considers
the chairman's reliance on both types of resources. In that sense, it employs
both the personal and the contextual perspectives of leadership. Institu-
tional prerogatives include the chairman's use of subcommittees, conduct of
meetings and hearings, influence over the committee's agenda, treatment of
the minority, dispensation of rewards and sanctions, and control over the
budget. Personal resources include the chairman's expertise on the rules
and subject matter of the committee, his reputation among his peers, his
political acumen, and whatever other assets he may have brought to the
office. Institutional and personal resources then are considered together in
terms of which were used more frequently and effectively. Much of the
data concerning leadership come from interviews with members and staff
as well as books and articles about these men. Chairman Powell wrote an
autobiography, and Chairman Perkins was interviewed personally for this
study. Consistent data on each chairman were not always available.
In considering the degree to which the committee reflected the chair-
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man's leadership, committee function is examined. A word of explanation
is appropriate about the use of the term function. It is difficult to pin down as
applied to congressional committees. Huitt (1954) discussed a committee's
function as guardian of the public interest in the face of competing interests.
He also noted the committee's fact-finding function, its role as a court used
to judge which special interest will prevail. He mentioned the committee as
a public forum for debate from which the general interest will derive. Other
functions include serving as a podium for the dissemination of information,
a "propaganda channel," and a "catharsis for frustrations and grievances"
(Truman 1951, 372-77). The most obvious function of a committee is the
consideration of legislative matters that come under its jurisdiction.
In the present study the term function is interpreted broadly. The
committee's function is determined by the external and internal environ-
ments of the committee, depending on whose view of the general interest
prevails. The prevailing sense of what is in the public interest is considered
to be the committee's function. It is a general gauge of why the committee
acted as it did. The function can be gleaned from what the committee does,
whether it blocks or facilitates certain kinds of legislation, disseminates
information, reinforces existing opinions, or provides a stage for propa-
ganda. It is determined by the actions of the committee chairman, in
particular, and also by the membership. How influential factions on the
committee regard the committee's agenda is, in a sense, its function. To
investigate changes in function, this study will determine whether the
committee's purpose and actions were different under each chairman.
What is the relationship, if any, between any shift in the regional and
ideological composition of the committee and policy outputs? If Brady's
critical election theory (1978) is correct as it relates to this committee,
substantial evidence of regional and ideological shifts should lead to
changes in the policy output of the committee. Other variables include the
committee leadership, the party ratios, executive interest, and public opin-
ion. The composition of the membership will be gauged by the patterns of
regional representation of the members, by their ideological leanings, by
their seniority, and in terms of where members went after service on
Education and Labor (i.e., whether they transferred to other committees or
served their entire congressional careers on this committee). Regional
representation is shown by comparing the geographic makeup of the com-
mittee with that of the House. Seniority is discussed by examining the
amount of time members had spent in Congress and on the committee,
including the proportions of new committee members and freshmen.
The ideological makeup of the committee is measured by interest
group scores. This study takes advantage of ADA scores, COPE scores or
other labor support scores, and ACA scores. These ratings were available
regularly after 1960 and irregularly during the 1950s. In the Barden years,
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the ratings were published as the number of votes each member cast in
accordance with the group's position. During the Powell and Perkins years,
these interest groups changed their reporting procedures to the percentage
of votes each member cast in accordance with each group's stance.
In its adaptation to both external and internal pressures, how did the
committee develop—in stages or through smooth, incremental transitions?
Did the structure become more complex, more reliant on formal rules, and
more decentralized, as organization theory would posit? How did the
structure differ from chairman to chairman? How did reforms imposed by
the House and by the Democratic Caucus in the 1970s affect the commit-
tee's structure? Did all aspects of the committee's structure and operations
change, or did some remain stable? Did procedures become more demo-
cratic? Did work load increase or decrease? Did voting patterns—cohesion
and partisanship—change? If so, how? To answer these questions, several
variables will be examined: structure, work load, and voting patterns.
Structural features of committees can be derived from measures of
salient structural characteristics applied to the House (Cooper 1981). In the
present study, committee structure is examined by exploring the existence
of, changes in, and reliance on the written rules, which denote formalism;
measures of the physical configuration of components, which illustrate the
degree of organizational elaboration; and the reliance on subcommittees
with specified jurisdictions. Committee structure then is discussed in
relation to its degree of centralization. The relevant aspects of structure are
examined for each chairman's tenure.
The work load of Congress and its committees is hard to pin down
because there are so many aspects of it, many of them not easily measura-
ble, quantitatively or not. In this study, it is gauged by the number of
hearings held in full committee and in subcommittees and by the number of
bills the committee reports. Other bills considered but not successfully
reported also are discussed on occasion. In addition, the numbers of bills
referred to the committee are discussed. Despite frequent use (Galloway
1953a, 1956; Mackenzie 1981; Davidson 1986), this measure has a number
of problems. It might be effective after the 1969 advent of multiple spon-
sorship, but not for those years when only one sponsor per bill was allowed,
unless duplicates are counted. From 1969 to 1978, up to twenty-five
members could cosponsor a bill (House Rules, 96th Cong., sec. 854, rule 22,
p. 549). In a 1978 rules change, the House allowed unlimited sponsorship,
effectively reducing the number of measures introduced (Davidson 1986,
8).
The Committee on Education and Labor has had the reputation of
being noncohesive and highly partisan for most of its existence (see Masters
1961; Fenno 1962; Munger and Fenno 1962; Manley 1965; Pressman 1966;
Boiling 1968; Morrow 1969; Dyson and Soule 1970; Fenno 1973; Ripley
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1978; Ostrom 1979; Harris and Hain 1983; Unekis and Rieselbach 1984;
Smith and Deering 1984; Parker and Parker 1985; Smith 1986). With the
exception of a few scholars who have taken advantage of committee roll calls
beginning in the 1970s (Unekis and Rieselbach 1984; Parker and Parker
1985), no one has been able to show conclusively that the committee in fact
was partisan and that it lacked cohesion or "integration," as it is often called
in the literature.
The present study examines all recorded roll calls taken in Education
and Labor between 1951 and 1984, with a few exceptions. Roll calls and
minutes for the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress (1953-54) and for
1957 were not available. Rice Index of Cohesion Scores (Rice 1928), which
are the percentage of yea votes minus the percentage of nay votes cast on
each roll call, are calculated for every roll call and averaged by term. The
average Rice Index Scores show the extent to which members actually
voted together in committee—whether they voted cohesively or not, as has
been alleged but not proven in previous research. When at least 70 percent
of the committee votes together, minimal cohesion is deemed to be present.
The 70-percent minimum yields a Rice Index Score of 40 or above.
The degree of partisanship, often seen as another important variable in
the operation of committees (e.g., Matthews 1973; Manley 1965, 1970;
Dyson and Soule 1970; Fenno 1973; Parker and Parker 1979; Feig 1981;
Unekis and Rieselbach 1984), is measured as well. Scholars often relate it to
the degree of integration (Fenno 1962, 1973; Manley 1965; Feig 1981). In
the present study, the degree of partisanship is determined by three meas-
ures: the percentage of party votes in committee, House party-unity scores,
and Rice Index Scores applied to committee roll calls and controlled for
party.
Partisanship frequently has been conceived of as the proportion of
times that Democrats vote with Democrats and Republicans vote with
Republicans, though the 90-percent criterion has been used also (Brady,
Cooper, and Hurley 1979). In the present study, the degree of partisanship
is measured by the percentage of committee roll calls on which at least 70
percent of Democrats voting opposed at least 70 percent of the voting
Republicans. A simple majority measure is not adequate because on many
occasions a bare majority of Democrats opposes a bare majority of Republi-
cans, thereby appearing as a party split but in reality being nonpartisan.
The 90-percent benchmark is too high for this committee, particularly in its
early days when one or two Democrats voted consistently with the Repub-
licans against the rest of their own party.
Party-unity scores for committee members are examined to provide
some measure of party support outside of committee. These scores measure
the percentage of House party-unity roll calls on which each member voted
in agreement with a majority of his party. Party-unity roll calls are those on
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which a majority of one party opposes a majority of the other party. Failure
to vote lowers party-unity scores. Not only do political scientists make use
of these scores (e.g., Matthews 1973; Sinclair 1983; Hinckley 1971), but
members of Congress use them to determine which members supported the
party on votes the party leadership deemed important. In the late 1980s the
House Democratic Caucus relied on party-unity scores in judging whom to
support in the contest for chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.
One candidate, the sitting chairman, had more seniority, and the other had
a far better record of party support. In the end, after threat of deposition,
the sitting chairman prevailed (interview, member).
The Rice Index of Cohesion applied to committee roll calls and con-
trolled for party is another measure of partisanship. As is the case for the
determination of party votes, minimal partisan cohesion is present when at
least 70 percent of the members of one party vote together, thus yielding a
minimum Rice Index Score of 40.
Although committee evolution is a continuous process, this framework
allows comparisons of the committee's setting, composition, voting pat-
terns, structure and operations, jurisdiction, work load, functions, and
leadership at different periods. It is useful for comparing the committee of
the 1950s with the committee of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Moreover,
these questions and variables could prove useful for comparing a cross
section of committees. By examining these variables at different times, one
can make inferences about the committee's organizational development
and, possibly, what will be the case in the future. The study includes an
analysis of the overall pattern of development of the committee.
The Committee during
the Barden Years
A successful congressional committee chairmanship depends, in part, on
the cards that the chairman was dealt in the game of leadership. These
include the committee's environment, its membership, and the rules under
which it operates. The chairman's own leadership skills are his ace in the
hole. When Graham Barden, a conservative North Carolina Democrat,
picked up his cards as chairman in 1950, the game of the modern committee
on Education and Labor was just under way.
Setting
National security issues, particularly involving the Korean War and its
aftermath, dominated much of the politics of the 1950s. Communist fear
inspired by traumatic foreign affairs events carried over into the domestic
arena. As a result of the convictions of eleven leaders of the U.S. Commu-
nist party for conspiracy to teach and to advocate the violent overthrow of
the U.S. government (Congress and the Nation 1965, 1656), the Alger Hiss
treason affair, and McCarthyism, which prospered until Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R-WI) was censured by the Senate in 1954, public and congres-
sional attention converged on the Communist threat.' The country suf-
fered repercussions of the "Red scare" for years. The Soviet launch of
Sputnik in 1957 intensified the fear of communism. Americans were
shocked and chagrined that such a "backward" nation had beat them into
space. Sputnik highlighted educational deficiencies in U.S. public schools.
Labor issues also charged the environment. President Harry Truman's
1952 seizure of the steel mills to thwart a strike that he believed threatened
national defense heightened public awareness of labor difficulties (ex-
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ecutive order 10340, April 8, 1952). And in the early 1950s television
emerged as a prominent factor in congressional activities and in national
politics. First used in the Senate, it provided a basis for later Education and
Labor investigations. Throughout 1951 Senator Estes Kefauver's (D-TN)
subcommittee held televised hearings on organized crime, exposing na-
tional criminal organizations that made immense illegal profits, influenced
local politicians, and bought protection. The Kefauver hearings were the
first opportunity for most Americans to witness congressional activities,
and the hearings attracted widespread attention. So did subsequent hear-
ings by Senator John McClellan (D-AR) in 1957-60 that revealed growing
evidence of widespread abuse of union funds, accelerating the clamor for
labor reform.
Racial discrimination also made headlines, particularly after the Su-
preme Court handed down its Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka deci-
sions. The 1954 decision, which sparked widespread protests and debates,
declared unconstitutional racial segregation in public schools as a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Previously sanctioned
under the separate but equal doctrine of the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision,
dealing with transportation, separate but equal school facilities were de-
clared by the Court to be "inherently unequal." A year later, after hearing
further arguments about the relief to be granted, the Court ordered local
authorities to "make a prompt and reasonable start" and local courts to
"proceed with all deliberate speed" to end segregation in the public schools
(Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, II).
Congress argued federal aid to education issues repeatedly throughout
the decade, but most proposals failed because of race-related issues. The
1957 crisis at Little Rock, Arkansas, intensified the conflict, particularly in
education, although other areas in which discrimination existed, such as
housing, also were in the limelight. President Dwight Eisenhower's action
to enforce a federal court order desegregating Little Rock's Central High
School incited a long-lasting conflict pitting states rights against the federal
government.
At the onset of the decade, Democrat Harry S Truman was in the
White House; however, he did not run again in 195 2. With former supreme
Allied commander in Europe Dwight D. Eisenhower as their candidate,
the Republicans held the presidency from 1952 to 1960, and they controlled
the 83d Congress (195 3-54) as well. Democrats managed to regain control of
both houses of Congress in the 1954 elections, although by small margins.
They won in increasingly large numbers in both the 1956 and 1958 elec-
tions, setting the stage for a return to prominence of the social welfare issues
traditionally emphasized by liberals. The Democratic platform in the 1960
election brought the social issues under the jurisdiction of the Committee
on Education and Labor to a top spot on the agenda.
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While much of the country was attentive to events in the international
arena, the members of Education and Labor were faced with a number of
important and controversial issues that were often so divisive that no
agreement was possible or, in the eyes of some, desirable. The focus of both
education and labor legislation changed over the decade. In the context of
outside events that both hindered and helped their resolution, the 1950s
Committee on Education and Labor haggled over two major education
issues, school construction and general aid to education. The latter had
been stifled for years because of a continuing controversy over whether the
federal government should provide aid to religious and segregated schools.
School construction, one of the few issues on which members could
compromise, occupied much of the committee's time throughout the dec-
ade. Proposals focused primarily on aid to areas overly burdened by
increased enrollments resulting from defense-related federal activities. In
1950 Congress passed two Education and Labor bills, Public Laws 81-815
and 81-874, known as "impacted areas" legislation, that authorized funds
for the construction of elementary and secondary schools and for operating
expenses to local educational agencies in federally impacted areas, such as
those with large federal installations that detracted from the local tax base.
In following years the committee amended and reauthorized this legisla-
tion. These two laws became models for subsequent proposals by the
National Education Association (NEA) for general aid that would provide
substantial assistance to public schools with no federal control provisions
attached (Thomas 1975, 23).
Nearly all of the efforts for general aid to education met with resistance
in the 1950s. From 1951 to 1953 federal aid was considered as an offshoot of
a long-standing argument between the states and the federal government
over "tidelands." At issue was whether the federal government or the
coastal states owned the submerged lands between the low-tide "mark and
the continental shelf. Several members, including Carl Perkins (D-KY),
proposed applying revenues from offshore oil to general aid to education.
Groups interested in guaranteeing that the coastal states controlled the oil
deposits adjacent to their shores opposed these amendments. The House
resolved the issue in favor of the states and omitted oil-for-education
provisions.
The Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education
affected aid to education deliberations for years to come. With its prohibi-
tion against segregation, Brown removed the question of whether Congress
should provide aid to segregated schools as an issue, although southerners
still opposed attaching strings to disbursements of federal money. The
Court's decision fueled the rancorous debate over federal aid to education,
especially in the Education and Labor Committee. Several members re-
fused to vote for aid that did not include segregated schools, and others
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refused to support aid to school districts that had not followed the decree.
Eisenhower's sending of federal troops to Little Rock and his nationaliza-
tion of the Arkansas National Guard in 1957 also hampered efforts at
enacting federal aid to education. The events bolstered Chairman Graham
Barden's arguments that federal aid would result in federal government
interference in local affairs.
Not until federal aid funds could be tied to the national defense was
there any hope of a general aid program passing. Sputnik provided that link,
and as a direct result, Congress enacted the National Defense Education
Act of 1958 (NDEA, P.L. 85-864), a one-billion-dollar school aid program
to improve the teaching of science, mathematics, and foreign languages at
all levels. Proponents capitalized on the widespread impression that Amer-
ican education was inadequate compared with that of the Soviets. By
including the reference to defense in the title, they made it difficult for even
the staunchest opponents of federal aid to vote against the act, because it
was a national security matter.
In sum, external events changed the issues facing the Committee on
Education and Labor throughout the decade of the 1950s. The question of
aid to religious schools that had been so prominent in the 1940s was eclipsed
by the problem of aid to segregated schools. Later, the integration issues,
although not completely dormant, gave way to national security concerns.
Supporters hitched general aid to education to the bandwagon of national
defense in response to perceived Soviet dominance in space. School con-
struction remained a prominent topic throughout the decade.
Although the labor issues facing the committee during the 1950s were
less prominent than those concerning education, they proved fertile turf for
committee efforts and were equally contentious. The most visible issues
involved labor reform, including pleas for repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act,
threatened strikes, and the corruption of labor unions exposed during the
Kefauver and McClellan hearings in the Senate.2 President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills contributed to the public awareness of labor
problems. As pressure for reform gathered steam from televised hearings
and strike threats, conservatives and prounion Democrats in the I louse
joined forces to kill a Senate labor reform bill in the 85th Congress (1957-
58), but the coalition dissolved in the 86th. In addition, proponents of a fair
employment practices committee kept up the heat, but their efforts were
fruitless. Minimum-wage increases frequently were proposed and occa-
sionally passed. Little labor legislation of consequence came out of the
committee, however, until 1959, when, after considerable dickering and
maneuvering, Congress passed a significant and stringent labor reform law,
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, named for two proponents on the
Education and Labor Committee.3
The decade of the 1950s thus seemed to be a pressure cooker for
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education and labor issues. The education laws enacted toward the latter
part of the decade were merely the first trickle of steam escaping through a
valve, before the cover blew off the whole pot. Education issues rolled to a
full boil before additional legislative remedies were enacted in the early to
mid-1960s.
Composition of the Committee
When Graham Barden picked up his cards as chairman, he appeared to
have every right to suppose that his incumbency guaranteed his domination
of the game. But his luck eroded as the years went by, and the House
leadership, hearing a different call, simply stacked his own deck against
him. Barden became a leader of a committee majority that would play his
game no longer.
The political culture of each state helps mold the political behavior of
its voters (Elazar 1984). Although regions are less unified in political culture
than are states, the geographic constituencies committee members repre-
sent are important determinants of their political philosophies. For exam-
ple, as a southern state, North Carolina had been Democratic since the
Civil War, and its citizens' attitudes about racial equality were bound to
influence Barden. While other areas may not have political cultures as
distinct as that of the South, their cultures can influence representatives'
philosophies and voting behavior and ostensibly, committee policies. The
regional makeup of the Education and Labor Committee during the 1950s
differs from that of the later periods, although the urban Middle Atlantic
states enjoyed a predominant proportion of the membership throughout all
three periods (see table 1.1). From 1951 through 1960, when committee size
ranged from twenty-four to thirty, these states averaged over a third of the
committee's membership. On average, almost a third of the Democrats and
more than 40 percent of the Republicans represented Middle Atlantic
states, especially New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The increase
in the proportion of Middle Atlantic representation from the 82d to the 85th
Congresses primarily resulted from the Democratic leadership's efforts to
populate the committee with more liberal Democrats, the reputed influence
of organized labor in the selection of committee Democrats, the Republi-
cans' response to those efforts, and the increasing salience of committee
issues to large urban areas.
The East North Central region, a Republican stronghold during the
1950s, boasted the next-highest representation. A fourth of the Republicans,
a conservative group, came from this area. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Ohio, and Wisconsin all claimed Republican representation on the commit-
tee. Most of the time, few committee Democrats came from the East North
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Table 1.1. Regional Composition of the Committee in 1950s (in percentages)
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Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
82d
4.1
29.1
16.6
12.5
20.8
12.5
0.0
4.1
—
7.1
28.6
0.0
14.3
35.7
14.3
0.0
0.0
—
0.0
30.0
40.0
10.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
10.0
—
83d
]
0.0
32.1
14.3
14.3
14.3
7.1
14.3
3.6
—
E
0.0
23.1
7.7
14.3
30.8
15.4
7.7
0.0
—
E
0.0
40.0
20.0
13.3
0.0
0.0
20.0
6.7
—
Congress
84th
Full Committee
0.0
40.0
10.0
6.7
10.0
6.7
13.3
13.3
—
, & L Democrats
0.0
35.3
5.9
5.9
17.6
11.8
11.8
11.8
—
& L Republicans
0.0
46.2
15.4
7.7
0.0
0.0
15.4
15.4
—
85th
3.4
44.8
10.3
3.4
10.3
6.9
10.3
10.3
—
0.0
37.5
0.0
6.3
18.8
12.5
12.5
12.5
—
7.7
53.8
23.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.7
7.7
—
86th
3.3
36.7
20.0
6.7
10.0
6.7
3.3
13.3
0.0
5.0
35.0
15.0
5.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
40.0
30.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
0.0
Source: Author's calculations from data in Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research. The sums of some columns are not exactly 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Central states. In later years, however, several Democrats who represented
some of the urban areas, such as Chicago and Detroit, and who tended to be
labor union advocates secured assignments to Education and Labor.
During the 1950s the South sent only Democrats to the committee and
few Republicans at all to Congress. Members from Alabama, Georgia,
North Carolina, Texas, and Arkansas held over a fifth of the Democratic
committee seats during the decade but constituted less than a sixth of the
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full committee's membership. As it happened, southerners did control
some of the more powerful seats on Education and Labor, including the
chairmanship. The percentage of southerners on the committee dwindled
from 20 percent (over a third of the Democrats) to 10 percent by the close of
the decade. The other areas of the country had smaller proportions of
Education and Labor membership. The West North Central, Border,
Mountain, and Pacific regions each was represented, on average, by less
than 10 percent of the committee's membership. New Englanders had few
seats on this committee in the 1950s.
The regional makeup of Education and Labor shifted toward the urban
areas during the 1950s. Although the Middle Atlantic states maintained a
substantial edge in representation on the committee throughout the decade,
the balance between the East North Central states and the South was
reversed: As southern and border state representation decreased by about
half over the period, the proportion of East North Central and Pacific
members increased. During the later years of the decade few southerners
either wanted or were appointed to seats on this committee. The Demo-
cratic leadership refused to give the recalcitrant North Carolina chairman
more ammunition than he already had in his war against progressive
legislation.
Committee membership turnover is also important because it can, and
usually does, change the ideological composition of the committee and thus
the chairman's power base. In the case of Education and Labor under
Barden, turnover and new assignments as the result of an enlarged commit-
tee realigned the ideological composition, changing a rather conservative
committee in the early 1950s into one dominated by "liberals" largely
committed to supporting legislation favorable to labor interests and to
federal aid to education, contrary to the wishes of the chairman (interviews;
Boiling 1966, 97).
The changing face of the committee significantly altered the chair-
man's power base over the course of the decade. Nearly a third of the mem-
bership of Education and Labor was new to the committee in the 1950s.
Over a third of the Republicans were first-time appointees in the 1950s, as
were about 28 percent of the Democrats (see table 1.2). Not surprisingly,
the highest proportion of new members came in the Republican 83d
Congress, with half of the committee members either freshmen or new
additions (either transfers or members with dual assignments).
First-term representatives filled two-thirds of the vacant seats on the
committee during the 1950s, comprising over 80 percent of the new Demo-
crats and 54 percent of the new Republicans. About a fifth of all committee
members were freshmen each term. Only 10 percent of the 142 committee
seats were taken by nonfreshman members not previously assigned to the
committee; these were split fairly evenly between Democrats and Republi-
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Table 1.2. Seats, New Members, and Freshmen, 1950s
Number
All members New members Freshmen
Congress Year Full Dems Reps Full Dems Reps Full Dems Reps
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Total
Mean
24
28
30
30
30
14
13
17
17
20
10
15
13
13
10
5 3 2
14 4 10
9 7 2
9 4 5
8 5 3
2
10
7
6
6
1 1
4 6
6 1
3 3
5 1
142
28.4
81
16.2
61
12.2
New members
Full Dems; Reps
45 23
9.0 4.6
Percentage
22
4.4
Full
31 19
6.2 3.!
Freshmen
Dems
12
i 2.5
Reps
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Percentage
of total
20.7
50.0
30.0
30.0
26.7
21.4
30.8
41.2
23.5
25.0
20.0
66.7
15.4
38.5
30.0
8.3
35.7
23.3
20.0
20.0
7.1
30.8
35.3
17.6
25.0
10.0
40.0
7.7
23.1
10.0
31.7 28.4 36.1 21.8 26.8 23.5
Source: Author's calculations from Congressional Directory, 1951-60.
cans. The nonfreshmen new members assigned to the committee in the
1950s either transferred from other committees or were given Education
and Labor in addition to other assignments. All three new nonfreshman
members in the 82d Congress transferred, giving up seats on other commit-
tees—Judiciary and Veterans Affairs for the two Democrats, and Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries for the Republican. Republicans had to draft
members from other committees to fill vacancies on Education and Labor,
particularly in the 83d Congress (and in many subsequent sessions).4 For
several reasons, including the chairman's recalcitrance and the nature of the
issues under the committee's jurisdiction, Democrats had similar difficulty
in attracting members, a major reason that over 80 percent of their vacan-
cies went to freshmen (interviews). Only three Democrats newly assigned
to Education and Labor between 1951 and 1960 were not freshmen—two
in 1951 and one in 1955.
It appears that few members voluntarily gave up assignments on other
committees to serve on Education and Labor; there were few out-and-out
transfers to the committee. Most new members either were freshmen or
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Table 1.3. Percentage of Members Who Left after Each Congress, 1951-1960
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
Year
1951-51
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Full
42.0
25.0
30.0
23.3
26.7
Dems
36.0
23.1
23.5
23.3
25.0
Reps
50.0
26.7
38.5
38.5
30.0
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1951-60.
had multiple assignments. Republican membership on this committee
offered few constituency or power benefits. Members were forced to
consider issues that few could capitalize on and that might even be harmful
to them back home. The preponderance of new Democrats were freshmen.
They were not assigned to the committee unless they were supported by
organized labor or held particularly safe seats (interviews; Masters 1961,
245). Using data on committee transfers, Goodwin (1970, 114-15) and
Ripley (1975, 102) show that Education and Labor ranked twelfth in
attractiveness out of the nineteen House committees from 1949 to 1968.
Electoral defeat proved to be the predominant reason for members'
leaving Education and Labor (see table 1.3). Moreover, not a few members
decided not to stand for reelection to Congress; some retired, and some
pursued other careers. Although a number of members served out their
careers on Education and Labor, seven transferred to other committees,
some taking chairmanships and others just moving to a more desirable
assignment. A few ran for the Senate or for other public offices, and
occasionally a member received a cabinet-level position.
The ideological leanings of members of the Committee on Education
and Labor during the 1950s cannot always be supported by "hard" data. To
show how representative the committee was of its parent body, surrogate
measures based on agreement with several interest groups are used in an
attempt to derive some judgment of the degree of liberalism or conservatism
of committee members relative to all House members. A number of interest
groups identified their congressional supporters and opponents. In the
1950s these groups included the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA),
the Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), the American Federation
of Labor (AFL), the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and the
Committee for Political Education (COPE). Several sets of preselected
votes from which measures could be calculated to gauge the ideological
leanings of members of Congress are available for the decade of the 1950s,
albeit somewhat sporadically.5 Since no interest group published "right"
and "wrong" votes for each year, no one type of score was calculated for
every session, necessitating the use in this study of a variety of group
ratings. The ratings are based on the percentage of "right" votes cast by
The Barden Years
Table 1.4. Interest Group Scores for 1950s
29
Full
Full
HR
E&
HR
E&
HR
E&L
Dems
L Dems
Reps
LReps
AFL
1947-52
35.0
31.9
429
34.6
34.3
24
54.2
29.3
228
54.5
31.4
14
13.1
17.5
200
6.6
10.3
10
CIO
1951-52
40.1
34.0
430
38.3
38.2
24
56.1
35.0
229
57.6
38.3
14
21.7
21.4
201
11.2
14.7
10
ADA
1951-52
39.2
33.6
421
37.7
38.7
24
56.3
33.5
111
59.3
37.0
14
19.1
19.8
193
7.3
9.7
10
Labor
1953-54
41.6
41.5
428
41.5
34.2
28
66.2
37.7
214
72.6
24.3
13
17.0
27.7
217
14.5
8.5
15
ACA
1957-59
43.6
34.0
428
39.8
36.7
30
22.0
18.1
278
15.9
13.7
20
83.5
15.0
150
87.6
11.2
10
ADA
1960
56.3
37.4
430
68.0
37.7
30
72.2
34.6
279
88.9
26.6
20
26.9
21.1
151
26.4
13.9
10
COPE
1959-60
54.6
40.0
431
65.2
41.3
30
71.8
36.4
280
88.7
28.0
20
22.5
22.7
151
18.1
12.2
10
AFL
1947-56
35.2
29.8
428
34.0
43.0
30
52.4
27.9
230
55.1
31.3
17
15.3
16.6
198
6.5
6.8
13
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Source: Author's calculations from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 1951-60.
N is the number of members whose votes were included in the calculations.
each member out of the total number of possible votes, in accordance with
the measuring group's point of view.6 The higher the score on votes chosen
by ADA, COPE, AFL, AFL-CIO, and CIO, the more liberal a member is
assumed to be, since labor union support generally is regarded as the liberal
position. Members with higher ACA scores are considered to lean toward
the conservative end of the ideological spectrum.
Table 1.4 shows the average interest group ratings for House members
and committee members, Democrats and Republicans. For every available
rating, committee Democrats on average ranked as more liberal than did all
House Democrats, with similar degrees of variation until about 1960, when
the committee showed less variation than did the House. By the same
token, committee Republicans averaged more conservative scores than did
all House Republicans, with substantially less variation. During the early
years of the decade, the differences between average scores of House and
committee Democrats were modest. As time passed, the magnitude of the
differences generally increased, as did the size of the Democratic advantage
on the committee, leading to the conclusions that the committee was
becoming more liberal than its parent body and that liberals were repre-
sented disproportionately on the committee. This deduction is reinforced
30 Congressional Committee Chairmen
by the 1960 ADA and 1959-60 COPE scores, on which committee mem-
bers averaged about seventeen points higher than did all House Democrats.
On all the positions deemed to be favorable by liberal interest groups,
committee Republicans scored lower and thus are considered to have been
more conservative than were House Republicans. It is interesting to note
that committee Republicans' scores were most conservative relative to their
House colleagues' on votes taken in the early part of the decade, just before
they won control of the 83d Congress (195 3-54). This difference could have
been caused by several factors. It could have been a function of the issues
chosen by the liberal-oriented ADA and COPE or of the prominence of
Korea and communism as issues. Alternatively, it could have resulted from
the influences of conservative party leaders, such as Senator Robert Taft
(R-OH)'and Representative Charles Halleck (R-IN). The more moderate
Eisenhower forces had not yet come to power. Or it could have been a result
of Democratic control of both houses and the Republican response of
assigning the most conservative Republicans to the committee that dealt
with provocative labor issues—the Taft-Hartley Act, Truman's seizure of
the steel mills, and federal aid to education proposals. To many Republi-
cans and other conservatives, the latter represented federal interference in a
state domain. Over the years, as determined by their average interest group
scores, the committee Republicans generally became more representative
of their parent House population, while the opposite was true for the
Democrats. The high average ACA scores for both committee and House
Republicans on votes cast between 1957 and 1959 indicate that the average
Republican in the House, whether or not on the committee, tended to vote
the conservative position on issues chosen by the ACA.
In the first decade or so of the committee's existence, the Democrats
seemed to reflect fairly closely the overall ideological picture of House
Democrats. On the other hand, Republicans were more extreme, thereby
pulling the whole committee to the right. Until 1959 and 1960 the entire
Education and Labor committee membership, as reflected by all the inter-
est group ratings, mirrored relatively closely the ideological leanings of the
entire House. Except for the 1959-1960 scores, the differences between
average House and committee interest group ratings were small.
The magnitude of the 1959-1960 differences can be attributed to the
House leadership's stacking of Education and Labor with liberal Democrats
to overpower the conservative chairman.7 Beginning in the mid-1950s the
leadership conspired to fill vacant seats that had been held by conservative
committee Democrats with more liberal members. Allegedly the labor
unions had some influence over the selection of Democrats assigned to the
committee. For several years, only those who were reputed to have strong
labor sympathies were assigned (interviews). As Clapp noted, "In 1959 no
one unwilling to take a certain position on labor legislation was permitted to
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gain a seat on the Committee on Education and Labor, though five vacan-
cies existed" (1963, 229). When the southerners retired or were defeated,
more progressive northern members filled the vacancies. The House lead-
ership refused to give the conservative chairman any more natural allies. In
addition, during the late 1950s the leadership increased the size of the
committee, and more liberals were added to accommodate the desire of
House members to facilitate the passage of liberal social legislation, such as
federal aid to education.8
Interest group ratings have shown that conservatives dominated Edu-
cation and Labor in the early part of the decade and that subsequently the
committee was transformed into a bastion of liberalism. Additional data,
research done by other scholars, and interviews with members and staffs
support this characterization. Early COPE and AFL scores reflect that as a
rule Education and Labor members in the early 1950s were no more
disposed to vote for proposals deemed beneficial to organized labor than
was the House as a whole. During the late 1940s and the early to mid-1950s
committee members' labor ratings fairly well represented those of the entire
House, a condition still not overwhelmingly favorable to organized labor.
The situation, which changed after the mid-1950s, was described by
one member: "The AFL-CIO got the committee stacked against Barden,
who was staunchly antilabor. Boiling and Rayburn stacked the committee.
The Speaker controlled Ways and Means, which controlled committee
assignments. In '54, '56, and '58, no one who wasn't solid prolabor was
appointed to the committee. This also was the first time that organized
labor got into the structural process of the committee" (interview). Another
longtime student of Washington politics described the complexion of the
committee as follows: "Only after six years of carefully planned appoint-
ments did the Democratic leadership in the House manage to build a
majority within the Education and Labor Committee that did not share the
anti-labor and anti-education bias of its then chairman" (Cater 1964, 160).
Former Rules Committee chairman Richard Boiling said: "By 1958, the
Democrats so preponderantly controlled the House that the bipartisan
conservative grip on the committee was broken, and a majority was as-
sembled that was favorable to federal aid to education and to unorganized
and organized labor" (1966, 97).
In addition to, and possibly contributing to, its leverage over assign-
ments, organized labor held some powerful purse strings over committee
members. According to the Congressional Quarterly, thirteen out of twenty
Education and Labor Democrats in the 86th Congress received contribu-
tions from labor organizations in 1958 (Weekly Report, April 19, 1959, pp.
512-15). Comparable data for earlier years are not available. Labor also gave
campaign money to Lee Metcalf (D-MT), who was on the committee in
1958 but transferred to Ways and Means the next year. Three New
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Yorkers, Adam Powell, Ludwig Teller, and Herbert Zelenko, did not
receive union funds, nor did New Jersey's Dominick Daniels. Of these
northerners, only Powell faced an opponent who got financial contribu-
tions from labor, and they were minimal. The three southerners, Chairman
Barden (D-NC), Carl Elliott (D-AL), and Phil Landrum (D-GA), also
received no support from labor unions, nor did they offer any to labor at
voting time. All the other Democrats on the committee benefited from
union contributions in the 1958 elections. Labor supported no committee
Republicans and few others.
Scholars also noted that the Democrats shifted toward the liberal wing
of their party while the Republicans still recruited committee members
from the conservative extreme of theirs. Masters wrote that, with a few
exceptions, "Democrats have felt that only members who can afford politi-
cally to take an outright pro-labor position—i.e., who get union support for
election—should be assigned to this committee" (1961, 245). Other mem-
bers were steered in other directions: "Members from farm or middle-class
suburban districts are discouraged from applying. Service on this commit-
tee by a member whose district is relatively free of labor-management or
segregation conflicts would only result in raising issues in his district that
could prove embarrassing and even politically fatal to the member" (Mas-
ters 1961, 245). Republicans, on the other hand, also discouraged most
members from applying. An assignment on this committee in the 1950s,
and to some extent in the 1980s, was a hardship post, somewhere Republi-
cans did their time and then moved on to more politically lucrative assign-
ments (interviews). Masters (1961, 245-47) noted that the Republicans were
hard-pressed to take a moderate stance on labor-management issues. They
were likely to take promanagement, antilabor positions and have close ties
to management groups.
Fenno (1969) provided a vivid description of assignment to Education
and Labor. He noted that freshmen Republicans were discouraged by their
leadership from choosing this committee unless "their convictions are firm,
their talents for combat considerable, and their districts reasonably safe"
(289). Those who ended up with this assignment, either by draft or by
choice, usually represented the conservative end of the spectrum. Of com-
mittee Democrats, Fenno wrote: "Members are strongly issue-oriented,
personally contentious, and vigorously committed. They tend to represent
the more liberal elements of their party. Party leaders produce this result
both by encouraging the appointment of labor-oriented congressmen and
by discouraging the appointment of southerners. To an individual repre-
senting a manufacturing or mining constituency, a place on the committee
dealing with labor matters will have positive electoral advantages" (290).
The Democrats appeased organized labor by assigning prounion members,
and Republicans catered to the National Association of Manufacturers by
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placing promanagement members on Education and Labor. Masters pointed
out that "this assignment is no place for a neutral when there are so many
belligerents around" (1961, 245).
Looking at Education and Labor through the eyes of its chairman,
Puryear's descriptions of committee activity (1979) reinforce the idea of
the contentiousness of members that has surfaced in the work of many
other scholars, including Munger and Fenno (1962), Fenno (1969), Eiden-
berg and Morey (1969), Brenner (1974), and Ostrom (1979), and in this
author's interviews with committee and staff members. Pury ear charac-
terized the committee as having severe ideological differences, noting that
in the 1940s "the religious issue had caused the 25 members of the House
Committee on Education and Labor to become so badly divided on
Federal aid to education that the Democratic leadership was doubtful as
[to] how to proceed. One congressional leader characterized the situation
as 'things are in a mess'" (1979, 89, quoting the New York Times, July 7,
1949).
As a result of the strong ideological divisions and the committee's
control by conservatives until the 86th Congress, no federal aid bills stood
even a slight chance of passing, especially during the Republican-con-
trolled Congress. The odds were little better under the Democrats, par-
ticularly in light of the feuds over aid to segregated or parochial schools.
These divergent attitudes on school aid are reflected in Frank Thompson,
Jr.'s (D-NJ) recollections of Barden's comments at a committee meeting in
early 1959 at which five new committee Democrats made their first
appearance:
Chairman Barden motioned me to sit by him and asked in his old-boy voice, "Frank,
what about these boys? Who are they?"
"Well, that first fellow there on the end is Roman Pucinski—that's spelled P-u-
c-i-n-s-k-i. He's from Chicago, and he's a Roman Catholic.Then the next fellow
there is Bob Giaimo, spelled G-i-a-i-m-o. He's an Italian-American from Connecti-
cut. And he's a Roman Catholic. The next one is Dominick Daniels."
Barden brightened and said, "Daniels. That sounds like a good Anglo-Saxon
name."
"No," I said, "He's of Italian background, too. And he's a Roman Catholic
from New Jersey. And that last young fellow there, that's John Brademas, spelled
B-r-a-d-e-m-a-s, from Indiana. He's the first Greek-American ever elected to Con-
gress. And he used to teach at St. Mary's College."
By this time, Barden's face was a vivid red, and the arteries were standing out
above his shirt collar. It looked like apoplexy was on the point of overtaking him.
"Goddammit," growled Barden. "It looks like they've given me the whole
goddamned League of Nations and the Pope of Rome, too."
With that, I got up and went back to my seat, doing my best to disguise the look
of satisfaction on my face. [Interview]
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According to Fenno, "until the Eighty-sixth Congress injanuary, 1959, the
Republicans plus the southern Democrats constituted a majority—hence a
controlling influence whenever they could agree" (1969, 292). The alliance
of conservative Chairman Barden and Phil Landrum (D-GA) with commit-
tee Republicans effectively created a standoff and stifled most efforts at
enacting any bills on federal aid to education, or any other "liberal"
legislation. The few not defeated in Education and Labor were thwarted by
Judge Howard Smith (D-VA), the chairman of the Committee on Rules.
The interest group data, this author's interview findings, and the
interpretations drawn by other scholars support the impression that mem-
bers of the Committee on Education and Labor reasonably reflected the
ideological leanings of the House, at least until the late 1950s. The data
buttress Masters's and Fenno's conclusions that, in the late 1950s and early
1960s, the committee attracted extremists from both parties. That was not
the rule during the early years of the committee, although some members
were interested in either restraining or catering to organized labor and in
either promoting or destroying opportunities for federal aid to education.
By all accounts, during the latter part of the 1950s the committee was
contentious, disputatious, and bitterly divided. As a result, brute force was
the only way to get legislation out of committee and passed.
Voting Patterns
Throughout much of the literature on congressional committees, Educa-
tion and Labor frequently has been the example of a conflictual, non-
cohesive, and extremely partisan committee (Masters 1961; Manley 1965;
Pressman 1966; Boiling 1968; Morrow 1969; Fenno 1973; Ripley 1978;
Ostrom 1979; Harris and Hain 1983; Parker and Parker 1985; and Smith
1986). Studies have shown and interviews with former members and staff
have confirmed the committee's high degree of discord. Archival commit-
tee roll-call votes, only recently available, finally substantiate these obser-
vations.9
Education and Labor voting records show that in the early 1950s the
committee was not as partisan or liberal as its reputation would have one
believe. In fact, as MacNeil (1963, 159-60) argued, it was decidedly conser-
vative. Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, the House leadership's stra-
tegic assignments to the committee decreased full committee cohesion and
increased party cohesion on committee roll calls. By the end of the decade
Education and Labor was transformed into a unit that voted primarily
along partisan lines when the parties were divided.
A comparison of House and committee member party-unity scores
yields a measure of partisanship as well as some indication of how represen-
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Table 1.5. Party-Unity Scores, 1951-1960
35
HR Dems
E & L Dems
HR Reps
E & L Reps
82d
77.0
22.5
68.8
77.0
26.0
71.4
80.7
17.4
75.5
90.2
9.7
90.0
83d
76.6
11.8
76.8
76.9
12.2
84.6
83.8
10.7
91.7
84.9
6.8
100.0
Congress
84th
71.0
15.0
54.6
75.0
16.0
64.7
69.7
11.1
52.5
70.3
8.3
38.5
85th
68.3
14.5
59.5
72.6
16.0
77.8
66.1
14.9
43.5
63.8
9.8
16.7
86th
70.7
17.0
57.2
76.2
15.1
72.2
74.5
14.0
69.6
73.9
12.4
75.0
Mean
SD
% > 70
Mean
SD
% > 70
Mean
SD
% > 70
Mean
SD
% > 70
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1951-61.
tative committee members were of their party in the parent body. On the
whole, Education and Labor Democrats supported their party on about
three-fourths of the votes reflecting party unity (see table 1.5)10 Given the
reputation of this committee for being more partisan than the House, com-
mittee scores should have been substantially higher than average House
scores, but for the most part they were only slightly higher. The degree of
difference between House and committee Democrats' scores, however,
increased throughout the decade. As committee Republicans became less
supportive of their party relative to House Republicans, committee Dem-
ocrats became more partisan relative to House Democrats. Moreover,
the committee boasted larger proportions of Democrats with party-unity
scores greater than 70 percent than did the House. After 1954 the opposite
was true for the Republicans; there were higher proportions of party
loyalists in the House. These phenomena give credence to the allegations
that the House Democratic leadership assigned only liberals to the commit-
tee beginning in the mid-1950s.
Given the committee's reputation for conflict, it would be surprising if
committee members voted together with any degree of regularity. Fenno
(1962, 1969, 1973) discussed the lack of integration on this committee,
writing: "The most basic fact about the House Committee on Education
and Labor is that, unlike its counterpart in the Senate, it exhibits an almost
classic incapacity as a consensus-building institution" (1969, 286). Based on
research conducted on House roll-call votes, Dyson and Soule (1970) found
Education and Labor to be one of the least integrated committees in
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Congress in the period 1955-64. And highlighting the committee's reputa-
tion for a lack of full committee agreement, Ostrom (1972) based his
dissertation on the conflict present in this committee.
An examination of committee voting records corroborates these assess-
ments. Committee roll calls, as reflected in Rice Index Scores, where a
score of 40 indicates minimum cohesion of 70 percent, showed relatively
low rates of cohesion.u Members apparently were unable or did not try to
minimize conflict. High cohesion scores, on the other hand, would have
meant that members played down conflict sufficiently to be able to vote
together to make policy decisions. The 1950s full committee Rice Index
Scores averaged on the low end of the 0 to 100 scale, indicating a relatively
high degree of conflict (see table 1.6). The average Rice Index for all
available roll calls in the decade was 29.0, well below the minimum
standard of 40. An index score of 29 means that, on average, approximately
65 percent of those voting lined up against 35 percent. During the last two
years of the decade, when the number of recorded votes increased, the
degree of full committee cohesion declined, indicating more conflict. The
committee reached the Rice Index of 40 benchmark for minimum cohesion
on only 23.9 percent of the votes taken in 1959-60 (when a relatively large
number of recorded votes were taken) and on 29 percent of its roll calls for
the ten-year period, supporting assertions that the committee was wrought
with conflict.
Full committee cohesion levels may have been higher in the Republican
83d Congress (1953-54) or in 1957, the years for which voting records are
not available, but it is doubtful. The ratio of Democrats to Republicans in
the 83d Congress was almost 50:50, and there is no reason why it or the
1957 session should be deviant with respect to committee cohesion. In fact,
the committee was particularly antagonistic in 1957, the year members
staged a revolt against the chairman. Most of the Democrats were unified
against the chairman, and the Republicans, under threat from the chair-
man, were allied with him.
The degree of full committee cohesive voting dropped sharply in
Chairman Barden's last term, after the House leadership, over a period of
years, had assigned more liberal Democrats to the committee. Barden voted
with the Republicans, who generally voted together. Moreover, the pri-
mary legislation considered by this committee during the 86th Congress
was the hotly contested Landrum-Griffin Act, which exacerbated inter-
party controversies as well as intraparty differences among the Democrats.
Given that full committee cohesion was low, that the subject matter
represented the fundamental differences between the two parties, and that
high concentrations of partisan members were assigned to the committee,
one would expect conflict to divide primarily along party lines, particularly
in the late 1950s. Partisanship and a lack of full committee cohesion should
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Table 1.6.
Congress
82d
84th
85th
86th
Committee Roll Calls Meeting
Index Scores, 1951-1960
Year
1951-52
1955-56
1958
1959-60
Total
Mean
N
27
20
30
92
169
Full E &
33.0
35.9
32.9
25.1
29.0
Minimum Cohesion
Rice Index
L Dems
35.8
65.5
72.5
52.1
54.7
Reps
65.9
61.4
73.0
85.1
77.1
and Mean
Full E & ]
%
29.6
35.0
40.0
23.9
29.0
37
Rice
LRI>40
N
8
7
12
22
49
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-60. Data for 195 3-54
(83d Cong.) and 1957 are missing.
yield high Rice Index Scores for each party on committee roll-call votes.
Confirming this expectation, Republican cohesion scores should be higher
than Democrats', since minorities traditionally band together to protect
their interests from being overrun by the majority. Moreover, Democrats
were (and are) not known for agreeing among themselves.
These expectations generally are borne out by the data. With the ex-
ception of 1955, Republicans voted more cohesively than did Democrats
during the 1950s. In 1955 the Republicans split on several issues, including
minimum wage; the "Powell Amendment" (antidiscrimination), even when
offered by one of their own; library services; and the Davis-Bacon Act.
On two occasions, in the 82d Congress (1951-52) and the 86th Congress
(1959-60), their cohesion scores substantially exceeded (by more than 30
points) those of the Democrats. In the 82d Congress, the issues divisive to
the Democrats were an investigation of the Wage Stabilization Board (six
roll calls) and the prevention of major disasters in coal mines (fifteen roll
calls). A major sticking point on coal mine safety was the size of small mines
that were to be exempt from safety regulations.
The high Republican cohesion in the 86th Congress may have been, in
part, a response to Chairman Barden, who reputedly told Republicans to
support his position or they would never get anything from him again
(interviews). Moreover, labor reform issues dominated committee life and
roll calls in 1959, and the Republicans united in their dislike of organized
labor and in their preference for management views. Democrats, however,
had no such coherent philosophy, and Barden worked to promote divi-
sions. The few southerners disliked labor unions and vowed to impose
strict regulations. Organized labor, on the other hand, had played a role in
selecting the Democratic committee members, and by 1959 the committee
was stacked heavily in its favor. What is more, Democrats did not always
agree on the best ways to achieve common ends. Some were out to stop
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labor reform completely, while others tried to minimize the inevitable
damage.
The index scores show that throughout the 1950s members of the
Committee on Education and Labor deserved their reputation as being
highly partisan, although Democrats were less partisan generally than
Republicans. At the outset of the decade, Democrats lagged Republicans
substantially; however, in the mid-1950s the gap narrowed, only to widen
again during Barden's last term when the committee size and political
ideology changed. Republicans averaged 77.1 and Democrats 54.7 on the
index for the years counted, showing that they voted together on about 89
percent and 77 percent, respectively, of the roll calls throughout the
decade. If the southern Democrats, including the chairman, who tradi-
tionally strayed to vote with the Republicans, had not been among the
ranks or had not bolted, Democratic cohesion scores would have been
higher.
Voting together was in the Republicans' best interest. If they voted
together and were joined by the chairman and one or two of his Democratic
allies, as was likely, they had the votes to defeat anything that the Demo-
crats put forth. In addition, they had the advantage because it was easier to
maintain the status quo and stop legislation from being enacted than it was
to get a law rewritten once it had passed. As a result, the Republicans were
able to stymie advances by more progressive-minded Democrats. The
Democrats, on the other hand, may have agreed on the ends, but not on the
means. Since they could not agree on how to achieve their goals, it was easy
for the Republicans and their allies to divide and conquer. Moreover, until
the end of the decade, the liberal Democrats did not have sufficient votes to
predominate over the conservative coalition.
The percentage of committee roll calls classified as "party votes"
illustrates the degree of competition between the Democrats and Republi-
cans on Education and Labor. Although the 70-percent criterion is the level
of choice in this study, statistics on voting at four levels are presented for
comparison with other investigations. Table 1.7 shows the percentages of
party votes meeting four criteria (50 percent, 70 percent, 75 percent, and 90
percent). By the 70-percent party vote benchmark, the roll calls themselves
lend only moderate support to the supposition that the committee was
excessively partisan, until 1960, when the percentage of party votes nearly
doubled (from 35.2 percent in 1959 to 66.7 percent in 1960). Over the
decade, an average of about 38 percent of the committee's roll calls could be
considered party votes.
The degree of party competition generally increased from 1951 to
1960. From 1955 on, more than 40 percent of the roll calls taken in
Education and Labor could be classified as party votes. Possibly the degree
of party voting has been obscured by the small sample size and by the lack
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Table 1.7.
Congress
82d
84th
85th
86th
Percentage of Party Votes in Committee by
Percent Criteria, 1951-1960
Year
1951-52
1955-56
1958
1959-60
Total
Percentage
of total
N
27
20
30
92
169
(number of qualifying
> 50% > 70%
48.1 (13)
65.0(13)
60.0 (18)
70.7 (65)
(109)
64.5
14.8 (4)
40.0 (8)
46.7 (14)
42.4(39)
(65)
38.5
50-, 70-, 75-, and 90-
roll calls in parentheses)
> 75% > 90%
11.1 (3)
25.0 (5)
43.3 (13)
39.1 (36)
(57)
33.7
0.0 (0)
15.0 (3)
26.7 (8)
16.3 (15)
(26)
15.4
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-60. Votes
for 1953-54 (83d Cong.) and 1957 were not available.
of statistics on voice votes, although one could argue that the fact that roll
calls were taken instead of voice votes shows more conflict and thus more
partisanship. Or perhaps the committee was not as partisan as it was
reputed to be until the latter part of the decade, when the Democratic
leadership had succeeded in saturating the committee majority with liber-
als. Either way, by the 86th Congress, the conservative coalition no longer
had a lock on Education and Labor.
A number of factors contributing to the committee's lack of cohesion
and its relatively high degree of partisanship during the 1950s exacerbated
the problems of coordination on Education and Labor. The most important
were the nature of the subject matter it considered, its original focus on
labor matters, the activity of its chairman, the temperament of its members,
the party ratio on the committee, and its operations. First, and most
important, the nature of the subject matter under this committee's jurisdic-
tion accounted for a good deal of the friction. On many issues no com-
promises were possible. They embodied the fundamental differences in
philosophy of the two main political parties: the questions of whether, how
much, and in what direction the federal government should be involved.
Members also considered issues that surfaced in most congressional cam-
paigns in one form or another during the 1950s: minimum wage, labor-
management relations, and aid to education. Liberal Democrats supported
unions and fought to keep conservative and antiunion Republicans and
southern Democrats from trying to diminish organized labor's clout. Not
only did the nature of the issues encourage the lack of full committee
cohesion, it fostered partisan conflict.
Federal aid to education, too, posed a divisive threat to organizational
unity on the Committee on Education and Labor. Republicans opposed
any form of federal interference in what they considered to be the domain of
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state and local governments. Chairman Barden, too, remained suspicious of
federal control; to him, federal money meant federal control. He held the
firm conviction that "with Federal Dollars came Federal regulators to
interfere in the operation of the local schools" (Puryear 1979, 108). A legacy
of disputes in the 1940s over aid to private or segregated schools also beset
the committee. The segregation issue particularly plagued the committee
after the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, dividing
both Democrats and Republicans. Formulas for the allocation of federal aid
funds created further dissension. Some proposals allotted money on the
basis of need, whereas others based the distribution of funds on school-age
population. Other plans took into account a combination of state resources,
state financial contributions to education, and the school-age population.
Labor, as the primary focus of the modern committee when it was
established in 1947, also aggravated full committee unity. Because most
committee members maintained major interests in labor and only minor
interests in education, the House leadership referred many education
programs to other committees, thus weakening and fragmenting efforts to
enact education legislation (Fenno 1969, 287-88). Education and labor
issues also generated conflicting forces. While members were able to agree
on some issues, especially in the field of labor, their constituencies pulled
them in different directions on education legislation, particularly con-
cerning religious and racial issues. According to Fenno, "Internal conflict
would doubtless be harsh in a single education committee, but the tradition
of charge and countercharge accompanying labor-management legislation
has certainly made it more difficult to build a consensus among the same
people in the area of education" (1969, 288).
The chairman was a third factor inhibiting committee harmony and
contributing to the air of partisanship. Discussed in greater detail in the
next chapter, Barden's ability to thwart legislation on federal aid to educa-
tion and anything favorable to organized labor undermined committee
unity. He skillfully created opposing coalitions in the committee, pur-
posely keeping the committee split to prevent progressive legislation from
being enacted or even from getting to the floor. In fact, one of his last efforts
was aimed at splitting the committee into a separate Committee on Educa-
tion and a Committee on Labor.
The feisty nature of committee members offered a fourth barrier to
committee accord. Fenno (1969) argued that the committee conflict was not
really over issues but among individual members. Ostrom described some
of the members as "issue-oriented crusaders" (1972, 85). Members from
both sides of the aisle were committed to their positions on education and
labor issues, having been assigned to the committee for just that reason. In
other words, these were the true believers, a difficult group in which to
work out compromises.
The Barden Years 41
A fifth factor, the party ratio on the committee, also contributed to the
lack of interparty consensus. Until 1959 the Republicans combined with
the southern Democrats to constitute a majority in direct opposition to the
liberal Democrats on the committee. In 1959, at the urging of several
members, the Speaker recommended a new party ratio, increasing the
Democratic portion to twenty out of thirty seats. Against the wishes of the
conservative chairman, the Democratic leadership then added six new
liberals. The new additions further divorced the chairman from the rest of
his party and necessitated alliances between conservative Democrats and
Republicans to fight liberal advances.
The committee's operations also interfered with compatibility. On
other committees, such as Appropriations or Ways and Means, procedures
and norms developed that accommodated members whenever possible
(Fenno 1966; Manley 1965, 1970). Education and Labor never spawned
these practices and, instead, fostered competition and filibuster. During
the Barden years, nothing was done to minimize the suspicions of Demo-
crats about Republicans and vice versa. Nothing fostered cohesion across
party lines, while several elements operated to enhance party voting on the
committee.
Committee Structure
Chairman Barden wielded more influence over the structure of the commit-
tee than did his successors, who operated in a more institutionalized
setting. In the absence of committee rules, he determined committee
structure by and large. During his tenure, what had been a relatively small
and uncomplicated organization grew in size and complexity. The config-
uration of committee units became more elaborate, and the staff size in-
creased. The newly adopted rules led to the establishment of standing
subcommittees, and as the committee developed, it became more decentral-
ized, albeit not to the degree it would be under subsequent chairmen.
Before the adoption of committee rules, House committees operated
within the rather vague guidelines set out in the 1946 reorganization act,
which allowed the chairmen a great deal of discretion. The act required that
each standing committee fix regular meeting days, keep a complete record
of actions and votes, report bills approved by its members, require written
testimony in advance from hearing witnesses, and open its hearings to the
public. The chairman determined other more important matters.
Committee rules came about because of need, not as a result of reg-
ularized committee procedure. The old adage "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"
applies to congressional committees as well as to a variety of other entities.
Education and Labor, like other organizations, did not institute rules until
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something failed to work. This action demonstrated that the system as
created by the 1946 act was not working to the satisfaction of a majority of
members. The procedures delineated in the House rules were not sufficient
to ensure that Education and Labor operated democratically, as the major-
ity of its members thought it should. Additional interference by forces
external to the committee indicated that the committee was also not con-
ducting its business to the satisfaction of the House leadership.
When Education and Labor instituted specialized rules in 1957, it was
one of the pioneer committees to do so. Only two committees had adopted
rules previously: Government Operations in the 83d Congress and Interior
in the 84th. An Education and Labor staff member commented that "the
excesses of the chairmen of this committee are largely responsible for the
committee rules and for some of the House rules." These excesses were
exactly what precipitated the revolts against Barden and later against
Powell. In a rare occurrence, Education and Labor members joined forces
to create a new committee in structure, leadership, and operations. After
several years of Barden's rather autocratic committee leadership, the com-
mittee boiled with controversy over procedure in 1957. The Democrats
resented the chairman's delaying and obstructing tactics, including his
failure to call meetings in accordance with the reorganization act and his
alliance with committee Republicans. Boiling reported: "[Stewart] Udall
[D-AZ] hit upon what was to be the coup de grace—the drafting of a set of
committee rules, meeting majority approval, that when adopted would
constrict the chairman so that his dictatorial scepter could be knocked from
his hand" (1966, 97). After years of dissatisfaction, Democrats revolted,
demanding weekly meetings, the appointment of standing subcommittees,
and majority approval of the hiring of professional staff members. To
forestall a crippling fight, Barden cleverly proposed several similar, less
restrictive measures. He maneuvered to avoid more stringent rules by
having his Republican allies move to take up his proposals en masse, thus
preventing consideration of each proposal separately. Barden's version was
approved with Republican support. Some Democrats, notably Powell, still
were unhappy, but they did not have the votes to amend the new rules until
the next Congress (see Powell 1971, 200; Puryear 1979, 116-17; and Mac-
Neil 1963, 172-73).
The committee's new 1957 rules incorporated regular bimonthly meet-
ings and standing subcommittees. Another important correlate in the rules
was the requirement that the chairman refer all legislation to the appropri-
ate subcommittee, a provision aimed at preventing him from sitting on bills
he opposed or referring them to unsympathetic subcommittees. It enabled
bills to go to hearings without the chairman's consent. Under the new rules,
the chairman had the power to appoint subcommittees and their chairmen,
although not necessarily on the basis of seniority, after consultation with
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the ranking minority member. The chairman and ranking minority mem-
ber had ex officio membership on all subcommittees. Any committee
member could attend and participate in any subcommittee meeting, al-
though he could not vote unless he was a member of that subcommittee.
The new rules also allowed written proxies to be accepted in committee
meetings if a majority of the members were present physically. The
chairman maintained his control over the hiring and discharge of committee
majority staff members.
Even after the rules were imposed, the committee still was not working
to its members' satisfaction. Committee Democrats revolted again in 1959.
Aided by the Speaker and the Committee on Ways and Means (acting as the
Democratic Committee on Committees), who stacked the committee in
their favor, members pushed for and won additional limitations on the
chairman in the committee rules.12 One new provision required that the
chairman appoint every member to one or more subcommittees, with due
regard to individual preferences to avoid skipping some members in the
assignment process. In the past, some had been passed over while others
received multiple subcommittee assignments. A second new provision
diluted the chairman's ability to prevent the official receipt of testimony by
declaring the absence of a quorum. Another rule stipulated that two
subcommittee members, rather than the majority required for transaction
of other business, constituted a quorum for the purpose of taking testi-
mony. This rule made it more difficult for the chairman and his allies to
avoid taking testimony contrary to their views by boycotting hearings.
Ostensibly to prevent the chairman from referring bills not to his liking to
subcommittees he knew would oblige him and bury the legislation, a third
rules change enabled the committee, as well as the chairman, to recall a bill
from a subcommittee for the full committee's direct consideration or for
referral to another subcommittee.
Nevertheless, Barden salvaged a few remnants of his authority during
the 1959 revolt. Much to the chagrin of Adam Clayton Powell, the ranking
Democrat, Barden and his allies defeated a provision requiring the chair-
man to rely on seniority in naming subcommittees and chairmen, thus
enabling Barden to skip over Powell in doling out subcommittee chairman-
ships. The 1957 and 1959 changes proved monumental for the structure of
the committee. The institution of committee rules effectively realigned the
power structure and the configuration of the committee, formalized com-
mittee procedures, and decentralized the decision-making process.
Committee size and party ratio were used by both House Democrats
and Republicans when they were in the majority to control the decisions of
the committee. Leadership actions enlarged the committee's membership
under Barden from twenty-four to thirty and diluted his control. Both
parties overrepresented themselves when in the majority. Republicans took
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advantage of their majority status in the 83d Congress and overrepre-
sented themselves slightly compared with the party ratio of the House.
The Democrats generally had about one more seat per term than this ratio
would seem to dictate. The extra seat enabled them to put an additional
liberal on the committee, a useful addition in efforts to override the
conservative chairman's maneuvers and, later, to undermine his effec-
tiveness at stalling. Overrepresentation of the majority party members
proved to be particularly important in the late 1950s, when the Demo-
cratic party leaders had trouble getting Chairman Barden to accommodate
their wishes. As a result of the Democrats' sweep in the 1958 elections,
they had twice as many seats on Education and Labor in the 86th Con-
gress as did the Republicans. The large Democratic majority, with its
influx of liberals, set the stage for upcoming liberal policy victories in the
early 1960s.
The number and jurisdictions of subcommittees fluctuated during the
1950s. In his first full term as chairman in 1951-52, Barden created ten ad
hoc subcommittees for various studies or investigations. The committee
accomplished little, however, and held relatively few meetings (only four
roll call votes were taken in 1951). Republicans, who had a majority of
members on the committee in the 83d Congress (1953-54), replaced the
subcommittees with ten special subcommittees focusing on the most promi-
nent issues under the committee's jurisdiction, such as aid to schools in
federally impacted areas, aid for school construction, and handicapped
rehabilitation. Another subcommittee investigated federal activities in edu-
cation. Given their anti-organized labor sentiments and the mood of the
country, it is not surprising that the Republicans established several labor
subcommittees in the 83d Congress to investigate dubious aspects of union
behavior, such as abuses in labor union welfare and pension funds or strikes
and racketeering. The subcommittees established by the Democrats when
they regained their majority in the 84th Congress (1955-56) had a different
focus. Most related to education, although others focused on facets of the
labor acts under the committee's jurisdiction, mine safety, and allegations
of misuse of union funds. Several of the fourteen subcommittees existed
only for one session.
The 1957 rules enabled committee members to transform the commit-
tee structure from a relatively simple one based on temporary ad hoc
subunits to a more complex arrangement with permanent subcommittees
with fixed jurisdictions spelled out in the rules. In addition, the rules
required that the chairman automatically refer legislation to the appropriate
subcommittee as determined by the subject matter. Nonetheless, Barden
managed to bypass the process and have his House or committee allies
pigeonhole most of the bills he opposed.
The committee set up five new standing subcommittees—two on
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education, two on labor, and one on safety and compensation—with
jurisdictions delineated in the committee rules. The chairman also created a
special subcommittee in 1957 to handle the volatile issue of welfare and
pension plan matters. Later, in the 86th Congress (1959-60), the chairman
combined the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations, headed by
Carl Perkins (D-KY), with the Labor Standards Subcommittee, chaired by
Phil Landrum (D-GA) to create a special joint labor subcommittee with
cochairmen. This move was part of a broader plan to prevent the bill that
would become the Landrum-Griffin Act from being pigeonholed in the
subcommittee chaired by labor ally Carl Perkins (Puryear 1979, 198). As
the 1950s ended, Education and Labor had five standing and two ad hoc
subcommittees.
Not only did subcommittee structure change during the decade, but
reliance on it shifted. At the beginning of Barden's tenure, in 1951 and
1952, subcommittees held rather extensive hearings. They conducted over
70 percent of the 82d Congress committee hearings and almost half of those
in the Republican-controlled 83d Congress. By the time Barden resumed
his chairmanship in the 84th, however, subcommittee hearings had
dropped precipitously, to less than 5 percent of the total committee hear-
ings. Federal aid for school construction and the minimum wage accounted
for most of the 1955 and 1956 hearings, which were held by the full
committee. Only two subcommittees heard testimony that term, one on
extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover certain retail employees,
and the other to investigate the Performance Trust Fund of the American
Federation of Musicians (committee Calendar, 84th Cong.). All other com-
mittee business was conducted in full committee. Table 1.8 shows the
proportion of full committee versus subcommittee hearings. After the 1957
rules allowed for standing subcommittees with fixed jurisdictions, both the
number of hearings and the proportion held in subcommittees increased
dramatically. The number of hearings grew by more than one hundred and
the proportion in subcommittees skyrocketed from under 5 percent to
almost 92 percent. The full committee held only a few hearings in the 85th
Congress, and none in the 86th. All 166 hearings in 1959 and 1960 were
before subcommittees, including the many pertaining to the Landrum-
Griffin Act.
The committee staff grew markedly during the Barden years, doubling
between 1951 and 1960 and culminating in the employment of eight
professional and ten support staff members for the full committee by 1960.
The minority was shortchanged, however, with only one employee in each
category. Apparently this also was the case in regard to subcommittee staff,
although ostensibly subcommittees had both majority and minority staff
members after the rules were established. A minority staff director com-
plained in later years that there was little Republican subcommittee staff
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Table 1.8. Full Committee and Subcommittee Hearings, 1950s
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
Year
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Total
Mean
Percentage
of total
Days of
full committee
hearings
25
54
88
16
0
183
36.6
28.4
Days of
subcommittee
hearings
62
50
4
180
166
462
92.4
71.6
Total
days of
hearings
87
104
92
196
166
645
129.0
Percentage of
subcommittee
hearings
71.3
48.1
4.3
91.8
100.0
63.1
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1951-60.
under Barden: full committee minority personnel were assigned to assist
subcommittees (interview).
In part, the chairman complied with the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946 requiring that staff members be selected "on a permanent basis
without regard to political affiliations" (P.L. 79-601). Some of the staff
members appeared to have been appointed on a partisan basis, while others
were not. During the 82d Congress, Fred G. Hussey served as chief clerk of
the committee, and John O. Graham served as minority clerk. When the
Republicans took control of the 83d Congress, the two clerks switched
places. Had the staff been assigned on a nonpartisan or nonpolitical basis,
these two men would have remained in their respective jobs. On the other
hand, Russell Derrickson may have been one of the few truly nonpolitical,
nonpatronage staff appointments on this committee, or at least he main-
tained friends on both sides of the aisle. He served as the committee's
investigator in the 82d Congress and as the chief investigator from the 83d
until 1961, when he became staff director under Chairman Powell. Edward
A. McCabe, who did not stay nearly as long, served as the general counsel
for both the Republican majority in the 83d Congress and the Democratic
majority in the 84th. Subsequent chairmen and ranking minority members
made few nonpartisan or nonpolitical staff appointments, although a few
staff members endured several chairmen.
The structure of Education and Labor changed dramatically over the
decade of the 1950s. At the outset, it was centralized: the chairman had
discretion over almost every aspect of committee operations. His abuse of
this discretion in opposition to his fellow Democrats led to the institution of
rules that decentralized the chairman's power, decentralizing the commit-
tee. Although the resources still were not distributed equitably among the
majority members, for the first time they had at their disposal the means to
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circumvent the chairman and to enforce their will. Concurrent with the
institution of standing subcommittees and the mandatory referral of legisla-
tion to the proper subcommittee came increased use of subcommittees for
hearings and legislative consideration. Subcommittees had a better chance
of getting their legislation reviewed in full committee, too, because the
chairman was required to call meetings. In addition, at the end of the
decade, staff members were assigned to subcommittees for the first time.
The enlargement of the committee and the Democratic leadership's inter-
ference in the assignment process to circumvent Barden's obstructionist
tactics changed the compositional picture of Education and Labor, setting
the stage for the progressive programs of the 1960s. Education and Labor
metamorphosed into a larger, more liberal, more conflictual, and more
partisan committee during Graham Barden's chairmanship. It also evolved
into a more universalistic, permanent organization.
Jurisdiction, Work Load, and Function
In its establishment of the Committee on Education and Labor, the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1946 specified its jurisdiction and outlined a set
of general operating procedures. Neither changed much during Barden's
chairmanship. In addition to general responsibility for measures relating to
education and labor, the reorganization act gave the committee respon-
sibility for all proposed legislation relating to child labor, convict labor and
the entry of goods made by convicts into interstate commerce, labor
standards, labor statistics, mediation and arbitration of labor disputes,
regulation and prevention of importation of foreign laborers under con-
tract, and the wages and hours of labor. Issues of school lunch, vocational
rehabilitation, the U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, Colum-
bia Institution for the Deaf, Dumb, and Blind (now Gallaudet University),
Howard University, Freedmen's Hospital (now Howard University Hos-
pital), Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, and the welfare of miners also came
under the committee's jurisdiction (P.L. 79-601, as amended).
The House charged each committee with the review of all legislation
under, and the tax policies affecting, its jurisdiction. In addition, commit-
tees oversee the activities of federal agencies within their purview. The
House rules gave the committee additional responsibility for reviewing,
studying, and coordinating all laws, programs, and government activities
concerning domestic educational programs and institutions, including stu-
dent assistance programs under the jurisdiction of other committees (House
Rules, rule 10, sec. 693, cl. 3[c]).
An examination of the committee's work load provides the basis for
showing what the committee accomplished during the period that Barden
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Table 1.9. Bills Referred to Education and Labor, 1951-1960
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
Year
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Number
referred
232
268
462
601
720
Number
reported
8
15
12
18
17
Number
passed HR
7
14
11
14
10
Number
public laws
4
12
10
14
8
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1951-60.
was the chairman. The work load is gauged from the number of days of
hearings held by the full committee and by subcommittees, and the number
of bills reported to the House (table 1.9). The sheer numbers of bills on
which action was taken are not used because they do not reflect accurately
the amount of work; this period predated multiple sponsorship of legisla-
tion, and many bills were duplicates. Moreover, the bills referred differ in
their level of importance and in the amount of work they require. To
compensate for this problem, this section includes some discussion on the
relative importance of the bills considered and some individual proposals
that took up a disproportionate amount of the committee's time.
Although an important gauge of committee success, the measure of the
number of bills reported, used by itself, obscures a great deal of the work
done; consequently, hearings are expressed by the number of days devoted
to that activity. Several days could be spent holding hearings on legislation
that never cleared the committee, such as some of the federal aid to edu-
cation legislation. Members oftentimes were thwarted by the chairman in
their efforts to get particular legislation considered by the full committee.
The number of days of hearings held in subcommittee and in full commit-
tee fluctuated dramatically over the decade. Full committee hearing days
ranged from 88 days in the 84th Congress to 0 in the 86th. Subcommittee
hearings ranged from a low of 4 days in the 84th to a high of 180 days in the
85th. A large number of hearings in the 85th and 86th Congresses con-
cerned particularly controversial bills. The committee spent numerous
days in the 85th Congress considering aid to education to promote the
national defense, and a substantial proportion of the 86th Congress hear-
ings concerned the Landrum-Griffin Act proposals.
The number of bills reported by the committee grew more than
twofold from the early to the late 1950s. As reflected in table 1.9, the
number of bills reported increased by 50 percent from the 82d Congress
(1951-52), which reported eight bills, to the 84th Congress (1955-56), which
reported twelve bills. The number of bills reported peaked in the 1957-58
with eighteen and stayed relatively high in 1959-60, when the committee
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completed work on seventeen bills, for a total of seventy reported for the
decade.
With the exception of a few bills, most of the legislation reported by the
Committee on Education and Labor during the chairmanship of Graham
Barden was of narrow scope and of little national significance. Many of
these bills were important to small groups of beneficiaries, such as long-
shoremen, agricultural workers, and people with various handicaps, but
few had earth-shaking, widespread impact. That assessment is not to be-
little the accomplishments of the committee, but just to note that much leg-
islation of broader scope was blocked somewhere in the process to prevent
its enactment. Not inconsequential time was spent on the proposals that
never had a chance of being considered by the full House—namely, those
bills favorable to labor unions. Most of the legislation that survived obsta-
cles in the committee either amended previously existing laws or helped
a narrow subset of the country.
By the end of the decade the picture had changed. In particular, four
rather significant pieces of legislation, two education and two labor,
emerged from the committee during Barden's tenure as chairman, all in the
late 1950s. All consumed a considerable amount of the committee's time
and effort. The two education bills were landmarks. The critical need for
increased national defense provided members with a vehicle for a general
aid to education bill. The National Defense Education Act (NDEA, P.L.
85-864), the first major aid to education program to pass in years, opened
the door for an increased federal role in education. Another important bill,
Representative Frank Thompson's general aid bill emphasizing the need for
school construction, passed the House in 1960 (86th Cong., H. R. 10128).
After Senate adoption of a similar measure, the Thompson bill died be-
cause the Rules Committee refused to authorize a conference. Never-
theless, the school construction bill did overcome a significant obstacle: it
passed the House with the inclusion of Powell's antidiscrimination amend-
ment, heretofore an impossibility. These two bills were the precursors to
the advancements in federal funding to education enacted in the 1960s.
The committee also reported landmark labor legislation concerning
welfare and pension benefit plans (P.L. 85-836) and labor-management
reporting and disclosure (the Landrum-Griffin Act, P.L. 86-257). Mem-
bers capitalized on the negative publicity accorded to organized labor and,
after extensive hearings and mark-up sessions, passed two bills increasing
the already harsh provisions (from the union standpoint) of the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act, the main law governing the behavior of labor and manage-
ment (other than minimum-wage laws). The 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, in
particular, increased the regulations and penalties for labor unions and
changed the face of labor-management relations.
Several factors account for the committee's general trend toward in-
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creased work load and productivity. Some changes were the result of
external variables, such as a surge in the number of bills introduced in the
House and referred to the committee. Others are attributable to committee-
specific factors. Environmental influences, including the growth of the
population, the changing role of the federal government, the expansion in
interest group activity, communications advances, and the complexity of
issues, contributed to the sharp rise in the number of bills and resolutions
introduced in Congress (Mackenzie 1981, 3-10). In addition to the sheer
volume of legislation, a shift in the committee's agenda increased the work
load and output. Growing interest in labor legislation, stemming both from
the desire to protect the rights of workers and the desire to regulate labor
unions, resulted in a larger number of bills referred to the committee and
more action taken. Moreover, Sputnik and defense concerns prompted a
greater interest in education, necessitating action by the committee.
In large part, several overlapping, committee-specific factors contrib-
uted to the greater activity and productivity. The new liberal emphasis in
the committee partially was responsible for the rise in the number of
hearings, the proportion of hearings held in subcommittees, and the num-
ber of bills reported. By the end of the decade liberals had built enough
support within the committee to override the chairman's wishes, aiding
their pursuit of an activist agenda in education matters. The expanded
number of liberals on the committee facilitated the 1957 adoption of
committee rules, which, in turn, significantly enhanced the reliance on
subcommittees for much of the committee's work. Mandatory subcommit-
tee creation diverted the work to smaller groups and diluted the chairman's
influence. The requirement that every bill referred to the full committee in
turn should be referred to its respective subcommittee contributed to the
increase in the number of hearings.
Although Barden had made substantial use of subcommittees in his
first term as chairman, he slacked off in his second term, probably partly as
a result of the 1954 Brown decision. The Supreme Court case marked a
turning point in his views on federal aid to education (Puryear 1979, 106-7)
and coincided with his reduced reliance on subcommittees, especially those
that dealt with education matters. As a consequence, the members adopted
the rules. The subsequent increase in the number of bills reported testifies
to the effects of both majority opposition and the creation of rules in
diminishing the chairman's powers.
Within the constraints imposed by official goals and charges, commit-
tees are relatively free to pursue their own agendas, as long as they do not
interfere with the policy demands of the larger body. When the committee
fails to fulfill its official duties to the satisfaction of a sufficient number of
members, however, the parent body acts to ensure that it mends its ways.
The Committee on Education and Labor had a mission of its own, one that
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changed over the years. Early in his tenure, Chairman Barden regularly
thwarted the will of the majority leadership in the House by refusing to call
meetings, loading the hearings, limiting the opposing witnesses' time, and
employing a variety of other tactics, thereby impeding the fulfillment of the
committee's official function. Barden worked to achieve the unofficial goals
he had set for the committee. He promoted the agenda of the committee's
dominant philosophical faction, a conservative coalition formed in coopera-
tion with the Republicans. As a result, he realized his goals, whereas he and
his allies frustrated those of the committee members outside the conserva-
tive coalition, as well as those of many House Democrats. Ergo, the
committee's de facto function was one of blocking legislation that did not
coincide with conservative goals.
Some of the most controversial legislation, clearly favored by the
House leadership and by most of the committee Democrats, stood no
chance of emerging intact from Education and Labor. If for some reason
these bills did survive, the chairman quietly appealed to his conservative
friends on the Rules Committee to intervene at the next step in the process
(interviews; for an example, see Puryear 1979, 121). For years, this conser-
vative coalition thwarted federal aid to education and proposals favorable to
organized labor. With the help of the House leadership, which did not
approve of minority rule, the picture began to change. Committee mem-
bership from the more liberal, urban Middle Atlantic states, in particular,
and the Pacific states grew throughout the decade at the expense of the more
conservative South, whose proportion of the committee declined by more
than half by the end of the decade. The new composition helped ensure that
the official duties of the committee would be performed in accordance with
House directives, or at least with the majority agenda. The Democrats
retained majority status officially, but the factions in control shifted. As the
majority changed, the function changed. The new progressive bill of fare
impinged on the dominance of the old conservative menu.
The liberals, aided by the new committee rules, laid the foundation for
the new agenda. Accompanied by a more equitable distribution of power in
the form of subcommittees and mandatory referral of all legislation, the
institution of the rules facilitated the consideration and reporting of bills. It
also enabled members to hold hearings without the chairman's approval
and, thus, to act on and report more bills. It gave more members an entree
into the legislative process.
When Chairman Barden retired, leaving the committee to a chairman
with an entirely different orientation, the committee was in a state of flux.
As future chapters will show, this condition was common for Education
and Labor.
The
Chairmanship of
Graham Barden
An abundance of institutional prerogatives combined with a personally
resourceful chairman who did not mind using them to further his objectives
characterized Graham Arthur Barden's chairmanship. His leadership was
negative and autocratic. It was negative, not in the sense that he was a bad
chairman or that he was ineffective (he was not, in either case), but because
he used his authority to keep things from happening, not to make them
happen. He used his considerable powers largely to prevent new legislation
from being enacted, to restrain organized labor, and to thwart the agenda of
the increasingly liberal committee majority. His leadership was autocratic
in the sense that he was unresponsive to the majority on his committee, and
often the House majority, and actively obstructed their wishes. In his
negative actions, Barden apparently effectively represented the viewpoints
of the people who elected him rather than those of the majority of his
Democratic colleagues. Voters in North Carolina's Third District elected
him to thirteen terms.
A Portrait of the Chairman
Knowledge of a chairman's background, constituency, and political ide-
ology helps place his leadership in perspective. It provides some insight into
how he exercised his powers. In the case of Barden, it highlights some of the
reasons he employed his resources in a negative manner, such as why he
blocked "liberal" legislation, particularly federal aid to education and any-
thing viewed favorably by organized labor.'
One of six children of James Jefferson Barden and Mary James Barden,
Graham Arthur Barden was born near Turkey Township in Sampson
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County, North Carolina, on September 25, 1896. He spent his early years
on the family farm. Later the family moved to Burgaw so the children could
attend high school. After graduating from Burgaw High School, Barden set
out for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, intent on a law
degree. But World War I interrupted his schooling, and he joined the navy
for a brief five months, signing up about a month before the armistice.
Barden earned his LL.B. in 1920 and passed the North Carolina bar
examination. Instead of setting up practice immediately, he taught and
coached at New Bern High School for two years to earn money for a law
library. He married Agnes Foy in 1922. After his first year of teaching,
Barden established his law practice with a friend. Ten years later, in 1931,
he left to practice with Mrs. Barden's brother-in-law.
Barden's public service began in 1921, when he was appointed judge of
the Craven County Recorder's Court, a post he held while practicing law.
He subsequently was elected to the position twice. In 1926 he entered the
Democratic primary race for solicitor of the Fifth Judicial District but came
in third. Barden earned considerable recognition during his days as an
attorney. He was highly visible and instrumental in bringing down the
Great Tiger Klan, a junior version of the Ku Klux Klan (though in later
years many considered him a racist because of his opposition to federally
forced school integration). Active in several local eleemosynary associa-
tions, he also put a great deal of energy into church and civic affairs.
In 1932 Barden ran for the North Carolina House of Representatives
on a platform advocating state support of public schools but opposing the ad
valorem tax on land that was meant to defray the expenses of the six-month
school term. He argued that the state should reimburse counties for a
portion of the debts incurred in the construction of school buildings, and he
wanted the state instead of the local school districts to spend money for
school buses. He also advocated the assessment of property at its real value,
a state tax on stocks and bonds of foreign corporations, and disbandment of
many state offices, bureaus, and commissions. He opposed corporate
lobbying and promised to represent the interests of Craven County. Barden
won the nomination and subsequently the election to the state House. He
used his assignment on the Appropriations Committee to attract statewide
attention, gaining public notice for his activity in behalf of adequate
funding for public school, state colleges, and universities, and for his
economy-mindedness.
Although the seven-term incumbent U.S. representative Charles L.
Abernethy was old and infirm, he insisted on running in the 1934 congres-
sional elections. Abernethy's son, who carried out most of his father's
duties, was expected to inherit the seat. Barden and several others decided
to challenge the expected inheritance. Barden won a plurality of votes in the
Democratic primary and faced Luther I lamilton of Morehead City for a
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primary runoff. Hamilton questioned Barden's loyalty to the Democratic
party, to which Barden replied that he had never voted anything but a
straight Democratic ticket and avowed his support for the New Deal and
for Franklin Roosevelt. Barden won the second primary by fewer than two
thousand votes, but his primary victory was tantamount to election in the
heavily Democratic district.
When Barden went to Washington in 1935 for his first term as a U.S.
representative of the Third District of North Carolina, he was assigned to
both the Committee on Education and the Committee on Rivers and Har-
bors. His seat on the latter enabled him to provide tangible benefits to his
constituents by working for navigational improvements, such as deepening
and widening channels, in the coastal counties of his district. His assign-
ment to the Committee on Education allowed him to work for improve-
ments in his area of interest. During his early years in Congress he cooperated
with the House leadership and with President Roosevelt while keeping an
eye on his obligations to the Third District. Several times, he campaigned
for reelection on his record of support for Roosevelt. The American Federa-
tion of Labor even lauded him for his prolabor leanings, based on four votes
on which Barden voted with the administration (Puryear 1979, 24).
Since Barden was a faithful supporter of the Roosevelt administration,
the House leadership named him as one of the three Democratic "official
objectors," to keep an eye on all private and consent calendar bills to weed
out those without merit in the 75th Congress (1937-38). He studied an
enormous number of bills and was recompensed by assignment to the
House Labor Committee, which had a vacancy caused by the death of a
member. Barden championed Roosevelt's 1937-38 efforts at reducing do-
mestic spending and increasing defense spending. He deplored the "idea
that the Federal government is some sort of spiritual Santa Claus having a
treasury without bottom and always full of money" (Puryear 1979, 27).
Although he voted to cut the president's proposals for relief, Barden also
voted to increase funds for vocational education and supported additional
spending for military construction and for the administration's farm pro-
gram. Barden's views conflicted with those of the Roosevelt administration
on the wages and hours bill and on antilynching bills, but he represented
the views of his district. He held the attitude "that Southerners would take
care of themselves if saved from reformers from other parts of the country."
Otherwise, he depicted Roosevelt as "the greatest man ever to sit in the
White House" (Puryear 1979, 26).
By 1940 the congressman was under attack by his electoral opponents
for his antilabor stances. In the previous year he had been in a well-
publicized dispute with the administration over the exemption of agri-
cultural workers from the wages and hours bill. When Barden ran for the
1940 nomination, he played down his ties to the administration for the first
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time. Instead, he focused on his record and experience, his committee
assignments, and the projects he had won for the district. He won the
nomination and then the election by a three-to-one margin. During the war
years Barden concentrated on bringing federal money to his district. In
1941 he was instrumental in getting Camp Davis, a large antiaircraft firing
base, built in Onslow County, North Carolina, in his district. The eco-
nomic benefits accrued to surrounding counties, and Barden reaped the
political harvest. The same year the Marine Corps built a large base at New
River, also in Onslow County, called Camp Lejeune. Soon thereafter, since
the Marines needed an air base, another military installation was built at
Cherry Point, in Carteret County, again in Barden's district. The navy also
used Morehead City as a sectional base from which to establish coastal and
harbor patrols, submarine detection, and mine-sweeping operations.
Besides the sheer financial benefits to his district, one of the many
interests Barden cultivated during his early years in the House was voca-
tional rehabilitation. During World War II a need for adequate rehabilita-
tion arose when the wounded returned from the war, work-related injuries
grew, and employment increased. One of Barden's pet projects was a bill
designed to fund rehabilitation (Puryear 1979, 41). Barden in the House
and Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (R-Wl) in the Senate introduced identical
vocational rehabilitation bills, but after opposition from veterans groups,
Congress adjourned without acting on either bill. The failure was at-
tributed to disagreements among veterans groups about which agency
should administer the programs. A veterans rehabilitation bill putting
control under the Veterans Administration was enacted instead. The next
term, in the 78th Congress, Barden deleted the clauses pertaining to
veterans in his bill and resubmitted it. This time it survived the legislative
process mostly intact and became the Barden-La Follette Vocational Re-
habilitation Act (P.L. 78-113).
By the 78th Congress (1943-44), Barden had enough seniority to chair
either the Library Committee or the Committee on Fducation. He opted
for the latter, which put him in a more strategic position from which to push
both his educational and his vocational rehabilitation interests. Throughout
his prechairman stint as a member of Congress, Barden focused his energies
in large part on education, labor, and benefits for his district. He faithfully
represented the Third District of North Carolina and, in the process,
wandered into the policy areas of agriculture and foreign policy.
Orientation of the Chairman
A committee chairman's orientation determines, to a large extent, how he
operates his committee and how he treats issues that come before it. His
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ideological proclivities affect the content and form of legislation reported by
the committee and often determine its outcome. Within certain externally
imposed parameters, his orientation and his leadership affect committee
operations and outputs, thus leaving their mark on public policy. Several
sources form the basis for inferences about the chairman's orientation
toward his committee and the issues it faced: his constituency and district
characteristics, his reputation concerning his philosophy, his voting rec-
ords, his interest group ratings, and his party-unity scores.
Barden's orientation as chairman of the Committee on Education and
Labor reflected, to a large degree, the characteristics of his constituency
and district. The people who elected him to represent them in Congress
played an important, albeit indirect, role in the operation of this commit-
tee.2 Their characteristics help explain his adamant opposition to federal
aid to education, his views toward integration, and his support for labor
reform.
He represented the Third District of North Carolina, located on the
eastern end of the state and including nine counties: Sampson, Wayne,
Duplin, Pender, Onslow, Jones, Craven, Pamlico, and Carteret. The
district's economy was based on agriculture. The main crops included
tobacco, cotton, corn, peanuts, soybeans, potatoes, strawberries, and blue-
berries. The lumber industry also provided significant income to the
district, with timberland comprising about 70 percent of the total acreage.
In the eastern counties of his district, along the Atlantic coast, commercial
fishing was a major industry. After Barden had been in Congress for a
while, military interests became well entrenched. As Barden's biographer,
Elmer Puryear, wrote, "Graham Barden was a product of the region and
possessed an understanding of the problems and aspirations of its inhabi-
tants and wanted to represent them in Washington" (1979, 13). Born and
raised on a farm, initially he reflected the agricultural concerns of his
district. Agriculture took priority over labor (Puryear 1979, 141).
The political characteristics of the chairman's district also provided
important elements for his orientation. The South traditionally has been
more conservative than many other parts of the country, and Barden's
district was no exception. Along with a majority of other southerners,
North Carolinians customarily favored states' rights over federal control or
centralization. They were also habitually Democratic. Barden was not just
from eastern North Carolina; he was of eastern North Carolina. He knew
what the people in his district wanted, and he differed from them little in
that respect. He was one of them. They long had opposed labor unions.
They objected to efforts by the federal government to force them to
integrate their schools. They were conservative economically. Barden
distrusted bureaucracy, big government, corruption, inflation, and "give-
away" programs and was "suspicious of bigness in any form" (Puryear
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1979, 226-27). He followed his own instincts in representing his district,
and judging from the absence of serious electoral opposition for most of his
career, he was successful.
By both reputation and action, Chairman Barden was a staunch south-
ern conservative.3 He held fast to the notion of being a Democrat, but in the
minds of some, after he became chairman he was a Democrat in name only.
Although he was convinced, especially after the 83d Congress, that Repub-
licans "simply don't know how to run the government" (Puryear 1979,
107), he spent a great deal of his legislative time allied with them. I le earned
the reputation among his Democratic colleagues of being more of a Repub-
lican than a Democrat because of his conservative views, especially on
federal aid to education and organized labor. He held traditional southern
attitudes, regarding labor unions as inherently evil organizations interfer-
ing with free enterprise.
The chairman also held traditional southern views on states' rights: the
federal government has a job to do, but it must not interfere in the business
of state governments. Barden maintained that the responsibility for the
operation of the nation's public schools lay in the hands of state govern-
ments, not with the federal government, and was suspicious of federal aid
to education because it presumed some degree of federal control over state
prerogatives. In the early 1950s he was persuaded that since the public
schools were having a hard time fulfilling their responsibilities, the federal
government should help. He favored aid to federally impacted areas, such
as those near large federal installations that provided extra students and no
revenues from property taxes. He promoted aid to elementary and second-
ary schools until the question arose about whether to aid private (i.e.,
religious) and parochial schools. Federal tax money, he contended, should
not be used to support religious education, even if, as his opponents argued,
it reduced substantially the burden on the public schools. If his opponents
insisted on federal aid to private schools, he would do everything in his
power to prevent it, even if it meant putting a stop to all federal aid
proposals.
The issue of racial integration was a thorn in his side. He objected to
efforts to prohibit federal aid to schools in states that allowed segregation of
the races in education, especially since North Carolina was among them.
As a consequence, his detractors charged bigotry despite his record of
opposition to the Great Tiger Klan. I Ie maintained that he was not bigoted
but adamantly opposed federal interference in state functions. To Barden,
federal laws dictating that his state could not receive federal funds because
it practiced segregation reeked of unwarranted and unwanted federal inter-
ference in the state domain. He held the firm conviction that "with federal
dollars came federal regulators to interfere in the operation of local schools"
(Puryear 1979, 108).
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Table 2.1. Barden's Interest Group Ratings Compared with the Average Scores
of Other Members
Group
AFL
AFL
CIO
CIO
ADA
ADA
Labor
AFL-CIO
ACA
COPE
ADA
Year
1947-52
1951
1951
1951-52
1951
1952
1953-54
1947-56
1957-59
1959-60
1960
Barden
3.7
20.0
0.0
0.0
7.7
0.0
33.3
26.3
52.0
10.0
11.0
E&L Dems
54.5
67.1
55.0
57.6
60.4
58.2
72.6
55.1
15.9
88.7
88.9
HR Dems
54.2
69.9
58.9
56.1
58.9
53.4
66.2
52.4
22.0
71.8
72.2
Full E&L
34.6
55.8
40.0
38.3
39.4
35.9
41.5
34.0
39.8
65.2
68.0
Full HR
35.0
42.5
43.7
40.1
40.5
37.7
41.6
35.2
43.6
54.6
56.3
Source: Author's calculations from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1951-61.
Barden's conservative and traditionally southern viewpoints aggra-
vated many of the more liberal members of Congress. In their eyes, he used
his position as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor to
impede progress on important social problems. He obstructed federal aid to
education of all sorts. He also did everything in his power to curtail the
activities of labor unions, thus evoking the anger and frustration of friends
of organized labor.
In this study, Barden's attitudes are gauged from surrogate measures
of ideology—from scores on scales devised by interest groups. Where
already-compiled scales were not available, the scores were calculated
from the numbers of times Barden supported the positions of the various
interest groups based on the number of "right" and "wrong" votes.4 The
chairman's scores are presented in table 2.1, along with those of Education
and Labor Democrats, House Democrats, the full Education and Labor
Committee, and the full House. The higher the score, the more closely
the members conformed to the relevant interest group's position. An
examination of the scores shows that Barden voted much more conserva-
tively than did his colleagues on the committee and in the House. There
was a difference of more than fifty points between his scores from most
liberal interest groups and those of his fellow Democrats on Education and
Labor. Barden received substantially higher scores on conservative meas-
ures than did his committee Democratic colleagues and most other Demo-
crats in the House. On all the labor union votes and on those of the ADA,
he scored substantially lower than did most other Democrats, ranking
among the lowest on every scale. Contrary to their reputation in later
years, committee Democrats, including the few southerners who brought
down the average, did not in the early part of the decade show outstanding
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Table 2.2. Barden's Party-Unity Scores Compared with the Average Scores of
Other Democrats, 1951-1960
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
Year
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
Barden
38
59
37
34
22
E & L Democrats
77.0
76.9
75.0
72.6
76.2
HR Democrats
77.0
76.6
71.0
68.3
70.7
Source: Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1951-60.
levels of support for labor issues or other liberal issues outlined by the ADA
in the 1950s. But Barden rated extremely conservative on all union or
liberal scales. On the ACA's ratings, Barden ranked moderately conserva-
tive. He scored above the House average and even higher above the com-
mittee average. Conservative Republicans often could count on Graham
Barden as a powerful ally in their quests to stop liberal legislation from
reaching the floor.
Also based on votes cast on the floor of the House, party-unity scores
provide additional clues to the chairman's orientation (see table 2.2).
Throughout the 1950s Barden's average party-unity score was 38 percent.
The comparable committee average for Democrats was 75.6 percent, and
that of all House Democrats, 72.7 percent. When the Democrats were in
the minority in the Republican-controlled 83d Congress, Barden voted
more often with his fellow Democrats, scoring only 18 percent lower than
both House and committee Democrats. When majorities of the two parties
were in opposition, it is clear that Barden voted with a Republican majority
much more often than he voted with the Democrats. In all but the 83d
Congress, he supported his party on less than half the occasions that his
committee and House colleagues did. It is understandable that in the 83d
Congress he might vote more often with the Democrats because of their
minority status, and at that time he still thought that the Republicans were
not competent to run the government.
Barden's support for his party diminished as the decade progressed.
His aversion to federal aid to education became more entrenched with the
advent of mandatory school integration and with the increasing probability
of aid going to parochial schools. His suspicion of labor unions increased
with the onslaught of strikes and with the exposure of corruption in union
leadership throughout the 1950s. With increasing frequency, he cast his
vote with the Republicans, who also opposed federal aid to education and
who set out with a vengeance to clean up the labor unions and to restrict
their activities and influence. In short, committee voting behavior aside,
Barden earned his reputation as a conservative.
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Table 2.3. Barden's Support for Democrats on Committee Party Votes,
1951-1960
Year Party votes
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
Total
Percentage
of total
0
4
4
4
14
25
14
65
Year Party votes
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
Total
Percentage
of total
2
11
8
5
18
49
16
109
> 7 0 % Democrats v.
With Dems
N
0
0
1
0
7
7
4
19
> 5 0 %
%
0.0
0.0
25.0
0.0
50.0
28.0
28.6
29.2
Democrats v.
With Dems
N
0
0
2
0
8
8
5
23
%
0.0
0.0
25.0
0.0
44.4
16.3
31.3
21.1
>70% Republicans
With Reps
N
0
4
3
3
3
17
9
39
>50%
%
0.0
100.0
75.0
75.0
21.4
68.0
64.3
60.0
Republicans
With Reps
N
2
11
6
4
4
39
10
76
%
100.0
100.0
75.0
80.0
22.2
79.6
62.3
69.7
No vote
0
0
0
1
4
1
1
7
No vote
0
0
0
1
6
2
1
10
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-60.
Votes for 1953, 1954, and 1957 were not available.
The degree of support that the chairman provided to each party is
determined from the party votes taken in committee, as reflected in the
minutes of the committee (see table 2.3). Relying on the 70-percent crite-
rion to define a party vote, Barden's high point of siding with his own party
in committee came in 1958, when he cast half of his votes with the Demo-
crats. With the exception of that year, he sided with the Republicans more
frequently than he did with the Democrats on party votes. His average
support of the Democrats throughout his tenure as chairman was just under
30 percent on party votes. He supported the Republicans, on the other
hand, on an average of 60 percent of those roll calls. In 1956, 1958, 1959,
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Table 2.3. Barden's Support for Democrats on Committee Party Votes,
1951-1960, Continued
61
Year Party votes
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
Total
Percentage
of total
0
3
2
3
13
23
13
57
Year Party votes
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
Total
Percentage
of total
0
0
1
2
8
11
4
26
> 7 5 % Democrats v
With Dems
N
0
0
1
0
6
7
3
17
>90%
%
0.0
0.0
50.0
0.0
46.2
30.4
23.1
29.8
Democrats v
With Dems
N
0
0
1
0
4
2
0
7
%
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
50.0
18.1
0.0
26.9
. > 7 5 % Republicans
With Reps
N
0
3
1
2
3
15
9
33
. > 9 0 %
%
0.0
100.0
50.0
66.7
23.1
65.2
69.2
57.9
Republicans
With Reps
N
0
0
0
1
1
8
3
13
%
0.0
0.0
0.0
50.0
12.5
72.7
75.0
50.0
No vote
0
0
0
1
4
1
1
7
No vote
0
0
0
1
3
1
1
6
and 1960, the chairman abstained from some party votes, thus bringing
down his average support of both parties.
Using an even stricter measure, an examination of committee roll calls
on which at least three-fourths of the Democrats lined up against three-
fourths of the Republicans, Barden again predominantly supported the
Republicans on party votes. Until 1958 he only voted once with the
Democrats on party votes. With the exception of that year, he supported
the Republicans on about two-thirds or more of the party votes, averaging
60 percent support of their position and 29.2 percent support of the
Democrats throughout the 1950s. As shown in table 2.3, from roll calls
62 Congressional Committee Chairmen
Table 2.4. Barden's Votes on the Winning Side in Committee, 1951-1960
Year
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
Total
Percentage
of total
Roll calls
4
23
10
10
30
71
21
169
Chair
N
4
17
5
6
11
50
6
99
wins
%
100.0
73.9
50.0
60.0
36.7
70.4
28.6
58.6
Party votes*
0
4
4
4
14
25
14
65
Chair
N
0
3
2
1
7
8
4
25
wins
%
0.0
75.0
50.0
25.0
50.0
32.0
28.6
38.5
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-60. Votes for 1953,
1954, and 1957 were not available.
*Party votes are defined as roll-call votes on which at least 70 percent of the Democrats
opposed at least 70 percent of the Republicans.
adjudged to be party votes by several criteria, one can conclude that in the
committee Barden voted more like the Republicans than like the Demo-
crats. Even by the most stringent criterion, with 90 percent of the members
of one party opposed to 90 percent of the other party, he still voted more
frequently with the Republicans.
Another characteristic of Barden's orientation toward the committee
and the issues before it can be gleaned from the proportion of times that he
voted on the prevailing side on committee roll-call votes. Not only how
often his side won but how often his side was victorious on party votes is
telling. Party votes are here considered those on which at least 70 percent of
the Democrats opposed at least 70 percent of the Republicans (see table
2.4). Although Barden voted with the winning side on a fairly healthy
proportion of committee roll calls over the decade, it is interesting to note
the generally declining percentages of his victories on party votes. Toward
the end of the 1950s, when the House leadership increased the size of the
committee and began loading it with liberal Democrats, Barden became
less and less effective at creating a majority on roll calls by his alliances with
Republicans. Even in 1959, when there was an abundance of roll calls and
he cast his ballot on the winning side on over 70 percent of them, his wins on
party votes declined. The large proportion of victories on all committee
votes that year stems from consideration of labor union financial reporting
and disclosure legislation, which consumed most of the committee's efforts.
There were enough members who wanted labor reform or who were
willing to vote for some provisions to keep harsher restrictions from being
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adopted to give Barden's side the edge. With the exception of 1956 and
1959, Barden's winning record on all committee votes also declined
throughout the decade.
Leadership: Institutional versus Personal Resources
Leadership is important because it affects committee structures, opera-
tions, atmospheres, and successes, resulting in different focuses and out-
puts for the committees and, ultimately, different policy outcomes.
Different chairmen exercise different leadership techniques. They use their
resources in a variety of ways, depending on a host of factors, including the
issues, the composition of their committees, the institutional context, and
their personalities. Determined to some extent by institutional context, a
chairman's leadership is an interaction between his institutionally derived
prerogatives and his personal political skills.6 His institutional orientation
can be inferred from the way he uses the means provided by his position in
the organization. His use of personal resources can be gauged by his
reputation, expertise, and political skills. Each of the three chairmen of the
Committee on Education and Labor examined in this study will be evalu-
ated on his use of institutional and personal resources.
One way to approach leadership is through a framework based on the
leader's reliance on the institutionally derived resources at his disposal.7 An
analysis of congressional committee leadership should include discussions
of the constraints imposed, of the chairman's reliance on his official pre-
rogatives, written and unwritten, and of his use of rewards and sanctions. A
discussion of the use of personal resources should focus on his reputation
among his peers, both in the committee and in the House, and on his
knowledge of the subject at hand and the rules. When discerned, these
elements of leadership should help illuminate the conceptually murky
linkage between a chairman and his committee members and the implica-
tions this relationship has for public policy.
Knowledge of which resources leaders tend to draw on most heavily
provides additional understanding of the interactions between leaders and
followers, in this case between a House committee chairman and his fellow
committee members. It also helps explain the impact of these relationships
on committee outputs. A chairman's manner of running his committee can
be approached from various angles, but the framework depicting his use of
institutional prerogatives and personal resources is one of the most telling.
Moreover, other leaders can be studied in the same manner, and their
techniques can be compared readily.
One aspect of a chairman's leadership is how he responds to the
expectations of him held by other members of his committee. Much of his
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influence derives from the prerogatives of the position. All chairmen have
at their disposal various tools with which to run their committees. Several
are spelled out in the House rules, and others, such as seniority, are
unwritten norms of the House. In addition, each committee has some say
over the powers of its chairman.
During the first ten years after the establishment of the Committee on
Education and Labor in 1947, the chairman had seemingly unlimited
power over the committee (MacNeil 1963; Galloway 1953a; Clapp 1963;
Goodwin 1970).8 Few constraints were imposed by the House rules or by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The chairman controlled the
establishment of subcommittees, the referral of legislation within the com-
mittee, the calling of meetings, and the scheduling of legislation for con-
sideration by the committee. He determined whether and when the
committee was to hold hearings and investigations. He had final approval
over the lists of witnesses to testify before the committee. He presided at
hearings and at committee meetings and had the authority to choose
whether or not to recognize people to speak. He controlled the committee
funds, authorized committee-related travel, and oversaw the employment
and discharge of staff members and the assignment of staff duties. The
chairman recommended to the Speaker appointments to conference com-
mittees and also acted as the primary manager in those groups. He had the
authority to manage committee bills and to control their debate on the floor,
whether he favored or opposed them. One of his most important resources
was his power over the timing of legislation. There were so many bills
referred to the committee that members could not possibly consider them
all. The chairman influenced which bills were chosen and when they were
discussed.
One of Barden's most effective weapons in his institutional arsenal was
the chairman's control over subcommittees. Until the revolt against him in
1957, when the committee adopted rules concerning the establishment of
standing subcommittees, Barden ran a centralized committee and ap-
pointed few subcommittees. He referred little legislation to those he did
appoint. Most of the work was done in full committee, where the chairman
could monitor it closely. When the chairman was particularly interested in
pursuing legislation, he chaired the subcommittee himself, as he did on aid
to federally impacted areas. North Carolina, and Barden's district in par-
ticular, had several large military bases. He could serve his district well by
making sure that it got at least its fair share of federal aid money. Moreover,
he could wield enough influence in the subcommittee to ensure that his
provisions maintaining state control and minimizing federal interference
were included.
Unlike members of the Committee on Ways and Means (Manley 1967,
119), Education and Labor members were not universally happy with the
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lack of reliance on subcommittees. There was no long tradition of not
having them, as Ways and Means had. Earlier chairmen had appointed and
used them. When Barden named subcommittees, he used them selectively
and effectively in accordance with his goals. He refused to establish stand-
ing subcommittees, preferring to keep committee matters under his thumb.
He appointed a few ad hoc units, though they were usually tools for
dispensing with unacceptable but popular legislation, particularly in his
later years as chairman. He would appoint a sympathetic subcommittee
and refer to it legislation that he preferred never see the light of day. He
rewarded his friends and ideological cohorts with subcommittee appoint-
ments and chairmanships, and thus not all members were afforded the
opportunity to serve. By 1957 the committee members were so dissatisfied
with the absence of subcommittees that they threatened a rebellion against
the chairman if he did not appoint standing subcommittees with fixed
jurisdictions. Even after he complied, subcommittees were not used to the
satisfaction of the members, who threatened Barden again in the next
session, the 86th Congress.
Barden also prevailed by other means, which included his power to call
or not to call committee meetings. Notwithstanding the fact that the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 mandated regular meeting days
with additional meetings to be called by the chair, Education and Labor
members voted in 1952 to meet at the call of the chairman. Several years
later they reneged. The lack of meetings was one of the most often-heard
complaints by Education and Labor members. In an effort to bury legisla-
tion that he found disagreeable, Barden called few meetings, thus frustrat-
ing members who wanted to consider bills assigned to the committee.
Relying on another institutional prerogative of the chairmanship, Barden
decided if, when, and where to hold hearings. If they suited his purpose,
fine. If they did not, they were never held. By manipulating the witness
lists and the time the witnesses had to speak, he managed to stifle a great
deal of dissent.
The chairman also controlled the committee's agenda, which was of
primary importance to the committee's output. Everything that came
before the committee came first to the chairman, who had the authority to
decide whether the committee would consider a particular piece of legisla-
tion, if it would be referred to a subcommittee, whether to hold hearings on
the subject, and the timing of these steps. His power over these choices was
significant. So many bills were referred to Education and Labor that the
chairman had to make strategic choices. Barden used this prerogative to his
fullest advantage, steering the committee in a conservative direction. He
pigeonholed much of the legislation he opposed and referred other bills to
ad hoc subcommittees composed of members who were not disposed to
report them to the full committee.
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Another use of the chairman's institutional prerogatives was his control
over the appointment and operations of the committee staff. Unlike the
staffs hired by the finance committees and others, Education and Labor
staff members did not have to be experts on matters within the committee's
jurisdiction. They were to serve at the beck and call of the chairman, a
tradition that still holds to a large extent in the 1990s. Staff appointments
were strictly under the chairman's patronage. Barden hired the few staff
members the committee had, keeping the majority staff small. In name they
worked for the committee; in reality they worked for the chairman.
Barden capitalized on the norms and expectations that went along with
the role of chairman. Making full use of his prerogatives, he ran a tight ship.
Little that he opposed ever emerged from the committee intact. If it did, he
relied on his friends in high places, such as the House Committee on Rules,
to help him. Committee members voted many of these prerogatives to the
chairman during the early and mid-1950s, but they began withdrawing
their support for them in later years when they thought Barden was abusing
his powers. The committee limited his discretion on the creation of sub-
committees and on their size and jurisdictions. The rules adopted in 1957
specified the name, size, and jurisdiction of each subcommittee and man-
dated that all legislation referred to the full committee be referred to the
appropriate subcommittees. The rules granted the subcommittees authori-
zation to hold hearings, receive exhibits, hear witnesses, and report back to
the full committee. The rules also specified that regular committee meet-
ings be held at least twice each month and otherwise at the call of the
chairman. Later, in 1959, members stipulated that the committee could
recall legislation from a subcommittee for immediate consideration in the
full committee or for referral to another subcommittee. These provisions
diminished the effect of the chairman's pigeonholing power.
After the advent of the new rules, Barden still managed to control his
committee more than it wanted to be controlled. He maintained the
agenda-setting functions, his prerogatives of recognition in committee
meetings and nominations to conference committees, and the ability to
construct a winning coalition with the help of the Republicans. Even in
later years members continued to grant him the power to employ and dis-
charge committee staff members as he saw fit. He used his powers to full
capacity.
The characterization of a chairman's institutional leadership is par-
ticularly reflected in his use of rewards. Their distribution implies manip-
ulation of circumstances to benefit the needs of others. It also implies some
benefit to the dispenser of the rewards. Committee chairmen have few
tangible incentives to induce the desired behavior of other members, since
they are limited by the constitutional and democratic need to treat members
equally. Moreover, chairmen cannot regulate the pay or the job status of
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committee members in regard to perceived good or poor performance
(Cooper 1977). By virtue of their organizational positions, chairmen in the
1950s did have a number of perquisites available. They could reward
members with their names on prominent pieces of legislation, with sub-
committee chairmanships, with appointments to subcommittees, with con-
ference committee membership, with management of bills on the floor, and
with recognition for contributions. Chairmen also controlled committee
office space, travel money, and staff support. Barden, it seems, did not use
rewards as frequently as some other chairmen did (see Manley 1967,
128-37). He did not subscribe, at least with the committee majority, to the
old axiom that honey catches more flies than vinegar. He rewarded his
friends with occasional subcommittee chairmanships and, infrequently,
with sponsorship of important legislation.
One example of the latter form of reward came in the Landrum-Griffin
Act.The committee had voted sixteen to fourteen to report Carl Elliott's
bill, which was similar to a Senate labor reform bill but contained over a
hundred amendments mostly designed to make the bill less offensive to
unions. Liberals condemned it as too harsh, and conservatives denounced it
as too weak. Barden requested that the Rules Committee authorize an open
rule, thus allowing other bills to be offered as substitutes for the committee
bill. He worked closely with members of a joint subcommittee dealing with
labor reform to come up with a more stringent labor bill. As his biographer
noted, he "maneuvered a committee shattered by divergent views into
accepting a bill he did not want in order to get something before the House"
(Puryear 1979, 204). He picked junior members Phil Landrum (D-GA) and
Robert Griffin (R-JV1I) to sponsor the bipartisan alternative, but he man-
aged the bill himself on the floor and won handily. Landrum and Griffin
had their names on major legislation because of their support for and
alliance with the chairman (Puryear 1979, 196-206).
Barden also appointed his friends to subcommittee chairmanships.
During one session, Cleveland Bailey (D-WV) headed three subcommit-
tees, and Carl Elliott (D-AL) chaired two. By and large, Barden's subcom-
mittee chairmen were southerners. There were a few exceptions, such as
Augustine Kelley (D-PA), Roy Wier (D-MN), Lee Metcalf (D-JVIT), and
Ludwig Teller (D-NY), though most did not chair subcommittees of major
import to the chairman. The chairman, however, liked Teller enough to
give him a subcommittee on welfare and pension plans in the 85th Con-
gress. One member recalled that "Barden loved Teller. He was an NYU
professor who wrote about the Taft-Hartley Act. Barden appointed him to
head a task force to investigate labor corruption. Udall and Metcalf de-
stroyed him" (interview).
A chairman's leadership is also reflected in his use of sanctions. Barden
withheld, among other things, subcommittee seats as well as chairmanships
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from his enemies. The best example of this use of power concerned Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY), who, as the second-ranking Democrat on the
committee, thought he was entitled to a subcommittee chairmanship. With
the backing of most of the full committee members, Barden refused to
appoint Powell to a subcommittee chairmanship, even though the seniority
norm dictated it, and did not appoint him to a subcommittee until the 85th
Congress. Barden did issue travel vouchers to Powell to get him out of the
way, although he sometimes denied them to others.
In sum, Barden rarely relied on the use of rewards and then only when
it suited his personal goals. He may have been thinking of them more as
tools than as rewards. Nevertheless, he favored those who supported him
and on whom he could rely with subcommittee chairmanships and spon-
sorship of major legislation. He dispensed these perquisites for political
reasons and not because they were well deserved by the recipients. He was
also not averse to withholding seemingly deserved rewards when it suited
his purposes.
Personal leadership is the other important aspect of a chairman's overall
leadership. Although personal resources may be related to the organization,
they do not accrue to anyone as a result of being in a leadership position. On
the contrary, they may be instrumental in helping the leader attain or retain
his position. They are accentuated or diminished by the institutional
context in which they are used. Personal power in Congress is shaped by
the use of personal resources in managing institutional prerogatives (and by
the institutional context). It depends on what constraints the chairman is
under, what prerogatives he has at his disposal, and how he employs them.
It also depends on his political skills and leanings. The chairman's personal
resources include his mastery of the subject matter and the rules, his
reputation, and his political skills and goals.
In Congress, as in other organizations, an important element of influ-
ence rests on knowledge of the subject matter in a leader's jurisdiction,
whether it is substantive, as in the case of standing committees, or pro-
cedural or political, as in the case of the House leadership. A chairman's
expertise and experience provide him with resources not readily available to
other committee members. Hall (1986, 1989) emphasized that experience
and expertise reduce the opportunity costs of participating in committee
decision making. They provide the chairman with a solid base from which
to try to influence others. Several psychologists studying leadership con-
cluded that "group members tend to defer to the perceived expert. Per-
ceived expertness tends to legitimize the leadership role" (Stogdill 1974,
285). Education and Labor's jurisdiction makes it hard for any member to
be the chief expert. Everyone knows something about education and has an
opinion on it. The same holds true for labor. The issues under this
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committee do not inspire compromise on technicalities, as does Ways and
Means legislation, for example. Education and Labor issues are more clear-
cut. Even so, it helps the chairman if he knows his material.
Barden had a lifelong interest in education and already had some
expertise by the time he was elected to Congress in 1935. He had pushed for
adequate funding for public schools during his tenure in the North Carolina
state legislature. In Congress, he was assigned to the Committee on Educa-
tion, as well as to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors. While the latter
proved to be a solid base for serving his district, the Education Committee
also gave him the opportunity to benefit the folks back home and the chance
to pursue his interest in education. As the former schoolteacher accrued
seniority on the Committee on Education, he gained national recognition
for his educational achievements, and later he gained notoriety. He cham-
pioned the cause of North Carolina public schools and the efforts that the
state had made to keep them going. He fought to keep from his state the
unfair burden of having to compensate for the lack of fiscal efforts by other
states to maintain their public school systems. Throughout his career he
maintained close contacts with the education establishment back in North
Carolina (Puryear 1979). Barden also worked on legislative programs for
vocational rehabilitation, his real area of expertise and interest. In 1943 he
wrote and aided the passage of the Barden-La Follette Vocational Re-
habilitation Act, which emphasized state roles in rendering services to train
disabled persons to support themselves. Barden's biographer noted that
"throughout his career Barden kept a jealous eye on the administration of
the act, insisting upon necessary appropriations and the retention of state
control" (Puryear 1979, 45). Many of the education bills referred to the
committee resulted in new bills offered by Barden. He gained considerable
expertise by having his fingerprints on most of the education legislation to
emerge from the committee. He especially left his mark in maintaining state
control over education, an area that he strongly believed to be outside the
purview of Congress.
Since by organized labor's standards Barden had a perfect voting
record on labor issues in his early years in Congress, he was appointed,
without asking for the position, to fill the vacancy on the Labor Committee
in 1937. A hard worker throughout his service, Barden made an about-face
from prolabor to antilabor stances. He participated in the shaping of the
Wagner Act (49 Stat. 449), the Taft-Hartley Act (P.L. 80-101), the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act (P.L. 86-257), the Fair Labor Standards Act (P.L.
75-718), and many others. In his early years in Congress Barden also
accumulated expertise and national attention in the arena of labor policy
when he switched from being a strong supporter of New Deal legislation to
an antilabor stance. He opposed the president on exemptions in the Fair
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Labor Standards Act as he tried to secure broader exemptions for agri-
cultural workers (Puryear 1979, 29).
While Barden certainly could be considered an expert on both educa-
tion and labor legislation, he did not have the reputation as a technical
expert enjoyed by Wilbur Mills on Ways and Means. Mills knew the tax
code better than just about anyone else and could run rings around most of
his fellow committee members, who frequently deferred to his expertise
(Manley 1967, 112-15). Barden, though, did have extensive knowledge of
the legislation that came under the jurisdiction of his committee. Most of
the Education and Labor Committee's legislation was not of the extreme
technical nature that Ways and Means bills were, so it was not necessary for
Barden to master the details to the same extent that Mills did or for his
committee members to defer to his leadership.
Barden also had an impressive mastery of the procedural rules of the
House. He knew them backward and forward and was known for being
able to use them to attain his goals—generally, thwarting liberal legislation.
Because of his adroit manipulation of the rules, he was known as a master of
parliamentary maneuver and played the role to the hilt.
A telling element of a chairman's personal leadership is his reputation
among his colleagues. Barden was highly respected in the House for his
ability to achieve his purposes and for his high principles. He had many
friends, especially among the southerners and the leadership. He relied on
these allies to support him when he could no longer contain an issue in his
committee. Some of his powerful friends in the House, however, disagreed
with Barden enough to stack his committee against him.
His colleagues on Education and Labor admired him for his per-
sistence, for his principles, for his ability to manipulate things to his best
interest, for his knowledge of procedure, and for his prowess in building
coalitions, but many did not much like him (interviews). Not that he was an
unlikable person—many people said he was absolutely charming. But he
frustrated too many people to be popular among his fellow committee
members. In fact, some members downright deplored him. A staff member
recalled, "Barden just drove Adam Powell wild" (interview). Another
former staff member, on the other hand, characterized Barden as "great,
jovial, and a good chairman. He was pretty good to his staff, but he
disagreed with Fred Hussey [the staff director] once in a while. Barden was
lots of fun" (interview).
Barden's adroit manipulation of rules and circumstances earned him
high regard. Even his staunchest opponents recognized great political feats
when they saw them. His last committee meeting as chairman provided just
one example of why he commanded grudging respect among his fellow
committee members. Trying to keep the liberal committee members from
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offering a Calendar Wednesday resolution to have the House consider
common site picketing and minimum wage, he arranged for Carl Elliott
to drag on for hours on a seemingly minor bill, much to the frustration
and anguish of other members. According to Puryear, "Whenever Elliott
showed signs of running down, Barden asked him carefully phrased ques-
tions with long pauses for meditation in order to get just the right word.
The chairman brushed aside points of order, parliamentary inquiries,
demands for votes and motions to adjourn until the next day" (1979, 208).
Barden had the timing figured out so that when Elliott finished, the I louse
would be in session. He adjourned the committee without ever getting
around to the liberal proposals, thus sealing their fate. One of his harshest
critics, Erank Thompson, Jr., (D-NJ), admitted that Barden had carried off
a masterful political move. Later Chairman Carl Perkins also confessed to a
grudging respect for Barden's abilities and his canniness at running the
committee to suit his own needs.
Committee chairmen, in particular, have at their disposal numerous
ways to exert negative influence. When chairmen successfully obstruct
legislation, they are using their resources in a negative manner, as they are
when they fail to use the seemingly appropriate rewards. Some do so more
than others. Chairman Mills of Ways and Means, for example, rarely took
advantage of his many opportunities to block or adulterate legislation or to
oppose his committee outright (Manley 1967, 137). Barden, on the other
hand, was a master of negative influence. He relied a great deal on the
negative use of resources to achieve his purposes. Manley (1967, 137) cited
him as the prime example of a chairman who used his authority to pro-
voke extreme hostility, tempered by grudging respect, from his fellow
members.
Failing to call meetings to prevent legislation from being discussed or
reported was a frequently employed negative practice. A Capitol Hill
observer described the situation: "Graham Barden of North Carolina . . .
ruled the House Education and Labor Committee with an arbitrariness that
approached tyranny. Barden, a conservative whose committee members
often saw the country's legislative needs differently from him, at times
simply blocked passage of all legislation under his jurisdiction by refusing
to call any sessions of his committee. With the committee unable to act,
the legislation referred to the committee died a-borning" (MacNeil 1963,
172-73). When obliged to hold a meeting, Barden rounded up his Republi-
can and southern Democratic allies to speak on matters of little importance
or on anything but what the liberals were trying to have the committee
consider. In effect, he encouraged filibustering. His treatment of his last
committee meeting in 1960 where he effectively buried common site picket-
ing legislation provides just one example of his negative leadership. His
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adjourning committee meetings for lack of a quorum when he knew that
sufficient members were on their way provides another.
Barden's refusal to rely on subcommittees is also an example of his
negative use of institutional resources. Had his failure to appoint subcom-
mittees ensured that all members had a say in what went into the legislation
or had it promoted unity or played down differential influence among
members, his use of this power would have been positive. Barden used his
authority, however, to keep legislation he believed undesirable from being
considered and reported. He made sure that it was taken up in the full
committee if it was considered at all. He declined to use subcommittees so
that he could capitalize on the rampant dissent among members on most
issues, playing up their differences to prevent them from forming winning
coalitions. His actions enhanced centralization and facilitated his domi-
nance of the committee.
Subcommittee assignments were another negative tool available to
Barden because of his position. On several occasions he stacked subcom-
mittees with opponents of a particular type of legislation, as when he named
a subcommittee with anti-federal aid to education proclivities to consider
just such legislation. When he created a subcommittee for some purpose or
another, he made sure that he or his allies were present to protect his
interests. Ironically, the House leadership used this same strategy against
Barden when they assigned a host of liberals and no Democratic southern-
ers to the committee beginning in 1956.
Withholding rewards was another aspect of Chairman Barden's nega-
tive leadership. He used almost every available tactic to ensure that his
preferences prevailed, including denying what should have been granted,
by tradition, to other members. Powell, denied both a subcommittee
chairmanship and subcommittee membership, was an object of this nega-
tive exercise of power.
Barden also used his committee as a tool for intimidating opponents or
for uncovering perceived wrongdoing. He participated actively in inves-
tigations of labor unions. In 1951, shortly after assuming the committee's
top spot, he created and chaired a subcommittee to investigate allegations of
racketeering, waste, and conspiracy to violate the Taft-Hartley Act by the
Atomic Energy Commission, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, the
U.S. Employment Service, and labor unions affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor on the Savannah River Atomic Energy Plant (see
Puryear 1979, 175-76). The chairman also served on the 83d Congress's
Subcommittee to Investigate Welfare and Pension Plans. For several years
he doggedly pursued investigations of abuses by and proposals to abolish
the Wage Stabilization Board and took advantage of all opportunities to
curtail the powers of organized labor. In the eyes of the liberal, prolabor
members, Barden made full use of his prerogatives in curbing legislation
The Barden Chairmanship 73
favorable to unions and in enforcing as many sanctions on them as he could
muster.
Barden's negative leadership was apparent in instances when he walked
out of committee meetings in frustration, as he did several times during the
consideration of federal aid to education legislation. He left a committee
meeting during a discussion on the National Defense Education Act of 1958
(P.L. 85-864), exasperated over the issue of federal scholarships. Although
they could not act officially without the chairman, members continued
deliberations. On another occasion, the chairman walked off the floor of the
House during consideration of a school aid bill that he was managing. The
subcommittee chairman had to take up where Barden had left off (Puryear
1979, 127).
Barden's negative use of personal resources often was evident in be-
hind-the-scenes maneuvering. When his committee reported a bill over his
opposition, he consulted his friends on other committees to help block it.
Friendship with Howard W. Smith (D-VA), chairman of the Committee
on Rules, provided Barden with many opportunities to affect the fate of
legislation after it had passed his committee and before it went to the floor.
On occasion, instead of doing everything he could do or was authorized to
do by his committee to ensure passage of reported legislation, Barden asked
Judge Smith not to issue a rule for a bill, thus precluding its consideration
on the floor (Puryear 1979). This became the fate of several general aid to
education bills. At other times, Barden colluded with conservatives on the
Rules Committee to get an open rule for an Education and Labor bill,
thereby ensuring that it could be amended beyond recognition on the floor
or replaced entirely with legislation more to his own liking. This strategy
determined the fate of the legislation that eventually became the Landrum-
Griffin Act.
Capitalizing on his friendship with Judge Smith, Barden secured both
an open rule and, later, no rule on a school construction bill sponsored by
Frank Thompson in 1960. When the Education and Labor Committee
bypassed the chairman and reported the bill, Barden requested his allies on
the Rules Committee not to issue a rule. Two months later, after Education
and Labor members threatened to circumvent Rules by use of Calendar
Wednesday, Barden asked for an open rule. The bill was amended on the
floor and passed, one of the first general aid to education bills ever to make it
through the House. After the Senate passed its own education bill, oppo-
nents tried another tactic. This time, Smith and his allies refused to allow
the bill to go to conference with the Senate, thus sealing its fate (see Puryear
1979, 135-37).
Barden profited from the prerogatives of his position, from his ability
to manipulate rewards and inducements, from his expertise on the rules
and on the subject matter, and from his political acumen. He combined
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them, by application, into a negative leadership. Realizing the futility of
trying to convince the liberal members of his committee that labor unions
were inherently evil and that the federal government should not interfere
with the rights of the states to determine their own education policies,
Barden made use of the strategies he deemed appropriate. Since his fellow
Democrats would not see the light as he thought it should be seen, he set
about to do everything to prevent their wattage from being more powerful
than his.
Barden's mission was to prevent liberal legislation from being enacted,
and his tool was the Committee on Education and Labor. While the
chairman had a majority coalition at his disposal, his mission also became
the committee's function. Through manipulation of the committee, he
successfully obstructed federal aid to education for years and prevented or
diluted proposals favorable to organized labor. Moreover, he used his
committee as a vehicle for protecting states' rights. His idea of good public
policy in education was to leave it to the states, and he used all the
accessories that came with the chairmanship to fulfill his mission. Barden
subscribed to the principle that "he never knew the Republic to be endan-
gered by a bill that was not passed" (Puryear 1979, viii).
Barden's Leadership in Retrospect
For most of Barden's chairmanship, the institutional context, particularly
the laxity of the rules in the 1950s, allowed chairmen to act autocratically
and provided the instruments for them to do so. Barden had a wide variety
of institutionally derived resources at his disposal. The combination of the
wealth of prerogatives and his personal orientation led to a negative ap-
proach. Another individual might have used the powerful chairmanship to
promote a positive or active agenda. Barden's leadership, in large part, was
the result of his personality, orientation, and political beliefs. These traits
led him to oppose a positive agenda and instead to focus on preventive
measures and to use his resources accordingly. When Barden repeatedly
thwarted the will of the House majority and stultified the democratic
process, members reacted by putting stringent limits on him, thereby
taking away some of his means. As his institutional resources diminished,
the chairman drew increasingly on his personal reserves, such as his own
political skills and his friendships with members of the Rules Committee, to
secure his ends effectively.
Committees lagged their parent chamber in leadership evolution. As
two scholars noted of House leadership, "by 1940, the personal, political
skills of the leadership, rather than its sources of institutional power, had
become the critical determinant of the fate of party programs" (Cooper
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and Brady 1981a, 420). In the 1950s institutionally derived powers still
were more important than were personal resources in committee lead-
ership, although the latter were not inconsequential. Not until the institu-
tional inducements were removed in the late 1950s did personal resources
begin to emerge as the primary aspect of leadership among committee
chairmen.
The Committee during
the Powell Years
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Democrat of NY, held an entirely different
hand in the game of leadership than did his predecessor, and he played the
game in an atmosphere entirely different from that surrounding Graham
Barden. The political focus of the nation had largely shifted from inter-
national affairs to domestic programs, promoting Education and Labor
proposals to the forefront of the president's agenda. Under the Powell
chairmanship, Education and Labor reformed its committee structure,
enabling it to accommodate the newfound enthusiasm for matters under its
domain and to facilitate the rush to enact the new liberal program. Powell's
cards also included a committee generally more inclined to agree with him
than to block him. The committee environment was conducive to his
leadership—at first.
Setting
Powell assumed the chairmanship of the Committee on Education and
Labor in an era of great social reform.' A number of factors converged to
make it possible. The new Democratic administrations under John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson brought new emphasis on social welfare
programs, including education, labor, and manpower. In addition, the
conservative and obstructionist Graham A. Barden departed the committee
and Congress, thereby removing a significant stumbling block to progres-
sive legislation. Furthermore, the liberals who had been assigned to the
committee by the party leadership to outvote Barden were entrenched by
the time that Powell became chairman.
The newly elected Kennedy administration provided a prominent
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vehicle for education and labor issues in the early 1960s. Although the
sagging economy was a major problem, the president actively promoted
federal aid to education and antipoverty initiatives. Other liberal programs,
doomed throughout the Eisenhower years, finally had a chance under the
Kennedy administration. These included a number of important initia-
tives: increases in the minimum wage and in vocational education, loans
and grants for school construction, broadening of Social Security benefits,
major housing legislation, manpower training programs, anti-water pollu-
tion measures, subsidies for economically distressed areas of the country,
voting rights, and urban renewal.
During Powell's tenure as chairman, other obstacles to the long-
delayed liberal social agenda were removed. Several legislative compro-
mises, formulated in the early to mid-1960s, enabled the passage of federal
aid to education, which had been stymied for so many years (with the
exception of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 [NDEA, P.L.
85-864]). The Brown v. Board of Education cases and the Little Rock crisis had
smoothed the way. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352), which
contained guarantees blocked by southern conservatives for decades, fi-
nally was enacted. It prohibited the use of federal funds for segregated
facilities and gave the federal government the power to sue for school
desegregation, effectively removing one of the major obstacles to federal aid
to education.
A committee with little or no major legislation to its credit as it began
the decade of the 1960s, Education and Labor became one of the more
important House committees because of its jurisdiction over issues that not
only were prominent on the national agenda but that had a prayer of
passing. The committee faced many of the same issues that had divided it
for the preceding decade or so, but few of the structural and policy obstacles
remained. The adoption and enforcement of legal barriers to segregation as
well as institutional changes removed most of the racial hurdles.
The committee's menu included a wealth of education issues in the
Powell years. The major impediment to federal aid remaining was the
question of whether to fund private and religious schools. Under Powell,
carefully formulated compromises involving education associations and
church representatives, as well as members of Congress, diluted the relig-
ious dispute. After lengthy debate, a compromise aimed at providing aid to
students rather than to schools resulted in the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA, P.L. 89-10). By the end of Powell's chair-
manship, neither race nor religion was sufficiently controversial to block
national education legislation, a marked change from the previous decade.
Other education measures were somewhat less controversial. In addi-
tion to the reauthorization of the NDEA, in 1963-64 the committee consid-
ered medical school construction and student loan programs that had been
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in dispute for the previous decade. Moreover, via the committee, Congress
authorized grants and loans for the construction of college buildings and for
expanded vocational education programs designed to deal with civil rights
and unemployment problems. Later, in 1965-66, prominent committee and
national issues included elementary and secondary education, higher edu-
cation, vocational rehabilitation, and library services.
Bridging education and labor, poverty issues rose to the forefront of the
political agenda early in Powell's chairmanship. Poverty policies begun
during the Kennedy administration had been propelled to national atten-
tion primarily as a result of Michael Harrington's book The Other America
(1962). When Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency after the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy in November 1963, Congress proceeded with
his agenda rapidly and successfully. In his first State of the Union address,
President Johnson called for an unconditional declaration of "war on pov-
erty" in the United States (Johnson 1964). Large portions of the resulting
"poverty program" came under the jurisdiction of Education and Labor.
The civil rights issues that dominated much of the domestic political
scene in 1963-64 contributed to the momentum of the War on Poverty.
Blacks pushed for equal rights in voting, employment, education, and
housing. Thousands demonstrated for equality in Birmingham, Alabama,
in Washington, D.C., and in hundreds of other cities across the country. At
the same time, both Republicans and liberal Democrats worked for strong
civil rights bills to combat racial discrimination in all areas of life. Growing
awareness of the problems facing blacks also helped focus attention on the
plight of the poor in America.
As had been the case during most of the previous decade, education
issues largely eclipsed labor issues during Powell's chairmanship. Since
Congress had enacted a strong labor reform bill in 1959, labor-management
questions generally were subjugated to other problems in the 1960s. Mini-
mum-wage legislation, however, blocked for so long under Barden, was the
first item on Powell's agenda in 1961-62. The new law raised the minimum
wage to $1.25 and subsequently, in the 89th Congress (1965-66), to $1.60
an hour. Amendments to the Davis-Bacon Act, which required payment of
the prevailing wage in government contracts, also were considered, as were
several bills relating to migratory labor. Coal mine safety, the Federal
Employees Compensation Act, and manpower development and training
also occupied the committee's time.
Congress defeated committee and administration proposals for the
repeal of Taft-Hartley Act provisions allowing states to enact laws banning
the union shop. President Johnson's troubles over the increasing money
and casualty pit in Vietnam affected other legislation. Eventually, the War
on Poverty, as well as several other Great Society programs, fell victim to
the increased attention to the high cost of involvement in the other war.
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Composition of the Committee
The demographic composition of the committee, new members and sen-
iority, and the ideological leanings of the members are all important deter-
minants of committee development and outcomes. They also affect the
success of the leadership in carrying out the committee function. Compared
with what it had been in the Barden era, the committee membership under
Powell was relatively stable. That is not to say, however, that it did not
change at all. Although the major changes had occurred in the mid- and late
1950s, the membership from 1961 to 1966 shifted slightly away from the
Middle Atlantic states and the South and increasingly toward the East
North Central states. The dominant regional factions alternated between
the Middle Atlantic and the East North Central states. Representation
from the West North Central states decreased slightly, and membership
from Pacific and External states grew a bit after the 87th Congress (see
tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Southern membership never reached the proportion it had been in the
Barden era. It increased by one member during Powell's chairmanship after
a decline at the beginning. Even a slight southern increase was surprising
given that few southern congressmen (and few others) wanted to serve on a
committee chaired by a black man, especially one as flamboyant as Powell,
whose actions many considered irresponsible (Hickey and Edwin 1963,
133; Wilson 1960, 367). Although the relatively conservative Phil Landrum
(D-GA) remained on Education and Labor until he transferred to Ways and
Means in 1965, he was the only southerner who also had served, on the
committee under Barden. New southern appointees included Ralph Scott
(D-NC), first assigned to the committee in 1961 despite his opposition to
nearly everything appearing liberal, and Sam Gibbons (D-FL), assigned in
1963, who had relatively favorable labor ratings.2
The shift in the regional bases of its members had important ramifica-
tions for the measures the committee considered. The issues under its
jurisdiction were not amenable to compromise for most members and
especially not for southerners, who would be forced into declaring posi-
tions on federal aid to education and on the racial and religious issues that
accompanied it. Several highly conservative Education and Labor south-
erners had been replaced, largely by more liberal northerners and west-
erners, during the later Barden years, softening the opposition to this
proposal.
Some of the geographic changes in committee membership were re-
flected in the Democratic representation, which shifted to the North and
East under Powell. As Democrats gained members from the Middle Atlan-
tic, New England, East North Central, and Pacific states, they decreased
their proportion of members from the South and nearly decimated their
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Table 3.1. Regional Composition of the Committee in 1960s (percentages)
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
87th
6.5
32.3
25.8
9.7
6.5
6.5
0.0
12.9
0.0
5.3
36.8
15.8
5.3
10.5
10.5
0.0
15.8
0.0
8.3
25.0
41.7
16.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.3
0.0
Congress
88th
Full committee
0.0
25.8
29.0
6.6
9.7
9.7
0.0
16.1
3.2
E & L Democrats
0.0
31.6
15.8
0.0
15.8
10.5
0.0
21.1
5.3
E & L Republicans
0.0
16.7
50.0
16.7
0.0
8.3
0.0
8.3
0.0
89th
3.2
29.0
22.6
6.5
12.9
6.5
0.0
16.1
3.2
4.8
33.3
19.0
0.0
9.5
9.5
0.0
19.0
4.8
0.0
18.2
36.4
18.2
18.2
0.0
0.0
9.1
0.0
Source: Author's calculations from data in Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research. The sums of some columns are not exactly 100.0 percent because of round-
ing.
representation from the West North Central states. The proportion of
Democrats from Border states also decreased. Republican membership, on
the other hand, shifted heavily away from the Middle Atlantic and Pacific
states toward the center of the country, to the East North Central states. In
the Powell years, the number of Republicans from the East North Central
states was double the number of Republicans from the previously prevalent
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Table 3.2. Percentage Change in Average Regional Representation from
Barden's Tenure to Powell's, 195()s-1960s
Region
East North Central
Pacific
New England
Middle Atlantic
South
West North Central
Border
Full E & L
+ 11.7
+ 5.9
+ 1.1
- 7.6
- 3.0
- 1.6
- 0.2
E & L Dems
+ 10.8
+ 11.3
+ 1.0
+ 2.2
-10.1
- 8.1
- 2.0
E & L Reps
+ 16.2
- 2.9
+ 1.2
-22.7
+ 5.9
+ 9.3
+ 1.2
Source: Compiled from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Middle Atlantic states. Republicans also increased the average proportion
of their membership from the South, as well as from the West North
Central and Border states.
The proportion of new members fluctuated slightly but remained
relatively stable across the Barden and Powell years. Chairman Powell
always had to deal with a significant number of new members—between
25.8 percent and 32.3 percent of the membership (see table 3.3). About 30
percent of the committee's members who served under Powell first arrived
on the committee during his stewardship, an average of 9.3 members per
term. This figure is quite similar to the percentage of new members named
during the 1950s, averaging 9 new members per term during the Barden
years.
Almost 68 percent of the members first assigned to the committee
during the Powell years were freshmen. Freshmen made up 62.5 to 70
percent of each class of new committee members, constituting an average of
about a fifth of the committee each session, slightly more than did two-term
members. Other members came from committees such as Post Office and
Civil Service, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, and
House Administration. Some surrendered their assignments on other com-
mittees, while other members held dual assignments. The influx of new-
members and, particularly, of freshmen meant that the committee had a
new chance to consider progressive legislation that had been bottled up by
Barden's capitalizing on disagreements for a decade. Furthermore, new
blood and, ostensibly, new ideas could be brought to the arena.
The new members filled vacancies created by defeat at the polls,
appointment or election to another office, or transfer to another committee.
It seems that a substantial portion of the members used this committee in
one way or another to get somewhere else—to the Senate, the presidency,
the cabinet, or a governorship. In addition to the few who ran for the
Senate, some other members considered themselves transients on Educa-
tion and Labor. They really did not intend to stay. They just filled the need
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Table 3.3. Seats, New Members, and Freshmen, 1961-1966
Number
All members New members Freshmen
Congress Year Full Dems Reps Full Dems Reps Full Dems Reps
87th
88th
89th
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Total
Mean
31
31
31
19
19
21
12
12
10
10
10
93
31.0
Full
59 34
19.7 11.3
28 16 12
9.3 5.3 4.0
Percentage
New members
Dems Reps Full
19 11
6.3 3
Freshmen
Dems
8
.7 2.7
Reps
87th
88th
89th
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
25
32
32
.8
.3
.3
21.1
31.6
28.6
33.
33.
40.
3
3
0
16.1
22.6
22.6
5.
26.
23.
3
3
8
33.3
16.7
20.0
Sources: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1961-66;
Congressional Directory 1959-66.
for bodies on the committee until they had gained enough seniority and put
in enough time to be rewarded with their first-choice assignments: Appro-
priations, Ways and Means, Rules, Agriculture, or some other more highly
sought committee (interviews).
An average of almost 27 percent of the committee membership left the
committee after each Congress (see table 3.4). Since the Republicans
seemed to draft more members for service on what was seen to be an
unprofitable committee, it is not surprising that they left at higher rates
than did the Democrats. At least a third of the Republicans did not return to
the committee after each term. Presumably this high rate of departure
could be attributed in part to heavy Republican losses in the Democratic
landslide in 1964 and the resultant new vacancies on other committees. But
interestingly, more Republican committee members suffered defeat in the
1962 elections, when the party picked up two House seats, than in the 1964
elections, when the Republicans lost thirty-eight seats. Only one Education
and Labor Republican was beaten in 1964, and one transferred to another
committee. Two others ran for the Senate and lost that year.
Nevertheless, committee Republicans suffered a higher rate of defeat
than did the Democrats. No committee Democrats were defeated in the
1966 elections, when the Republicans gained forty-seven House seats at
Democratic expense. The rate of defeat among those who left the commit-
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Table 3.4. Percentage of Members Who Left after Each Congress, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Year
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Full
32.3
22.6
25.8
Dems
31.6
15.8
19.0
Reps
33.3
33.3
40.0
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1961-66.
tee during or after the 1961 -67 period was slightly lower than the 1950s rate
of defeat, 31.1 percent.
During the Powell years, transfers to other committees accounted for
the loss of 36 percent of the members. Four Democrats went to Appropria-
tions, one to Ways and Means, and one to Agriculture, and one sacrificed
his seat for assignment to two other committees. For the 1961-67 period,
only two Republicans transferred: one went to Rules and one gave up his
Education and Labor seat to devote full time to his duties on Foreign
Affairs.
It is interesting to note that the four members who opted for Appropri-
ations transferred from a committee that had a reputation in the I louse for
having a partisan and contentious membership to one that recruited mem-
bers who, according to Masters (1961, 2 39-41) and Fenno(1973, 20), had "a
responsible legislative style." House leadership, therefore, seemed to rein-
force the tradition of contentiousness and partisanship of Education and
Labor, not only by assigning highly partisan and committed members to it
but by removing the responsible and ostensibly moderating members by
naming them to other committees. Three of these four members had spent
only one term on Education and Labor. Perhaps the leadership wanted to
get them to Appropriations before they had a chance to be corrupted
completely by the partisan ways of Powell's fiefdom, or perhaps Education
and Labor was only a holding tank during Powell's chairmanship. Only one
committee member (a Republican) had transferred to Appropriations in the
preceding decade.
Fenno remarked that "Education and Labor does little to alter the
image of a lopsidedly liberal Democratic committee heavily dependent on
its liberal Democratic coalition allies" (1973, 78-79). This reputation was
earned in the 1950s when Speaker Sam Rayburn, in the hope of one day
being able to outvote Chairman Bardcn, infiltrated the apparent bastion of
conservatism with liberals. Organized labor's informal but traditional role
in the selection process for Democratic members also contributed to the
influx. The liberalization of the committee membership that had begun
during the Barden years continued during Powell's tenure, and the magni-
tude of the ideological differences between House and committee members
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increased. Committee members were substantially more liberal than the
House as a whole. Writing about committees during this period, Fenno
noted that "control of the selection process by organized labor and party
leaders has produced a markedly unrepresentative committee—a 'stacked'
committee as its members call it on the Democratic side" (1973, 74).
The committee's ideological cleavages were aggravated by House Re-
publicans' use of the assignment process in their attempts to deadlock the
committee and prevent the reporting of liberal legislation. The two-to-one
Democratic majority often made such efforts futile, however. Not one of
the Education and Labor bills enacted in the 87th, 88th, and 89th Con-
gresses was sponsored by a Republican. Nevertheless, actions by both
parties provided fodder for disputes and made compromises difficult.
Ideological differences are reflected in the liberal-conservative con-
tinuum ratings calculated by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA) and Committee on Political Education (COPE) and the conservative
Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA) (see table 3.5).3 The most
telling statistics are the differences between House and committee averages
on the interest group scales (see table 3.6). The comparisons indicate how
representative the committee members were of their House colleagues.
Throughout the early and mid-1960s, committee Democrats, according to
these measures, consistently voted the liberal position more than did House
Democrats. They topped their House colleagues on both the ADA and
COPE scores and lagged on favorable ACA scores. The most notable
difference came in 1966, when Democratic committee members averaged
26 points higher on the ADA scores than did House members and about 15
points lower on the conservative-oriented ACA scores.
Committee Republicans, on the other hand, were not quite so unrepre-
sentative of House Republicans, although the interest group scores do not
bear out Fenno's assertion that Republicans were "a faithful replica of their
party colleagues in the House" (1973, 74). Their scores averaged in the
more conservative direction than did those of their House colleagues for
the 87th and 88th Congresses, with the largest Powell-era disparity (10.1 on
the COPE rating in 1963-64) showing committee members more conserva-
tive than House Republicans at the height of the presidential election
season. House Republicans scored 23.6 on labor's COPE scale, while
committee Republicans mustered only 13.5. Committee Republicans took
a slightly more liberal bent in the 89th Congress, scoring higher than their
House colleagues in the 1966 ADA and 1965-66 COPE scores and lower in
the 1966 ACA ratings. This deviation may have resulted from a backlash
against conservative Republicans in the 1964 elections. Or it could have
been a function of the issues that finally reached the congressional agenda.
Despite its ideological differences, the committee managed to reach
compromises on several pieces of Great Society social legislation in the 89th
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Table 3.5. Interest Group Scores, 1961-1966
HR Dems
E & L Dems
HR Reps
E & L Reps
HR Dems
E & L Dems
HR Reps
E & L Reps
HR Dems
E & L Dems
HR Reps
E & L Reps
1962
68.8
31.6
261
88.3
21.0
18
23.8
26.1
175
20.7
21.7
14
1961-62
74.9
30.4
264
90.9
18.9
19
12.7
19.1
173
5.2
7.1
12
1961-62
22.5
27.7
263
9.4
16.6
19
75.8
17.6
172
81.1
15.5
12
ADA Scores
1963-64
69.0
29.3
252
82.7
20.8
19
15.7
18.9
175
12.0
11.9
12
COPE Scores
1963-64
76.5
30.2
251
90.0
19.8
19
23.6
21.1
176
13.5
9.8
12
ACA Scores
1957-64
21.5
24.6
252
10.1
15.4
19
80.1
17.2
176
85.3
12.0
12
1966
56.8
34.8
297
82.8
20.8
21
10.5
17.6
134
16.5
28.0
10
1965-66
70.5
36.6
297
89.2
21.9
21
11.6
22.8
134
16.1
30.7
10
1966
28.8
29.3
296
13.6
17.7
21
77.0
17.2
134
73.4
21.5
10
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Source: Author's calculation from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1961-66. N is the number
of members whose votes were included in the calculations.
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Table 3.6. Difference between Mean Interest Group Scores: House Members
versus Education and Labor Members, 1950s-1960s
Group
AFL
AFL-CIO
CIO
ADA
Labor
COPE
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
COPE
COPE
COPE
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACA
Year
1947-52
1947-56
1951-52
1951-52
1953-54
1959-60
I960
1962
1964
1966
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
1957-59
1961-62
1957-64
1966
Dems
+ 0.2
+ 2.7
+ 1.5
+ 3.0
+ 6.4
+ 17.0
+ 16.6
+ 19.5
+ 13.7
+ 26.0
+ 16.0
+ 13.5
+ 18.7
-6 .2
-13.1
-11 .4
-15.2
Reps
- 6 . 5
- 8 . 8
-10.5
-11.7
- 2 . 5
- 4 . 4
-0 .5
- 3 . 1
-3 .7
+ 6.0
- 7 . 5
-10.1
+ 4.5
+ 4.1
+ 5.3
+ 5.2
- 3 . 6
Source: Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1950-66.
The + signifies that committee members had higher average scores than did their House
counterparts. The — signifies that the committee mean was less than the House mean. For
AFL, CIO, Labor, ADA, and COPF. scores, the + indicates that committee members were
more liberal than House members; for ACA scores, the reverse is true.
Congress. Some committee Republicans voted with committee Democrats
on long-standing controversial issues, including federal aid to education.
The committee as a whole was more liberal than the House in the 89th
Congress. This unrepresentativeness boded ill for earning the trust of the
House membership and for carrying the committee's bills on the floor.
Given the liberal character of the majority of the committee during
Powell's chairmanship, it is not surprising that many other House members
looked for ways to sabotage or to dilute the committee bills. The Commit-
tee on Rules provided one such tool. It locked up liberal committee bills in
the early 1960s, stifling three major education bills in the 87th Congress. In
addition, it issued open rules for several other pieces of legislation, enabling
them to be amended severely on the floor.
Voting Patterns
Characterized as a committee with zero-sum issues and distinct ideological
cleavages (Hinckley 1975), Education and Labor earned its reputation for
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being one of the most contentious and least unified subunits of the House.
Rampant partisanship, exceeding levels of the Barden years, characterized
it during the early and mid-1960s. Interparty unity reached all-time lows at
the same time that party cohesion was apparent in most aspects of commit-
tee operations, particularly in roll-call voting. Party conflict was high,
markedly more so than it was in the House.
Although the party-unity measures showed only lukewarm support for
partisan alignments, the Rice Index Scores did not. On party-unity meas-
ures, the Republicans generally did not seem to fit the image of a committee
renowned for its high partisanship. They had lower average scores than did
all House Republicans in the 87th and 89th Congresses. According to the
Rice Index Scores, however, committee Republicans acted in a highly
partisan fashion, even more so than did the Democrats. Issues not under the
jurisdiction of Education and Labor, as well as election returns, perhaps
inspired a relatively high rate of defections among committee Republicans
on the floor, since the same patterns are not apparent in committee voting.
Committee Democrats, on the other hand, lived up to their reputation as
being more partisan than the average Democratic House member. Their
party-unity scores topped those of House Democrats for all three Con-
gresses, as they had for the terms during Barden's tenure. Their Rice Index
Scores also exhibited a high degree of party cohesion.
Party-unity scores based on House floor votes provide a gauge of the
degree of partisanship in the House environment, as well as a measure of
intraparty consensus among committee members. Average scores of com-
mittee members are compared with those of all House members in an
attempt to show the extent of partisan voting by committee members versus
voting on the floor and whether committee members were, in fact, repre-
sentative of the entire body (see table 3.7). For a committee with a reputa-
tion for being so partisan, it is interesting to note that while committee
Democrats averaged higher party-unity scores than did their House coun-
terparts for all three terms, committee Republicans had lower average
scores than did their House colleagues during the 87th and 89th Congresses
and higher scores in the 88th. The differences, however, were small.
Committee Democrats did surpass the minimum threshold (70 percent) for
party voting as gauged by their average party-unity scores in all three
terms. The Republicans only did so in the 88th Congress.
Large proportions of roll calls in the Committee on Education and
Labor did not meet the 70-percent criterion for minimum intracommittee
cohesion, as gauged by Rice Index Scores (see table 3.8). Only 19.6 to 30.6
percent of the votes qualified in the three Congresses. The least conflictual
term was the second session of the 87th, in 1962, when half of the votes met
the minimum standards. That year, at least 70 percent of the members
voted together on five measures: the elimination of federal funding for
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Table 3.7. Party-Unity Scores, 1961-1966
Chairman Powell
HR Dems
E & L Dems
HR Reps
E & L Reps
87th
61.0
70.0
20.1
59.4
79.7
13.6
83.3
70.3
17.5
57.7
66.6
25.1
50.0
Congress
88th
44.0
69.1
21.9
59.2
74.5
17.0
68.5
71.2
17.2
62.8
75.1
12.2
75.0
89th
63.0
62.5
25.1
48.0
76.0
21.5
71.4
67.8
16.9
52.2
63.2
17.1
50.0
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Source: Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1961-67.
segregated institutions of higher education, amendments to the prevailing
wage sections of the Davis-Bacon Act, extension of the child labor provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the manpower training act,
and the production and distribution of educational films for the deaf.
On the other hand, in 1964, when the poverty program was under
consideration, only about 11 percent of the committee roll calls showed
even a remote degree of cross-party unity. The preponderance of members,
agreed on only three amendments out of the twenty-four roll calls on the
Economic Opportunity Act. On at least one of these votes, however, the
large number of Democrats voting obscured the fact that all nineteen
Democrats opposed all eight Republicans present. Only one roll call illus-
trated a substantial amount of agreement, with all the Democrats voting
with the majority of Republicans present and voting. Otherwise, the roll
calls in 1964 showed high party unity and low overall unity. Only eleven of
the fifty-six votes taken in the 88th Congress exhibited minimal cohesion.
The roll-call statistics corroborate what other scholars have said about
the low level of political harmony on this committee. Calculating how often
each committee member voted on the House floor with every other com-
mittee member on roll calls on committee proposals, Dyson and Soule
(1970) determined that Education and Labor was one of the least cohesive
committees in the House during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, al-
though fragmentation was the norm in the House. The Rice Index of
Cohesion measure applied to all Education and Labor roll calls supports
their findings of low agreement. The average scores, ranging from 27.4 to
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Table 3.8. Committee Roll Calls Meeting Minimum Cohesion and Mean Rice
Index Scores, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Year
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Total
Mean
N
74
56
36
166
FullE&L
27.4
31.0
38.2
31.0
Rice Index
Dems
84.0
87.1
70.2
82.0
Reps
88.7
87.8
81.4
85.8
Full E &
%
21.6
19.6
30.6
22.9
LRI>40
N
16
11
11
38
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1961-66.
38.2 during the Powell years, do not reach the standard of a score of 40 for a
minimally cohesive committee (70 percent of the committee voting together
on the majority of votes).
Despite the relatively low full committee cohesion scores, the Rice
Index applied to committee votes by members of each party shows a high
degree of party alignment on Education and Labor (see table 3.8). With the
exception of Democrats in the 89th Congress (1965-66), all the averages
exceed 80, which means that few members defected from either party on all
votes taken in the committee. On average, over 90 percent of the members
of each party cast their ballots with their party colleagues. For both parties,
but especially for the Republicans, all members of each party voted to-
gether on a large number of roll calls, resulting in a score of 100 for each roll
call. As shown by the average scores, the Republicans seemed to show more
unanimity than did the Democrats, although the latter, too, displayed their
fair share.
The Rice Index Scores project a markedly different picture of the
degree of partisanship apparent on Education and Labor than do the House
party-unity scores. Judging by the Rice Index Scores, it would seem that
members preferred to vote with the majority of their own party more
frequently in committee than in the House. Whereas the unity scores
illustrate moderate levels of partisanship on House votes, both Republicans
and Democrats showed less reluctance to support their own parties in
committee. Each party's scores were high throughout all three terms
Powell was chairman.
The party vote statistics confirm a marked party cleavage on Education
and Labor. The low rate of full committee cohesion and the high rate of
partisanship illustrated by the Rice Index Scores for each party are borne
out in high degrees of party conflict. About three-quarters of the roll calls
pitted the parties against each other. The primary measure of committee
interparty differences in this study is the percentage of party votes: com-
mittee roll calls on which at least 70 percent voting Democrats cast their
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Table 3.9. Percentage of Party Votes in Committee by 50-, 70-, 75-, and 90-
Percent Criteria, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Year
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Total
Percentage
of total
N
74
56
36
166
(number of qualifying
> 50% > 70%
87.8 (65)
82.1 (46)
80.6 (29)
(140)
84.3
82.4(61)
75.0(42)
61.1 (22)
(125)
75.3
roll calls in parentheses)
> 75% > 90%
79.7 (59)
73.2 (41)
52.8(19)
(119)
71.7
47.3 (35)
62.5 (35)
25.0 (9)
(79)
47.6
Source: Compiled from Committee on Kducation and Labor, Minutes 1961-66.
ballots against at least 70 percent of voting Republicans. For easy com-
parison with other studies, table 3.9 also presents statistics on other com-
monly used levels of party voting. By the 70-percent opposition criterion,
the committee divided into partisan factions on 75.3 percent of the votes
taken while Powell was chairman, a rather high rate of party conflict. The
statistics at the 75-percent level are strikingly similar. More remarkably, on
nearly half of the committee's roll calls, over 90 percent of the voting
members of each party opposed over 90 percent of those of the other party.
If there was some basis for integration on Education and Labor, it was
party. As they had in the previous decade, the issues under the committee's
jurisdiction promoted partisanship instead of full committee agreement.
The committee's subject matter frequently was morally based and thus not
amenable to compromise. For the most part, the topics were the fundamen-
tal issues underlying the party differences, which were reflected in commit-
tee voting patterns. During the 1960s, when issues under the committee's
jurisdiction were at the top of the legislative agenda, members warred
bitterly for their beliefs. Most of the time the antagonists divided along
party lines. Republicans fought to maintain the status quo of limited federal
involvement in the social arena. Liberal Democrats, on the other hand,
having endured years of frustration at the hands of conservatives, battled to
have their social programs enacted and expanded. Party provided the basis
for whatever degree of committee integration existed.
For the first time in years, the issues of interest to the Democrats were
at the height of public interest. They had a chance to push through federal
aid to education, antipoverty measures, and manpower development and
training legislation that either had been languishing in committee for years
or had yet to reach the fore. Democrats had to band together to protect their
newfound progress and their potential programs. The Republicans, on the
other hand, bound together to prevent the irresponsible expenditure of
public funds and the interference in state prerogatives. They united in their
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opposition to federal aid to education and to the poverty program. Many
of the divisive roll calls concerned minority-sponsored amendments that
would have diluted, restrained, or failed to extend federal aid bills or
provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act.
Even if Dodd's (1972) conception of integration as value agreement
across a broad range of issues had been used, Education and Labor still
would show little unanimity. The issues under the committee's jurisdiction
were among those underlying the basic differences between the two par-
ties, and they inspired party voting to the detriment of full committee
cohesion. When such underlying issues are discussed, members and their
parties are not likely to give in gracefully. Even with a large margin of
Democrats over Republicans, the levels of full committee unity remained
low. On the whole, the average full committee cohesion Rice Index Scores
for Powell's tenure were slightly greater than those for Barden's.
During the 87th Congress, several major issues contributed to the lack
of full committee accord, dividing members mostly along party lines. A
large number of roll calls, an indicator of divisiveness itself, centered on
federal aid to education. All but two such roll calls showed low degrees of
cohesion. Bills related to school construction, to the National Defense
Education Act of 1958, and to impacted areas caused a great deal of
controversy in the committee, necessitating at least 60 percent of the roll
calls. Other divisive issues included youth unemployment remedies, the
Davis-Bacon Act, migrant agricultural laborers, and various provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Antipoverty legislation spawned the major controversies of the 88th
Congress. Nine roll calls during the first session pertained to the creation of
a Youth Conservation Corps, a predecessor of the major antipoverty pro-
gram. Almost all of the second session votes concerned items in the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964 itself. Out of twenty-four roll calls, only
three inspired any inkling of unanimity between the parties. During the
first session, bills related to manpower development and training generated
controversy as well.
Much of the lack of full committee agreement in the 89th Congress
stemmed from legislation related to elementary and secondary education,
either the main bill or amendments to the 1965 act. There were fewer roll
calls in the 89th Congress than there were in the 88th, but the votes in the
1965 and 1966 sessions were predominantly related to education. Members
seemed to be more unified in their outlooks on higher education legislation.
Perhaps the barriers had been overcome by the previous education pro-
grams. In addition to education, the poverty program was still a hot issue,
as were amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
The fact that the committee's jurisdiction covered such important parts
of the administration's domestic legislative agenda also contributed to the
92 Congressional Committee Chairmen
divisiveness. The president's advancement of these issues increased their
visibility and public interest, thus stimulating partisan conflict, since the
minority hardly wanted the Democrats to have the credit. The really
important issues that the committee considered during the Powell years
were the ones that most contributed to the image of controversy and
detracted from a potentially unified committee. Although committee mem-
bers were unified on some roll calls, either the stakes were lower or
dissenters wanted to get the bill out of committee so the House could defeat
it. Usually, the issues on which the committee was more cohesive were not
those exemplifying the fundamental bases of party division. Members had
little trouble voting together on providing training films for the deaf or on
creating a teaching hospital at Howard University. On the other hand, they
had difficulty coming to terms on whether there should be antipoverty
legislation and federal aid to education and, if there should, how to go about
it. The issues just did not inspire agreement.
Committee Structure
In part because of Adam Clayton Powell's personality and behavior, the
committee structure changed significantly from what it had been under his
predecessor. It became markedly more decentralized, universalistic, demo-
cratic, and complex. The committee was also more capable of acting.
Unlike most other House committees, the Committee on Education and
Labor, by the time Powell came to power, had a well-defined set of rules
enacted as a result of the abuses of the former chairman, Graham Barden.
Despite these provisions, Barden had managed to obstruct legislation and
frustrate the committee. As a result, compared with other committee chair-
men, Powell confronted a rather formidable set of rules. He still maintained
control over the referral of legislation, but his discretion was restricted.
Before Powell had a chance to take advantage of his position, the
committee members in the 87th Congress (1961-62) approved several new
rules governing committee operations (Committee on Education and Labor
Rules, 89th Cong.). According to at least one member, however, the provi-
sions adopted at this time contained only minor changes from those enacted
in the previous session (interview). The 1961 rules remained in effect until
well into the 89th Congress. Some were a direct reaction to the abuses of
former chairman Barden. Others were precautionary measures designed to
enforce majority rule instead of tyranny. A few others were directives
about record keeping. Some of the rules and traditional practices adopted
under Barden were clarified in the 87th Congress.
Several committee rules changes were drawn directly or indirectly
from the rules of the House: keeping a journal, setting party ratios, stating
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the committee's jurisdiction, and recording votes on demand of one-fifth of
those present. In addition, the new committee provisions applied House
rules to the operation of the committee, including setting time limitations
on the questioning of witnesses. Other changes instituted in 1961 con-
cerned subcommittees. When standing subcommittees were specified in
the rules, their jurisdictions were left undefined. Their inclusion in the
rules had not yet been institutionalized. Moreover, other House committee
chairmen had reasonably strong control over their subcommittees at that
time. The omission of specific subcommittee jurisdictions left Chairman
Powell with a great deal of discretion over bill referral. I le could assign bills
to whatever subcommittee he wanted.
According to staff, Education and Labor members took the measure of
their new chairman and presently decided that if they wanted travel money
and subcommittee funds, they would be better advised not to threaten him
with hobbled authority. One staff member said, "Their willingness to
cooperate was because they wouldn't get to go far and do much because he
held the purse strings" (interview). In addition, they finally had a chairman
who wanted to get things done. Another staff member said, "They were
willing to give Powell a free hand. Barden had been prone to bottle up
education legislation, so they curtailed him. Thinking Powell would be
liberal, there was a willingness to let him go" (interview).
The new rules authorized the six standing subcommittees to act as
agents of the full committee, and they were given the power to do so. As a
result, their status was upgraded. Barden had not authorized subcommit-
tees to act on behalf of the committee in the previous decade. The rules also
set subcommittee membership ratios at 60 percent from the majority to 40
percent from the minority. Except for the subcommittee chairmen, mem-
bers retained their seniority on their original subcommittees. The ranking
members of the majority party were to be the chairmen of the standing
subcommittees.The rules also included a provision for a subcommittee
chairman to be replaced if he missed more than three successive subcom-
mittee meetings, except for reason of illness or of official congressional
duties.
The other two rules changes concerned the use of committee staff by
members and limitations on proxy voting. One provision allowed the
members of the committee to use the committee staff for assistance not
regularly rendered in the course of normal duties, but only after authoriza-
tion from the chairman. There had been no such privilege under Barden.
The other limited the use of blanket proxy votes. Whereas proxies were
recognized in the previous sessions, the new rules required that they had to
be in writing and in the hands of the clerk before or during each roll call in
which they were to be voted. Proxies also were approved for use in
subcommittees.
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The Committee on Education and Labor was far ahead of other com-
mittees in instituting more democratic rules and procedures in 1966. Un-
fortunately, this leadership was not the result of remarkable foresight or
sincere desire that everyone share in the wealth of power. These changes
were too often the reaction to abuses of power by the chairmen of this
committee. Chairman Barden had abused his powers of referral and his
authority to call and preside over committee meetings. In different ways,
Chairman Powell also abused power: for example, he was absent at strate-
gic times when members needed him to request a rule, or he refused to
report a bill to the House that the committee had ordered reported. Both
Barden and Powell frequently found it convenient to be elsewhere when
the majority of members wanted to act. Barden used truancy as a tool to
prevent liberal legislation from being considered or reported by the com-
mittee. Most of the time, Powell did not necessarily want to prevent
legislation from being considered, though ostensibly that was the reason for
some of his absences (interviews). He seemed to have better things to do,
such as traveling to Bimini or going on junkets to other places around the
world. His nonattendance seemed to be a gesture of contempt for other
members and for the institution, and committee members responded by
adopting rules to control him (interview; Committee Rules). Prerogatives
formerly reserved for the chairman now were shared with the majority
membership of the committee. As Powell put it, "The net effect of the
reorganization would be an enormous reduction of the powers of the
committee chairman and a vast increase in the authority of the subcommit-
tee chairmen. It also began to look like an outright battle over the overall
seniority system that governs all House conduct" (1971, 207).
Given the chairman's chronic absences, committee members had to
provide some way to operate when he could not or would not be found or
controlled. As a result, they deprived him of some responsibilities formerly
vested solely in the chairman. They voted to impose time limits on bill
referral to subcommittees, to allow majority members to vote to call
meetings, to appoint the ranking member to preside in the chairman's
absence, and to designate another committee member to report bills to the
House. According to a former staff member, "the committee put the situs
picketing bill out. . . . He [Powell] didn't do anything about it for two
Congresses. From this came the rule that the chairman had to take the bill to
the floor when it was reported" (interview). This action and Powell's failure
to report the poverty bill in 1966 precipitated changes in reporting author-
ity. Additional rule changes provided that each member had to receive
written notice of any full committee meetings other than those regularly
scheduled. For at least forty-eight hours prior to a mark-up session, each
member was entitled to a copy of each bill reported by a subcommittee and
a section-by-section analysis of proposed changes in existing law.
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The committee also reacted to the chairman's practices of slighting
some of his subcommittee chairmen. In one instance, Carl Dewey Perkins
(D-KY) headed a subcommittee, but it was a long time before Powell
referred any legislation to it (interview, staff). Apparently he did the same
to some of the other subcommittee chairmen. Powell had violated an
understanding about who was to get which bills and, on occasion, had
removed a bill from a certain subcommittee to punish the chairman and
referred it to another; hence subcommittee jurisdictions and prompt, man-
datory referrals were specified. The chairman no longer had full control
over the referrals; the majority members of the committee also could direct
that a bill be referred to a particular subcommittee. Otherwise, the chair-
man had to refer bills to the appropriate subcommittee within one week of
receipt by the full committee. He was required to provide written notifica-
tion of every referral to the subcommittee chairman, who had three days to
file objections. Bills reported by subcommittees had to be taken up in full
committee in the order in which they were reported unless the committee
voted to the contrary.
Committee members also rewrote the subcommittee jurisdictions into
the rules and mandated that the party ratio on each subcommittee reflect
that of the House. Moreover, the majority members delegated to them-
selves the power to establish subcommittees in addition to those set out in
the rules and to authorize subcommittee hearings outside of Washington,
D.C. The standing subcommittee chairmen could approve travel within
the limits of their budgets and had the authority to appoint, discharge, and
direct the activities of subcommittee staff members. Another change dimin-
ished the chairman's discretion concerning conference committees. It re-
quired him to appoint as conferees, in order of seniority, the members of
the subcommittee that reported the legislation.
The budgetary and staffing provisions resulted from unauthorized
expenditures of committee funds. Some staff members traveled with the
chairman, and others were said to have traveled with the chairman but in
fact did not.4 Nevertheless, the money was spent. Family members were
kept on the payroll, even though they did not perform official duties in
Washington, D . C , or in the state of New York.5 The manager of the
House Stationery Store told later committee employees that a few staff
members charged office supplies to the committee through the House
Stationery Store and then returned them for cash (interviews).6 Other
supplies were bought for the committee and used elsewhere: some were
found in the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem (interview).
Newly instituted budgetary procedures required the chairman to pre-
pare a preliminary budget and subcommittee chairmen to draw up supple-
mental budgets. These plans were to include the necessary amounts for
staff, travel, investigations, and operations. The budgets would be consoli-
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dated by the clerk, approved by the committee, and submitted to the House
for approval. Thereafter, the budget could not be changed without the
approval of the full committee. In addition, the chairman was directed to
supply an accounting of the amount and purpose of all expenditures to the
full committee once a month.
Perhaps the size of the majority or the degree of outrage allowed
committee members to impose these rules on Powell but not on Barden,
who also was renowned for being unavailable. Or perhaps their confidence
in their authority to control a chairman expanded after they changed the
rules on Barden. Both chairmen stretched the patience of their colleagues to
the limit, albeit in different ways. Each thwarted rules or traditions, much
to the exasperation of his colleagues. Members had to keep the committee
functioning, even if the chairman was not. The rules might have been more
effective had they been enacted sooner. As it was, they were not enacted
until the last months of Powell's leadership.
The facts that Education and Labor itself imposed constraints on its
chairman and that these rules were not applied by the House to all commit-
tee chairmen are telling. Because of obstructionist and dilatory tactics, the
committee members had to restrain the chairman to preserve or to facilitate
democratic decision making. They capitalized on Powell's low status in the
House to take the advantage. Both he and Barden had crossed the line of
tolerance.
The 1966 rules might have had more immediate impact had not other
elements intervened shortly after their enactment. They were in effect just
four months before the House Democratic Caucus effectively deposed
Powell for funding irregularities and installed the ranking member, Carl
Perkins (D-KY), as the new chairman. In the face of well-publicized legal
problems, shortly thereafter the House denied Powell his seat (see Jacobs
1973), an action subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court.
The size of the Committee on Education and Labor increased slightly
at the outset of Powell's chairmanship from what it had been under Barden.
The leadership added another seat in the 87th Congress, leaving the
committee at thirty-one members for the duration of Powell's tenure. The
heavily Democratic partisan split on the committee throughout his chair-
manship reflected as accurately as possible the party division in the House,
given the uneven number of members and the inclusion of the ratio in the
committee rules. The party ratio ranged from a nineteen-to-twelve Demo-
cratic majority in Powell's first two terms as chairman to a subsequent
twenty-one-to-ten Democratic advantage.
The overwhelming Democratic majority in both Congress and the
committee in the 89th Congress, a consequence of President Lyndon
Johnson's landslide victory over ultraconservative challenger Senator Barry
Goldwater in 1964, gave the Democrats the votes to override the Republi-
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cans at will. Although the Democrats had had the votes in the 87th and 88th
Congresses, there were still enough conservative southerners left to team
up with the Republicans and at least give liberals a run for their money. In
the 89th, however, conservative opposition could be defeated easily be-
cause of the abundance of Democrats and other liberals. The committee
ratio permitted Democrats to overcome much of the opposition that had
deadlocked the committee for years. On occasion during the 1960s the
liberal Democrats even received some help from Republicans, almost
unheard of under Barden.
Under the new Democratic administration, much of the subject matter
under the jurisdiction of Education and Labor moved to the forefront of the
congressional agenda. About 40 percent of the president's domestic legis-
lative agenda related to education and labor laws (Committee, Activities and
Accomplishments, 87th Cong., 1961, p. viii). The committee set up six
standing subcommittees, one more than in the previous term, to meet the
challenge of an expected increase in the amount and salience of referred
legislation. The new 1961 standing subcommittees were the general, spe-
cial, and select subcommittees on education and on labor. The General
Education and Special Education subcommittees were holdovers from the
previous term. Although "select" committees generally were established by
the House to study a certain subject, the select subcommittees on education
and labor had the same status as the other standing subcommittees. General,
special, and select were simply the names chosen; the titles connoted nothing
about jurisdiction or function, which was undefined.
Additional ad hoc subcommittees were created as needed, with their
jurisdictions determined by the chairman. Certain issues either crossed
jurisdictional boundaries or were salient enough to warrant the creation of
special units for their treatment. Normally bills on such matters might have
gone to one of the standing subcommittees, but they generated enough
interest among other members to make it advisable to establish additional
subcommittees. For example, in the 88th Congress, the poverty issue
inspired sufficient public attention and member interest that the chairman
appointed a subcommittee solely for that subject. The narrow scope of an
issue constituted another reason for the establishment of an ad hoc subcom-
mittee. Special investigative committees, such as the task force investigat-
ing a labor dispute on the nuclear ship Savannah and the subcommittee
investigating activities of the National Labor Relations Board, are examples
of these units.
Ad hoc subcommittees also provided rewards or incentives. Often
their chairmen did not have enough seniority to have standing subcommit-
tees of their own. Since the rules required that the standing subcommittees
had to be chaired by the senior members of the majority party, the creation
of new units offered ways for the chairman to involve other members. The
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chairman could reward desirable behavior with a subcommittee chair-
manship or with the investigation of an issue that might have been of special
concern to a member. Being able to hold hearings in one's own district was
one benefit of chairing an ad hoc subcommittee.
The chairman also used ad hoc subcommittees to work on legislation or
to investigate activities in which he took a particular interest or over which
he wanted to maintain control. The War on Poverty Subcommittee is an
example of the latter. In the 88th Congress, Powell chaired three ad hoc
subcommittees himself. In the 89th, he ran the Subcommittee on De Facto
School Segregation, an issue of particular interest to him. Surprisingly, he
left the Subcommittee on Integration in Federally Assisted Education to
Dominick Daniels (D-NJ).
Seniority dominated the new structure. As the rules mandated,
standing subcommittee chairmanships were reserved for the most senior
members of the majority party, who chose, in order of seniority, which
subcommittees they wanted to head. As members gained seniority, some
were likely to trade education subcommittees for labor subcommittees, or
vice versa, when chairmanships became open. The seniority rule was
followed except in one case, that of Phil Landrum (D-GA), who not only
did not have a chairmanship but did not sit on any subcommittee during the
87th Congress. He was assigned to the ad hoc Subcommittee on the War on
Poverty in the 88th, probably at the suggestion of the administration,
which wanted him to manage the bill on the floor, but he was not assigned
to a standing subcommittee. Although the rules stated that standing sub-
committee chairmen were to be the ranking members of the majority party,
Landrum is reputed to have turned down a chairmanship because he
believed that Powell would not give him jurisdiction over any important
legislation (Lewis 1963, 95-96). Landrum was a conservative, and the
liberal chairman was not likely to give a conservative the reins over liberal
bills important to the administration. Also, there was some speculation that
Landrum may have been paying for the earlier refusal of his friend and
southern ally, Barden, to appoint Powell to a subcommittee chairmanship
during the 1950s (interview), even though his ranking-member status
warranted a chairmanship by tradition. Powell had fought hard, but unsuc-
cessfully, to establish this as a requirement under Barden.
Frequently the chairmanships of the ad hoc subcommittees went to
the next most senior members in line after the standing subcommittee
chairmen. On other occasions, such as in the case of Sam Gibbons (D-FL),
they reached further down the seniority list. As seventeenth out of nineteen
in seniority among the Democrats, Gibbons chaired a subcommittee to
study education and serious crime.
With the exception of Landrum, all committee members were assigned
to at least one standing subcommittee each term, and frequently more. The
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Table 3.10. Education and Labor Subcommittee Assignments, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
87th
88th
89th
Standing
1.3
1.8
2.1
Average Number of Assignments to
Subcommittee, per Member
Democrats
2.4
3.1
2.9
Republicans
2.5
3.1
3.4
Average Number of Subcommittee Seats
per Member, by Type
Democrats
Ad Hoc/Other
1.0
1.3
1.1
Republicans
Standing Ad Hoc/Other
1.4 1.1
1.7 1.5
2.2 1.2
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1961-66.
rules required, insofar as practical, that the appointments be made with
regard to the preferences of the members. Table 3.10 shows the average
number of assignments per member and the average number of committee
seats per member, by type of subcommittee. Because the rules stated that
the full committee chairman and the ranking minority leader were ex officio
members of all subcommittees, the numbers do not reflect their assign-
ments. These statistics show that Democrats allocated seats in nearly the
same proportions as did the Republicans throughout the Powell years.
Fenno quoted one member as saying that "you can get practically any
subcommittee you want so everybody is happy with his assignments"
(1973, 101).
Despite being the committee workhorses, Education and Labor sub-
committees lacked clearly marked jurisdictions during all three Powell
Congresses. The fuzzy boundaries were used by the chairman as a political
tool to reward his friends and punish his enemies. For example, although
one reasonably might have expected that legislation relating to youth
unemployment would be referred to a labor subcommittee, it was referred
instead to the General Subcommittee on Education, chaired by Perkins,
who had a particular interest in the work training programs. A bill to
provide for an additional assistant secretary of labor was assigned to Edith
Green's (D-OR) Special Education Subcommittee. The subcommittee
chairmen took full advantage of the maneuvering room. Ordinary mem-
bers, too, sometimes could arrange for seemingly incongruous referrals for
their pet bills.
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Members of the Committee on Education and Labor had a reputation
among their colleagues for lacking the degree of specialization apparent on
other committees, a specialization ordinarily fostered by subcommittee
membership. A member of Education and Labor, on the whole, may have
been more interested in education than in labor, or vice versa, but it was
hard to develop a speciality, particularly given the subject matter. It was
also more difficult for members to be perceived as specialists by other
members of Congress, particularly when every representative seemed to
consider himself an expert on this committee's issues. Committee members
may have had specialties, but few House members deferred to them.
Despite the well-defined structure of the standing subcommittee system in
Education and Labor, it was actually quite permeable. Unlike members of
many other committees, Education and Labor members were (and still are
in the 1990s) free to participate in subcommittee deliberations in subcom-
mittees other than the one they were assigned to initially. They could not
vote, however. Although this practice was allowed, it was not prevalent.
Powell took advantage of the existing standing subcommittees and
also established others to work on special projects. Most of the ad hoc sub-
committees he created were chaired by members who were not already
chairmen of standing subcommittees, thus placing these new chairs in his
debt. In this way, the power resources in the committee were broadened. A
larger number of members were able to share in the power distribution than
would have if there had been no ad hoc subcommittees or, as was the case in
the early Barden years, if there had been little or no reliance on standing
subcommittees. There did not seem to be any systematic prejudice in favor
of or against particular subcommittees, although allegedly there was.7 All
the subcommittees were able to participate fully in committee decision
making.
One major drawback to Education and Labor subcommittees was the
lack of deference afforded their decisions. Fenno asserted that "subcommit-
tee decisions carry very little weight in the full committee. . . . On major
bills, the subcommittee has no standing with the full committee" (1973,
102). Vogler supported this argument, stating that "Education and Labor
subcommittees do not make decisions for the whole committee. There is no
expertise mystique preventing other subcommittees and the full committee
from questioning decisions made in Education and Labor subcommittees"
(1974, 133). Frequently, if a subcommittee member could not get his
amendment approved in subcommittee, he would offer it again when the
bill was marked up in the full committee. Other members also frequently
proposed amendments. Often, the Republicans tried to kill or dilute Demo-
cratic-sponsored legislation with a "death by amendment" strategy. More
often than not, they failed.
Although not all of the bills reported by subcommittee were amended
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before being reported to the House, many were. Instead of sending the
subcommittee version with all its attached amendments to the floor, clean
bills (renumbered versions of the legislation with all the committee amend-
ments incorporated) were introduced frequently as a result of full commit-
tee amendments to bills reported by subcommittees. When the clean bill
was referred to the committee, it would be reported to the floor imme-
diately. About 39 percent of Education and Labor bills reported to the
House in the 87th Congress (1961-62) had been reintroduced as clean bills
(Committee Calendar, 1962). The committee also used another practice,
that of striking everything after the enacting clause and replacing it with the
language of a new bill incorporating all the amendments. The relatively
common occurrence of the introduction of clean bills and of the replace-
ment of the original text with new language substantiates Fenno's allegation
that the full committee did not place wholehearted trust in the work of the
subcommittees, at least not for the final versions of bills.
Committee and subcommittee staffs are another important element of
committee structure. After the relative paucity of committee employees
during the Barden years, the Powell staff seemed bountiful. The rules
delegated to the chairman the authority to employ and discharge staff
members. As a result, when Powell became chairman, he nearly doubled
the number of committee employees. He increased both the professional
and support staffs for the committee majority and, to a lesser degree, the
number of staff members for the minority. Powell, in effect, institu-
tionalized subcommittee staffs. Before his chairmanship there were few, if
any, subcommittee staff, professional or support. That lack is understand-
able, since there were few subcommittees under Barden until 1957. Even
then there were only two professional subcommittee staff members and
four clerical employees. In 1960 the total was even smaller. When the
committee began to rely more on the established standing subcommittees,
the staff had to be increased. At one point, after 1964, Powell had 143
persons on the committee payroll. A subcommittee investigating Powell's
activities contracted with a private firm to determine whether, in fact, all
these staff members were real people (New York Times, Dec. 20, 1966, p. 34,
col. 3).
Fenno (1973) repeatedly cited the lack of reliance on committee staff
members for policy advice. He gave the impression that staff members
were so unhappy that the turnover was high, especially on subcommittee
staffs. It should be noted, however, that because Powell delegated the
authority and funds to hire staff to his subcommittee chairmen, when a
chairman switched to head another subcommittee, as was the case on
several occasions, he generally took his staff with him. Many of the exam-
ples Fenno cited could have been subcommittee staff members changing
subcommittees with their chairmen. Fenno and several of the committee
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members he interviewed gave the impression that the committee staff
members generally were incompetent, although Powell claimed that he
hired "the highest caliber men and women available" (Powell 1971, 202). A
holdover from Barden's committee staff said, "The new people from New
York Powell brought in didn't know anything. One asked, 'What's a
calendar?'" (interview). Many of the so-called professional staff members
were not professionals in the sense of being experts on matters under the
committee's jurisdiction, or even knowing anything about it. Some ap-
pointments were political favors. The chairman may have been just "salting
them around," in the words of one former staff member (interview).
Others, however, were hired by the subcommittee chairmen precisely
because they had experience dealing with the issues under the committee's
jurisdiction and were exceedingly competent. Although sometimes he did
hire experts, the chairman had little incentive to import only staff members
who were experts on the issues under consideration. The benefits of hiring
political allies or aides outweighed the benefits of having a knowledgeable,
professional, committee-oriented staff. Normally, the latter would be help-
ful in formulating policy, but in a committee with a jurisdiction so contro-
versial and so nontechnical, it was hard to maintain an aura of specialized
competence.
Another factor worth noting about the Education and Labor staff was
its partisanship (Morrow 1969, 56). The chairman hired the majority staff,
and the ranking minority member was responsible for the minority com-
mittee personnel. The two had little official interaction. One scholar
accused Education and Labor, along with one or two other committees, of
having an "aggressive, ideologically scrappy" staff (Goodwin 1970, 152).
Jurisdiction, Work Load, and Function
A look at the committee's jurisdiction, work load, and function provides
insight into what mission the Congress assigned the committee, what the
committee did, and whether its mission changed under Powell. During his
chairmanship, jurisdiction expanded, work load increased dramatically,
and function shifted from blocking to activist. External factors, such as the
Great Society, and internal dynamics, such as the chairman's personality
and behavior and the composition of the committee, were catalysts for these
developments.
In the Powell years the jurisdiction of Education and Labor topped the
domestic legislative agenda of two presidents. Both Kennedy and Johnson
emphasized aid to education and programs to help the disadvantaged. The
committee's work was enhanced by calls for action in presidential speeches
and messages and by the concomitant media attention. Charged with
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writing, handling, and safe passage of much of the domestic political
agenda as set out by the presidents, Education and Labor reached a
prominence previously unknown. Whereas Education and Labor's jurisdic-
tion is set out in relatively general terms in the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, the 1961 version and subsequent editions of the committee
rules include a detailed list of the issue areas, legislation, and programs
under the committee's purview. The rules list specific pieces of legislation
(e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act, the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act) in addition to more
general matters such as welfare of miners, youth programs, and inter-
cultural activities. The jurisdiction expanded insofar as new issues, not
anticipated when earlier versions of the rules had been adopted, came onto
the agenda. For example, the War on Poverty legislation was referred to this
committee, although nothing in the committee's official jurisdiction specifi-
cally refers to antipoverty programs. One could argue, however, that the
War on Poverty came under "manpower" or "measures relating to educa-
tion and labor generally." As more issues came to public attention, the
committee could make a case for expanding its jurisdiction.
By most measures, the committee work load, activity, and productiv-
ity during the Powell years increased dramatically from what it had been
during Barden's reign (see tables 3.11 and 3.12). The number of bills
referred to the committee grew, albeit not steadily, from the beginning of
the Barden years through the Powell years. Moreover, as measured by the
number of hearing days, committee activity soared. Productivity, in bills
reported, increased dramatically when Powell took over. In his first term as
chairman, the number of bills reported exceeded the total number reported
in the previous two terms. Productivity stayed high throughout Powell's
tenure, peaking in his last term. The average number of bills per term that
became public law doubled during his chairmanship. The number is lower
in the 88th Congress because ten committee bills were incorporated into
other acts and thus are not reflected in the total number enacted.
Several factors contributed to the higher work load and activity of the
committee during the Powell years. For the first time, the issues under the
committee's purview were high priorities on the administration's agenda.
President Kennedy proposed a new national antipoverty program about the
time Powell took the chair, and a large portion of it came under the
committee's jurisdiction. A second factor was the growth in the number of
bills the committee considered and reported. In part, the increased activity
was a result of Powell's desire to process legislation. He could have ignored
the mounting demands made on the committee by the House. But Powell,
along with most others on the committee, had been frustrated under
Barden and wanted to get things done. In addition to letting committee
members do what they wanted, he also was willing to promote the inves-
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Table 3.11. Full Committee and Subcommittee Hearings, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Year
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Total
Mean
Days of
full committee
hearings
1
4
2
7
2.3
Days of
subcommittee
hearings
254
284
289
827
275.7
Total
days of
hearings
255
288
291
834
278.0
Percentage of
subcommittee
hearings
99.6
98.6
99.3
99.2
Sources: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1961-66; Committee on
Education and Labor, Activities and Accomplishments 1961-66.
Table 3.12. Bills Referred to Education and Labor, 1951-1966
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
87th
88th
89th
Year
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Number
referred
232
268
468
601
720
741
713
959
Number
reported
8
15
12
18
17
44
25
51
Number
passed HR
7
14
11
14
10
l4a
14
32
Number
public laws
4
12
10
14
8
18
14
28
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1951-66.
"Plus six Senate bills.
tigation and passage of committee legislation. He freely gave his permission
for members to hold hearings and conduct investigations, which aug-
mented the activity and productivity of the committee. In addition, he
moved things along in committee meetings instead of stalling. A third
factor relates to the second. The long-thwarted, newly liberated committee
majority also contributed to the rise in activity and productivity. Having
been stifled by Barden for so many years, majority members seemed to
rush to handle and report legislation that had been pent up for years by the
chairman.
During the 87th, 88th, and 89th Congresses, members had the chance
to accomplish many of the goals that had escaped them for years. The
predominant emphasis was on education and on the poverty program,
although the committee considered a healthy sampling of labor issues.
Powell's first term as chairman commenced with a flurry of subcommittee
activity. Hearings were held on a variety of education topics, including
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adult basic education, problems of the aged and aging, educational mate-
rials for the deaf, and various aspects of federal aid to education. The major
labor legislation included amendments to the minimum-wage law, the
longshoremen's act, the coal mine safety act, compensation for federal
employees, and migratory labor. The chairman directed that the committee
take up minimum wage first because it had been blocked so successfully in
previous Congresses. Ultimately, the committee saw nine education bills
and nine labor bills enacted in the 87th Congress (1961-62) (Committee
Activities and Accomplishments, 87th Cong., 1963).
The main thrust of the committee in the 88th Congress (1963-64) was
the antipoverty legislation (Committee Activities and Accomplishments, 88th
Cong., 1965). This committee was at the forefront in considering bills to aid
Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. Not only was the issue with Education
and Labor's jurisdiction, but the close correlation between poverty and race
made poverty an appealing issue for Chairman Powell. Months of delibera-
tions culminated in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452).
The committee handled 111 bills related to this topic. Forty-eight of these,
establishing a national peace corps, were reflected in the VISTA Corps
portions of the program, which also incorporated another forty-eight bills
relating to a Youth Conservation Corps and work training programs. The
work-study sections derived from a 1963 bill entitled the National Educa-
tion Improvement Act.
As a result of the fruition of the civil rights movement during the early
to mid-1960s, the committee worked on seventy-nine bills concerned with
discrimination in schools and in employment, segregated schools, and the
use of federal monies to aid institutions that discriminated on the basis of
race (Committee Activities and Accomplishments, 88th Cong., 1965). The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352), handled by the Judiciary Commit-
tee, incorporated these efforts.
The committee also succeeded in getting enacted several important
education laws in the 88th Congress. These included the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-204), the expansion of provisions of the
NDEA (P.L. 88-665), the Vocational Education Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-210),
and the approval of a National Council on the Arts (P.L. 88-579). The
fourteen committee bills enacted in the 88th Congress do not reflect the ten
bills that were incorporated into other legislation, such as the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Education bills took the spotlight in the 89th Congress, which became
known as the "Education Congress" because of the scope and magnitude of
the education legislation enacted (Committee Activities and Accomplishments,
89th Cong., 1967). The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA P.L. 89-10), a hallmark in the committee's history, was designed to
provide comprehensive assistance to improving education in elementary
106 Congressional Committee Chairmen
and secondary schools throughout the country. Its major focus was on the
educationally deprived and disadvantaged, a holdover emphasis from the
antipoverty program, although it was designed to help all sectors of society.
Committee members had been trying for years to get some sort of elemen-
tary and secondary school aid through Congress and had been thwarted at
nearly all stages until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 removed the segrega-
tionist obstacles from the path of federal aid to education, and a liberal black
New Yorker replaced a conservative white southerner as chairman. Other
proposals compromised by focusing on pupils rather than on institutions,
enabling members to get over the stumbling blocks provided by the issue of
aid to church schools. In addition to the ESEA of 1965 and its 1966
amendments (P.L. 89-750), Congress enacted the Higher Education Act of
1965 (P.L. 89-329) and amendments to the aforementioned Higher Educa-
tion Facilities Act (P.L. 89-752).
The function of the committee in the 1960s was markedly different
from what it had been during most of the previous decade. Whereas under
Barden the committee's mission had been to block progressive legislation
and to maintain the status quo, the committee under Powell had an activist
mentality. And by virtue of the Speaker's interference in the assignment
process throughout the 1950s, it had a liberal majority. The Democrats,
including the chairman, set out to better the human condition and to change
the status quo to something more humanitarian. The emphasis was on
helping people become better educated, have better job opportunities, and
thereby experience a better quality of life.
The predominantly liberal committee was ready to go. Members
wanted to pass legislation that had been bottled up by conservatives in
previous Congresses. They were successful largely because the chairman
did not interfere in subcommittee operations. He gave the subcommittee
chairmen free rein. Many of the accomplishments were possible because
the chairman generally was on the same side as his majority members,
unlike his predecessor, who had sided with the Republicans for the most
part. The fact that the administration backed the committee majority in its
desire to enact federal aid to education, increase the minimum wage, and
find a solution for the poverty problems also facilitated the committee's
mission.
The committee did not have smooth sailing. In addition to the substan-
tial controversies generated by the subject matter under consideration, after
a while the chairman did an about-face and stopped cooperating. Members
faced a situation not so different from what they had had to contend with
under Barden: Powell began wielding his powers as chairman as a weapon.
He used bill referral to subcommittees to punish his enemies and reward
his friends. He pocketed bills instead of reporting them to the House. In
the midst of its great legislative strides, the committee had to restrain
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its chairman and enhance its ability to act without him. Despite well-
publicized difficulties with the chairman, the committee accomplished a
great deal during the last term of Powell's chairmanship. The committee
reported fifty-one bills that term, three times the number reported in
the 86th Congress (1959-60), Barden's last. Members were able to push
through a large number of bills, some of them with major ramifications.
Although the official jurisdiction was largely the same under Powell as
it had been under Barden, it expanded with different types of programs. In
addition, the committee's function changed to reflect the mission of the
chairman and his committee and in concurrence with an activist Demo-
cratic administration. The liberal bent of the committee became institu-
tionalized under Powell. Begun in the Barden years, the committee under
Powell generally was considered a place for the most liberal of liberal
Democrats and the most conservative Republicans. This is illustrated by
more partisan voting patterns under Powell than had been evident under
Barden.
The chairman's personality and behavior, along with changes in
committee rules, committee size and party ratios, subcommittees, and com-
mittee staff, made the committee more decentralized, democratic, univer-
salistic, and complex at the same time that it remained highly partisan and
conflictual. Powell, in effect, was no shrinking violet and took advantage of
whatever opportunities the chairmanship afforded him to leave his imprint
on the committee. His ideological leanings and activist stance helped alter
committee jurisdictions and functions, transforming the committee from a
legislative barrier to a battering ram for social legislation. At the same time,
some of his indiscretions led to a restructuring of power.
The decentralization process began with the inclusion of mandatory
referrals to subcommittees with specified jurisdictions in the committee
rules during the later Barden years. Although the fixed jurisdictions were
removed from the 1961 rules to give an activist chairman some discretion,
they were restored in 1966 after Powell abused the privilege. Conse-
quently, the decentralization made the committee more universalistic in
that it made favoritism less prevalent, distributing advantages in a less
particularistic manner.
Under Powell, committee decentralization was institutionalized. It
was attributable, in part, to provisions in the committee rules mandating
the use of subcommittees and, in part, to Powell's laissez-faire attitude
toward the committee. His disposition may have stemmed partly from his
need to depend on his subcommittee chairmen to take committee bills to the
floor, since Powell's sponsorship and endorsement were tantamount to a
death warrant for a bill. For the most part, unless the matter was of
particular interest to Powell, the subcommittee chairmen conducted the
show. Since all bills were referred to subcommittees, each subcommittee
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was free to take up anything that its chairman or members wanted to
consider and to hold whatever hearings were desired. The rules allowed
legislation to flow through the process as smoothly as its content would
allow, without being held up because the full committee chairman did not
support it. As a result, most legislation referred to the committee in the
1960s had a better chance of being discussed than did bills referred in the
previous decade.
All the provisions giving the majority party members more voice in
committee actions democratized as well as decentralized the committee.
Members could call meetings, establish subcommittees, report legislation,
authorize the hiring of staff, approve travel, and hold hearings. In effect,
they could act without their chairman. When they had tried to do that
under Barden, the parliamentarian had ruled them out of order.
Subcommittee staffs became institutionalized under Powell. While he
controlled the full committee staff, he permitted subcommittee chairmen to
hire and manage their own personnel. For the first time, the chairmen had
at least some support staff to help in their work. In addition, they had the
money to operate.
Prior to Powell's chairmanship, the committee budget was left entirely
up to the chairman. The rules enacted in 1966 ostensibly gave the members
some control over where the money was being spent; however, Powell's
stewardship of committee funds raised questions about the committee's
financial management. Subsequently, the House launched an investigation
into the financial practices of this committee.
In sum, by the time Powell left office, the democratic, decentralized
committee with an expanded membership and staff was here to stay. After
the establishment of the structure in the rules, future chairmen would have
found it difficult to regain the prerogatives that Barden and Powell had lost.
The Powell years represented the heyday of the Committee on Education
and Labor. Never had it played such an integral role in enacting the
administration's agenda or attracted so much public attention. Never had
its legislation earned such widespread support. Never had it had the help of
both the majority in the committee and the majority on the floor to
accomplish its mission. As Powell said of the committee in the 88th
Congress: "The door to the Great Society has now been opened. The
threshold has been crossed. These achievements have been made possible
by the splendid cooperation of the members of the committee in studying
and formulating sound legislative proposals" (Committee Activities and
Accomplishments, 88th Cong., 1965, p. viii).
By the end of Powell's last term, Education and Labor had nearly
reached its pinnacle as a vital, salient committee. Not only had the
quantity of work referred to it increased sharply, but the demand for
quality became more critical. Members had their chance to make a mark
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on history, to be remembered for contributing to some of the most inno-
vative ideas and programs that the nation had seen since Franklin D.
Roosevelt was in office. In addition to the landmark proposals, the com-
mittee considered and saw enacted numerous programs with limited
impact, such as the provision of reading materials for the deaf. The
committee worked to protect migrant agricultural workers and child la-
borers. Members tried to alleviate some of the unemployment problems
and the problems caused by extreme poverty. Many people would benefit
from the work these members did during the 87th, 88th, and 89th Con-
gresses. On the other hand, acceptance of these programs was not uni-
versal. Some people regarded them as poorly designed or ill advised.
Moreover, they cost taxpayers a great deal, and in the 1990s members are
hard-pressed to hang on to the gains they made in social welfare in the
early to mid-1960s.
The
Chairmanship of
Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr.
One of the Committee on Education and Labor's most productive but
evolutionary periods occurred during the chairmanship of Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. (D-NY). Perhaps as much as that of any chairman before or
since, his leadership shaped the future of the committee.
Portrait of the Chairman
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was an important man. He was an inspirational
leader among blacks and chairman of the powerful Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor during the 1960s. He attracted attention everywhere he
went. Part of the appeal was his flamboyant personal style, in addition to
his charm and physical attractiveness. Another part derived from his
oratorical skills, which he fine-tuned as pastor of the Abyssinian Baptist
Church in Harlem. He spoke eloquently on a broad array of topics and
could move people with his words. People listened when he preached, on
political as well as religious issues.
Powell was born on November 29, 1908, in New Haven, Connecticut,
the son of a Baptist preacher. In his autobiography, Powell claimed that his
paternal grandmother, Sally, was part Cherokee Indian and part black and
bore a son by a white slaveholder of German descent. The slaveholder died,
leaving Sally to fend for herself and her unborn child. A former slave
named Dunn took them in and raised Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. Powell Jr.
claimed that Adam, Sr. married a young woman sired by Colonel Jacob
Shaefer of the brewing family. The daughter of the brewer and his mistress
was the mother of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Charles V. Hamilton, a noted
political scientist and one of Powell, Jr.'s biographers, could find no
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evidence of these claims, however (see Hamilton 1991, 41-43). Evidently
Powell's ancestry was mixed, and although he went through most of his life
as black, he did not seem to be quite sure how black he really was (Hickey
and Edwin 1965; Powell 1971).1
Powell's father took a job as minister of the large Abyssinian Baptist
Church in Harlem and moved the family there weeks after young Adam
was born. Adam, Jr. grew up there and attended New York City public
schools. In 1925, at sixteen, he entered the City College of New York. He
failed out of school his first semester but was allowed to return because of a
family friendship with the president of the college. He failed five courses in
his second semester and was expelled (Powell 1971, 27). After months of
education that only the streets of Harlem could provide, Powell enrolled in
Colgate University.
Powell apparently passed as white for a brief period while at Colgate
(Hickey and Edwin 1965, 34-35; Lyons 1972). He and a white roommate
pledged a white fraternity. Apparently the fraternity background check
was responsible for raising a question about his racial background. One of
his friends recalled his discovery that Powell was not white: " 'When the fall
term started, the track coach told me to hunt up a Negro boy named Powell
who was supposed to be a good 440-yard-dash prospect.' Vaughn was
unable to find him. Then, a few weeks later, Vaughn's German professor
was reseating his students in alphabetical order, and in so doing, called out
the name 'Powell.' Vaughn looked at the freshman student, and thought
'That can't be my 440 man. He's white.' But then he looked harder and
decided that Powell was, in fact, a Negro" (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 34-35)
When the news leaked, Powell was shunned all over campus. He thereupon
joined a black fraternity instead of the white one and stilled the disruption.
In 1930 he graduated from Colgate.
After Colgate, Powell attended Union Theological Seminary. He left
the seminary after several disagreements with its president, Dr. Henry
Sloane Coffin, who told him that no minister could marry anyone in show
business or anyone who was divorced (Powell 1971, 37). Powell then en-
rolled in Columbia Teachers College and earned a master's degree in relig-
ious education (Powell 1971, 37).
When his father retired in 1937, Adam, Jr., took over the ministry of
the Abyssinian Baptist Church and began cultivating a large part of what
soon would be his congressional constituency. In 1930, at the request of
several prominent New York citizens, he agreed to organize the local
populace for the fight to admit blacks to city hospitals. Later, he wrote:
"And so for the first time I heeded the call of the masses and became part of
the struggles of the people of Harlem—not through any wish of my own,
not through any divine call, but simply because I had been born to begin
my work in the Great Depression" (Powell 1971, 57). He became a gadfly
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and an activist in New York politics. In 1941 he was elected to the New
York City Council. In addition to his religious and political activities,
Powell also edited and published a city newspaper from 1941 to 1945 and
claimed to have taught religious education at the extension school of
Columbia University from 1932 to 1940. Hamilton noted, "The last item
must have been quite a revelation to officials at Columbia University"
(1991, 59).
Powell was elected to Congress for the first time in 1944. He referred to
himself as the "first bad nigger in Congress" (Powell 1971, 70). Speaker
Sam Ray burn called Powell into his office and told him:
"Freshmen members of Congress are supposed not to be heard and not even to be
seen too much. There are a lot of good men around here. Listen to what they have to
say, drink it all in, get reelected a few more times, and then start moving. But for
God's sake, Adam, don't throw those bombs."
I said, "Mr. Speaker, I've got a bomb in each hand, and I'm going to throw
them right away." . . . After that first exchange Mr. Sam and I became close
friends. [Powell 1971, 72]
Powell went into Congress with his mouth at full throttle, advertising his
presence from the first day to the very last. For him to have done otherwise
would have been as difficult as hiding a bull in a bean hamper.
Orientation of the Chairman
Adam Powell's orientation differed dramatically from Graham Barden's.
He appropriated for himself a broad national, liberal constituency inter-
ested in advancing civil rights and progressive positions. He could not
confine himself to a relatively narrow, conservative district. He promoted
an activist federal government instead of minimal federal interference.
Philosophically, he was much more representative of his party and his
committee majority than was Barden. On a personal level, Powell's de-
meanor was as flamboyant as Barden's was courtly and reserved. All of
these factors contributed to a different type of management of the commit-
tee and to different committee outputs.
Although his electoral constituency lived within the geographic
boundaries of the Fourth District of New York, Powell cultivated assidu-
ously his larger national constituency. He viewed all blacks and civil rights
supporters as his people. As one pair of his biographers said to him
concerning his early years in the House, "That he spoke for Negroes
everywhere—not just those in Harlem—became increasingly apparent"
(Hickey and Edwin 1965, 95). Of course, by improving the lot of his
The Powell Chairmanship 113
national following, he also made advances on behalf of his reelection. Part
of the reason for this phenomenon was the tremendous overlap between the
people in his district and those in his national following. And many of the
national black leaders had Harlem connections. Powell seemed to have a
black mandate, especially when he was first elected. The more whites
criticized him, the surer black America was that it had a true black repre-
sentative in Adam Powell (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 91-92).
Powell's district in the 1960 census was about 86 percent black and
Puerto Rican and was centered in Harlem. There were more than 107,000
people per square mile in his district, with a total population in 1960 of
431,330 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963). He first was elected on the
tickets of three parties, a fact that seemed to give him license to do and say
anything in Congress and risk little wrath at home. Although his geo-
graphic and reelection constituencies were in Harlem, Powell's most sup-
portive constituency was even closer to home. Powell took advantage of his
pulpit at the Abyssinian Baptist Church to cultivate his primary constitu-
ency among church members, of which there were thousands. The church
was both battery and power train of his political organization. Hickey and
Edwin described the situation as follows: "Adam [has] practically unlimited
appeal to the females. Some overstater has said, in fact, that the Reverend
Powell slithered into the House on the kisses he has implanted on Abys-
sinian's glassy-eyed sisters every Sunday morning" (1965, 105).
In many ways, Adam Clayton Powell was a polar opposite of Graham
Barden. The committee could hardly have had such a different chairman,
particularly one of the same party. Whereas Barden was known for his
conservative tendencies, Powell was renowned as an extreme liberal, par-
ticularly regarding civil rights issues. He long had been known as a de-
fender and promoter of minority rights and was famous—and notorious in
some quarters—for his "Powell Amendment," denying federal funds to
states that discriminated on the basis of race. He tried to attach it to dozens
of appropriations bills before the House. Powell was for federal inter-
ference and anything else necessary to make gains for nonwhites. Powell
used his chairmanship of the Committee on Education and Labor to ad-
vance civil rights. His congressional district was in Harlem, but he made
few efforts to make gains for Harlem in particular, crusading instead for
equality for all blacks. He preached to a national constituency of blacks,
working for black causes nationwide and sometimes on the international
scene. He was a prominent figure in the civil rights movement, although
frequently he disagreed with other black leaders.
Powell was a hard pill to swallow for many House members, including
some on Education and Labor. He had flouted the traditions of the House,
angering many people along the way. For instance, he ate in the members'
dining room—a whites-only bastion since opening its doors—and was the
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first black to do so (Powell 1971, 82-83). He incited Democratic contempt
for his public support for the reelection of Eisenhower in 1956 against
Democratic challenger Adlai Stevenson.
Powell's legal problems also disgruntled the House. He was indicted
for tax evasion after the Internal Revenue Service and a federal grand jury
had investigated him intermittently for several years. Shortly after he as-
sumed the chairmanship, his case was dismissed in federal court (Powell
1971, 182). Powell also was involved in a libel suit that lasted until 1968 and
included at least four civil or criminal charges of contempt of court against
him (see Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1966, 520-21). And in 1959 the FBI
investigated possible bribery charges against him. Charges were never
filed, however, because agents could not prove that Powell received money
in exchange for introducing a bill that would have guaranteed a particular
immigrant permanent residency status in the United States (Hamilton
1991, 421).
A great many House members resented this particular black man's
having the chairmanship of an important committee (interviews, mem-
bers), although William Dawson of Illinois, chairman of the Committee on
Government Operations, did not stimulate any noticeable flow of bile.
Powell certainly would not stay "in his place." Southerners, in particular,
feared the legislation that might come out of his committee and, in their
eyes, have adverse effects on their constituencies. Other members resented
his flamboyance (Powell 1971), his irresponsibility (Hickey and Edwin
1965; Wilson 1960), his eloquence, and his legal difficulties. They did not
think that anyone, particularly a black, as flamboyant and as irresponsible
as Powell, much less anyone who was under indictment for tax evasion,
should be rewarded with a committee chairmanship (interview). Barden
even had delayed his retirement in the hope that Powell would not be
around to succeed him. He finally gave up because Powell was a much
younger man than he and signaled no intention to quit Congress anytime
soon (Puryear 1979, 219). So many members despised Powell that, in order
to promote its passage, no legislation reported by his committee bore his
sponsorship, although he took credit for a great deal of the progress.
On the other hand, liberal members of Education and Labor were
delighted finally to be rid of the previous chairman. With Barden gone,
their legislation had a substantially better chance of reaching the floor and
of passing. With Powell at the helm, the legislation not only would not be
blocked by the chairman, but it might even be facilitated as long as it treated
blacks well. Members knew, for example, that Powell favored federal aid to
education, given that it did not discriminate against his constituency.
Powell also looked out for himself and his personal gain (Powell 1971;
Hickey and Edwin 1965). He used his chairmanship as he used his pulpit.
He fought hard for his people and enjoyed the perquisites of the chair-
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manship as he had those of the pastorate. He could live in high style, and
the chairmanship of a salient committee provided him high visibility. He
put his friends and his wife on the payroll. He signed approval of his own
travel and took whomever he wanted with him. In effect, he no longer had
to have everything approved by someone else before he could do it. He was
finally the one who did the approving.
The chairmanship offered Powell additional access to the media, and
he loved the attention. He was an accomplished, stage-wise performer.
According to his colleagues, he was charming and had mastered the knack
of sounding articulate without really knowing much about a subject. He
drove fancy cars and usually had beautiful women within arm's reach. He
used his chairmanship to help his celebrity status, frequently taking credit
for work that was done by others (interviews, members and staff).
The chairman's ideological leanings can be inferred from surrogate
measures of liberalism and conservatism, namely from interest group scores
(see table 4.1). Ratings by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA),
Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), and the Committee on Politi-
cal Education (COPE) are considered. Throughout Powell's tenure as
chairman, his ratings by the liberal interest groups were high. They were
always above 80 percent, and several times he rated 100 percent support.
His scores on the conservative ACA scale were low. During his first term as
chairman, Powell scored the extremes on all three scales. He had 100
percent approval by the ADA and by COPE and voted "wrong" on every
issue counted by the ACA. He voted more liberally than already liberal
Democratic committee member averages.
A comparison of Powell's and Barden's interest group scores for the
1950s illustrates how much more liberal Powell was than Barden (see table
4.2). The data show Powell far outscoring his southern colleague on the
surrogate measures for liberalism. Using 1950s ADA and labor support
scores, the average difference between Barden's scores and the mean scores
of his committee colleagues was almost fifty-five points. For the same
period, the difference between Powell's scores and those of the committee
Democrats averaged just over seventeen points. His ratings would have
been higher had he been present for all of the votes included. Powell voted
"wrong" only occasionally, according to the interest group records, but his
absences lowered his scores. The conservatives rarely could count on
Powell, as they could on Barden, to side with them. During the 1960s the
differences between Powell's ADA and COPE scores and the average
scores of Democratic committee members were even smaller, averaging
nine points. In contrast to Barden, he was fairly representative of his
majority committee members.
House party-unity scores, measuring how frequently a member votes
with other members of his party on party votes, indirectly shed light on the
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Table 4.1. Powell's Interest Group Ratings Compared with the Average Scores
of Other Committee Members, 1961-1966
Group
ADA
COPE
ACA
ADA
COPE
ACA
ADA
COPE
ACA
Year
1962
1961-62
1961-62
1964
1963-64
1957-64
1966
1965-66
1966
Powell
100.0
100.0
0.0
92.0
82.0
13.0
88.0
100.0
10.0
Dems
88.3
90.9
9.4
82.7
90.0
10.1
82.8
89.2
13.6
Reps
20.7
5.2
81.1
12.0
13.5
85.3
16.5
16.1
73.4
Source: Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1961-66.
Table 4.2. Interest Group Ratings of Barden and Powell in 1950s
Group
AFL
AFL
CIO
CIO
ADA
ADA
Labor
AFL-CIO
COPE
ADA
Year
1947-52
1951
1951
1951-52
1951
1952
1953-54
1947-56
1959-60
1960
Barden
3.7
20.0
0.0
0.0
7.7
0.0
33.3
26.3
10.0
11.0
E & L Dems
54.5
67.1
55.0
57.6
60.4
58.2
72.6
55.1
88.7
88.8
Difference
-50.8
-47.1
-55.0
-57 .6
-52.7
-58.2
-39.3
-28.8
-78.7
-77.8
Powell
70.2
90.0
90.0
62.5
77.0
61.5
90.4
89.4
100.0
100.0
Difference
+ 15.7
+ 22.9
+ 35.0
+ 4.9
+ 16.6
+ 3.3
+ 17.8
+ 34.3
+ 11.3
+ 11.2
Source: Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1951-61.
The — signifies that the chariman was more conservative than the average committee
Democrat. The + indicates that the chairman was more liberal.
chairman's orientation. Their informational value is limited to measuring a
member's support for his party on party votes and, given the lack of unity
among Democrats on certain issues, they cannot be used as measures of
liberalism or conservatism. Powell's House party-unity scores were low, in
sharp contrast to his high degree of party support when voting in commit-
tee.
Powell, it seems, did not rush to demonstrate particularly high degrees
of partisanship on the floor during the 87th, 88th, and 89th Congresses. He
showed only moderate support for his party, averaging over twenty points
lower than did his committee Democratic colleagues (see table 3.7). His
88th Congress score was particularly low. The relatively low unity scores
added to the resentment that his colleagues felt for him, but they took no
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Table 4.3. Powell's Rate of Attendance at Committee Meetings, 1951-1966a
Year
1951
1952
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Total number
of meetings
11
14
14b
15
33
37
28
41
32b
29
22
29
21
Powell
N
1
2
4
4
11
11
11
36
21
21
8
25
18
present
%
9.1
14.3
28.6
26.7
33.3
29.7
39.3
87.8
65.6
72.4
36.4
86.2
85.7
Powell
N
10
12
8
11
22
26
17
5
11
8
14
4
3
absent
%
90.9
85.7
57.1
73.3
66.7
70.3
60.7
12.2
34.4
27.6
63.6
13.8
14.3
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-1966.
N is the number of meetings held each year.
"Data do not include hearings. Data for 1953, 1954, and 1957 are missing.
bAttendance data not available for two meetings.
action to chastise him at this time. Later, in the 1980s, low scores reportedly
prevented other members from being awarded chairmanships or other
party roles (interviews).
At least two factors may have affected Powell's scores. First, he had a
well-deserved reputation for poor attendance, and his absences detracted
from the degree of party support measured by the unity scores.2 For
example, according to one of his committee colleagues, Sam Gibbons (D-
FL), Powell missed 164 of 218 floor roll calls in 1966 because of vacations in
Bimini or elsewhere (Robertson 1966; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1966,
520).3 Hamilton stated, "Actually the question about Powell was not how
he would vote, but, on important roll call votes on the floor, if he would be
around to cast a vote" (1991, 356-57). (See table 4.3.) Second, Powell may
have thought that some of the issues on which party votes occurred were
biased against blacks. He withheld his support on numerous programs
because he thought either that they were discriminatory or that blacks
could be treated better.
A rather ironic note is that Powell's party-unity scores for the 87th,
88th, and 89th Congresses are reminiscent of Barden's low party-unity
scores in the 1950s. Nor were Powell's 1950s scores high. Over the years
that Barden was chairman, Powell averaged 64.2 percent support for the
Democratic party on House party-unity votes, and Barden averaged 38
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Table 4.4. Powell's Support for Each Party on Committee Party Votes,
1961-1966
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Total
Percentage
of total
Party votes
50
11
17
25
17
5
125
With
N
46
11
14
25
17
5
118
Dems
%
92.0
100.0
82.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
94.4
With
N
3
0
1
0
0
0
4
Reps
%
6.0
0.0
5.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.2
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1961-66.
Party votes are defined here as roll-call votes on which at least 70 percent of the Democrats
opposed at least 70 percent of the Republicans.
percent support. After Powell became chairman, he supported his party on
just over half of the unity votes.
An examination of Powell's voting record on committee votes shows
that his low degree of partisanship on the floor did not carry over to the
committee. His committee votes show how frequently he voted with his
fellow Democrats, on all votes and on party votes, and how often his side
prevailed (see table 4.4). Contrary to his predecessor, Powell rarely de-
fected to the Republican side on party votes. What is more, he sided with
his fellow committee Democrats much more frequently than he did with a
majority of House Democrats. His support for the Democrats on those roll
calls was exceedingly high: 100 percent in four of the six years he was
chairman, 94.4 percent for his entire tenure. He abstained or was absent on
several other votes. He voted with the majority of the Republicans on 15.7
percent of all committee votes, although many of these votes had a large
portion of the Democrats aligned with a large portion of Republicans (see
table 4.5).
In all but the last year of his chairmanship, Powell had an impressive
record for voting on the winning side. The large Democratic majority
helped his chances. Aside from his frequent introduction of the Powell
Amendment in the 1950s, majority members had little problem with
Powell's voting behavior. Over the period 1961-65, he averaged victories on
more than 82 percent of committee votes, winning on over 90 percent in
1964, when the poverty bill was considered. During his last year as
chairman, however, he was on the prevailing side on only 41.6 percent of
the tallies (see table 4.6).
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Table 4.5. Powell's Support for Each Party on Committee Roll Calls, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Years
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
Total
Percentage
of total
Roll calls
74
56
36
166
With
N
67
51
29
147
Dems
%
90.5
91.1
80.6
88.6
With
N
10
9
7
26
Reps
%
13.5
16.1
19.4
15.7
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1961-66.
This table includes all committee roll calls, not just those on which the parties were opposed.
Table 4.6. Powell's Votes on the Winning Side in Committee, 1961-1966
Congress
87th
88th
89th
Total
Percentage
of total
Mean per
term
Mean per
session
Roll calls
74
56
36
166
55.3
27.7
Chair
N
63
48
26
137
45.7
22.8
wins
%
85.1
85.7
72.2
82.5
Party votes*
61
42
22
125
75.3
41.7
20.8
Chair
N
53
38
20
111
37.0
18.5
wins
%
86.9
90.5
90.9
88.8
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1961-66.
* Party votes are defined as roll-call votes on which at least 70% of the Democrats opposed at
least 70 percent of the Republicans.
Powell's 82-percent overall winning record does not mean that he lost
on 18 percent of those votes. On about 45 percent of the votes that he did
not win, he was absent, passed, or voted present for the record (see table
4.3). In fact, he lost on only 16 of the 166 total roll-call votes taken during
his chairmanship. That means that of the 150 votes on which he cast either a
yea or nay ballot (either in person or by proxy), he was successful on about
90 percent. On the losing roll calls, he generally voted with most of the
Democrats against a few Democrats aligned with virtually all of the Repub-
licans. Divisions among the Democrats accounted for most of his losses.
In his first term as chairman, Powell voted on the losing side on several
amendments to the College Academic Facilities and Scholarship Act,
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which was never enacted. In addition, he failed in his bid to keep National
Defense Education Act (NDEA) funds from being slashed. In 1963-64,
Powell's side lost on an antidiscrimination amendment to the extension of
impacted areas legislation, on an exemption in the Federal Coal Mine
Safety Act for mines with fewer than fourteen people, and on two amend-
ments to the poverty program. In 1965 he lost on minimum wage, the
higher education bill, and a procedural motion.
That there were only twelve committee roll calls during the 1966
session and that Powell was absent or voted "present" on five of them may
have lowered his overall success record. Two of those votes related to some
serious problems he had in his committee. He had provoked his colleagues
into proposing restrictions on the chairman's powers. Naturally, he voted
against the motion to consider such rules changes and then cast a "present"
vote on their adoption. The other issue he lost on was an amendment to the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 concerning education payments relat-
ing to Indian children under the poverty program.
Comparatively, Powell was much more successful in voting with the
winning side in committee than was Barden as chairman during the 1950s.
Barden never won on more than 75 percent of the party votes, and gener-
ally, the more party votes there were, the worse his record was. Barden
won on 5 8.6 percent of all votes and on only 38.5 percent of the party votes.
Powell, on the other hand, voted on the winning side on over 82 percent of
all committee roll calls and on 88.8 percent of the party votes during his
tenure as chairman. While it is a rare chairman who can win on every vote,
Powell was substantially more representative of his party and of his com-
mittee than was Barden.
Leadership: Institutional versus Personal Resources
The manner in which a chairman combines the use of his official pre-
rogatives and personal resources is a manifestation of how he exercises
leadership. Powell's reliance on the written and unwritten prerogatives of
the chairmanship, his use of rewards and sanctions, his reputation among
his peers, and his knowledge of the rules and of the subject at hand
distinguished him from Graham Barden. The committee, though com-
posed of many of the same members, was a different organization under the
leadership of each chairman. It worked differently, had a different reputa-
tion, and produced different outputs. The chairmen of Education and
Labor provide evidence that leaders perceive and respond to environmental
constraints and expectations in myriad ways. These variations, plus dissim-
ilarities in personality and personal resources, yield diverse leadership
patterns and impacts.
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The 1960s committee had a new agenda, this time led by the adminis-
tration and carried out by a liberal majority that was created largely as a
result of the House leadership's skewing of assignments. This agenda was
important to a variety of people, and it received a great deal of media
attention. By and large, Powell, unlike his predecessor, let the committee
run itself. Powell increased the staff, the number of meetings, and the
number of hearings. He delegated much of the authority and took credit for
the accomplishments. An active subcommittee system did most of the
work.
Since his power base derives in large part from the position's pre-
rogatives, a primary aspect of a chairman's leadership behavior is his
response to expectations held by other members of his committee. If his
actions coincide with their expectations and those of the House, he will be
successful, and the committee will run smoothly. If not, he will be re-
strained. Whatever personal influence a chairman has augments the wealth
of resources at his disposal.
Despite the addition of some amendments to the committee rules when
Powell took the helm, he had more discretion than Barden had had in the
previous term. Although the subcommittees had been established by the
1961 rules and were given the authority to act as agents of the committee,
the major difference was the lack of firmly defined jurisdictions. This lack
left Powell a great deal of discretion over the referral of bills. He also had the
authority to establish additional subcommittees as he wished. In other,
generally less-consequential ways, the new chairman had less discretion.
He was required to assign all members to one or more subcommittees. The
rules designated the ranking majority members as subcommittee chairmen
and directed the chairman to recommend as conferees with the Senate the
members of the subcommittee that reported the bill in question. Without
an outright confrontation, however, there was little way to enforce these
provisions. The chairman could disregard the rules until a majority was
willing to call him on it. Few members relished challenging the chairman.
Powell relied heavily on subcommittees. Virtually all the legislation
referred to the Committee on Education and Labor subsequently was sent
to a subcommittee. Powell was good at delegating the details to others. He
gave the subcommittee chairmen free rein to run their subunits. He let
them do the work and was adroit at taking much of the credit for programs
that survived the process. Members voiced few complaints about Powell's
referring legislation to the wrong subcommittees, at least for the first two
terms. According to staff, Powell and the members had a "gentleman's
agreement" that if somebody had worked on a particular subject for a long
time, related legislation would be referred to whichever subcommittee he
happened to chair or sit on, regardless of the subcommittee's jurisdiction.
For example, during the 87th Congress, bills relating to aid for the fine arts
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came under the jurisdiction of the Select Subcommittee on Education,
chaired by Frank Thompson, Jr., (D-NJ). In the 88th, Thompson chaired
the Special Subcommittee on Labor, which then considered bills to aid the
growth and development of the fine arts. Also in the 88th, bills on "quality
education," either relating to the NDEA or to cooperative research, were
sent to the Special Subcommittee on Labor, where Representatives Hugh
Carey (D-NY) and James G. O'Hara (D-MI) served. Powell generally
referred bills to the subcommittees where their sponsors and promoters
served.
Powell did establish special subcommittees for his personal interest, as
well as for the interests of other members. He chaired a subcommittee on
the International Labor Organization because of a personal interest—in the
travel benefits, it is said (interview). He also chaired the Subcommittee on
the War on Poverty Program, comprising the most senior Democrats and
assorted Republicans, and another on the study of shared time education.
In the 89th Congress, he sat as chairman of the ad hoc Subcommittee on De
Facto School Segregation, which handled an issue of long-standing interest
to him. It gave him another platform from which to decry racism and to take
credit for efforts to abolish it. Powell also let other members chair subcom-
mittees concerning issues of personal interest. He established a subcommit-
tee to study the impact of automation on employment and appointed as
chairman Elmer Holland (D-PA), who had a particular interest in labor and
unemployment. Powell initially favored John Dent (D-PA) with the chair-
manship of the ad hoc Subcommittee on the National Labor Relations
Board, but its ranking member, Roman Pucinski (D-IL), took it over when
Dent was appointed chairman of the Subcommittee on the Impact of
Imports and Exports on American Employment. Both subcommittee chair-
men had strong labor constituencies that were adversely affected by auto-
mation and by imports. Powell, too, had a strong interest in the effects of
automation on black labor and used the issue to needle labor unions about
their discriminatory practices.
The creation of these ad hoc committees may have led one scholar to
accuse Powell of circumventing the established subcommittee system by
creating a new subcommittee structure, assigning the new subcommittees
jurisdictions similar to the old ones, and appointing to them members who
shared his views. Morrow (1969, 40) argued that Powell then referred most
of the major bills to the newly created subcommittees. An examination of
the committee's activities and accomplishments and the ad hoc subcommit-
tees that Powell established, however, provides little support for this
argument.4 The Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program was the
only ad hoc unit created to deal with major legislation. For the most part,
the chairman assigned bills to the standing subcommittees. On occasion, he
set up a task force or a subcommittee to investigate complaints or to study a
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subject in which he or another member was interested, but the standing
subcommittees did most of the work.
The gavel provides one of the chairman's most valued resources. With
gavel in hand, he controls, among other things, the conduct of meetings and
hearings, the recognition of members to speak, the power to make parlia-
mentary rulings, the authority to call votes, the scheduling of legislation,
the time allotted to consider a proposal, and conferences with the Senate.
Moreover, he can do whatever he can get away with until someone chal-
lenges him.
Powell had no qualms about calling meetings during his first two terms
as chairman. If Powell was indisposed, Carl Perkins (D-KY) presided with
his blessing. During the 89th Congress, however, the members were
angered by Powell's increasingly frequent absences. Powell was indisposed
so often that the members were frustrated in several attempts to push
through their legislation. In the session before, in 1964, Powell had at-
tended only 36.4 percent of the committee's meetings. As a consequence of
his absences, his committee colleagues instituted rules legitimating their
actions when he was not present. Verifying current practice, the new rules
allowed the ranking majority member present to preside in the absence of
the chairman. A former staff member, however, disagreed with the need to
change the rules, commenting that "Powell's absences never stopped a
thing. Perkins could do it. He followed Adam's instructions to the letter"
(interview).
Powell let his committee members hold hearings on just about any-
thing. The 1961 committee rules authorized subcommittees to hold hear-
ings, receive exhibits, take testimony, and report the results or findings to
the full committee. The chairman had to authorize any hearings held
outside Washington or during a recess or adjournment. As a result of these
rules and of a cooperative chairman, the number of hearings increased
under Powell.
By all accounts, Powell was effective in his use of the gavel and its
associated prerogatives, although he was not always fair to his opponents.
He ran the meetings efficiently, but the Republicans claimed, on occasion,
that he "stampeded" them. In response to one such accusation during the
poverty hearings, Powell replied, "I am the chairman. I will run this
committee as I desire" (Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings on the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, p. 1150; cited
in Bibby and Davidson 1972, 239; Zarefsky 1986, 54; and Jones 1984, 99).
On another occasion, he retorted, "It's my game, baby" (Green, Fallows,
andZwick 1972, 135).
The chairman also has the power to control the committee's agenda.
He can decide which legislation merits the most attention and which should
be ignored. For the most part, Powell did not attempt to exercise strict
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control over what the committee considered. The committee had a full
menu, and he allowed his subcommittee chairmen to take advantage of the
opportunities afforded by the new salience of poverty and education. In the
process, he exploited the racial aspects of every issue, holding up some
long-awaited labor legislation because unions were unfair to blacks.
By virtue of the rules of the House, as chairman Powell controlled the
appointment and duties of committee and subcommittee majority staff
members. The ranking minority member had the same authority over
minority party staff. By the committee rules, Powell could delegate staff
members, after consultation with subcommittee chairmen, to subcommit-
tees wherever he saw fit. Other committee members desiring staff as-
sistance were required to petition the chairman for his permission.
Although the previous chairman had appointed what little staff there
was in his last Congress, Powell allowed subcommittee chairs effective
control over their own employees. One member recalled: "Under Powell,
for the first time, the committee budgets were raised, and there was
adequate staff. Barden had kept all the committee staff to himself. The
subcommittees also had staffs for the first time. The'committee now had
the capability to get things done" (interview). One member, who claimed a
large part of the responsibility for separate subcommittee staffs, com-
mented: "Committee members wanted Education and Labor to be immu-
nized from Powell. He was uneven. I knew I could take advantage of
Powell's status in the House and establish a precedent to have separate
guaranteed funding for subcommittees. Banking and Currency—the hous-
ing subcommittee headed by [Albert] Rains—was next. Now several sub-
committees have it. It was easy to diminish Powell's power" (interview).
Powell kept control of the full committee majority staff, keeping only two
who had been with Barden. He hired almost all new people. Although
some of his committee employees were professionally qualified, Powell also
staffed the committee with friends and relatives, much to the chagrin of
the rest of the committee and, ultimately, of Congress.
Powell started his staffing abuses early in his congressional career. An
Abyssinian Baptist Church aide, his secretary in the days before he became
chairman, was convicted of, among other things, being on a congressional
payroll long after she had returned to New York (Hickey and Edwin 1965,
118-21). Powell was accused of taking kickbacks from her congressional
salary, although no one ever could prove it. Powell also abused his chair-
manship privileges by hiring his wife at a salary of nearly thirteen thousand
dollars per annum, his girlfriend, a clerk who served as a maid in his Bimini
home (Hamilton 1991,411-14,447), and other people deemed unacceptable
by the committee majority. Everybody knew it by 1966, when his then-
estranged wife, Yvette, who lived in Puerto Rico and was on the committee
payroll at a salary of more than twenty thousand dollars, complained that
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she had not been receiving her checks. Powell allegedly had endorsed her
checks and kept the money (Udall 1972, 254). In addition, he frequently
was accompanied by staff members, usually beautiful women, on his
travels about the world (see Jacobs 1973, 251).
Powell brought a torrent of criticism and attention to himself by
flaunting his congressional privileges. In the process, he drew unfavorable
attention to Congress itself. Many questions were raised about the pro-
priety of taking his secretary, a former beauty queen, and another attractive
female staff member on a trip throughout Europe at government expense,
ostensibly to study equal employment opportunities for women in the
member countries of the Common Market. The trip caused such a clamor
back in the United States that Powell's career never recovered. His House
colleagues even laughed at him when he returned to the floor (Hickey and
Edwin 1965, 222-23).
The chairman of the Committee on House Administration, Omar
Burleson of Texas, threatened to reduce Powell's staff funding. Powell
responded and further embarrassed the House by saying that he had done
nothing that white Congressmen had not been doing for years. His sup-
porters accused the Congress of scrutinizing Powell because he was black.
The chairman exploited this argument to its fullest potential, saying, "I
wish to state emphatically that I will always do what every other Con-
gressman and committee chairmen do in the House" {Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1966, 520).
Some of the minority committee members seemed to have a generally
favorable view of how Powell ran the committee, but such an opinion was
far from universal. It is notable that a Republican cast the only dissenting
ballot when the rules changes were instituted in 1966 and that a longtime
Republican committee staff member stated that Powell was a good chair-
man. Nevertheless, Powell did not cater to the Republicans. On Powell's
treatment of the minority, one majority member recalled: "Powell treated
the minority shabbily. He didn't give them a lot of attention. He wouldn't
kowtow to them. When there was big stuff, he courted Republican sup-
port. He was solicitous of them. When the battle lines were clear, he ran
right over them" (interview). Powell did have his disagreements with the
Republicans and was well known for his partisanship on the committee. In
one instance in 1961, he took control of the minority's office space, sparking
nearly an all-out war with ranking minority member Carroll Kearns (R-
PA). Kearns refused to move, and Powell blocked the door (interview,
member; Saloma 1969, 120; Fenno 1973, 87).
In 1966 the minority complained that hearings were scheduled at
irregular hours, that members were not given proper notice, and that
Powell was using the gavel to stifle dissent (Bibby and Davidson 1972, 239).
In House debate on Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
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of 1965, Powell requested that the debate and amendments be cut off by
6:15 P.M. , thus precluding discussion of nine amendments to be offered by
Republican committee members (Saloma 1969, 123; Eidenberg and Morey
1969, 135). As the partisan wrangling continued, one of the Republicans
complained that the product aptly could be entitled the "Railroad Act of
1965" (Saloma 1969, 124).
In the hearings on the War on Poverty, the Republicans charged
Powell with promoting unfair partisanship. According to one account,
"Chairman Powell selectively enforced a five-minute time limit on the
cross-examination of witnesses, becoming especially strict when Republi-
cans were questioning. The minority party was not allowed to question a
witness until six Democrats had done so, although the committee's custom
was to alternate between majority and minority members. Republicans
further complained that they were not given sufficient advance notice of the
committee's meetings" (Zarefsky 1986, 53-54). Nor were Republicans
happy when the administration supplied a parade of witnesses in favor of
the program and outnumbered opponents. Fifty-six people testified as
primary witnesses in favor of the bill, whereas only nine testified against it
(Bibby and Davidson 1972, 239).
On occasion, the chairman also employed other techniques to irritate
Republicans. When the antipoverty bill was marked up, Powell locked out
the Republicans, and the final amending and revisions were done by
committee Democrats (Zarefsky 1986, 54). During the mark-up session,
the Republicans picketed the locked meeting room carrying a sign saying,
"Open the door, Adam" (Fenno 1973, 87). Powell's actions were ironic.
Eighteen years earlier he had complained bitterly that the Taft-Hartley Act
had been marked up by the Republians in secrecy (Hardeman and Bacon
1987, 329). Everything the minority proposed was rejected, usually by
straight party vote, and members alleged that the chairman did not allot
them sufficient time to explain or justify their proposals (Zarefsky 1986, 54).
In sum, Powell did not always act favorably toward the Republicans.
He exploited and exacerbated party rifts and sometimes intentionally
annoyed Republicans. While the minority, for the most part, agreed that
Powell was an effective chairman, when the time came, they too voted to
curb his behavior and adopted new committee rules. He had no reliable
allies among the Republicans.
As defined by Stogdill, "reward power implies the ability of one
individual to facilitate the attainment of desired outcomes by others" (1974,
287). Powell had to take advantage of his reward power to attain his own
outcomes. In effect, he had an implicit arrangement with the subcommittee
chairman. Because his name on a bill or his association with a particular
position on an issue generated so much automatic opposition he needed
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allies to achieve his policy goals. Carl Perkins (D-KY) told the author that
"it was poison for Adam Clayton Powell to have a bill with his name on it.
Pure, blatant racism" (interview). A frequently repeated comment rein-
forces this point: "Powell loses twenty votes every time he stands up on
one side or another on an issue" (quoted in Eidenberg and Morey 1969,
53).
Powell used bill sponsorship as a basis for and a reward for support. On
several occasions, while avoiding sponsorship himself, Powell managed to
look magnanimous by stepping aside and allowing someone else to sponsor
and manage an important piece of legislation. For instance, about spon-
sorship of the poverty bill, two scholars wrote: "Powell took an active
interest in the bill, though he agreed to the administration's tactical sugges-
tion that a respected southern moderate, Representative Phil M. Landrum
(D-GA), serve as the bill's principal sponsor" (Bibby and Davidson 1972,
238). By having a conservative introduce the bill and by keeping Powell's
name off of it, southerners and other conservatives ostensibly might be
more likely to support it.
Powell rewarded members with bill sponsorship on lesser measures as
well. For example, in 1965 the committee responded to a large earthquake
in California by passing unanimously a disaster relief bill in the form of
amendments to the impacted areas legislation. In those days, only one
sponsor's name could appear on a bill. The chairman selected the most
senior of the five freshmen assigned to the committee in 1965, William D.
Ford (D-MI), to sponsor the clean bill, a major piece of legislation with good
chances of passing the House. Powell earned Ford's support because the
latter had been in the House for only two months and already had a law
with his name on it. Next the chairman went to Patsy Mink (D-HI), Lloyd
Meeds (D-WA), William Hathaway (D-ME), and James Scheuer (D-NY).
He gave each a bill with his or her name on it that would probably pass
(interview, member) or another vehicle to allow him or her to excel.
Hamilton quoted John Brademas (D-IN) as remembering an incident that
happened early in his tenure in Congress: '"John, I want you to be chair-
man of a task force to take a look at what the federal government should be
doing in the way of higher education.' Well, for a fresh second-term
congressman to be given that kind of opportunity was a marvelous thing.
And he said, 'Here is some staff money. You pick out the other members of
your task force'" (1991, 346).
Powell's main use of his reward power was to let the other committee
members do as they pleased. Then he claimed the credit for their accom-
plishments. He could do so using the rationale that he let them do it; he did
not stand in the way of progress, but he could have. One member said,
"Powell took credit for everything like it came from his tutelage. There was
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no such thing as a Powell tutelage. This was just to feed his ego. He acted
like he was behind the scenes" (interview). Powell even had the audacity to
take credit for the ideas in and for drafting one of President Kennedy's
speeches. When confronted by a Kennedy aide about his claims, Powell
said, "Well, you know those tape recorders. They have all those knobs that
you turn on and off. . . .  they put other things in other places . . . that's
what happened" (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 248).
One pair of scholars suggested that Powell let "the committee have its
head" because he did not want to have his authority challenged (Eidenberg
and Morey 1969, 52). Evidence also suggests that he let the committee do as
it pleased largely because he was not interested in doing the nitty-gritty
work necessary to produce good legislation. He much preferred to act as the
"committee mouth" and let others act as the hands. By all accounts he also
had a short attention span. Boiling said it "has been variously estimated as
ranging between forty seconds to two minutes" (1966, 98). Dr. Deborah
Wolfe, the committee education chief, recalled that the chairman often got
"a little wiggly" at hearings (Hamilton 1991, 349). Powell could relax in
Bimini or on the government's cruise ship and let the more diligent mem-
bers write the legislation and haggle over the small print (interviews,
members and staff).
Powell's taking credit for all committee accomplishments was one of
two themes dominating the literature and the author's conversations with
committee members and staff. The other was Powell's hands-off mode of
committee operations, resulting in a rather smoothly functioning organi-
zation. Although members generally were pleased that the chairman had
followed this practice, they were less enthusiastic over his claiming credit
for other members' work, thus depriving them of possible national ac-
claim.
Another way Powell employed rewards and sanctions was by the
referral of bills. According to several staff members, although the chairman
usually referred bills to the designated subcommittees, he sometimes used
his referral powers to "punish his enemies and reward his friends," par-
ticularly in his last term (interviews, staff). He ran afoul of his committee
when he violated the "gentleman's agreement" on bill referral. He assigned
bills without regard to tradition, a practice that annoyed committee mem-
bers. On several occasions, he sent a subcommittee chairman's coveted bill
to another subcommittee. For instance, Edith Green (D-OR), who chaired
the Special Education Subcommittee, had had jurisdiction over the Juve-
nile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-274)
since the 87th Congress. In the 89th, Powell took it away from her and
referred it to the General Education Subcommittee. Staff members said
that he "swapped situs picketing around, too" (interview). According to
Hamilton (1991, 388), Powell was ready with the stick. When Edith Green
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reneged on a promise to support a bill if her wishes to keep religion out of
the elementary and secondary education bill and other matters were accom-
modated, Powell threatened to remove vocational rehabilitation from her
subcommittee, to fire her sister from the committee staff, and to give her
pet bill, the higher education legislation, to John Brademas.
Another of Powell's actions that could be considered a sanction con-
cerned the speed, or lack thereof, with which he referred bills to subcom-
mittees. Since there was no routinized procedure concerning referrals, bills
were sent to subcommittees when the chairman got around to directing that
they be sent. Members became irritated when Powell's absences and poor
office procedures delayed the transmittal. A former staff member said, "I
don't know if the delays were deliberate or if they were a result of slop-
piness. The clerk would not act without specific directions, and frequently
Powell was not available" (interview).
Several people connected with the committee during the 1960s said
that Judge Howard W. Smith (D-VA), chairman of the Rules Committee,
had a rumored and unpublicized practice of letting Education and Labor
have only one rule a year. "No rules for schools was a known Smith policy"
(Johnson 1971, 209). According to staff, "Powell played games with this.
He created a jam in the committee over whose bill it would be. The last in
line wouldn't make it" (interview).
Powell also used sanctions for bargaining purposes with the House, not
just the committee. On several occasions Powell held up actions on major
bills until promises made to him were fulfilled. He delayed action on ele-
mentary and secondary education legislation in 1965 until he was granted
the $440,000 he had requested for operating expenses for the committee.
Although the House balked because members were "edgy about his con-
spicuous junketeering" (Goldman 1969, 302), President Johnson persuaded
the House to give him his money so the committee could act (Johnson 1971,
211).5
Another example of his bargaining tactics occurred with 1966 amend-
ments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. He held the bill hostage
for four months after the committee reported it on June 1 while he negoti-
ated for what he wanted in the program. He also withheld a task force
report that he had received in March showing the antipoverty policy to be a
good program until one week before the bill was to be reported on the floor
in September 1966 {Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1966, 257, 520). His
absences, as well as an unusual Rules Committee action, contributed to the
delays. The Committee on Rules had issued a rule giving the Speaker the
option to bypass the committee chairman in calling up the poverty bill.
Powell was insulted and refused to cooperate with efforts to secure a floor
vote. He finally relented and allowed it to be scheduled for September 26.
His actions on this bill led to the committee revolt against him four days
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before the bill came to the floor (see Loftus 1966b; Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1966, 520).
Chairman Powell also balked on two labor bills considered important
by the liberal Democrats on the committee and in the administration. AFL-
CIO leader George Meany was not pleased when Powell delayed action on
the repeal of section 14B of the Taft-Hartley Act that gave states the right to
enact "right-to-work" laws outlawing the union shop. Powell refused to
report the bill to the House until legislation, which had yet to be intro-
duced, strengthening federal laws against prohibition of discrimination by
labor unions had been enacted. He later moderated his position and re-
ported the bill, along with a twenty-one-day resolution to speed its trip to
the floor (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1965, 827; 1966, 520).
Powell also held up the situs picketing bill of 1966 because the con-
struction unions discriminated against blacks. After it had been approved
by the committee, he delayed reporting the bill pending Senate action on it
and on an anti-discrimination in employment bill and until the House had
passed the minimum-wage bill. By May 1966 these conditions had not been
met. Powell arranged with the Speaker to have the situs picketing bill
removed from the House calendar, an action that, in effect, was a pocket
veto (CongressionalQuarterly Almanac 1965, 832-43; 1966, 85, 520, 820; and
Loftus 1966a, 1966b, 1966c).
A chairman's personal power is shaped by his use of institutional
prerogatives, by the institutional context, and by his personal attributes.
These include his expertise on the committee's subject matter and the rules
and his reputation as a leader, both among his constituents and in Congress.
His personal resources also shape his use of institutional tools. Powell was
an expert on neither the subject matter nor the rules. While other members
spent hours poring over the details of major legislation, Powell either could
not or would not. He claimed to have the expertise but, in fact, did not. A
fellow committee member described him as "pretty irresponsible. Other
committee members were afraid that he'd get up on the floor and make
some terrible blunder because he didn't know what was going on. He took a
lot of credit but really didn't know" (interview). According to people who
knew him, Powell became bored easily. He was undependable. He could
not be counted on to be there when he was needed, much less to say what he
was supposed to say or to support what he was supposed to support. More-
over, many thought that he could undermine progress with one fell swoop
of his "Powell Amendment" (interview).
On the other hand, Powell was an expert at thinking on his feet and at
articulating those thoughts. He could make a sound and eloquent case for a
proposal while knowing little about it. His expertise lay in his oratorical
skills. He left the details to be worked out by others. One of his committee
members said, "Powell was there to open debates on the floor, but then he
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turned it over to those who worked on it" (interview). In one episode, he
had been before the Committee on Rules presenting the case for an Educa-
tion and Labor bill. When Rules members asked him about another Educa-
tion and Labor bill, about to be pleaded by Representative Green, Powell
had no inkling of what they were talking about but extricated himself
gracefully by presenting a persuasive and articulate case for why Mrs.
Green would be the best one to talk to about the bill (interview, member).
Powell also was expert at exploiting the racial aspect of every issue. He
could find a  racial argument in just about every issue or position that he
opposed, saying that it was detrimental to blacks or accusing the people
supporting it of being bigots or "Uncle Toms." He used race as a tool for
achieving his goals, almost as blackmail. One House member and author
referred to this practice as the "racial bugaboo," saying that "for years Mr.
Powell successfully answered all criticisms with cries of 'bigotry' and
'racism'" (Udall 1972, 255). On the floor of the House he intervened with a
point of order to question the propriety of Congressman John Rankin's use
of the term nigger in his speeches before the House. Although Speaker
Joseph W. Martin, Jr., ruled that he had heard Negro rather than its more
offensive variation, by raising the issue, Powell had forced it to be printed
in the Congressional Record, thereby bringing it to public attention (Hickey
and Edwin 1965, 111). He put some of his fire to paper in his book,
Marching Blacks (1945), a controversial history of the black struggle that
drew attention to many of the problems of blacks. He particularly attacked
the South and urged blacks to move to the North, where the schools were
not segregated, there was no poll tax, and even the worst conditions were
better than those in the South.
Although not a widely renowned parliamentarian, Powell had suffi-
cient expertise to manipulate the rules of the House and of parliamentary
procedure to his advantage. His closure of the debate on the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act was an example of such skill. But he was not
known particularly for his ability to run rings around the Congress or to tie
it in procedural knots by tactical maneuvers. Instead, he raised sticky
questions that involved it in debate or stalemate for hours. Nevertheless, in
his last term, by thwarting the rules altogether, he delayed or prevented
legislation from coming to the floor.
Few people could deny that Powell was one of the great orators of his
day. He was a Baptist preacher by training. He could manipulate a crowd
on the street or a group in the House. One House member said, "He had
crowds eating out of his hand. He moved people. That was his talent and
what he enjoyed doing. He was a preacher—not much as a legislator"
(interview, member). Hickey and Edwin described a campaign speech in
1958: "For thirty minutes, Powell held them rapt. It was a strange and
highly-charged scene. . . . His words, gestures, intonations, and appear-
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ance were almost calculatedly sensual. At one instant, he roared his pain so
that it rumbled across the black faces; at the next he was silent, un-
breathing, and tentative, until the next rush of passion tumesced in him. He
worked over them with the attention and fastidiousness of an amorist"
(1965, 151-52).
Powell had the reputation of being one of the most influential and
powerful black politicians of his day and "one of the Congress's most
warmly disliked members" (Eidenberg and Morey 1969, 52). One member
said, "He could have eclipsed Martin Luther King" if he had played by the
rules of the game (interview). Another wrote: "Adam Clayton Powell
equals Martin Luther King in magnetism, in intellect. But King has some-
thing Powell has not: exemplary character and moral force. But more
important, Powell had something King could never hope to have: cold
political power beyond that ever held by a Negro. His lack of King's charac-
ter threw this magnificent potential away" (Udall 1972, 254). Powell's
reputation as one of the most influential black leaders often put him in
competition with other blacks prominent in the civil rights movement. He
frequently played hard ball in efforts to prove his importance and to
maintain his reputation as a preeminent leader of black causes. Taylor
Branch brought to light an incident in which Powell resorted to blackmail
to prevent Martin Luther King, Jr., from picketing the 1960 Democratic
National Convention in Los Angeles over the civil rights plank in the
platform. Reportedly Powell threatened to tell the press that King was
having a homosexual affair with Bayard Rustin, who was known among
black leaders to have a homosexual "problem" (Branch 1988, 314-15;
Garrow 1986, 140).
Powell's reputation as a leader among blacks also made him a much
sought after prize in the endorsement competition accompanying the
1960 presidential campaign. He had supported Lyndon B. Johnson prior
to the Democratic National Convention but was persuaded to make ten
speeches—purportedly for a payment of fifty thousand dollars—in sup-
port of John F. Kennedy after the latter received the nomination (Branch
1988, 343).
Adam Clayton Powell also had a well-deserved notorious reputation.
There was nothing even remotely inconspicuous about him. Everything he
did attracted attention—his speeches, his cars, his female companions, his
travels, and his absences. He earned renown for being a philanderer.
Wherever he went, he was in the company of beautiful women. This
attracted a great deal of attention, some of it flattering and some of it not,
among his constituents and among his colleagues in Congress. Defending
himself from accusations of hedonism, Powell said: "I have been criticized
during my life for admitting that I enjoy the company of women. And there
have been times when I have been told that it would be better not to let
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photographers shoot me with a glass in my hand. I have also been accused of
almost everything—of being a black racist, an Uncle Tom, a rabble-rouser,
a pleasure-seeker, a slanderer, and much more. But I have never been
accused of being a hypocrite, of saying anything I did not believe in, or
doing anything I did not enjoy" (1971, 235).
Powell's reputation among his constituents differed from his reputa-
tion among his congressional peers. Many of his constituents seemed
proud, whereas most members of Congress were annoyed or embarrassed.
In his district, the chairman was known as the Reverend Powell of the
Abyssinian Baptist Church. Although he referred to himself as a "poor
parish priest," his constituents' admiration for him grew from his role as
pastor, his physical attractiveness, and his efforts to advance minority
rights (Valenti 1975, 187; Udall 1972, 252).
He had a fiery style in the pulpit. He could move crowds with his
words like few others and could manipulate them to do just about anything.
He had a flair for making people believe in the image he put forth. Hickey
and Edwin cited several examples of the loyalty of his constituents as he was
being tried for tax evasion.
I'm standing here praying for him. I know God will answer my prayers. He
champions the underprivileged and is a leader of people in all walks of life.
I love Reverend Powell. He began helping us workers years ago. I know this
day he's being prosecuted for helping us. I intend to stand for him until the end of
this unfair trial.
Reverend Powell is the greatest living Negro we have. It's a downright shame
he has to suffer for this.
I feel that because he has been so outspoken in representing us is the very reason
he's in there.
I'm for Adam because he can't be bought. He fights hard out there for me and
I know it. [1965, 167-68]
In addition to his appearances of uprightness, Powell also was dashing
and had a great appeal among the Harlemites, especially the women. His
reputation as a womanizer was not hurt by his escorting women who were
among the most beautiful in the world. He frequently was seen in the
company of Corinne Huff, a former Miss Ohio who also had been a runner-
up in the Miss Universe pageant and was on the committee staff.
More important to his career, Powell had a reputation for fighting for
the rights of "colored" people and of irritating a great many whites in the
process. He frequently was in the forefront of public attention in the civil
rights movement, although he had his differences with other black leaders,
such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and A. Philip Randolph. Powell advanced
his reputation and broadened his public appeal via his editorial column,
"Soapbox," in the Amsterdam News, a weekly New York newspaper of the
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time. Later the column appeared in the People's Voice, established to enable
Powell to reach a larger constituency than only the Abyssinian Baptist
Church and the New York City Council. He used it to make anti-right
wing declarations, attacking fascism at home as well as abroad and pro-
nouncing against racial inequities (Hickey and Edwin 1965).
Powell's colleagues in the House had an entirely different impression of
the fiery speaker and angry young man from New York than did his flock.
In Congress, many considered him a troublemaker, especially the south-
erners. They thought him "the very opposite of the model 'good Negro' as
typified by Representative Dawson of Chicago," chairman of the House
Committee on Government Operations (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 135).
Powell frequently referred to Chairman Dawson as an "Uncle Tom" or a
"house Negro." Powell was convinced that Dawson had undermined a
strong civil rights plank on the 1952 Democratic party platform (Powell
1971, 90-91). Powell also irritated other Democrats in Congress because he
would not toe the party line. When he bolted the Democratic party publicly
to support Eisenhower's reelection in 1956, his image as a troublemaker
grew. The party, in effect, had its hands tied, because every suggestion that
Powell be disciplined was greeted with accusations of racism on the part of
House Democrats because (until years later) they had failed to discipline
other members who also had deserted the party.6 Many members of
Congress thought that Powell himself was a racist. He agreed: "The white
man just doesn't understand what the Negro is thinking. Everything they
call me downtown—demagogue, racist—strengthens me uptown. My
people want me to be a racist—we're all racists" (Hickey and Edwin 1965,
153-54).
Members of Education and Labor accused Powell of playing to his
constituency and of insincerity in his use of the "Powell Amendment."
Many perceived his frequent use of his amendment as a ploy to annoy those
trying to win aid for education. Once during the Barden years, the use of
this amendment allegedly led to blows when Powell offered the anti-
discrimination rider and Representative Cleveland Bailey (D-WV), accus-
ing Powell of trying to destroy the public school system, landed a punch on
his jaw, knocking him to the floor. Both gentlemen denied the incident.7
In his favor, Powell had the reputation among many of being one of the
brightest members of Congress. Brilliant was a word frequently used to
describe him. He certainly was one of the most articulate. One of Speaker
Rayburn's lieutenants said that Powell was one of the twelve smartest men
in the House, one that "you don't tangle with until you've done your
homework" (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 211). Another party wheel said, "He
was brilliant, amoral, and an excellent chairman" (interview, member).
One member said that columnist Murray Kempton called Powell "brilliant,
beautiful, and treacherous. Like a pet ocelot in the House." The member
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continued, "Powell had catlike movements, too. If you turned your back,
you were likely to get clawed" (interview). Another wrote that he was "a
study in contrasts: brilliant, but erratic" (Udall 1972, 252).
In addition to his brilliance, Powell seemed to cultivate the reputation
of being irresponsible. Several committee and staff members alluded to this
trait in interviews with the author, as did Hamilton (1991, 365) in his
biography of Powell. The chairman's many absences were a contributing
factor to this facet of his ill repute. His limited attention span was another.
One member commented, "When Adam Clayton Powell was interested, he
showed up. If he wasn't, he didn't" (interview). Columnist Murray Kemp-
ton predicted that Powell would be a terrible chairman because he was
"lazy, careless, and selfish" (1960).
Powell was reputed to be a debonair, articulate, verbose, and irrespon-
sible troublemaker who did not know his place. This combination was a
formula for ill will in the House. His reputation affected his acceptance by
other members and, ultimately, his career. Bills lost support rapidly if
Powell's name was attached. Two scholars noted that Powell always was
able to provoke a "high level of personal antagonism" (Eidenberg and
Morey 1969, 53).
Powell's Legal Difficulties
Powell's troubles with the law did little to aid his reputation in Congress.8
He flouted authority left and right throughout all his legal troubles, ignor-
ing court orders and claiming ignorance or poverty. First, two of his aides
and a congressional secretary were indicted for tax evasion. When Powell
was called to bring his financial records and to testify at the trials of the two
aides, he claimed that all the records had been destroyed in a fire at the
Abyssinian Baptist Church and that he knew nothing of any improprieties
that might have occurred. Subsequently, the indictments against one of the
aides were dropped. The other was convicted and sentenced to a year in
prison and payment of a one-thousand-dollar fine in 1956. His secretary,
who had worked at the church for years, stood accused of receiving a
congressional salary after she had returned to Harlem. She was charged
with kicking back her salary to Powell between 1948 and 1952 and was
convicted and sentenced to prison for seven months. The investigation
focused on Powell, but no concrete evidence against him could be found.
The government's investigation of Powell was now public knowledge.
He finally was indicted for tax evasion in 1958. He allegedly prepared false
returns for his wife, Hazel Scott, who was not charged, and underreported
both their earnings. But in January 1960 the indictments against Powell
were dismissed. Hamilton (1991, 340) noted the seeming coincidence that
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on the same day that the administration announced its decision to drop its
tax case against him, Powell uncharacteristically announced his decision
not to pursue his antisegregation amendment on school aid legislation, thus
removing a major stumbling block to the president's agenda.
The third legal difficulty adding to his image problems stemmed
from a 1963 judgment in a libel suit brought by Mrs. Esther James, a
black domestic, whom Powell had referred to in a televised interview as
a "bag woman" (i.e., graft collector) for the police department in Wash-
ington Heights, New York. Powell claimed that he was only providing
information to his constituents and claimed congressional immunity from
prosecution. He was convicted of libeling Mrs. James, and the jury set
damages at more than two hundred thousand dollars, of which the bulk
was for damaging the plaintiff's reputation and earning power. Powell
refused to pay and was cited for contempt of court. He could not be
arrested because of congressional immunity while the Congress was in
session. In New York, it was illegal to serve a civil summons on Sunday.
Hence, he returned to his district only on Sundays to deliver his sermon
at the Abyssinian Baptist Church. Mrs. James had great difficulty in
getting her money, because Powell no longer received a salary from the
church or had property in his own name in the state. His house in
Puerto Rico was in his wife's name and his congressional salary could
not be garnished.
Again he was held in contempt of court for nonpayment and nonap-
pearance. He was served with a criminal summons one Sunday outside of
his Harlem church. His lawyers negotiated an agreement that enabled him
to return to New York with immunity. Mrs. James agreed not to pursue
court action until after the court ruled on his appeal. The judges refused
to dismiss the judgment but considered it excessive and reduced it to
$46,500: $11,500 compensatory damages and $35,000 punitive damages.
They agreed to drop the contempt charges. The legal troubles dragged on
for years. Powell still refused to pay Mrs. James. He took the case all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to review it. He held that
the point was moot since he did not have $46,500.
In a second case, Mrs. James alleged that Powell and his wife had
transferred property in Puerto Rico to his wife's relatives to avoid its
attachment to satisfy the original judgment. Powell failed to file an answer.
In February 1965 a jury awarded Mrs. James $350,000. The trial judge
reduced the award to $210,000. After Powell repeatedly failed to appear in
this case and failed to pay the court-ordered damages, the court ordered
him to pay even more damages. The court issued several arrest warrants for
Powell on contempt of court charges. As a result of the James suits, for
several years Powell could not go back to his district without being arrested,
except on Sundays or on election day.
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Powell's blatant disregard for the authority of the law further under-
mined his standing in the House of Representatives. "For a Member of this
House to behave in such fashion as to cause the courts to describe his course
of conduct as 'flagrantly contemptuous,' as promoting 'the tragic disrespect
for the judicial process as a whole,' as displaying 'blatant cynical disregard
for the law on the part of a United States Congressman (which) is detrimen-
tal to the law, the ministry and to democracy,' and as 'a very bad example
for the youth of this city and this country,' clearly brings great disrespect
for the House of Representatives" (In re Adam Clayton Powell 1961, 13). In
addition, a New Jersey House member asked him if he would not mind
slowing down a bit because the state police were complaining that Powell
roared through the state in his flashy sports car at 110 miles an hour on his
way to and from his district. The troopers could not keep up with him.
Powell promised that in the future he would not go over 90 (interview,
member). Members of the House eventually came to realize that they could
no longer tolerate his irresponsible, illegal, immoral, and flaunting behavior
(interviews) and refused to seat him in 1967.9
Powell's Leadership in Retrospect
When Powell assumed the chairmanship in 1961, the new Kennedy admin-
istration was emphasizing social issues. He was able to capitalize on the
Kennedy proposals and parlay his position into one of great influence. The
administration frequently sought Powell's assistance and support for its
policies. In return, Powell put up few obstacles to the president's programs.
He spoke articulately for the causes and moved the legislation through his
committee, tolerating little opposition from Republican dissenters. Ac-
cording to Fenno: "He wanted his chairmanship to be judged by the large
number of bills passed. And he wanted the kind of credit that coalition
members—from House to White House—showered upon him. For he
traded heavily on that credit to furbish his image as a powerful leader of a
nationwide black constituency. An implicit bargain—autonomy for the
subcommittees, credit for the chairman, and good public policy for the
liberal-Democratic policy coalition—was the basis for normal decision
making during the Powell chairmanship" (1973, 130).
In many respects, Powell was a "good" chairman, in the words of his
committee members, who largely approved of his committee leadership.
He presided competently and ran meetings well. He facilitated the consid-
eration and approval of legislation that members and the administration
deemed important. He was an eloquent spokesman for the committee.
During his first few years as chairman, Powell used his institutional
resources to the benefit of the majority—for the committee rather than
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against it. For the first time members were allowed to do what they wanted
to do and to accomplish what they wanted to accomplish. One of his
committee colleagues, John Brademas, said of Powell: "He was a tragic
figure. He had intelligence, charm and power, but he lacked the character
to put it all together. He was an effective chairman in the early years, but
then he ran out of gas" (quoted in Lyons 1972).
Committee members have said that Powell let the committee run itself.
He took advantage of his institutional prerogatives and personal resources
to exercise permissive, facilitative, and flashy leadership, at least until his
last year. His permissiveness resulted in compromises that could not have
been worked out and in legislation that never would have been reported
under Barden. Expressing a sentiment echoed frequently by former mem-
bers and staff, one pair of scholars wrote: "He was content to let the
subcommittees do their work with latitude and freedom. The smaller work
groups handled much of the detail and tedium of guiding legislation
through the floor. Powell was satisfied to act as chairman and to receive the
perquisites of office (symbolic and material), and generally let others run
the legislative show" (Eidenberg and Morey 1969, 54-55). Throughout his
chairmanship, Powell exercised his authority largely at the expense of the
Republicans and went along with or facilitated the will of the majority.
Nevertheless, toward the end of his tenure, he pushed the limits by his
high-handed use of his institutional prerogatives concerning bill reporting.
For the most part, Powell relied on institutional prerogatives more than
on personal factors to operate the committee. With a wealth of resources at
his disposal by virtue of his position, particularly his broad discretion over
the referral of bills, the chairman could act as he wished, within bounds,
without having to rely heavily on personal resources. As he departed from
the policy goals of the majority, he took advantage of the chairman's
discretionary powers and betrayed the committee's trust. As happened
with Barden, members rebelled and voted to curtail the chairman's institu-
tional prerogatives near the end of his tenure. His use of personal resources,
on the other hand, resulted in difficulties with the entire House.
Institutional context, in addition to personal factors, dictated that he
could not be authoritarian toward the Democrats and get away with it for
several reasons. For one, his predecessor had run the committee entirely
according to his own wishes and contrary to the policy goals of the majority
party. Powell knew that he would not succeed with similar practices for
long or committee members would revolt against him, too. Congress was
never meant to be a hierarchical institution. Second, the chairman did not
have the backing of the House leadership and membership to support an
authoritarian leadership. He was disliked by many members, and he knew
that they were looking for ways to get rid of him. Third, the composition of
the committee was such that he agreed with his majority most of the time on
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policy issues; thus he did not have to exercise his options in an authoritarian
manner. The 1961 rules allowed him enough discretion so that he could
have if he had wanted to, although in the earlier years of his chairmanship
he did not need to exercise his authority in a negative manner.
Although a Protestant minister, Powell did not subscribe to the Protes-
tant work ethic. His personality dictated that he talk a good game, rely on
others to get the work done, and then take the credit for the success and
avoid as much of the blame for defeats as possible. I le delegated many of his
institutional privileges to his subcommittee chairmen and let them carry
out the agenda of the committee.
Powell presided over a committee that had the opportunity to leave its
mark on the country by formulating, considering, and approving many of
the social welfare programs of the Great Society. When he was chairman,
Education and Labor was in its heyday. The issues under its jurisdiction
could no longer be ignored. They were ripe for consideration. The chair-
man's facilitative and permissive use of institutional prerogatives allowed
him to make great contributions to the enactment of progressive legislation,
to efforts aimed at improving the quality of life for blacks, and to carrying
out the committee's agenda. Although he had little to do with the details, he
did not stand in the way of, and often facilitated, passage of important
legislation. Except when Powell was fighting for his favorite causes, his
leadership enabled legislation that had been bottled up for years to be
placed on the public agenda, to be considered, and eventually to be enacted.
The chairman's facilitative leadership decentralized power in the com-
mittee to a somewhat greater degree than it had been under Barden. More
members had a stake in getting the committee's legislation approved. They
were willing to work harder because there was a better chance that they
would get results. Powell took advantage of their willingness to work and
let them.
Until he used his institutional prerogatives to commit the fatal act of
thwarting the majority, he was respected by his committee members as an
effective chairman. But he crossed the bounds of acceptability by holding
important legislation until his demands were met. Once he stalled bills dear
to the hearts of his allies, his support diminished, and members acted to
curb his ability to delay by creating an institutionally powerless chair-
manship (Eenno 1973, 130). They approved rules changes to enable the
committee to act when the chairman was indisposed or uncooperative.
Not only was Powell's use of institutional prerogatives of concern to
the committee, it also got him in trouble with the 1 louse. By delaying
several critical bills, he thwarted the will of the House majority. In addi-
tion, he hired several unscrupulous staff people who stole money from the
committee or who had no business being on the payroll at all. And he
abused the travel privileges.
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It was largely his reliance on personal resources, however, that led to
his downfall. His biggest sin was that he had committed his offenses
publicly and then embarrassed the House repeatedly by arguing that he
only did what everyone else was doing. In effect, he held his colleagues up
to ridicule and would never be forgiven. His personal excesses had offended
his colleagues, as had his violations of House rules by his financial prac-
tices. Moreover, as a prominent lawmaker he had shown flagrant disregard
for the law by repeatedly failing to answer court orders to appear in New
York.
Powell had exceeded the limits of acceptability imposed by the institu-
tional context, in the committee and in the House, in his use of both
institutional and personal resources. As a result, the committee revolted
against Powell just at it had against Bard en. The House ultimately took
action against Powell, stripping him of his chairmanship and subsequently
refusing to seat him in 1967.
The Committee during
the Perkins Years
The cards Carl Dewey Perkins (D-KY) drew when he became chairman of
the Committee on Education and Labor in 1967 did not afford him the
opportunities that had challenged his predecessor. Many of the major
education controversies had been settled under Adam Clayton Powell, at
least temporarily. Perkins faced another, less exciting, but equally critical
challenge—that of expanding or maintaining the gains the committee had
made in the preceding six years. Moreover, the chairman's institutional
resources had been curtailed because of his predecessors' behavior.
From 1967 to 1984 the committee was quite unlike the committee
under its predecessors. Its major legislative areas—education and labor—
were no longer at the top of the political agenda. It differed in the demo-
graphic and ideological composition of its membership, in its voting pat-
terns, in its structure, and in its operations. Not only had the composition
changed, but the voting behaviors of the members were slightly less
extreme under Perkins than they had been under Powell, the structure of
the committee was more complex, and the jurisdiction, function, and
orientation of Education and Labor had changed.
Setting
Although the years that Perkins chaired the committee may not have been
as turbulent as the early 1960s, it was by no means an era of tranquillity.
Congressional Quarterly termed 1967 and 1968, Perkins's first two years as
chairman, as "two of the most trying years in [U.S.] history" (Politics in
America 1969, 68). The traumatic political events of the 1960s included the
Vietnam War, the assassination of political leaders, inner-city riots, student
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protests, a deadly fire aboard a spacecraft, a moon walk, riots at the
Democratic National Convention, the withdrawal of President Johnson
from the political arena, and a host of other occurrences that unsettled the
United States. Some of these developments were particularly important to
the considerations of the Committee on Education and Labor. The earlier
emphasis on large social welfare programs and federal funding for educa-
tion faded somewhat by 1967, as attention focused on the Vietnam War and
war protests. Funds were diverted from social programs and funneled into
the war effort (Peters 1982, 241), the cost of which exceeded two billion
dollars a month in 1967 (Politics in America 1969, 70).
Several large-scale efforts, such as the Poor People's March on Wash-
ington and the establishment of Resurrection City, a tent encampment for
the impoverished amid Washington's monuments, kept the nation's (and
the committee's) attention focused on the plight of the poor. Nevertheless,
widespread rioting in the inner cities fostered resentment among many
whites. The assassinations of two prominent national leaders, the Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, rekindled
concern over the causes and remedies for the waves of violence buffeting the
country.
The war emerged as a major campaign issue in the 1968 elections. Low
popularity because of failures in Vietnam led President Johnson to an-
nounce that he would not seek reelection. In a campaign aimed at "forgotten
Americans"—those not demonstrating or shouting, not racist or sick, and
not guilty of crimes—former vice president Richard M. Nixon defeated
the Democratic nominee, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and the
American Independent party candidate, Alabama governor George Wal-
lace. By the end of the decade both parties were in upheaval. Nixon was
reelected in 1972 in a landslide. He rekindled relations with China and then
managed to extricate the United States from the quagmire of Vietnam. The
economy, however, was in shambles, and the country faced an energy
shortage because of an Arab oil embargo in 1973-74. Vice President Spiro
Agnew resigned in October 1973, and Nixon's second term was cut short as
a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters precipi-
tated the downfall of the president himself in the infamous Watergate
affair. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded to the presidency in August
1974.
The 1972 and 1974 elections changed the distribution of power in
Congress. A tide of young liberal Democrats swept in at the expense of
some hard-line conservative Republicans. In the 1974 elections, Democrats
picked up forty-nine seats that had been held in the 92d Congress by
Republicans. The influx of new faces in the 1970s enabled Democrats to
enact a series of major reforms, beginning with the Legislative Reorgan-
ization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510; 84 Stat. 1140) and proceeding to the 1973
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and 1974 House Democratic Caucus reforms strengthening subcommit-
tees.
Democrat Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976 to preside over a
few years of relative calm without wars or major scandals. The economy
was the primary concern until the Islamic revolution in Iran became a
problem of immense proportions in the United States. Militant Shiite
Muslims seized the U.S. embassy in Teheran in 1979 and held fifty-two
occupants hostage for 444 days—until the day President Carter left office.
As Vietnam had plagued President Johnson, so the hostage crisis plagued
President Carter. In addition, a sagging economy, an out-of-control federal
budget, and high unemployment and interest rates all added to Carter's
image as "weak and ineffective" and led to the election of Republican
Ronald Reagan as president in 1980 and to Republican control of the Senate
{Congress and the Nation 5:3). Reagan's election heralded the rise of the "New
Right," the "Religious Right," and political action committees (PACs),
which were primarily conservative at first.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s new issues surfaced on the public
agenda, displacing old ones, including many of the staples of Education and
Labor. Consumer protection, environmental, energy, and health questions
moved to the forefront of American attention and increased in salience
throughout the 1980s. These new issues and their high-cost programs
impinged on the social welfare programs that had been so prominent in the
past. Education and Labor was compelled to defend its turf. In large part,
the committee focused on amending and extending previously authorized
programs. Members concentrated on education rather than labor legisla-
tion, with the exception of programs aimed at the creation of jobs for the
unemployed and underemployed.
Composition of the Committee
Committees have been called microcosms of the House—a comparison that
presumes a geographic and ideological representation on committees sim-
ilar to that of the House. This condition does not hold true for the
Committee on Education and Labor. In the regions represented and mem-
bers' seniority, ideological bent, and reasons for leaving, Education and
Labor was not a microcosm of the House during this period, although it
moved closer to being one before the end of the Perkins chairmanship.
Education and Labor, from the 90th to the 98th Congress (1967-84),
attracted its membership predominantly from the Middle Atlantic and the
East North Central regions (see table 5.1). Moreover, at least half of
committee Democrats and a large portion of the Republicans came from
these two regions during every Congress under consideration. Compared
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Table 5.1. Regional Composition of the Committee, 1967-1984 (percentages)
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
External
90th
3.1
21.9
28.1
6.3
12.5
6.3
0.0
18.8
3.1
5.6
27.8
22.2
0.0
5.6
11.1
0.0
22.2
5.6
0.0
14.3
35.7
14.3
21.4
0.0
0.0
14.3
0.0
91st
2.9
25.7
31.4
8.6
5.7
2.9
2.9
17.1
2.9
5.0
35.0
25.0
5.0
0.0
5.0
0.0
20.0
5.0
0.0
13.3
40.0
13.3
13.3
0.0
6.7
13.3
0.0
92d
5.3
31.6
26.3
5.3
2.6
5.3
2.6
18.4
2.6
9.1
36.4
18.2
4.5
0.0
9.1
0.0
18.2
4.5
0.0
25.0
37.5
6.3
6.3
0.0
6.3
18.8
0.0
Congres:
93d
FulK
5.6
30.6
25.0
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
13.9
2.8
E&L
5.0
35.0
15.0
5.0
10.0
10.0
0.0
15.0
5.0
E&L
6.3
25.0
37.5
6.3
0.0
0.0
12.5
12.5
0.0
94th
>
95th
Committee
7.7
25.6
25.6
12.8
7.7
5.1
0.0
12.8
2.6
8.3
30.6
25.0
11.1
5.6
5.6
0.0
11.1
2.8
Democrats
3.8
26.9
26.9
7.7
7.7
7.7
0.0
15.4
4.2
4.2
37.5
25.0
8.3
4.2
4.2
0.0
12.5
4.2
Republicans
15.4
23.1
23.1
23.1
7.7
0.0
0.0
7.7
0.0
16.7
16.7
25.0
16.7
8.3
8.3
0.0
8.3
0.0
96th
8.3
25.0
22.2
11.1
11.1
5.6
8.3
8.3
0.0
8.7
34.8
17.4
4.3
8.7
4.3
8.7
13.0
0.0
7.7
7.7
30.8
23.1
15.4
7.7
7.7
0.0
0.0
97th
8.6
22.9
25.7
11.4
5.7
2.9
11.4
11.4
0.0
5.0
25.0
25.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
10.0
20.0
0.0
13.3
20.0
26.7
20.0
6.7
0.0
13.3
0.0
0.0
98th
2.9
22.9
22.9
11.4
8.6
2.9
11.4
17.1
0.0
0.0
27.3
22.7
9.1
9.1
4.5
9.1
18.2
0.0
7.7
15.4
23.1
15.4
7.7
0.0
15.4
15.4
0.0
Source: Author's calculations from data in Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research. The sums of some columns are not exactly 100.0 percent because of round-
ing. Territorial representatives are not included in the calculations.
with the proportion of Democratic members in the House, these parts of
the country consistently had more than their share of majority committee
seats, sometimes even twice the percentage of Democrats in the House. In
addition, in seven of the nine Congresses, Republicans from the East North
Central states were overrepresented, too.
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On the whole, the proportion of committee seats from the West North
Central states did not deviate greatly from the proportion in the House.
Unless members from these states had a strong interest in education, they
found little to attract them to this committee. Most of the programs targeted
federal aid to urban areas in various forms or concerned labor union issues,
which were not as salient in this region as in others.'
Few members represented the Deep South on the committee during
the Perkins years, a trend dating from the Barden era when the Speaker
stacked the committee with northern, urban liberals and refused to assign
southerners. Assignments on other committees would seem more profit-
able for conservative southerners; Education and Labor offered few induce-
ments to members from rural or conservative, antiunion districts. Border
states also were underrepresented consistently from 1967 to 1984.
The proportion of members from the western regions reasonably re-
flected the proportion of the full House representing those regions, al-
though the percentages fluctuated. With a few exceptions, such as Edith
Green (D) and John Dellenback (R) of Oregon, the several members from
California's urban areas formed the basis of the relatively large proportion
of committee members from the western states. Although still holding a
relatively small proportion of the House and committee membership, the
mountain states (including the Southwest) gained representation in both
throughout the period, particularly among the Republicans.
These statistics on regional representation support the contention that
members from northern, urban districts, aided by a large contingent of
members from the West Coast, controlled the Committee on Education and
Labor. With representation ranging from 65 to 80 percent of the majority
membership, members from the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and
Pacific states exerted a great deal of influence over the committee's opera-
tions and output. With the exception of the 96th and 97th Congresses, over
half of the minority opposition also represented these three regions.
An average of over 40 percent of the members of Education and Labor
were freshmen or sophomore members during the period 1967-84. Demo-
crats tended to stay longer on the committee than did Republicans. Demo-
crats had a much higher proportion of members who had served five or
more terms and a smaller percentage of new members. With the exception
of a few senior members, generally those in control of minority subcommit-
tee staff funds, Republicans tended to stay on the committee for one or two
terms and then move on to better assignments. Part of this phenomenon can
be explained by the fact that Education and Labor had little to offer most
Republicans. Their constituencies and their reputations could be enhanced
by service on other committees. According to several former members and
staff, most Republicans and many Democrats viewed Education and Labor
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as a hardship post.2 With marginal perquisites, oftentimes Republicans
served on this committee for a few terms in return for promises of choice
assignments on other committees.
Beginning in the late 1970s, a few members of both parties were as-
signed to the committee temporarily. When there were vacancies, mem-
bers with major assignments on other committees, such as Energy and
Commerce or Foreign Affairs, could sit on Education and Labor. They
were committee members in every respect but seniority, ranking behind
other members who had permanent assignments. This accounts for a
seemingly curious situation where one member who joined the committee
in the 96th Congress was outranked by seven new members in the 97th
because of his temporary status. One benefit of this practice is that it gives
the party the chance to remove members who do not live up to the
expectations of other party member.3
Republicans far outpaced Democrats in the race to assign new mem-
bers to Education and Labor. As can be seen in table 5.2, on average, less
than a fourth of the Democrats were new each term, whereas nearly 34
percent of the Republicans were first-term committee members. In the
98th Congress (1983-84), over 46 percent of Education and Labor Republi-
cans were recent additions to the committee. New members predominantly
were House freshmen from both parties, although occasionally a veteran
member would join, especially when bodies were needed to fill vacancies.
In the 90th Congress (1967-68), Majority Leader Carl Albert (D-OK) "took
a troubleshooter assignment on the Education and Labor Committee be-
cause its combative Democratic members were badly divided" (Boiling
1968, 94).4 He was the only new committee Democrat named in the 90th
Congress, for Democrats had lost two seats. The GOP, on the other hand,
assigned seven new freshmen.
For a variety of reasons, including death, defeat, retirement, and run-
ning for other office, forty-eight members of the committee left Congress
from 1968 to 1984, while four were elected or appointed to the Senate and
forty-one transferred to other committees. On average, more than one-
fourth of the members left after each term: 24.75 percent of the Democrats
and 35.8 percent of the Republicans (see table 5.3). The 93d Congress in
1973-74 saw a significant increase in the number of members who did not
return to Congress. Half the Republicans did not return to the committee.
Several Nixon loyalists on Education and Labor were defeated in the
Watergate aftermath, including Earl Landgrebe (R-IN), who was called
"Nixon's most extreme and ludicrous defender in the House" (Rapoport
1975, 5). Another committee Republican, Robert Huber, from Michigan,
also fell victim to Watergate. Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews described him
as "a solid right winger in the House—with a reputation for zaniness that
got him stuck on the hopelessly liberal Education and Labor Committee—
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Table 5.2. Seats, N e w Members, and Freshmen, 1967-1984
Number
AH members N e w members Freshmen
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72"
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80b
1981-82
1983-84=
Total
Mean
Full
34
35
38
37
40
37
36
36
38
331
36.8
Dems
19
20
22
21
27
25
24
21
23
202
22.4
Reps
15
15
16
16
13
12
12
15
13
127
14.1
Full
8
6
10
6
14
11
13
10
14
92
10.2
Dems
1
3
6
3
9
7
6
3
8
46
5.1
Reps
7
3
4
3
5
4
7
4
6
43
4.8
Full
7
5
7
6
13
8
10
9
12
77
8.6
Dems
0
2
4
3
9
6
5
3
7
39
4.3
Reps
7
3
3
3
4
2
5
6
5
38
4.2
Percentage
New members Freshmen
Full Dems Reps Full Dems Reps
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
23.5
17.1
26.3
16.2
35.0
29.7
36.1
27.8
36.8
5.3
15.0
27.3
14.3
33.3
28.0
25.0
14.3
34.8
46.7
20.0
25.0
18.8
38.5
33.3
58.3
26.7
46.2
20.6
14.3
18.4
16.2
32.5
21.6
27.8
25.0
31.6
0.0
10.0
18.2
14.3
33.3
24.0
20.8
14.3
30.4
46.7
20.0
18.8
18.8
30.8
16.7
41.7
40.0
38.5
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1967-84. The counts
include the delegates from Puerto Rico, who can vote in committee but not on the floor
of the House.
aIn the 92d Congress, Adam Powell is not counted as a new member. He was added to the
bottom of the seniority list in the 91st after having been omitted from the committee roster in
the 90th. Although he never showed up for meetings, he is included in the full committee
count.
bIn the 96th Congress, Peter Peyser switched from the Republican to the Democratic party.
Full committee numbers to not show him as a new member, although he is counted as a new
Democrat. Raphael Musto (D-PA) replaced Don Bailey (D-PA). Only one is counted as a
new member because only one seat was affected.
cIn the 98th Congress, Thomas J. Tauke is counted as a new member because he was
reassigned to Education and Labor after serving in the 96th Congress and sitting out the 97th.
He did not retain his seniority because he had a temporary assignment in the 96th.
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Table 5.3. Percentage of Members Who Left after Each Congress, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Full
17.6
20.0
18.4
29.7
35.0
32.4
32.4
33.3
40.0
Dems
15.8
20.0
18.2
14.3
33.3
24.0
28.0
19.0
45.4
Reps
20.0
20.0
18.7
50.0
38.5
50.0
41.6
53.3
30.1
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1967-84.
and he was a constant and enthusiastic supporter of Richard Nixon" (1977,
434). David G. Towell (R-NV), who came to Congress on Nixon's coat-
tails, went out on them, too. Generally known as a moderate, John Dellen-
back (R-OR) was another victim of Watergate and the strong Democratic
tide.
While seven or eight committee members left Congress after each term
between the 94th and the 98th Congresses, another four to seven members
transferred to other committees each term. Eleven members went to Ap-
propriations, four to Rules, and three to Ways and Means. According to
Education and Labor staff members, many Democrats particularly wanted
an assignment on Appropriations, more so than on any other committee, to
protect the funding for Education and Labor programs that were enacted in
the 1960s. Republicans, on the other hand, in addition to wanting off of
Education and Labor, coveted assignments on Appropriations so they
could help cut the large amounts of money appropriated for liberal social
welfare programs of the type considered by Education and Labor. Other
committees that attracted Education and Labor members during this period
included Budget (four members), Judiciary (three), Foreign Affairs (four),
Commerce (three), Government Operations (two), Public Works (two),
Banking (one), and Small Business (one).
Several institutional changes may have contributed to the increased
transfer rate from Education and Labor to other committees. First, at the
beginning of the 94th Congress, the seniority system was dealt a severe
blow with the institution of a caucus vote on all chairmen and the resultant
unseating of three committee chairmen. Members no longer were guaran-
teed a chairmanship if they outlasted their colleagues on a committees.
Length of service was not a sufficient condition for a leadership position as
it had been for many years (Abram and Cooper 1968; Copeland 1987).
Second, in 1971 Democrats limited members to one subcommittee chair-
manship each, extending the availability of power positions to more mem-
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bers. As a result, members do not have to wait as long before acquiring a
subcommittee. In addition, the number of subcommittees has increased
(Copeland 1987; Smith and Deering 1984). Third, some members may
have surrendered seats on Education and Labor to maintain seats on other
committees. The transfer statistics mask the fact that many members held
dual assignments. After the Democratic Caucus limitation on more than
one seat on a "major" or "semiexclusive" committee was instituted in 1973,
some members dropped Education and Labor seats in favor of their other
assignments.5 Some members may have had better chances for subcommit-
tee chairmanships, while others may have had better opportunities for
constituency service. Still others may have sought any excuse to get off of
the controversial committee.
Another explanation for the increased departures from the committee
lies in the decreased salience of its jurisdiction. Most of the committee's
major work to date was done in the early to mid-1960s when the administra-
tion designated the issues under its jurisdiction as top priorities. In the
mid-1970s much of the committee's work focused on reauthorizations of
existing programs and on maintenance of the gains made during the Great
Society days. Other committees, such as the Judiciary Committee, had the
headlines in the 1970s. And in addition to the magnetic appeal of Appropri-
ations, Ways and Means, and Rules to many members, other committees
increased their drawing power at the expense of Education and Labor,
whose limelight seemed to have faded. According to Unekis and Rieselbach
(1984, 10), Education and Labor declined from tenth to fifteenth in the
attractiveness of House committees to members from the 88th-92d to the
93d-97th Congresses.
The philosophical predispositions of committee members influence
committee decisions and operations. The larger the disparity of ideological
leanings between the two parties, the higher the degree of partisanship in
the committee. The more differences among party members, the greater
the likelihood that operations will be on a bipartisan or consensus-building
basis. Moreover, if the committee majority is divided, the harder it will be
to build a consensus sufficiently large to report and pass a bill. The
ideological makeup of the Committee on Education and Labor again is
inferred from an examination of ratings by several interest groups with
rather well-known tendencies: the liberal Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion (ADA), the prolabor, liberal Committee on Political Education
(COPE), and the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action (AC A).
As in past chapters, scores for Education and Labor members are compared
with scores for House members in each term in an attempt to show how
well the positions of these committee members reflect a cross section of all
House members (see table 5.4).
Judging by the magnitude of the ADA and labor union support scores,
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Table 5.4. Interest Group Scores, 1967-1984
Full
Full
HR
E&
HR
E&
Full
Full
HR
E&
HR
E&
Full
Full
HR
E&
HR
E&
HR
E&L
Dems
L Dems
Reps
L Reps
HR
E&L
Dems
L Dems
Reps
L Reps
HR
E&L
Dems
L Dems
Reps
L Reps
90th
38.7
33.8
55.4
35.0
56.3
32.5
80.9
12.2
15.5
17.1
20.1
22.6
48.9
39.4
67.2
38.4
69.9
36.8
96.5
6.7
21.4
21.9
26.6
23.6
48.5
36.7
33.5
37.7
25.9
30.2
4.8
3.8
78.2
19.0
73.1
24.6
91st
38.3
31.7
54.3
34.7
51.7
32.7
78.0
20.3
20.5
19.4
22.9
22.6
54.6
33.9
68.9
34.6
71.5
31.3
94.3
11.2
32.3
22.4
35.1
24.4
46.5
28.6
34.7
30.7
32.4
26.1
14.0
9.8
65.0
19.7
62.3
26.8
92d
37.7
32.3
53.2
29.5
51.5
32.3
73.0
17.0
17.9
19.8
24.1
17.0
Congress
93d 94th 95th
ADA Scores
39.8
30.8
54.4
27.5
55.1
28.9
73.2
16.8
20.1
20.1
30.9
18.7
45.1
33.1
55.6
30.4
58.5
29.9
71.7
20.6
18.2
20.3
23.5
19.1
39.7
27.9
49.2
27.1
50.3
26.6
61.6
22.7
18.8
16.5
24.4
16.2
96th
42.
31.
53.
30.
57.
9
4
6
0
3
28.6
70..7
19.8
18.
17.
24.
.0
.6
.5
19.2
COPE/AFL-CIO Scores
53.4
33.0
63.4
32.2
72.6
26.1
73.0
17.0
25.6
19.2
29.0
20.4
50.2
31.7
37.5
30.2
34.0
27.7
16.2
13.1
73.6
20.3
68.7
18.4
53.6
37.6
66.9
34.4
77.6
27.7
93.2
13.1
22.6
23.5
34.1
21.6
58.1
31.9
69.5
31.5
74.3
23.7
88.2
11.5
25.5
18.7
32.0
24.2
ACA/ACARI
45.1
30.4
33.9
27.5
27.8
24.1
15.4
12.3
67.4
22.0
57.1
23.4
43.5
32.6
33.2
29.7
28.9
26.7
16.5
15.6
72.9
21.6
66.5
21.8
54.2
30.3
65.4
28.9
69.3
23.2
83.4
11.5
24.1
17.4
29.3
15.6
Scores
46.0
31.2
34.9
28.7
31.5
25.1
18.8
14.7
75.0
20.1
67.2
21.6
49.
29.
58,
32.
65.
.8
.7
,7
.6
.7
22.9
81
12
22
17
18
11
45
31
38
32
26
20
.2
.5
.4
.4
.9
.7
.4
.4
.8
.1
.7
.5
17.4
10
77
17
76
19
.4
.6
.8
.7
.2
97th
43.9
53.6
56.8
31.0
64.1
62.9
76.0
19.0
18.1
17.8
30.9
24.5
53.3
54.1
62.2
36.0
79.2
58.7
90.6
10.4
20.0
17.1
23.7
16.3
49.4
30.5
37.6
30.3
29.2
22.7
15.0
10.4
75.1
16.5
68.3
18.6
98th
49.3
33.6
57.6
32.3
70.4
23.0
79.7
12.6
15.8
16.0
21.9
19.1
54.4
33.6
62.7
38.7
77.8
20.1
90.8
11.9
16.8
62.7
15.1
9.8
46.8
32.7
35.8
31.6
26.7
21.9
14.8
11.5
78.9
18.3
69.8
22.3
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Sources: Author's calculations from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Scores for the 98th Cong, are from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 14,1984, pp.
1696-97, and April 20, 1985, pp. 748-49. COPE scores became AFL-CIO scores in 1980,
and ACA scores became ACARI scores in 1982.
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the practice of recruiting more liberal Democrats for Education and Labor
continued into the Perkins era, although at a slowed rate. The com-
paratively high average ADA scores and the relatively low standard devia-
tions suggest that, by this measure, committee Democrats largely were
more liberal than were their House counterparts. The southern Democrats
and other conservative party members who were not assigned to Education
and Labor and thereby could not lower the averages. Moreover, a seem-
ingly large number of committee Democrats scored in the upper ranks of
the liberalism measure. Much higher proportions of Education and Labor
members than of House members earned ADA ratings of 70 or more.
The labor union support scores, which were called COPE scores until
the 96th Congress (1979-80), when they were revised as AFL-CIO support
scores, also show that Education and Labor Democrats largely were more
liberal than were their House counterparts. In all but one Congress (the
96th) during the period under consideration, over 90 percent of committee
Democrats scored above 70 percent support for labor unions, compared
with nearly two-thirds of the House. While House Democrats were in-
clined to side with union positions, House Republicans were not. Few
Republicans scored above 70—under 8 percent in every term and none in
the 95th through 98th Congresses, although generally, committee Republi-
cans showed a higher degree of labor support than did House Republicans.
The ACA scores buttress the conclusion that Education and Labor
attracted liberal members. The magnitude of the differences between
House Democratic and committee Democratic means again are striking,
and again they seemed to be declining in contrast to the Powell years, when
they seemed to be increasing. They peaked in Perkins's first term as
chairman, the 90th Congress (1967-68), after which Democratic members
seemed to move toward being more representative of all the House Demo-
crats. The Republicans continued a trend begun in the 89th Congress
whereby committee members were less conservative than their House
counterparts. Throughout the Perkins years, committee Republicans were
rated as less conservative than their House colleagues.
The relatively high rates of turnover, the reversal of Republican status
from earlier eras, and the declining differences in average House and
committee ratings illustrate that the committee was moving toward becom-
ing a microcosm of its parent body. Perhaps these factors also indicate
decreasing salience of the issues under the committee's jurisdiction. Several
institutional changes may have contributed to the moderation of the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor. The general atmosphere of the committee
became more respectable when Perkins took the helm than it had been
under Powell and Barden. Perkins worked to maintain the committee
balance in his favor. A former staff member said: "Perkins had to lobby like
hell to get people on the committee. Every time a new bunch came in, he
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would go over the list and try to canvass those he wanted. He wanted a
Texan on there in the worst way. Wanted to keep it from being a New York
committee. Had a great nest of New Yorkers on there. 'Them eastern
seaboard boys,' he called them. They didn't give a damn about education.
They were purely interested in labor" (interview). Perkins wanted mem-
bers who would be inclined to vote with him, whose districts would benefit
from the same formulas as his, and whose loyalty he could foster. He was
afraid "them eastern seaboard boys" would override him.
The Republicans on the committee became more moderate for several
reasons. Federal involvement in education had become an accepted prac-
tice, and they no longer had to wage an all-out war against it. Also, most of
the big labor fights had been fought. Common site picketing was the only
labor issue that engendered a significant degree of controversy, although
labor issues always exacerbate differences. The last major labor battle had
been fought in 1959 over the Landrum-Griffin Act. Furthermore, as a
former staff member said, "Right-wing nuts didn't want to settle there very
long. They wanted to serve their time and get out" (interview). Finally, and
probably most important, the newly elected Nixon administration proba-
bly had a moderating influence generally on Republican behavior. Republi-
cans had power in the White House, and they may have felt compelled to
act a little more responsibly, since they had powerful help in getting their
agendas considered or passed.
Voting Patterns
Examination of voting patterns conveys a sense of how cohesive or unified
the members were in support of legislation, the frequency and intensity of
conflict among members, and the degree of party unity. House party-unity
votes show a relatively high degree of unity within each party. Voting
patterns from 1967 to 1984 characterize the committee as having a high
degree of conflict that generally split along party lines. Nevertheless, when
the Rice Index of Cohesion is applied to roll-call votes in the committee, it is
apparent that full committee cohesion levels increased from what they had
been during the leadership spans of the previous chairmen. The percen-
tages of committee party votes, on the other hand, manifest competition
between the parties, particularly in the 1980s, when the Reagan adminis-
tration targeted many of the committee's major programs for cutting.
The degree of partisanship apparent in the House and how reflective
committee members were of their House counterparts can be gauged by
party-unity scores, which were calculated for House roll calls only. The
mean party-unity scores of committee members are compared with those of
House members in table 5.5. Mean party-unity scores for committee
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Table 5.5. Party-Unity Scores, 1967-1984
153
Full
Full
HR
E&
HR
E&
HR
E&L
Dems
L Dems
Reps
LReps
90th
65.9
20.4
51.7
73.0
16.6
56.3
63.5
23.2
50.8
80.3
10.4
72.2
69.1
15.4
52.9
63.6
18.7
35.7
91st
60.2
18.1
35.2
65.3
17.7
48.6
59.4
20.1
37.8
69.1
17.2
55.0
61.1
15.2
31.8
60.3
17.7
40.0
92d
62.6
19.7
44.8
69.6
13.1
56.7
59.5
22.2
41.1
74.4
10.4
68.1
67.1
14.3
50.3
63.1
13.8
40.0
93d
66.1
17.8
51.5
69.1
15.0
59.9
66.0
19.7
55.7
76.9
10.5
85.0
66.3
14.9
46.0
59.3
14.1
26.7
Congress
94th
68.2
19.6
56.2
71.2
17.1
61.6
67.5
20.7
56.3
76.6
12.3
73.1
69.6
17.1
56.0
60.3
20.5
38.5
95th
67.0
18.2
52.8
68.9
16.3
55.6
65.5
19.1
52.1
71.6
15.6
66.7
70.0
16.1
54.1
63.4
16.8
33.3
96th
69.9
18.2
58.9
75.1
11.5
72.3
68.9
18.4
56.4
76.0
9.7
69.5
71.8
17.8
63.3
73.5
14.4
77.0
97th
72.7
42.9
60.9
73.7
14.9
70.6
73.6
55.6
59.7
80.1
8.7
84.2
71.4
15.6
62.4
65.6
17.4
53.3
98th
74.4
15.6
71.5
76.7
12.5
74.2
75.3
15.5
73.3
80.3
7.9
90.9
73.1
15.7
68.6
70.5
16.4
46.2
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Mean
SD
%>70
Sources: Author's calculations from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Scores for
the 98th Congress are from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984.
members exceeded the average scores of all House members in each of the
nine Congresses under consideration. Committee Democratic means sur-
passed the average scores of their counterparts in the House in every
instance. In addition, the variation in the House was far greater than the
variation among committee Democratic scores.
Committee Republicans, on the other hand, seemed to be less partisan
than their House Republican colleagues in every Congress under consid-
eration save one, the 96th (1979-80). Moreover, committee Republicans
party-unity scores generally varied more than did those of House Republi-
cans. Whereas Republican leaders in previous years had tended to assign to
Education and Labor the most conservative and partisan members they
could find, after Perkins assumed the chairmanship that practice abated a
bit. Given the higher standard deviations, the committee had at least a few
Republicans who were less wed to their party's positions or more liberal
than their predecessors. Interest group scores also indicated that the Re-
publicans assigned to the committee had become slightly less extreme over
the years.
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Table 5.6. Committee Roll Calls Meeting Minimum Cohesion and Mean Rice
Index Scores, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Total
Mean
Percentage
of total
N
99
61
132
91
69
108
53
55
49
717
FullE&L
30.6
38.9
34.6
45.7
56.1
44.9
42.8
37.1
42.6
40.8
Rice Index
Dems
75.3
78.9
67.8
73.8
78.7
73.4
82.8
93.5
82.4
76.5
Reps
83.2
80.7
77.5
79.5
67.6
73.1
73.0
78.9
77.8
77.0
FullE&LRI>40
%
27.2
37.7
31.8
48.4
66.7
53.7
45.3
47.3
46.9
45.0
43.7
N
27
23
42
44
46
58
24
26
23
313
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1967-84.
As a matter of course, Education and Labor Democrats boasted some
of the higher party-unity scores among House members. Larger percen-
tages of committee Democrats had party-unity scores greater than 70 than
did House Democrats. In the 98th Congress (1983-84), more than 90
percent of the Democrats were highly partisan by this measure. Committee
Republicans, on the other hand, had smaller percentages of highly partisan
members than did the House. Their scores were consistently lower than
those of their House counterparts.
Not only were there substantially more roll calls during the Perkins
years than during his predecessor's, but voting generally was more co-
hesive. Members voted together, with a minimum of 70 percent of mem-
bers on the same side, on 43.7 percent of all the roll calls during the Perkins
chairmanship, as compared with about 23 percent under Powell. More-
over, the average Rice Index Scores for all roll calls under Perkins generally
were higher than those under Powell, averaging 40.8. See table 5.6.
Rather than some cross-cutting consensus that led to near unanimity on
the floor as evidence of an integrated committee, the political parties
provided the integrating mechanism on Education and Labor that allowed
the committee to function. The conclusion that it was sufficiently inte-
grated to satisfy its organizational maintenance needs and to get its job done
is supported by data gathered from committee prints, interviews, and
written studies illustrating that the parties were well integrated and deline-
ated on this committee. Rice Index Scores based on roll-call votes in
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Table 5.7. Percentage of Party Votes in Committee by 50-, 70-, 75-, and 90-
Percent Criteria, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Total
Percentage
of total
N
99
61
132
91
69
108
53
55
49
717
(number of qualifying
> 50%
75.8(75)
70.5 (43)
72.0(95)
57.1(52)
56.5 (39)
63.0 (68)
77.4(41)
80.0 (44)
65.3(32)
(489)
68.2
> 70%
64.6 (64)
59.0 (36)
48.5 (64)
46.2 (42)
37.7 (26)
45.4(49)
58.5 (31)
70.9 (39)
53.1 (26)
(377)
52.6
roll calls in parentheses)
> 75%
57.6(57)
50.8(31)
45.5 (60)
44.0 (40)
34.8 (24)
41.7 (45)
54.7 (29)
69.1 (38)
44.9(22)
(346)
48.3
> 90%
27.3(27)
31.1 (19)
25.8 (34)
23.1(21)
11.6 (8)
25.9(28)
22.6(12)
54.5 (30)
38.8 (19)
(198)
27.6
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1967-84.
committee, controlled for party, provide a means to determine the extent of
cohesion within each party on Education and Labor and, unlike party-
unity scores, can be compared over time. In contrast to their voting
behavior on the floor as shown by House party-unity scores, members of
both parties, in committee, voted overwhelmingly with members of their
own party much more often than not. Over the entire period Perkins was
chairman (1967-84) the Democrats had an average Rice Index of 76.5,
showing an 88-percent average cohesiveness. The Republicans averaged
77.0, meaning that they voted together about 89 percent of time. The
indexes were high for both parties throughout Perkins's chairmanship, in
keeping with the intraparty unity during the Powell era.
Interparty differences are reflected in the levels of party competition,
which were relatively high on this committee throughout the Perkins years,
although lower than they had been under Powell. When Powell was
chairman, the parties opposed each other on about 75 percent of the votes.
Under Perkins, just over half the roll calls qualified as party votes (see table
5.7). The issues Powell's committee faced in 1961-66 generated stronger
partisanship, both in the committee and in the House. Nonetheless, com-
mittee programs faced severe cutbacks during Republican administrations,
particularly during the Reagan years. The Democrats banded together
to protect their vested interests—the liberal programs enacted in the
mid-1960s. For all the assertions of "extremism" (Unekis and Rieselbach
1984), however, Perkins seemed to have had a moderating influence on the
committee after Powell. Party voting levels on the committee decreased
during the first ten years that Perkins was chairman, bottoming out in
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1975-76, when Democrats opposed Republicans on 37.7 percent of the
votes. The percentage of party votes began an upswing again in the 95th
Congress (1977-78), peaking in the 97th (1981-82).
If the standard for integration is bipartisan consensus, the Committee
on Education and Labor under Perkins once again could be characterized as
a low-integration committee. This finding corroborates those of Unekis and
Rieselbach (1984) and Parker and Parker (1985), who used different meas-
ures. Full committee integration grew during Perkins's tenure, partially,
although not entirely, as a result of his stewardship. Nevertheless, the
committee cannot be classified as highly cohesive. As it had in past Con-
gresses, party provided the main integrating force once again on Education
and Labor. With party voting as the norm, all three measures of par-
tisanship indicate a high reliance on party in committee. But they also
demonstrate a lesser degree of partisanship under Perkins than under
Powell.
The party-unity scores pointed to committee Democrats as more likely
than most of their other House colleagues to vote with the party on roll calls
that pitted a majority of one party against a majority of the other. The
Republicans, on the other hand, seemed slightly less likely to toe the party
line on party-unity votes. The larger standard deviations for committee
Republicans hint that a few may have had party-unity scores sufficiently
low to bring down the mean scores among committee members apprecia-
bly, thus making the committee Republicans look less reliant on party than
their House colleagues and than the committee Democrats. The Rice Index
Scores are the strongest indicator of the partisanship in operation on the
committee. They show that committee members were strongly inclined to
vote with members of their own party in committee, but they mean little
without being considered in the context of the proportion of times that the
two parties were opposed. Not only were the index scores relatively high,
but the proportion of votes on which the parties opposed each other was
high as well, although not as high as it had been under Powell.
Committee fluctuations may be subject to a variety of interpretations.
Some of the increased cohesion and slightly reduced partisanship might be
attributed to the partisan split, since when the Democrats had the highest
percentage of members (94th Congress, 1975-76), their voting cohesion was
the highest, with 70 percent of the members voting together on two-thirds
of the votes. But the Democrats never had 70 percent of the membership.
To achieve the 70-percent minimum level of cohesion, some Republicans
had to vote with the majority, or a fair number of Democrats had to vote
with the Republicans in order to reach levels of minimal cross^party unity.
At least four other factors entered the picture: the chairman's influence, the
ideological composition of the committee, the imposition of additional
committee rules, and the nature of the issues considered.
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Politically, Perkins knew what would win. As one of his committee
staff members said, Perkins "was good at getting his members to pull
together," cajoling and persuading them frequently (interview). Perkins
traded votes and support effectively in both parties, often managing to
attract some Republicans. Early in his career he had mastered the art of
easy-going persuasion, tugging at sleeves, and wheedling. He was re-
lentless in pursuit of votes. His efforts paid off in committee as well as on
the floor. His close friendships with a few of the Republicans helped, too.
Cohesiveness probably was facilitated by a more liberal minority.
Until Powell's last year as chairman, the interest group scores showed that
committee Republicans tended to be more conservative than the average
House member. Beginning in 1966 the picture changed, so that the com-
mittee Republicans were slightly more liberal than their House colleagues,
as were the Democrats, conditions that held true throughout the Perkins
years. Perkins was more representative of minority philosophies than
Powell had been. Minority members also may have been more willing to
support the chairman because he had a reputation for being fair to them and
he did a great deal of persuading on their side of the aisle. Charac-
teristically, Perkins traded votes and made deals with the Republicans to
bring them to his side.
The enactment of additional rules calling for more democratic pro-
cedures for the committee also promoted increased voting cohesion. Rules
themselves are an integrating measure. They contribute to a universalistic
rather than a particularistic method of operating and provide a way to
organize conflict and keep it civil. As a former committee staff member
said, "If everything is civil already, the rules are a way to structure the
committee's business" (interview). The institution of rules and the chair-
man's enforcement of them reduced conflict over some of the procedural
matters, thereby increasing integration in the process. Chairman Perkins
realized that solving little problems often makes compromises on the more
controversial issues easier.
Another factor that contributed to higher levels of cohesive voting on
the committee was a change in the nature of the issues. Several had lost their
partisan sting. Most of the battles over program authorizations had been
fought by the time Perkins was far into his chairmanship, so all that was left
were reauthorizations. The hard part had been done. Constituents of the
Office of Economic Opportunity had been established in most members'
districts. Federal aid to education monies were apparent all over the coun-
try. The Republicans, too, had vested interests in committee legislation.
They had a more difficult time voting to cut existing programs that came
out of their committee than they had had in voting against them in the first
place. It is hard to vote against something that many perceive as working
and that has established constituencies.
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Committee Structure
Certain facets of committee structure are vital to the functioning of the
committee: committee rules, committee size and party ratios, subcommit-
tee structure and use, and committee and subcommittee staff. Changes in
them from chairman to chairman show how each leader handled the
committee differently.
Numerous committee rules changes were enacted after Perkins as-
sumed the chair; however, most of the limits on his authority were in place
when he took over. Although the chairman was affected by the House and
Democratic Caucus reforms, he had far less to lose than other chairmen,
since many of the House and caucus reforms were in effect on Education
and Labor before they were applied to the House at large. In the last
months of Powell's tenure, as a response to perceived widespread abuses of
power and as an inoculation against future abuses, members approved
several strict new provisions giving majority members more responsibility
in committee operations. Perkins had been part of the cadre of committee
members seeking to rein in the chairman and had few objections. In fact, he
generally favored them and had voted for them in 1966.
As a result, the initial changes adopted when Perkins took the helm
were relatively minor. Majority members already had given themselves
control over the creation and jurisdictions of the subcommittees, although
the effect of this provision was postponed until Perkins became chairman in
1967. It mandated due regard to committee seniority and to individual
preferences, in effect almost guaranteeing choice subcommittee assign-
ments and leaving little discretion to the chairman. Consequently, Perkins
was little affected when the House Democratic Caucus adopted similar
provisions applying to all committees in the 1973 "Subcommittee Bill of
Rights."6
The 1967 committee rules prohibited subcommittee chairmen from
sitting on more than one other subcommittee. They limited other members
to three subcommittees and implied that subcommittees were to be ap-
pointed by the chairman, who was not mentioned specifically. Nor was the
method of assignment set out—only that seniority and individual prefer-
ences were to be taken into consideration, insofar as practical. In contrast,
Powell specifically had been authorized to appoint every committee mem-
ber to at least one subcommittee. Perkins did the appointing in accordance
with members' preferences.
Another new provision enacted when Perkins assumed the chair in
1967 allowed members to file, as part of the printed committee report,
individual, minority, or dissenting views on any bill reported to the House
by the committee. (A three-day time limit on the filing of these reports was
imposed in 1973 to conform to Democratic Caucus reforms.) Another new
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1967 clause stipulated that committee roll-call records indicate when a vote
was cast by proxy, a practice that had been followed at least since the early
1950s. The 1967 rules also applied the committee rules to the subcommittee
and gave subcommittee members the option of removing subcommittee
personnel.
After Perkins's initial term as chairman, Education and Labor mem-
bers adopted several major changes concerning committee operations in the
1970s. They also added others that reflected procedural changes of lesser
significance, although they had the effect of furthering committee de-
centralization. A small number actually restored bits of authority to the
chairman. Although most of the rules changes came about as the result of
House or Democratic Caucus action, these were not the actions with the
major operational effects on Education and Labor. The strongest impacts
came from within the committee and set the course for other committees to
follow.
The chairman initiated the operational rule change that had the most
dramatic effect—the opening of committee meetings to the public. A senior
staff member recalled the following scenario when the Republicans boy-
cotted the mark-up of antipoverty legislation: "In one of his rare displays of
indignation or perturbation, Perkins said, 'Just open those doors. Let the
people in. And call the reporters. 1 want the people to see what's a-goin' on
in here.' They opened the doors, called the reporters, and seven or eight
Republicans filed out of the Republican cloakroom back there like little
gentlemen and took their seats. I think that was the first open mark-up in
any committee. When the vice president arrived at Perkins's birthday party
on October 15, 1967, he referred to this 'open covenants openly arrived at'
[one of Wilson's Fourteen Points]" (interview). The move was so successful
at keeping a quorum and ensuring that members were on their best be-
havior that a provision requiring that committee and subcommittee meet-
ings be open to the public appeared in the committee rules in the 91st
Congress, four years prior to the 1973 stipulation in House rules that all
committee and subcommittee bill-drafting sessions, with a few exceptions,
be open to the public (House Rules 1979, rule II, cl . 2, Sec. 708).
As an internally initiated offshoot of 1973 House Democratic Caucus
reforms, the chairman regained a few prerogatives when the committee
majority caucus adopted rules giving the chairman authority to fill remain-
ing Democratic vacancies on subcommittees, with regard to previous serv-
ice and individual preference, subject to majority approval. The committee
rules authorized the chairman to make temporary subcommittee assign-
ments of any committee member to participate in committee matters
outside of Washington, D.C. All members could question witnesses at
public hearings of any subcommittee.
Committee majority members also amended the questioning provi-
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sion, directing the chairman to recognize two Democrats for every one
Republican called on to ask questions. The 1970 Legislative Reorganization
Act (P.L. 91-510; 84 Stat. 1140) allowed the minority to call witnesses
during at least one day of hearings on each bill, but until 1975 the commit-
tee rules provided for the chairman to initiate the questioning during
hearings, followed by the ranking minority member and all other members,
alternating by party. To keep the chairman from being overly accom-
modating of the minority, the new provision forced him to take into account
the ratio of majority to minority members and to set the order of question-
ing so as not to disadvantage the Democrats. It also kept the Republicans
from monopolizing the questioning.
An era of reform in the 1970s inspired numerous changes in House
procedures, carried out in large part by the House Democratic Caucus.
Many of these reforms trickled down to committees. One led to the 1973
adoption by Education and Labor of a rule concerning subcommittee
appointment procedures. It required the chairman to appoint all Demo-
cratic members to subcommittees, pursuant to committee majority caucus
rules, which entitled each committee member to a seat on one subcommit-
tee of his choice as long as there were vacancies. In 1974 the House
Democratic Caucus rule was amended so that no one was entitled to more
than two assignments until all other members had made one choice and no
one could be ranking majority member on more than one subcommittee,
and subsequently the committee rule was likewise amended. In effect, this
provision restored to the chairman the official appointment authority,
which had been left unstated in previous rules. It also confirmed an existing
practice on Education and Labor.
The prerogatives of committee chairmen were being challenged by
reformers in the House, and nor were subcommittee chairs sacrosanct.
Until 1975, Education and Labor Committee rules decreed that the ranking
majority members be appointed to subcommittee chairmanships. As an
offshoot of Democratic Caucus action, the 94th Congress committee rules
gave majority members the right to bid for subcommittee chairmanships in
order of seniority, with all bids subject to approval of a majority of those
present and voting in the committee majority caucus. As an attempt to
make subcommittee chairmen more responsive to their subcommittees and
to the majority members of the full committee, the bidding procedure
threatened the seemingly inalienable right of ranking majority members to
be subcommittee chairmen. Its seeds were sown in the House Democratic
Caucus, where the previous "right" of senior committee members to be-
come chairmen was threatened by the 1973 adoption of automatic caucus
votes on committee chairmen. Just as the chairman's authority was dimin-
ished by caucus rules requiring him to stand for election to his post, so was
that of his subcommittee chairmen. Moreover, in recent years Education
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and Labor had stripped two chairmen of their prerogatives. Perkins would
not allow himself to be the third. His staff recollected that the bidding
procedure had little impact on the chairmen's behavior. It did not change
noticeably after the caucus reforms (interviews).
Reflecting the reorientation of authorizing committees toward over-
sight and away from the approval of big spending programs, the committee
responded to pressure from the House to step up its oversight activities.7 In
1975, as an indirect result of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the
committee adopted a rule directing each subcommittee to review and study
on a continuing basis the application, administration, execution, and effec-
tiveness of the laws or parts of laws under its jurisdiction (House Rules 1979,
rule 10, cl. 2, sec. 692). The subcommittee was charged with determining
whether these laws were being implemented in accordance with the intent
of Congress; if the programs should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated;
and if additional legislation was needed. The chairman was required to
assign oversight measures to the subcommittees. The House granted a
special oversight function relating to Education and Labor in the 93d
Congress, directing the committee to oversee domestic education programs
within the jurisdictions of other committees (House Rules 1979, rule 10,
cl. 3[c]).
In 1975, when the House allowed the multiple or split referral of
legislation, the committee followed suit. In a move restoring prerogatives to
the chairman, committee members adopted rules allowing the chairman
discretion in simultaneous referral of legislation to two or more subcommit-
tees for concurrent or sequential consideration (Committee Rules, 94th
Cong.). He also had the option of dividing legislation and referring the parts
to the appropriate standing or ad hoc subcommittees. With the advent of
this provision came the most discretion over referrals the chairman had had
since the Powell years.
Another major procedural rules change adopted by the committee en-
larged its investigative powers. Echoing House rules enacted in 1975, the
1977 committee rules included a provision enlarging the committee's inves-
tigative powers by authorizing the issuance of subpoenas on the approval of
a majority of the present and voting members, with a majority present.8
Subpoenas were to be signed by the chairman or by any designated
member. Although this provision did not enhance or diminish the chair-
man, it certainly increased his stature vis-a-vis hearing witnesses and gave
him equal standing with those few committees that previously had been the
sole proprietors of the subpoena powers: Appropriations, Budget, Govern-
ment Operations, Internal Security, and Standards of Official Conduct
(Wouse Rules 1979, rule 11, cl . 2, sec. 718, annotation, 413).
In 1984 a new committee rule directed the committee chairman, on
request from any subcommittee chairman, to file with the appropriate
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department or agency head a formal objection to any final implementing
regulation identified. The purpose of this rule was to suspend the effective
date of the regulations in question and to ensure that regulations fell within
the authority conferred by authorizing legislation.
The committee also adopted a host of important but less conse-
quential rules changes. Since they largely concerned record keeping and
the routinization of operating procedures, most of their impact lay within
the committee. Several of these rules enhanced the chairman's preroga-
tives. One 1973 procedural rule change restored to the chairman the sole
power to authorize committee-related travel for members and staff. In the
prior Congress, the chairman or any subcommittee chairman could au-
thorize travel funds. Largely confirming existing practice, this seemingly
innocuous provision was the underpinning for a great deal of influence by
the full committee chairman. The rules also required that the ranking
minority member receive a copy of all written requests for travel. In 1973
the chairman also was authorized to approve international travel. As a
safeguard against the repetition of past abuses, members had to submit a
written report of their activities and of pertinent information gained on the
trip.
The rules for the 92d Congress (1971-72) also revised the process for
calling special committee meetings to enable the committee majority to
circumvent an intractable chairman, at the same time giving him the
authority to assemble recalcitrant members if they did not accomplish the
committee's business in the normally scheduled meetings. Members rein-
stated a previously used provision allowing the chairman to call special
meetings as he deemed necessary for the consideration of any piece of
legislation or other item of committee business. This rule also empowered
the members to petition for the call of a special meeting by filing a notice of
intent with the committee clerk and apprising all members of the meeting
time, place, and purpose.
In 1977 members made it easier to get a quorum and more difficult for
Republicans to hold up committee business for lack of a quorum. A new
rule provided that one-third of the members of the committee or a subcom-
mittee, rather than a majority, constituted a quorum for taking any action
other than amending the rules, closing a meeting from the public, reporting
legislation, or authorizing a subpoena. This rule highlighted the difficulty
of obtaining a quorum when members relied frequently on proxies, which
were invalid in a quorum count.
Another 1977 rule prohibited consideration of a proposed change in
committee rules unless the text of the change had been in the hands of all
committee members for at least forty-eight hours prior to the meeting in
which the change was to be considered. Of import only to committee
members, this provision made it difficult for anyone to change the rules
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midstream to suit his purpose before other members could examine the
impact such a rule change might have. It also served as fair warning
for members to attend a meeting in which rules changes were to be dis-
cussed.
In 1971 minority members were given authority to call witnesses. In
accordance with new House rules, the 1973 committee rules specifically set
out hearing procedures generally pursuant to rule 11, clause 27, of the
House rules. The chairman or subcommittee chairman was required to
announce and publish the logistics and purpose of each hearing at least one
week in advance. Witnesses were required to file with the clerk written
statements of their proposed testimony at least twenty-four hours before
their appearance. Also concomitant with House reforms, the 1971 commit-
tee rules delineated extensive provisions regulating media coverage of
hearings. All media had access to full committee hearings, although access
to subcommittee hearings was governed by majority vote of the subcom-
mittee in question. The rules largely were designed to provide a minimum
of interference in committee operations by regulating placement of cameras
and other media equipment.
Although the chairman's statutory powers generally were weakened
throughout the period that Perkins was chairman, the decline by and large
was imposed externally, in contrast to committee-initiated reforms under
the two previous chairmen. Most of the Education and Labor restructuring
enacted before the Perkins era had been instituted by frustrated majority
members. They had been chipping away at the chairman's traditional
authority for ten years before Perkins became chairman. Having been
subject to the abuses by the two previous chairmen, he had been part of the
reform movement aimed both at Barden and at Powell and had voted for the
rules crippling the chairman's power. Perkins knew all too well the prob-
lems that could occur without proper restrictions.
During his chairmanship, and particularly in the early 1970s, the
chairman lost some of his standing at the hands of the House and of the
caucus, but he was not alone. All other committee chairmen were subject to
the same debilitations, such as being subject to caucus approval and being
limited to chairing one subcommittee. This development was the result of
an era of reform in the House substantially democratizing its committee
decision-making processes.
From 1967 to 1984 most of the changes in the committee rules were
relatively minor structural or procedural amendments, although they were
of great import to committee members. The chairman-initiated opening of
committee meetings to the public was perhaps the most significant reform,
affecting the operations and the fate of legislation not only in Education and
Labor (and possibly in the House) but later, in all committees. It almost
forced attendance and attention to constituency pressures, because for the
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first time the constituents could see what their representatives were doing
behind previously closed doors. The open-door policy fostered public
accountability and aided interest group monitoring.
The size of the committee increased with the installation of a new
chairman at the beginning of the 90th Congress in 1967, as it had when
Powell assumed the chairmanship in 1961. Thirty-one members had been
assigned to the committee under Powell. The committee picked up three
slots in the 90th Congress and generally grew until the 95th, when, with
fourteen new members, it peaked at forty members. It later leveled off at
thirty-six members until the 98th, when it had thirty-eight.
The party ratios on the committee were similar to those in the House
for every Congress between 1967 and 1984. Both the House and this
committee were lopsidedly Democratic during most of the Perkins years,
especially during the 94th through 96th Congresses (1975-80) when about
two-thirds of the House membership was Democratic. The Watergate
scandal seemed to have a national impact beginning in the 1974 elections,
when the Democrats picked up nearly fifty seats in the midterm elections
and maintained a heavy advantage until the 97th Congress (1981-82), when
the Republicans gained thirty-four seats. Democratics regained most of
them in the 98th Congress (1983-84).
During the years that Perkins was chairman, the House and Demo-
cratic Caucus approved a series of sweeping reforms aimed at decentraliz-
ing the committee system. Subcommittees all over the House increased
dramatically in importance and autonomy (Davidson 1981b; Deering and
Smith 1984; Sheppard 1985, 232-52). Changes in internal structures and
procedures enhanced the ability to produce policy decisions more effi-
ciently (Rieselbach 1975). They increased the flexibility of the seniority
system by encouraging less-senior members to play more important roles in
the legislative process. A summary of these reforms follows:9
1970 Legislative Reorganization Act
Provided that the ranking majority member would preside in the absence of the
chairman. In practice on Education and Labor in 1966.
Encouraged open meetings unless majority voted to close them. In practice on
Education and Labor in 1967.
Made roll calls available to the public.
Stipulated that committee reports must be filed within seven days.
Prohibited blanket proxies in committees.
Allowed three days for supplemental or minority reports to be filed for inclusion in
the committee report.
Required one-third of committee's funds to be allocated for minority staff. Minority
budget in practice on Education and Labor after 1966, but not necessarily one-
third of the funds.
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Provided that the minority be able to call witnesses during at least one day of
hearings on a bill (nullified in 1971).
Permitted broadcast of hearings. In practice on Education and Labor in 1967.
1971 House Democratic Caucus Reforms
Prohibited members from holding more than one legislative subcommittee chair-
manship. In practice on Education and Labor since 1967, although not written
specifically into the rules.
Limited full committee chairmen to one subcommittee chairmanship. In practice on
Education and Labor since 1967.
Required committees and subcommittees to have written rules. In practice on
Education and Labor since 1957.
Permitted subcommittee chairmen to select one professional subcommittee staff
member, subject to approval by the full committee majority caucus. In practice
on Education and Labor since 1961.
1973 Democratic Caucus Reforms, ''Subcommittee Bill of Rights"
Provided election of subcommittee chairmen by majority committee caucus.
Fixed subcommittee jurisdictions set by majority caucus. In Education and Labor
rules since 1966.
Provided that party ratios on subcommittees be set to reflect ratio in the House. In
Education and Labor rules in 1957, 1959, and after 1966.
Guaranteed adequate subcommittee budgets by majority caucus. In practice on
Education and Labor beginning in 1967.
Guaranteed each member a major subcommittee assignment as long as there were
vacancies. In practice on Education and Labor beginning in 1967.
Required full committee chairman to file committee reports within two weeks. In
Education and Labor rules, chairman was directed to report bills "promptly"
beginning in 1971.
1974 Reforms
Required committees with more than twenty members to establish a minimum of
four subcommittees. Education and Labor mandated the establishment of
subcommittees in 1957.
Provided that no member could be assigned to a second subcommittee before every
member had chosen one subcommittee assignment (bidding).
Restricted members to membership on two subcommittees per committee assign-
ment. Education and Labor rules limited members to three subcommittees in
1967.
A notable feature of Education and Labor is its autonomous subcom-
mittee structure (Unekis and Reiselbach 1984, 150). Since 1967 majority
members of the committee have controlled the creation, number, and
jurisdiction of subcommittees. Formerly, and in all other committees, those
prerogatives were reserved for the chairman.
During the first four terms of Perkins's chairmanship, the number of
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subcommittees fluctuated, although the committee always had a minimum
of six standing subcommittees, and on occasion there were two or three
special, select, or ad hoc subcommittees or task forces. These subunits were
not specifically titled to indicate their jurisdictions. Instead, they were
numbered or referred to by vague titles—general, special, and select
subcommittees on education and on labor.
The implementation of the 1973 caucus reforms in the 94th Congress
only slightly changed the subcommittee picture on Education and Labor.
The committee replaced the vague titles of its subcommittees with more
specific ones. It altered its subcommittees slightly over the next few ses-
sions, changing names, adding units, or reorganizing as the issues or
politics demanded, although not to the extent that the subcommittees of
many other committees were altered.
Changes in the nature and salience of the issues before the committee
dictated most of the subcommittee jurisdictional changes and reorganiza-
tions that appeared during the Perkins years. As issues became politically
salient and appeared on the committee's agenda—such as the problems of
juvenile delinquents, agricultural workers, and the elderly—subcommit-
tees were created or reorganized to handle them. And their jurisdictions
were increasingly specific in the rules.
Several structural rules changes reflected the shifting proportions of
Democrats to Republicans in the House, mirroring the desires of the
majority to increase its proportion of seats. These changes varied in specif-
icity. In the early years, the ratio of majority to minority members was set
at three to two on each subcommittee. Later it was changed to two to one.
As the Democrats won more seats, they assigned an additional majority
member to each subcommittee. In 1979, instead of setting ratios, commit-
tee rules set the precise number of members from each party entitled to
seats on each subcommittee. Some subcommittees increased in size at the
expense of others, echoing the changing committee size and jurisdictional
salience.
The 1967 committee rules required that all members be appointed to
one or more subcommittees in accordance with seniority and individual
preferences and limited members to three subcommittees. Chairmen of
standing subcommittees were restricted to one additional subcommittee.
Ranking members of the majority party automatically would hold the
chairmanships of the standing subcommittees. The full committee chair-
man could appoint any additional subcommittee chairmen, with due regard
for seniority.
Not including the chairman, unless he chaired a subcommittee, or the
ranking minority member, unless he had a regular seat on a standing
subcommittee, the average committee member held between two and three
subcommittee seats per term on Education and Labor. On the whole,
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Democrats on Education and Labor were likely to hold a slightly higher
number of standing subcommittee seats than were Republicans. Notwith-
standing the committee rule limiting members to a maximum of three
subcommittees, a member occasionally sat on four or five. There also were
several violations of the rule stating that a chairman of a standing subcom-
mittee may not be assigned to more than one other subcommittee. By
tradition, the structure was sufficiently permeable during the Perkins years
to allow any member desiring to participate (but not vote) in subcommittee
deliberations to do so, even if he was not a member of that subcommittee.
(A provision allowing such participation also was in the original committee
rules adopted in 1957.)
Subcommittees were accorded little deference by the full committee.
Frequently, battles fought and resolved (or not resolved) in subcommittees
were fought again in full committee, although a good many bills were
reported to the House in the form in which they left the subcommittee.
Several characteristics of Education and Labor accounted for the lack of
faith in subcommittee decisions. First, the controversial nature of the issues
and the lack of necessity for expertise made the full committee the likely
arena for many debates. Second, the contentious nature of many of the
members was a contributing factor. If a subcommittee member did not get
his amendments through the subcommittee, frequently he would try again
in the full committee. Third, the Democrats frequently did not agree on the
formulas for many of the programs. Chairman Perkins wanted his district
to profit most, while the northern, urban, liberal majority of the Democrats
wanted urban areas to get the lion's share of the benefits.
The committee rules required that every bill referred to Education and
Labor be assigned to the subcommittee of proper jurisdiction within a week
of its referral to the full committee, regardless of whether the sponsor was a
member of that subcommittee (Committee Rules, 90th Cong.). Perkins
generally followed this stipulation unless someone made a special request
that a bill be sent to his subcommittee. Committee staff members who
handled the referrals for the chairman did not remember the assignment of
bills ever being an issue (interview).
The advent of specific subcommittees and mandatory referral, while
not a new idea on Education and Labor, diminished the chairman's already
precarious power a little further on paper but did not have a perceptible
impact on operations. The primary result of these reforms was a name
change for Education and Labor subcommittees. Perkins continued to
operate as he had before the changes in rules and continued to follow
committee rules regarding bill referral. The committee rule allowing the
chairman to make multiple or split referrals of bills to subcommittees
counterbalanced any loss of his authority. Perkins was much more demo-
cratic about running the committee than Barden and Powell had been, and
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Table 5.8. Full Committee and Subcommittee Hearings, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Total
Mean
Percentage
of Total
Days of
full committee
hearings
36
38
61
5
7
0
0
14
20
181
20.1
6.5
Days of
subcommittee
hearings
193
343
236
338
288
317
335
271
262
2,583
287.0
93.5
Total
days of
hearings
229
381
297
343
295
317
335
285
282
2,764
307.1
Percentage of
subcommittee
hearings
84.3
90.0
79.5
98.5
97.6
100.0
100.0
95.1
92.9
93.1
Sources: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Calendar 1967-84; Committee on
Education and Labor, Activities 1967-84.
the changes instituted before he took control blunted the impact of the
1970s caucus reforms.
Under Perkins, Education and Labor held frequent hearings at both
the full committee and subcommittee levels. Between 1967 and 1984 just
over 93 percent were held before subcommittees. Despite this high percen-
tage, Perkins held more hearings in the full committee than Powell did,
although in the 95th and 96th Congresses, Perkins held no full committee
hearings at all. During Perkins's chairmanship, there were 181 days of full
committee hearings, with an average of 20.1 per term (see table 5.8). On the
other hand, for the three terms that Powell was chairman, the full commit-
tee held only 7 days of hearings, at an average of 2.3 days per term. The
average number of subcommittee hearings during the Perkins years also
exceeds that of the Powell years, as does the average total number of
hearings per term. The Perkins committee held more hearings than did the
Powell committee, just about any way they are compared.
Perkins relied largely on the full committee in his early terms as
chairman to hold hearings on legislation he sponsored. The issues included
amendments to and extensions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and the National
School Lunch Act. On several occasions the full committee held hearings
on ranking minority member Albert Quie's (R-MN) education legislation as
well.
It has been said repeatedly that Carl Perkins set out to solve unemploy-
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merit problems single-handedly by hiring everyone who needed a job for
his office or for the committee. As a result of this practice and for other
reasons, the size of the staff varied markedly from month to month. Some
stayed for years, and others for just a few months. Moreover, it is not
always possible to determine how many staff members there were or
whether they were classified as statutory or investigative. The record
keeping and reporting procedures and practices varied throughout the
years.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601) allowed each
committee four permanent, professional staff members and six clerical
personnel. Minority allocations were not specified, because staff were
supposed to be appointed without regard to political affiliation. Provisions
for minority staff personnel were not written into the House rules until the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which provided that one-third of
the committee's investigative personnel funding, two of the committee's six
professional statutory personnel, and one of the statutory clerical employ-
ees be allocated to the minority. Malbin (1980, 13) noted that both House
and Senate Democrats ignored the one-third rule in subsequent years. In
fact, the provision was repealed in 1971 and not reinstated until 1974, when
the minority was allotted one-third of the eighteen professionals and twelve
clerks and one-third of the investigative funds. In 1975 the House elimi-
nated the 1946 requirement that professionals be nonpartisan and instituted
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, and age.
That same year, subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority members
were authorized to hire staff members, paid out of statutory or supplemen-
tal funds, to work on their subcommittees (House Rules 1979, rule 11, cl. 6,
p. 439).
One of the hallmarks of Education and Labor staff members under
Perkins (and Powell) was their party loyalty (Goodwin 1970; Morrow
1969). Despite the nonpartisan requirement, throughout both eras the
committee staff was partisan. As one set of authors noted, "Party affiliation
is a very important criterion in staff selection; here the minority staff
services only minority members of the committees, while majority staff
appointees serve only majority members of the committees" (Jewell and
Patterson 1966, 242). There were physical barriers between the two staffs
and little communication between them (interviews).
Prior to the guaranteed independent staffing of subcommittees imple-
mented in 1971 (Deering and Smith 1981, 264), personnel considerations
were limited by the committee budget. The chairman had the authority to
employ and discharge additional majority committee and subcommittee
staff members as the budget would allow. Under Perkins, however, many
of the professional staff were on the House payroll and were not paid out of
committee funds. Because the numbers of standing committee staff mem-
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bers were set by law, Perkins (and other committee chairmen) also relied on
staff members paid out of investigative funds to do much of the work,
including the staffing of subcommittees. Moreover, he allowed the minor-
ity part of these funds, but not necessarily one-third.
Until 1966 the authority of the committee to employ or discharge
majority committee staff members was reserved for the chairman, while the
ranking minority member had control over the minority staff. When
Perkins became chairman, the subcommittee chairmen hired their own
staffs, and the full committee chairman was responsible for the full commit-
tee staff. Perkins took advantage of his hiring powers to enlarge the inves-
tigative staff. Moreover, not only did he hire his own people, he hired
friends of his ranking committee colleagues—Frank Thompson, Jr., Edith
Green, John Dent, and James G. O'Hara, among others—sometimes
giving them preference over his own people.
Although Education and Labor subcommittee staffs were not guaran-
teed prior to Perkins's chairmanship, they were authorized in the commit-
tee rules beginning in the 87th Congress (1961-62). The 1961 rules provided
that the full committee chairman, in consultation with the subcommittee
chairmen, would assign the duties and responsibilities of members of the
staffs and delegate duties that he deemed appropriate. The ranking minor-
ity member had the same powers in regard to the minority staff, which was
allocated by the grace of a merciful majority, since there were no statutory
provisions for minority staff until the 1970 reform act. Although the
Republicans had full committee staff they had few, if any, subcommittee
employees throughout the Perkins years. It is difficult to tell from the
records with any degree of certainty.
Under Powell, if a member desired staff assistance not usually ren-
dered in the course of regular committee and subcommittee staff duties, he
had to appeal to the chairman for such assistance. After Powell's departure,
the committee rules for the 90th Congress (1967-68) borrowed a phrase
from existing House rules that declared that "staff members shall be
assigned to committee business and no other duties may be assigned to
them" (Committee Rules, 1967, rule 11). This rule was honored more in the
breach than in the observance, however. Under both Powell and Perkins,
committee staff frequently handled district matters, according to some staff
members (interviews).
By the end of the Perkins era, Education and Labor had a more
complex structural configuration than it had had when it was chaired by
Barden. It had more members, more subcommittees, and a larger staff. It
was infinitely more decentralized than it had been in Barden's day, relying
on subcommittees to a greater extent and allowing subcommittee chairmen
a greater degree of influence in committee operations. As a forerunner in
the decentralization of House committees, Education and Labor had in-
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stitutionalized its own decentralization. Formal committee rules had in-
creased in number, scope, and specificity and were followed more closely.
In general, the committee was more egalitarian. All these strictures and
developments had less impact on committee operations than might have
been expected. Perkins had championed the reforms that devolved author-
ity when Barden and Powell were chairmen and was able to manipulate
committee activities to his liking despite them. The result was a more
democratic, decentralized committee responding to its chairman's direc-
tion.
Jurisdiction, Work Load, and Function
The nature of the issues before Education and Labor changed during
Chairman Perkins's tenure, as did the mission of the committee. The
committee was no longer the bastion of innovation it had been in the early
and mid-1960s. Throughout most of the 1967-84 period, Education and
Labor was in a holding pattern. Budget cuts and a decreasingly salient
jurisdiction forced it to concentrate on protecting the gains made in the
Powell years.
The official jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Labor
remained largely the same as it had been under Powell. Nevertheless, new
issues expanded its scope and shifted its emphasis. The programs covered
within the vague issue areas delineated in the House rules changed in
concurrence with issues on the political agenda. Most of the emphasis
during the Perkins years was on education, although the major education
laws had been enacted in the mid-1960s after years of bitter controversy. By
the 1970s most of what Education and Labor did in education was by way
of amending and extending the 1960s programs. A few new areas did
emerge, however, such as day care, asbestos in schools, drug and alcohol
abuse prevention and education, immigrant and refugee education, boxer
safety, computer-related education, and, later, AIDS education. As far as
labor was concerned, attention was diverted from union issues toward the
formulation of job training programs for the disadvantaged. There were a
few issues new to the political agenda, such as public sector pension and
retirement plans legislation. The committee also dug deeper into occupa-
tional health and safety issues and manpower policies.
Education issues were prominent on the agenda at the outset of the
Perkins years because of the recently passed Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA, P.L. 89-10) and the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (P.L. 89-329). In the face of administration requests for large
budget cuts in social programs, including federal aid to education, in
Perkins's first year as chairman the committee authorized more than nine
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billion dollars to extend and amend ESEA in the largest school aid bill in
U.S. history (P.L. 90-247). The bill consolidated library and instructional
resources as well as innovation and support services programs under
ESEA. In addition, it extended aid to federally impacted areas and ex-
panded programs for the education of handicapped children. In other
legislation, members extended policies affecting higher education (P.L.
90-575) and vocational education (P.L. 90-576). In 1970 Congress enacted a
further extension of ESEA (P.L. 91-230), to the tune of $24.6 billion. The
program, which was overhauled and authorized again for four years in 1974
(P.L. 93-380), had expired but was kept intact by funding via a continuing
resolution. The revisions also consolidated several grant programs and gave
states more discretion over spending. They benefited poorer and more
rural states at the expense of wealthier urban states (Congress and the Nation,
4:383). In 1978, however, when the ESEA was amended and extended
again, Congress returned the emphasis to the urban, wealthier states, away
from the more rural South (P.L. 95-561).
The Education Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-318) responded to in-
creasingly vocal opposition to busing students to achieve racial integration
by restricting busing and allotting two billion dollars for desegregation
efforts. Several amendments to education legislation in subsequent years
contained antibusing provisions.
The committee considered a variety of solutions to the rising costs of
higher education—a 77-percent increase between 1966 and 1976 (Congress
and the Nation 5:665). Ultimately the Education Amendments of 1972
authorized nineteen billion dollars to aid higher education and other pro-
grams. As part of these amendments, Congress approved Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) to pay up to one-half the cost of higher
education for first-year college students. Congress also extended the higher
education programs in 1979. The 95th Congress defeated proposals for
tuition tax credits opposed by the Carter administration and approved
legislation expanding eligibility for BEOGs and decreasing the amount of
discretionary income required of qualifying families.
One major education measure escaped committee preview. The estab-
lishment of a cabinet-level Department of Education came under the aegis
of the House Committee on Government Operations instead of Education
and Labor.
With the coming of the 1980s, several other issues moved to the
forefront of the education agenda and consumed committee time. With the
rise of the New Right and the election of President Reagan, issues of prayer
in public schools and equal access to public school facilities by religious
groups resurfaced. Concurrently, questions of censorship of public school
textbooks (for "secular humanism") attracted attention. Questions con-
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tinued on funding for elementary and secondary education, higher educa-
tion, special education for the handicapped, and school lunch.
By the Perkins years, welfare and labor issues largely had been subju-
gated to education questions. Welfare concerns, a legacy of the Great
Society, received little sympathy from subsequent Republican administra-
tions. The influence of organized labor also declined {Congress and the Nation
2:618). With some notable exceptions, few significant labor laws were
enacted between 1967 and 1984. After Chairman Powell had pocketed the
situs picketing bill in 1966, thereby leading to its demise, Education and
Labor approved it again in 1967, but it never reached the floor. When
Congress finally passed a common site picketing bill in 1976 (H.Res. 5900),
President Ford vetoed it. The next year, with a Democratic administration,
Congress defeated a similar measure. It has yet to succeed.
Besides picketing at construction sites, organized labor largely con-
centrated its lobbying efforts on public service employment programs, ex-
tensions of unemployment compensation benefits, increased retirement
benefits, and increased minimum wage {Congress and the Nation 3:703).
President Nixon vetoed the committee's public service employment pro-
gram, although one was approved in 1974 (P.L. 93-567) and another during
the Carter administration (P.L. 95-44) to combat the recession. The com-
mittee was successful at getting Congress to increase the minimum wage
(P.L. 93-259).
In the early years of Perkins's chairmanship, two major committee
labor bills concerning worker protections were enacted: the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-173) and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA, P.L. 91-596). The mine safety act
established safety standards for coal mines and approved financial com-
pensation for victims of black lung disease (pneumoconiosis). The next
year, Congress established the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration to oversee a comprehensive job training safety program covering
fifty-five million industrial workers, farmers, and construction workers
engaged in interstate commerce. These two acts were amended and ex-
tended throughout the duration of the Perkins years and on into the late
1980s.
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, although Congress
amended and extended existing labor programs, it voted down other com-
mittee labor initiatives. In addition to legislation on picketing, the Senate
killed a proposal that would have made it easier for unions to organize.
Congress also defeated a measure that would have indexed minimum wage
to inflation.
Manpower and training issues received considerable attention be-
tween 1967 and 1984. At the outset of Perkins's chairmanship, questions
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arose about the continued reauthorization of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, which contained the poverty program. Despite pressures
resulting from Vietnam, inflation, and administrative problems to cut
back Great Society programs, Chairman Perkins successfully shepherded
the reauthorization through Congress in 1967. By the early 1980s, how-
ever, most of the poverty programs had been dismantled or cut back
severely (Peters 1982, 241). The few that remained were parceled out to
other agencies.
Largely as a result of high unemployment rates, and with a legacy of
programs aimed at creating jobs, the committee worked on a number of
other job training and employment opportunities bills throughout this pe-
riod. In a major development in 1973, Congress approved one of the most
controversial manpower acts since the WPA program of the 1930s—the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA, P.L.
93-203). This act incorporated a comprehensive approach to job training
and employment opportunities for the economically disadvantaged, the
unemployed, and the underemployed. After being criticized and amended
for several years, CETA was replaced by the 1982 Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPL, P.L. 97-300), which was aimed at preparing youths and
unskilled adults for entry into the labor force. JTPL also provided job
training for the economically disadvantaged or for those who faced other
barriers to employment {Summary of Major Legislative Action, 97th Cong.,
p. 16).
The committee was successful in efforts to amend black lung compen-
sation laws, the longshoremen's compensation act, and the Manpower
Development and Training Act several times. As part of the anti-poverty
drive, it created the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 197 3 (P.L. 93-113),
which gave statutory authority to the ACTION agency and included
VISTA, the domestic Peace Corps. The committee reported and Congress
approved the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974
(P.L. 93-567) to expand CETA. In addition, between 1967 and 1984,
members voted on public pension plan legislation, including the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA, P.L. 93-406) and the at-
tempted Public Employment Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability
Act.
Under Perkins's chairmanship, the committee's work load and success
rates increased, as measured by the number of hearings held in full commit-
tee and subcommittee, the number of bills reported to the House, the
number that passed the House, and the number enacted into public law (see
table 5.9). The number of hearings by both subcommittees and the full
committee rose. Part of the increase stemmed from the House's stepped-up
emphasis on oversight, which resulted in all subcommittees being charged
with oversight duties. The chairman's role perhaps was more important.
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Table 5.9. Bills Referred to Education and Labor, 1951-1984
Congress
82d
83d
84th
85th
86th
87th
88th
89th
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Number
referred
232
268
468
601
720
741
713
959
836
855
1,110
1,258
1,089
1,113
521
433
488
Number
reported
8
15
12
18
17
44
25
51
38
26
29
41
34
40
34
33
55
Number
passed HR
7
14
11
14
10
20"
14
32
33
24
28
36
27
37
25
17
43
Number
public laws
4
12
10
14
8
18
14
28
23
23b
19
33
17C
31
13
7
19
Source: Compiled from Committee on Fxlucation and Labor, Calendar 1951-84.
aIncludes six Senate bills.
b Three additional bills were enacted as part of the Elementary and Secondary Amendments of
1969 (P. L. 91-23).
cTwo additional bills were enacted as part of the Education Amendments of 1976 (P.L.
93-482).
Carl D. Perkins, an active and permissive chairman, contributed substan-
tially to the growth in hearings. In addition to scheduling regular hearings
in Washington, the chairman frequently held hearings in his own and other
members' districts. He also allowed other members to hold as many
hearings as they liked. The general increase in the importance of subcom-
mittees because of House and House Democratic Caucus reforms also may
have contributed to more hearings. Some subcommittee chairmen may
have been trying to carve a niche for themselves, a task that became easier
when subcommittees gained importance in the House. The fact that Chair-
man Perkins himself took a subcommittee beginning in the 93d Congress
(1973-74) accounted for the large jump in the percentage of subcommittee
hearings. He used his subcommittee rather than the full committee for his
forum, contrary to his predecessors.
While the committee was holding more hearings, it was producing
somewhat less legislation. The number of bills reported dropped off
slightly, from an average of 40 per term under Powell to 36.7 under
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Perkins. This decrease can be explained in part by the eroding salience of
the committee's jurisdiction under Perkins. By the time Perkins became
chairman, Vietnam had become the top priority at the expense of domestic
issues other than the economy. Another explanation for the decrease in the
number of bills reported lies in the increased emphasis and time put into
oversight.
Although the committee reported fewer bills per term under Perkins,
its success rates on the House floor were substantially higher. Nearly 82
percent of the bills reported by Education and Labor passed the House as
compared with the 55 percent that were approved under Powell. Once
these bills reached the Senate, however, they sometimes were blocked by
the difficulty of forging agreements with the Senate in a limited amount of
time. There were several presidential vetoes.
Chairman Perkins was a factor in the relatively high rates of success
the committee had between 1967 and 1984. Although by and large the
measures considered by the committee under Perkins were not as critical
as those handled during the Powell years, as chairman Perkins added
prestige to the committee because of his honesty and seriousness. Perkins
also worked diligently at building majorities for his bills. He was relentless
in his efforts to win House support for committee bills, particularly his
own. Committee concentration on amending and extending legislation en-
acted in the 1960s contributed to the higher number of bills passed and sub-
sequently enacted. Moreover, many of the bills were of smaller scope and
thus easier to pass.
On the whole, the Committee on Education and Labor's work load was
not substantially different from what it had been during the Powell years.
The flurry of activity increased, but the productivity, as measured by the
number of bills reported, decreased. The functional shift the committee
underwent during the Perkins years contributed to this change. An impor-
tant point to remember, nonetheless, is that the success rate of committee
bills on the House floor rose significantly, a development that can be
attributed in large part to Chairman Perkins.
Concurrent with a change in the chairmanship, the committee function
changed from spearheading presidential programs to maintaining earlier
accomplishments. Under Powell, the committee had been the administra-
tion's vehicle for a large part of its domestic agenda, which included the
War on Poverty programs and federal aid to education, two top priorities of
President Johnson. By the time Perkins became chairman in 1967, many of
the administration's programs were in place. Moreover, Vietnam had
bumped poverty off the top of the public agenda. Funds from human
resources programs were funneled to the war effort. In addition, the
economy was in sad shape. As a result, Republican administrations came to
power with objectives entirely different from the Great Society. They
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opposed large social welfare programs and set about to abolish them or
replace them with cash grants. Nixon's impoundment of funds from the
Office of Economic Opportunity overruled by the Supreme Court, is a
prime example. Moreover, the Republicans also had different ideas con-
cerning federal aid to education. Nixon favored a general revenue-sharing
approach to restore discretion over education spending to the states. In
addition, government spending was increasing, and efforts were under way
to balance the budget, cutting federal education and welfare spending in the
process.
Another factor in the functional shift of the committee was the declin-
ing power of its constituent interest groups. First and foremost, the decline
of organized labor in membership, political and financial clout, and salience
affected both labor and education. Unions had been heavy backers of
committee programs. With the loss in labor influence, education programs
were more vulnerable to attack, because labor had provided some of their
strongest supporters. The education establishment maintained its strength,
but it, too, met with resistance from the budget cutters.
As a result of the change in emphasis and concentration on budget
cutting, Education and Labor shifted from activity and innovation to a
holding pattern. A major goal of committee Democrats throughout the
Perkins years was to hold on to gains they had made in the 1960s. Republi-
cans, on the other hand, made large-scale efforts to cripple many of the
committee programs, such as school lunch, scholarships, guaranteed stu-
dent loans, and BEOGs. Chairman Perkins complained, "They're unrea-
sonably gouging the Education and Labor Committee and the people in
education and in labor. They've done so much harm" (interview). Although
authorizations for education programs were increasing, there were large
gaps between the amounts approved and the amounts appropriated. By
fiscal 1973, Congress appropriated less than four dollars for every ten
dollars it authorized {Congress and the Nation 4:384). To compensate for a
jurisdiction declining in salience and power, the committee, according to
the chairman, broadened its scope. It concentrated on issues new to the
political agenda.
The 1974 budget act put the committee at the mercy of the Budget
Committee and subsequent budget control acts, such as Gramm-Latta and
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Education and Labor, led by Chairman Per-
kins, fought tooth and toenail to maintain its programs intact, particularly
those in education. Members tried to keep secondary education, higher
education, and vocational education reasonably supported, and they inves-
tigated alternative sources of funding, such as tuition tax credits. They also
returned to race issues to deal with problems created by forced busing.
In sum, the committee's function under Perkins was to hold on to the
gains made in the early and mid-1960s. During the years that Perkins was
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chairman, committee concerns were no longer at the forefront of the public
agenda. Education and Labor continued to authorize large entitlement
programs but met resistance from the budget cutters. As a former staff
member lamented, "They keep trying to reinvent the wheel" by amending
and extending existing programs and trying to keep them financially sound
(interview).
The
Chairmanship of
Carl Perkins
The chairman of a congressional committee, within certain parameters
imposed by House and committee environments, makes a difference in the
behavior of his committee and in the outcome of the issues before it. This
expectation certainly was true of Chairman Carl Dewey Perkins (D-KY),
who had a unique impact on the operations and output of the Committee on
Education and Labor.
A Portrait of the Chairman
"Carl Dewey Perkins was up there next to God in the Seventh District of
Kentucky. He was a savior," according to one of his constituents who later
worked for him.1 He brought federal money, accompanied by jobs and
roads, to one of the poorest congressional districts in the country, in the far
reaches of Appalachia. After he died on August 3, 1984, between five and
six thousand people attended his funeral in the Knott County High School
gymnasium in Hindman, Kentucky, including a delegation of more than
one hundred members of Congress and five former Kentucky governors as
well as the sitting governor of the state. According to the Troublesome Creek
Times, "The funeral probably represented the largest single gathering of na-
tional figures in Kentucky's history" (Daley 1984). Admirers later erected a
statue to Perkins in Hindman and elected his son to fill his congressional
seat.
In explaining some of the adulation, one of his obituaries quoted a
highly placed official in the Johnson administration as saying, "It's safe to
say that Carl Perkins has gotten more Federal money for his district, on a
per capita basis, than any man on Capitol Hill" (Hunter 1984). Perkins
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helped millions of people, particularly the thousands of poor in eastern
Kentucky, through the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, and Vocational Education Act of 1963,
adult education programs, funding for libraries, black lung benefits for coal
miners, flood-control projects, free school lunches for poor children, and
other programs.
Born in 1912 on a farm near Hindman, Carl Perkins was the son of
Dora Calhoun Perkins and James Perkins. His father, a lawyer, who also
operated a livery stable, had come to Knott County from Grayson County,
Virginia, in about 1880 (Reeves 1977). Hindman was a remote town,
isolated by mountains. As a boy, Perkins earned money by taking a drove of
horses to the railroad station in Hazard to pick up the lawyers and judges
traveling the court circuit. For about $1.50 per person, he would guide
them up the Kentucky River valley, over the mountains, and back along
Troublesome Creek to Hindman.2
After attending the Hindman Settlement School and the county
schools, Perkins was a student at nearby Caney College, now Alice Lloyd
College, in Pippa Passes, Kentucky. After two years, he took a job teaching
school for about fifty dollars a month (Hunter 1984).3 He commuted on
horseback, traveling over the mountain instead of by the road, which was
twice as far (Glickman 1972, 2). For a time Perkins also attended Lees
Junior College in Jackson, Kentucky. He had a less than spectacular
academic record and never graduated from college.4 Later he graduated
from the Jefferson School of Law in Louisville.
Subsequently, Perkins held a number of public offices. In 1939 he
served an unexpired term as Commonwealth attorney. The next year he
was elected to the Kentucky General Assembly. Perkins served as the
Knott County attorney from 1941 to 1948, even during the time he served
in the U.S. Army in Europe. In 1948 Governor Earle Clements appointed
him counsel for the Kentucky Department of Highways.. Also that year
Perkins first won election to Congress.
Carl Perkins married Verna Johnson, and they moved to Washington
to be near Congress, although Perkins never called any place home but
Hindman. In 1954 Carl and Verna had their only son, Carl C., whom they
called Chris. When Carl Perkins died in 1984, Chris was elected to his
father's seat largely on the strength of the Perkins name, which was highly
revered in eastern Kentucky. He retired in 1992 after the legislature passed
a redistricting plan that pitted him against formidable GOP opposition.
Ultimately encompassing twenty-three counties in eastern Kentucky,
the Seventh District is largely a jumble of mountains and steep valleys,
except where it gentles out into a few counties in the state's famed Bluegrass
region. At the onset of Perkins's congressional service, roads were generally
poor, television was unknown, and radio stations were few and far be-
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tween. Outside the county seats telephone communication was marked less
by its presence than by its dearth. There was (and is) only one city of any
consequential size, Ashland, which had 29,000 people in 1970 and de-
clined to 27,064 in 1980. The Seventh District of Kentucky was and is one
of the poorest congressional districts in the United States. According to
the Ralph Nader Congress Project's research on Perkins, the 1968 average
per-capita income in the Seventh District was $1,332. This figure com-
pares with a statewide average of $2,614 and a nationwide average of
$3,159. The Nader Project described it as the "most thickly-populated
rural area in the country despite a ten percent population loss during the
60s" (Glickman 1972, 2).
The local economy depends on the coal industry, which was depressed
severely during most of Perkin's congressional service. Increased mecha-
nization of Kentucky mines and the ease of mining western coal, which was
less harmful environmentally, resulted in fewer jobs for coal miners.
Moreover, many companies increasingly relied on strip mining, which
requires fewer workers than does deep mining. As a consequence of these
factors and the dangers associated with mining, many miners abandoned
the Seventh District for promises of a better financial future in industrial
places like Akron, Flint, Toledo, and Detroit, where there were factory
jobs (Glickman 1972, 2; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1977, 326). Many
district residents also relied on tobacco farming for their income. In 1972
over half of the district's farms, more than thirty thousand of them, grew at
least some tobacco. In addition, livestock, petroleum refining, and primary
metal industries fueled the economy.
Also in 1972 about 80 percent of the residents lived in rural areas, and
70 percent were blue-collar workers, almost double the national average.
Blacks and foreign born composed only 2 percent of the district's popula-
tion (Glickman 1972). At one point, Committee on Education and Labor
staff members reported that school superintendents under federal pressure
to integrate their schools complained that there were not enough blacks to
go around to satisfy an order from the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.
The residents of the Seventh District traditionally have been Demo-
crats as a result of New Deal reforms and the influence of the United Mine
Workers (UMW). As of 1972, the voter registry listed 65 percent of the
voters as Democrats and 34 percent as Republicans. In Perkins's first
election, the Taft-Hartley Act was the major campaign issue. Perkins took
the side of the miners, although he did not have their union's endorsement.
He had, however, represented more than a few miners in workmen's
compensation cases. He won the election with 60.5 percent of the vote
(Glickman 1972, 2). In every election after that, the UMW was solidly
behind him. Despite the declining importance of the labor unions, the
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district remained largely Democratic and loyal to Carl Perkins, even after
his death.
Not only the miners in the Seventh District and in Kentucky, but
union members all over the United States considered themselves constitu-
ents of Carl Perkins. He had come along at the appropriate time to prevent
legislation abhorrent to organized labor from being reported from his
committee. He had been on the side of labor from the moment he entered
Congress in 1949 and was one of the few members involved in the House-
Senate Conference Committee on the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 who
would not sign the conference report. In the 1930s and 1940s mine owners
and UMW members fought bitterly over union wages and benefits, but the
struggle later was replaced by one between the mining industry, par-
ticularly strip mine operators, and environmentalists (Glickman 1972, 2).
The battle still rages in the 1990s. Strip mining became one of the major
issues of the district elections, and several groups antagonistic to strip
mining formed during the 1970s. Generally, environmentalists did not
support Perkins.
The education establishment supported Perkins, who, in turn, was one
of its biggest supporters. Before he was chairman, he gained its backing by
his work on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the
Vocational Education Act of 1963. The teachers' unions found good in
Perkins from both the educational and the union perspective. He was a
champion of teachers and of public education.
When he became chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor
in 1967, Carl Perkins came in contact with a broader, but not fundamen-
tally different, constituency. It consisted of the poor people of the nation,
the beneficiaries of the social welfare programs enacted with the help of the
committee in the 1960s. They lived all over the country, in large cities and
ghettos, in small towns, in rural areas. Thousands of these people—poor,
uneducated, unemployed, and unskilled—happened to live in the Seventh
District of Kentucky. Disadvantaged was the word used to describe them.
They made up his real constituency. Rather than regarding himself as an
advocate of the disadvantaged nationwide, as some perceived him to be,
Perkins was devoted to the people of the Seventh District, truly being one
of them himself. Throughout his congressional career, he fought tirelessly
for programs to improve the quality of life in this poor Appalachian region.
Although those who knew him well knew better, on the surface Perkins
appeared to many to be a fumbling, bumbling bumpkin who whistled
through his teeth when he talked.5 Tom Bethell described him in the Rural
Coalition newsletter as "a great, shuffling, bear of a man who has never
paid attention to changing fashion. . . .  He has enormous hands that look
as though they remember what manual labor was like. He doesn't televise
well, and he lacks the quick wit and glibness that today's politicians seem to
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need" (cited in Furguson 1984). One of the committee staff members wrote
to a constituent: "It has now been nearly 30 years since Carl came to
Washington. But it is as if he has been placed under a glass bell, for urban
life, Potomac Fever, or Congressional grandeur have never rubbed off on
him. He is still the same plain, unaffected, old-fashionedly polite Ken-
tuckian he was when he set foot in the place" (Reeves 1977).
Perkins did not join the Washington social scene. Frequently he did not
even tell his wife about generally coveted invitations to the White House
and to other affairs. Most people jump at the chance to dine at the White
House, but not Carl Perkins. One time when he and his wife, Verna, were
invited to the Johnson White House for dinner, the chairman asked a staff
member to "go down there and represent me." The last time he had gone,
"They didn't get supper on the table 'til after 10 o'clock." The women had
gone with Mrs. Johnson, and the men had sat and talked with the president,
who told one Sam Rayburn story after another. Perkins had not enjoyed the
previous occasion and did not relish a repeat performance (interview, staff).
Perkins had the reputation of being exceedingly honest. He earned
great respect among his colleagues for this trait. On one occasion, the
Kentucky AFL-CIO tried to present him with a color television as a token
of appreciation. He would not go near it. He did not want even the ap-
pearance of accepting gifts.6 He also paid for his personal telephone calls
made from his office and put postage on personal letters instead of relying
on the readily available congressional frank. Perhaps his caution in this
respect was heightened by the prison terms meted out to two of his eastern
Kentucky predecessors for financial malfeasance.7
A telling factor regarding his financial caution was his refusal to accept
campaign contributions from anyone, including his staff, for the greater
part of his congressional career. His campaign expenses were minimal and
came out of his own pocket. Beginning sometime in the Nixon administra-
tion, he began to accept a few contributions, albeit not large ones. By that
time it had dawned on him how much television air time cost and how many
stations he had to buy from to get his message to constituents in his district
(interviews, staff).
Perkins's district was such that he did not need to spend large amounts
of money campaigning for reelection. Mass media were limited in his rural,
mountainous district; thus political advertisements on radio or television
were minimally effective. He did buy some television time, but it was
expensive, and he did not consider it as efficient as some of his personal
campaign practices. Perkins spent time instead of money campaigning,
thereby negating the need for most financial contributions. He made the
long trip back to his district almost every weekend and traveled the territory
meeting with everyone he could. He went way back up in the "hollers" to
visit constituents and to see if they had any problems that he could help
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them solve. Perkins also worked long hours attending football games, horse
shows, fairs, and other social functions where he had maximum access to
large numbers of constituents. Years after he died, the Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly Report characterized Perkins as having a "blend of informal
'hillbilly' manners and deal-cutting skills" that made him "an influential
legislator unassailable at the polls" (January 25, 1992, p. 189).
Orientation of the Chairman
Since his rough edges never wore off and he never became a part of the
Washington establishment, Perkins truly was one of the people of the
Seventh District. They could have had no better representation in Con-
gress. Perkins was noted, both at home and throughout the country, for
aiding his district. There was no one able or willing to fight harder for the
benefits of his constituents, and they knew it. By his persistence and
maneuvering, he managed to gain a strategic position that could bring large
amounts of money to the poverty-stricken area of eastern Kentucky. As
chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, he had control over
legislation that targeted the underprivileged areas of the nation, and he used
his position to funnel funds to his own people.
Out of devotion to the people in his district, he worked hard for the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Vocational Educa-
tion Act of 1963, and the poverty program even before he became chair-
man. He made sure that the formulas were written to the benefit of his
constituents. These three programs directly improved the quality of life for
the people of the Seventh District. Between 1964 and 1968 Kentucky
received the fifth highest amount of War on Poverty funds in the country,
preceded only by the much larger states of California, New York, Texas,
and Illinois (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1969, 331).
Kentucky also received among the highest amounts of federal educa-
tion funding. It ranked fifth in the amount of higher education grants and
loans, seventh in Teacher Corps funds, ninth in elementary and secondary
education money, and thirteenth in vocational education financing (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1969, 134). Had Carl Perkins not been influential in
the creation of the formulas, Kentucky probably would have been way
down the list. It surpassed several much larger states whose cities alone
should have merited higher rankings. One committee member cited eastern
Kentucky as "the model for everything" (interview). Another said, "He let
run the labor side of the committee. As long as we started from the
Seventh District and worked from there in the education formulas. Give
Carl what he wants and cut the rest up" (interview). Another committee
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member referred to this aspect of Perkins's leadership as his "regional
agenda" (interview).
Perkins improved his standing at home and advanced his agenda by
routinely taking congressional delegations to his district for hearings. He
wanted his fellow members to see how badly his people needed help, and he
tried to make sure that all the new committee members went to Kentucky to
attend hearings on black lung. It was important to Perkins that members of
Congress understand the distress of his constituents suffering from the only
recently recognized disease. After one such trip to the Seventh District, one
committee member said, "If you ever had a doubt [about black lung
legislation], go into a drafty high school gymnasium. Hear the witnesses
talk and the people coughing in the audience. You'll come back supporting
it" (interview). In questioning a victim witness about black lung's ravages,
Perkins sometimes could be embarrassingly clinical. "Mr. ," he
would say in his country lawyer voice, "tell this committee what color you
spit up." The witness graphically would describe the product of his cough.
Perkins was satisfied, and the assembled committee was quite willing to let
it go (interview, staff). To accomplish his goal of getting other members to
his district, Perkins frequently held hearings in their districts. He also
made them look good to their hometown crowds.
Because of his success at bringing millions of dollars in federal money
to his district and his hands-on, personal contact with his constituents,
Perkins was highly regarded in Kentucky. His constituents respected him
for his persistence, his position, and his successes, and many loved him for
his down-home, personal concern for their welfare. He was reelected by
large margins every time after 1956. Few had the courage to oppose him in
the Democratic primary, and on several occasions no one filed, although
the Republicans always put up a candidate. His victories in the general
election were overwhelming.
Despite large electoral margins in his favor, however, he never felt
secure about his seat. He was afraid that he would be defeated, and he
worked tirelessly for the benefit of his district. In turn, his constituents
almost worshiped him. A staff writer for the Louisville Courier-Journal
described Perkins and the attitude of his constituents toward him: "Tough
and persistent but disarmingly gentle in manner, the wily Knott County
native had showered his mountain district with enough dams, social pro-
grams and constituent favors to rank, as one Eastern Kentuckian put it, 'just
about a half-notch below God'" (Brown 1988). One member who knew
Perkins well said that he had never seen anyone who could so diligently and
effectively protect his parochial interests while being a national legislator:
"Carl has a tremendous impact on his district. It makes the difference
between getting an education and not getting an education, and eating and
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not eating. They are the best-taken-care-of people from the congressional
standpoint that there ever were" (interview).
When Carl Perkins died, the members of Congress who went to the
mountains of eastern Kentucky to pay their respects and to see the Seventh
District of Kentucky were surprised at the extent of the pride and admira-
tion Seventh District denizens held for their congressman. More than one
member was overheard saying, "Now I understand."8 Other attendees
who had not visited the district for many years were amazed at the improve-
ments, particularly in the roads, that had been made.
Some people judged Carl Perkins to be liberal, and others judged him
to be conservative. The best indicator of Perkins's ideology is the benefits
that accrued to his district. He was regarded as a liberal because of his
wholehearted support of the social welfare programs of the 1960s aimed at
helping the poor and otherwise disadvantaged. He fought for federal aid to
education and on the side of organized labor—two liberal mainstays. And
he was one of the few southern Democrats to vote for the Civil Rights Act of
1964. He was a liberal in that he thought that government was meant to
help the people and the otherwise disadvantaged. One editorial writer
wrote, "The idea of government as a helping hand has never been more
embodied in one man than in Carl Perkins" (Furguson 1984).
He was regarded as conservative in other aspects. An Education and
Labor staff member who knew him well stated, "There really wasn't
anything liberal about Carl Perkins. He looked to his conservative southern
Democratic friends to tell him how to vote" on issues that were not under
his committee's jurisdiction (interview). His son, Chris, concurred: "My
father was basically very conservative, but he had a social agenda that
would be considered liberal. He believed in feeding and educating chil-
dren, in giving students the opportunity to attend college, and in taking
care of mothers and children. He believed in causes associated with human
need" (interview). Most of the chairman's best friends were among the
southern conservatives, such as William Natcher (D-KY). Perkins also took
the conservative position on some social issues, such as allowing students
who wished to congregate for religious purposes equal access to public
schools.
Chairman Perkins did not think "liberal" or "conservative" con-
sciously. He thought Seventh District. Being one of its people, he knew the
problems and did everything he could to help. One of his obituaries said,
"He wasted no time on futile arguments over whether legislation was liberal
or moderate or conservative—his only criterion was whether it was good
for the people. He was a resourceful, tireless and tenacious fighter for his
causes. Those causes were invariably the ones that were important to the
people of his beloved 7th District" (Reeves 1984). He worked for improved
health care, having known the critical need for it personally. He lost his
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only brother to peritonitis or appendicitis in about 1930 because no medical
facilities were nearby. Perkins himself had a brush with death when he was
young. His appendix burst, and "he was stiff as a board by the time they got
him to the little clinic at Ary for surgery" (Reeves 1977). His liberal attitude
toward government spending on health care was a result not of his philoso-
phy, but of his understanding of the needs of his constituents.
Vocational education was another of Perkins's favorite issues consid-
ered liberal by many. But in fact it resulted from his childhood classes in
manual training at the Hindman Settlement School and had little to do with
political philosophy except in its potential benefits for the people of the
Seventh District. He appreciated and saw the benefits of the manual skills
that vocational training could produce. He frequently mentioned someone
in Knott County or in Floyd County who was "one of the finest carpenters I
ever saw" (Reeves 1977). He put some of his interest into practice in his
sponsorship and support of the Vocational Education Act of 1963 (P.L.
88-210) and later the Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act (P.L.
98-524).
School lunch, or "feeding programs" as he called them, was another of
the chairman's favorite causes. One of his friends was quoted as saying:
"Literally millions of kids are getting fed every day because of him. Maybe
it would have happened without him, but he was the one who found the
handle to do it. He believed in getting something going, not just talking"
(quoted in Furguson 1984). To Perkins, ideology did not matter as long as
he could help the poor people of the Seventh District. The badly needed
roads, schools, training programs, flood-control projects, and miners' pro-
tections financed by massive amounts of federal money poured into his dis-
trict stand as monuments to the "ideology" and persistence of Carl Perkins.
In generally accepted surrogate measures of ideology, such as interest
group scores, Perkins generally ranked somewhere toward the liberal end
of the scale. He looked like a moderate in comparison with his committee
Democratic colleagues, however, despite generally reflecting the positions
of House Democrats (see table 6.1). On the other hand, the labor unions,
usually considered liberal, supported him wholeheartedly, as did education
groups. His scores on the labor scales indicate that he returned the favor
most of the time; they were always higher than the average House Demo-
cratic ratings. When he died, his overall labor support record was 89
percent favorable to organized labor. Out of a lifetime 320 votes considered
critical to AFL-CIO, Perkins voted "wrong" on only 35 roll calls ("Rep.
Carl Perkins Mourned" 1984). To show their respect when he died, the
miners put a black "miner's wreath" of mourning at the entrance to the
UMW headquarters in Washington ("Rep. Carl Perkins Mourned" 1984;
York 1984). This honor usually is reserved for victims of mine accidents or
for deceased UMW officials.
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Table 6.1. Perkins's Interest Group Ratings Compared with the Average Scores
of Other Members, 1967-1984
Group
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
ADA
COPE
COPE
COPE
COPE
COPE
COPE
AFL-CIO
AFL-CIO
AFL-CIO
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACA
ACARI
ACARI
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Perkins
62.7
40.0
50.5
51.8
59.0
42.5
57.0
65.0
71.5
100.0
76.5
95.8
100.0
93.5
79.8
74.6
88.7
93.2
18.0
19.5
26.2
16.7
20.0
19.0
21.7
27.6
21.0a
E & L Dems
80.9
78.0
73.0
73.2
71.7
61.6
70.7
76.0
79.7
96.5
94.3
73.0
93.2
88.2
83.4
81.2
90.6
90.8
4.8
14.0
16.2
15.4
16.5
18.8
17.4
15.0
14.8
HR Dems
56.3
51.7
51.5
55.1
58.5
50.3
57.3
64.1
70.4
69.9
71.5
72.6
77.6
74.3
69.3
65.7
79.2
77.8
25.9
32.4
34.0
27.8
28.9
31.5
26.7
29.2
26.7
Full E & L
55.4
54.3
53.2
54.4
55.6
49.2
53.6
56.8
57.6
67.2
68.9
63.4
66.9
69.5
65.4
58.7
62.2
62.7
33.5
34.7
37.5
33.9
33.2
34.9
38.8
37.6
35.8
Full HR
38.7
38.3
37.7
39.8
45.1
39.7
42.9
43.9
49.3
48.9
54.6
53.4
53.6
58.1
54.2
49.8
53.3
54.4
48.5
46.5
50.2
45.1
43.5
46.0
45.4
49.4
46.8
Sources: Scores for Perkins, and for all members in 1983-84, are from Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report 1967-85. Other than for Perkins, ratings from 1967 to 1982 are from
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
"Perkins died in August 1984 and was not rated by ACARI for that year. The score presented
is the 1983 score.
ACA scores, generally presumed to indicate the degree of conservatism
in a member's voting behavior, reflect a decidedly nonconservative bent to
Carl Perkins. Although he did not score in the top reaches of the more
liberal ADA scores, neither did he rate even moderate scores in the conser-
vative-oriented ACA rankings. According to ratings by this group, Perkins
voted the ACA position slightly more often than did his Democratic
committee colleagues, but less frequently than did the average House
Democrat.
Perkins's interest group scores bear out the assertion in his obituary
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Table 6.2. Perkins's Party-Unity Scores Compared with the Average Scores of
Other Members, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Perkins
89.0
83.0
81.0
83.0
83.0
82.0
83.8
72.3
86.2
E & L Dems
80.3
69.1
74.4
76.9
76.6
71.6
76.0
80.1
80.3
HR Dems
63.5
59.4
59.5
66.0
67.5
65.5
68.9
73.6
75.3
Full E & L
73.0
65.3
69.6
69.1
71.2
68.9
75.1
73.7
76.7
Full HR
65.9
60.2
62.6
66.1
68.2
67.0
69.9
72.7
74.4
Sources: Scores for Perkins, and for all members in 1983-84, are from Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1967-84. Other than for Perkins, ratings from 1967 to 1982 are from Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
cited above that he was not interested in whether an issue was considered
liberal, conservative, or moderate. He voted the best way he knew how to
benefit the Seventh District of Kentucky. Nevertheless, the bulk of the
legislation he supported, such as federal aid to education programs and
prolabor policies, generally was seen as liberal. He supported government
intervention to help the poor, particularly in eastern Kentucky, not the
minimal government favored by most conservatives.
Another aspect of the chairman's orientation is illustrated by compar-
ing his party-unity scores with those of his fellow committee members and
House members. As shown in table 6.2, with the exception of one term
(1981-82), when he was chairman Perkins voted more frequently with the
majority of Democrats on party votes than did the average committee
member. His scores were higher in all but that one instance than were the
averages of the scores of his fellow Education and Labor Democrats; they
had been since 1951, except when they were identical in 1955-56. In
addition, Perkins's scores were higher for every Congress between the 90th
and 98th except the 97th than were the averages of all House Democratic
scores. In all but the 97th Congress (1981-82), Perkins voted with the
Democrats against the Republicans on over 80 percent of the roll calls on
which a majority of Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans. In his
first term as chairman, he supported his party on nearly 90 percent of the
party votes.
By most standards, and compared with his predecessors, Perkins was a
loyal Democrat; he seldom voted against his party. Barden and Powell both
had relatively low party-unity scores. While chairman, Powell had voted
with the Democrats on just over half of the votes. Barden had averaged only
38 percent Democratic unity. Not only were there more party votes
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Table 6.3. Perkins's Support for Democratic on Committee Party Votes,
1967-1984
Congress Year
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Total
Percentage
of total
Party votes
(> 70%
opposition)
64
36
64
42
26
49
31
39
26
377
With
N
55
29
59
36
26
44
28
39
26
342
Dems
%
85.9
80.6
92.2
85.7
100.0
89.8
90.3
100.0
100.0
90.7
Party Votes
(> 50%
opposition)
75
43
95
52
39
68
41
44
32
489
With
N
58
33
84
39
39
54
37
43
32
419
Dems
%
77.3
76.7
88.4
75.0
100.0
79.4
90.2
97.7
100.0
85.7
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes, 1967-84.
between 1967 and 1984 (3,549), but Perkins showed higher rates of party
unity than did either predecessor, with an average of about 83 percent for
the entire period.
Therefore, both party-unity scores and interview data characterize
Perkins as a loyal Democrat. An examination of the chairman's voting
record in committee illustrates that his relatively high rates of support for
Democratic positions in fact did extend to his committee behavior. The
chairman's support of a majority of Democrats is shown in table 6.3 for
votes on which 70 percent of one party opposed at least 70 percent of the
other. His record of support for bare majority opposition is shown for
purposes of comparison. The data in this table show that Perkins, for the
most part, had a similar rate of party voting in committee and on the floor of
the House. When party votes at the 70-percent level are counted, Perkins
overwhelmingly supported his fellow Democrats against the Republicans.
His levels of support compare favorably with Powell's. Overall Perkins
voted with committee Democrats on about 91 percent of the party votes
(70-percent level), whereas Powell voted with his fellow party members on
about 94 percent.
Table 6.4 shows the extent of Perkins's support for the Democrats on
all committee votes, not just on those considered party votes. Most of the
time he voted with his party. He rarely opposed a majority of his fellow
Democrats. His low levels of support for the Republicans on party votes
(9 percent) bears out that assertion.
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Table 6.4. Perkins's Support for Democrats on All Committee Roll Calls,
1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Years
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Total
Mean
Percentage
of Total
Roll calls
99
61
132
91
69
108
53
55
49
717
With > 70%
Dems
(%)
76.8
78.7
72.7
76.9
81.2
72.2
84.9
96.4
85.7
80.6
78.7
With > 50%
Dems
(%)
80.8
80.3
90.9
82.4
89.9
83.3
92.5
96.4
98.0
88.3
87.3
Source: Author's calculations from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1967-84.
These statistics lead to the conclusion that Perkins was likely to support
the Democrats at the expense of the Republicans. On occasion he sup-
ported the minority, but not often. His floor behavior and his committee
behavior were similar. On committee party votes in three Congresses (94th,
97th, 98th), he did not side with the minority in a single instance.
Not only did the chairman vote frequently with the Democrats, but he
voted most often on the winning side. Such success is not surprising given
the Democrats' control of both the committee and the House and Perkins's
penchant to support Democrats. Table 6.5 illustrates his success record on
committee votes, an average of over 84 percent during the period he was
chairman. Perkins's average was slightly higher than Powell's winning
average on all committee votes.
Perhaps because he voted more often with the Democrats, Powell had a
slightly better record for winning on party votes. On party votes at the 70-
percent level, Powell was successful about 89 percent of the time, Perkins
on about 87 percent. Although he generally voted with the Democrats, a
few of Perkins's wins were at the Democrats' expense, although in no
discernible pattern. Powell, however, rarely voted with the Republicans on
party votes, and Perkins's casting his ballot with the minority more fre-
quently probably is reflected in his lower overall win rate on party votes.
Nevertheless, in several Congresses, Perkins won on over 90 percent of the
party votes. Perkins's success rates were high on his committee, more than
double those of Barden, albeit lower than Powell's. Perkins also served as
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Table 6.5. Perkins's Votes on the Winning Side in Committee, 1967-1984
Congress
90th
91st
92d
93d
94th
95th
96th
97th
98th
Total
Year
1967-68
1969-70
1971-72
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82
1983-84
Percentage
of total
Roll calls
99
61
132
91
69
108
53
55
49
717
Chair
N
85
54
97
77
58
91
48
52
44
605
Wins
%
85.9
88.5
73.5
84.6
84.1
84.3
90.6
94.5
89.8
84.4
Party votes*
64
36
64
42
26
49
31
39
26
377
Chair Wins
N
55
32
49
33
25
44
28
38
24
328
%
85.9
88.9
76.6
78.6
96.2
89.8
93.5
97.4
92.3
87.0
Source: Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1967-84.
*Party votes are defined as roll-call votes on which at least 40% of the Democrats opposed at
least 70% of the Republicans.
chairman nearly three times as long as Powell did, and the committee cast
over three times as many recorded votes (377 under Perkins to 125 under
Powell).
In sum, although his support for the Democrats was strong, Perkins
was oriented more toward his district than toward any particular party or
philosophy. He wanted to improve the lot of the people in the Seventh
District of Kentucky, where the state of the coal industry had left many
citizens destitute. Perkins was in a position to help and did so at every turn.
Although Perkins lived in Washington for thirty-five years, it never
seemed to rub off on him. The rough edges remained: he still walked and
talked like a mountain man from Kentucky. Behind that country facade lay
a clever man who knew how to get the most out of government for his
people. He also was expert at getting the most out of his colleagues. Many
people mistakenly thought that because he was unpolished he was stupid
and that they easily could take advantage of him. In turn, he ran rings
around them in the legislative arena. He ended up owning many of their
votes because of naive bargains they had made.
Perkins did not consider himself a liberal or a conservative but had good
friends in both camps and few enemies. He was a moderate compared with
most of his fellow committee members, although many outside the commit-
tee considered him a liberal because of his support for big-spending liberal
social welfare programs. He generally voted with the Democrats but
occasionally strayed to the minority side of the aisle.
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The Seventh District of Kentucky was the guiding force of this chair-
man of the Committee on Education and Labor. Everything he did re-
volved around his constituents. He did not take advantage of many of the
perquisites available to him because he did not want his people to think
badly of him. I Ie brought the weight of Congress to bear on improving the
conditions in eastern Kentucky. Benefits to other areas that had similar
problems were a by-product of Carl Perkins's efforts at helping his own.
The Seventh District of Kentucky defined Carl Perkins.
Leadership: Institutional versus Personal Resources
Each committee chairman reacts to constraints imposed by the committee,
the House, and external factors, by developing available institutional and
personal resources. As a consequence, the chairman has a unique impact on
the committee. In this study, the way a chairman led is inferred from the
way he tapped the resources at hand—the institutional prerogatives that
accrue by virtue of the office and whatever personal resources he may have
brought with him.
The parameters of acceptable behavior differ from committee to com-
mittee and have become more restrictive over the years. Education and
Labor was in the forefront in forging more stringent rules. Because of the
excesses of Barden and Powell, members had adopted a host of measures
designed to limit the institutional prerogatives of the chairman and to en-
able members to operate in his absence. Each of the two previous chairmen
had abused the behavioral expectations. In turn, each had been subject to
revolts of the majority membership, which imposed rules to curtail his
discretion. As their legatee, Perkins operated within a significantly more
constrained committee environment than had Barden and Powell. On
assuming the chairmanship, Perkins inherited fewer leadership resources
than did his predecessors and most other committee chairmen. Instead of
possessing a healthy reserve of official prerogatives, he had to rely on his
wits to get his way to a greater extent than did most of his fellow chairmen.
Writing about committees between 1955 and 1966, Fenno referred to
the chairmanship of this committee as "institutionally feeble" (1973, 287).
The abundance of rules adopted to hog-tie Powell in his last year as
chairman instead constrained Perkins, decentralized the committee struc-
ture and operations, and forced the chairman to resort to ways to exert his
influence that would not conflict with the committee rules—largely by way
of personal factors. Fortunately for Perkins's leadership, his goals coincided
with those of most of the majority members, thereby reducing the levels of
conflict. He was willing to play within the committee rules, and he agreed
with his majority committee colleagues on the direction that education and
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labor legislation ought to take; thus Perkins had few problems. Since he
cooperated with his colleagues and they with him, the committee was not
under sufficient stress to necessitate a third revolt to disarm the chairman.
Perkins employed what institutional resources he had, however, dif-
ferently than his predecessors had. This individualized resource deploy-
ment was reflected in his use of subcommittees, conduct of meetings and
hearings, influence over the committee agenda, treatment of the minority,
dispensation of rewards and sanctions, movement of legislation, and con-
trol over the budget.
Some chairmen strictly limited the use of subcommittees. For instance,
Ways and Means had no subcommittees for years, allowing the chairman to
have full control of all the legislation referred to the committee (Manley
1969). In Judiciary, Chairman Emanuel Celler (D-NY) often used his
discretionary power to avoid referring legislation to the appropriate sub-
committee, leaving bills to die without consideration (Schuck 1975, 48).
Although the Judiciary subcommittees determined their own jurisdictions,
Celler co-opted many bills that might have gone to other subcommittees,
directing them instead to his own (Schuck 1975, 51).
Perkins, on the other hand, had less discretion over the use of subcom-
mittees than did other chairmen. His authority over assignments had been
reduced to appointments to ad hoc subcommittees, since seniority dictated
who would serve on standing subcommittees. Also as required by the rules,
he duly assigned most Education and Labor bills to the requisite subcom-
mittee, whose members could determine how the bill would be treated. On
many occasions, however, the bills were not finally marked up in subcom-
mittee but reported back to the full committee for mark-up. If a significant
number of the members were interested in a bill, the mark-up was done the
first time in full committee to avoid marking up a bill in subcommittee and
again in full committee. Moreover, on several occasions, the full committee
discharged the bill from the subcommittee if members could not reach an
agreement on how to proceed. Perkins kept close tabs on what was going on
in his subcommittees and usually attended meetings when the chairmen
needed him for a quorum. Some major bills were kept for consideration by
the full committee.
In general, Perkins adopted a permissive stance toward subcommittee
operations. He allowed the subcommittees to hold whatever hearings
members wanted and, for the most part, to schedule them wherever they
wanted. In addition, he held all the full committee hearings that his
members requested. As one staff member said, "Perkins never turned
down a hearing in his life" (interview). He gave everyone's witnesses a
chance to speak, sometimes to the point that it seemed to both members and
staff that the hearings would never end. Perkins generally favored whatever
measures would help his members in their policy or reelection goals. He
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tried to keep his membership satisfied. The only thing he did not tolerate
was some other member's conducting an investigation or a hearing in the
Seventh District.
A former Education and Labor staff member characterized Perkins as a
floundering presiding officer: "He was so fumbling that everybody wanted
to help. It was the secret of his strength" (interview). He appeared to be so
helpless that members frequently came to his rescue, in the process giving
him what he wanted. Many people were uncomfortable watching a great
hulking man whistling through his teeth and blundering with the pro-
cedure. But as the chairman said, "I'm a pretty good feller for playin'
dumb" (interview).
In this respect, Perkins was a stark contrast to Adam Clayton Powell,
the master orator and preacher. Powell could run a meeting efficiently and
speak eloquently on just about any subject, even if he knew nothing about
it. Perkins, on the other hand, just bumbled along, sometimes running
roughshod over the rules for committee meetings and hearings. The reac-
tion of the other members was a shrug, a shake of the head, and a "Well,
that's just Perkins." He never appeared to be doing it on purpose. He acted
the same way at least once when he chaired a conference committee. When
asked what the impact would be of the House instructions to the conferees,
Perkins responded, "Well, we'll try to follow the spirit of it" (Gladieux and
Wolanin 1976, 192). According to many people, Powell had been an
excellent presiding officer. He had run the meetings efficiently and with a
sense of order, something that was an anathema to Perkins. A staff member
said, "Order was the antithesis of what Perkins was trying to do—get his
way. He succeeded by virtue of his awkwardness" (interview).
Committee chairmen must operate within certain boundaries of ac-
ceptable behavior imposed by the congressional environment; they have
little authority per se. They cannot control the decisions or actions of others
via commitments to organizational values and purposes. What little author-
ity chairmen do have over committee colleagues is circumscribed by demo-
cratic values dictating member equality and collegial decision making. The
chief institutional resource remaining to the chairman is the authority "to
arrange and order the consideration of business" (Cooper 1977, 147).
Nevertheless, for many reasons, Perkins had little direct control over
the committee agenda. His practice of referring bills to the appropriate
subcommittees and then letting the subcommittees decide which bills to
consider sapped his authority. For his first two terms as chairman, Perkins
did not chair a subcommittee. As a consequence, he kept major legislation
in the full committee to protect it. There were few serious objections to
such actions because he and the majority generally were in agreement. In
addition, if the chairman wanted a bill, few subcommittee chairmen were
willing to fight him for it.
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Although he could not control the agenda absolutely, Perkins exercised
his influence by concentrating the full committee efforts (or his own
subcommittee's) on legislation with potentially large impacts in his district.
Particularly in his early days in power when he was one of the few chairmen
to allow television cameras in his committee room, Perkins could command
national attention in this television-dependent society by granting access to
the media. He held numerous hearings and had the committee consider
bills that other chairmen might not have chosen. In these endeavors, he had
the full weight of the administration behind him when a Democrat was in
the White House.
Much of each administration's domestic legislative agenda came under
the jurisdiction of Education and Labor. With difficulties in the interna-
tional arena, the Johnson administration was eager to shift the public focus
to domestic issues. Perkins exploited the opportunities fully. A staff mem-
ber commented that it was a happy coincidence that Perkins was chairman
of such a committee when his type of poverty was in vogue (interview).
Perkins also headed the committee when its social programs were the target
of the budget-cutting ax of several Republican administrations. He affected
the agenda by drawing attention to the people who would be hurt if these
programs were cut back or eliminated.
Perkins's persistent efforts to obtain support for his programs shaped
the agenda as well. He brought national attention to coal mine safety by
holding lengthy televised hearings on coal mine disasters and black lung
disease that affected so many of his constituents. He repeatedly focused the
committee's efforts on the need for vocational education and school lunch
programs. As the first chairman to open committee mark-up sessions to the
media, he used their coverage to revitalize poverty issues. As he had done
when he was a subcommittee chairman considering the Youth Conserva-
tion Corps legislation in 1962, Perkins would hold hearings just to keep an
issue alive.
When Republicans won the White House and targeted programs under
the committee's jurisdiction for elimination or severe cutbacks, Perkins
fought tenaciously to keep them properly funded. He refused to let his
causes die, and the committee concentrated on bills that would improve the
lot of the disadvantaged, often when other issues were more salient. As
Perkins's son said, "He was an unrelenting type of force who would not
accept no for an answer. You could beat him, but you couldn't stop him"
(interview). A fellow committee member recalled Perkins's counting his
votes and saying, "We're not a-gonna let 'em do it."
The chairman's influence with the House leadership was a handy
agenda-shaping tool. His friendship with the Speaker as well as his mem-
bership in the establishment enabled him to collude with the leadership in
getting particular bills assigned to his committee or to others. If Perkins
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wanted a measure passed or killed, he went to the Speaker and asked that it
be referred to whichever committee was likely to do what he wanted with
it. That was not always his committee. Sometimes it was to his advantage
not to decide on a bill, although this situation did not occur frequently.
Such decisions might have been politically disadvantageous or divisive for
his committee or his district. Moreover, he traded these favors with other
chairmen.
Many members believe that the chairman is responsible for protecting
the committee's jurisdiction from impingement by other committees. Un-
less for some reason he wanted a bill to go somewhere else, Perkins fought
for his committee's turf with gusto, something not always done by Educa-
tion and Labor chairmen. According to a chairman of another committee,
Perkins could (and did) make a case that every bill with even a minor impact
on "his people" should be referred to Education and Labor. Frequently he
won.9 Perkins made essentially the same arguments for his constituents as
did a chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service who
stated that his committee ought to have jurisdiction over every bill affecting
a federal worker (interview). In effect, this attitude gave him license to
consider just about all the bills introduced in the House.
By and large, the committee agenda was imposed by forces external to
the committee. The chairman could and did influence the committee's
work, however, by strategic selection for consideration of issues important
to him. He commanded public attention by opening the committee to the
media, particularly to television news cameras, and by making people
aware of congressional actions and possible cutbacks in federal programs.
His persistence in pushing his programs helped design the committee
agenda. Moreover, although he did not pen the bills, Perkins significantly
molded legislation and the distribution formulas, largely to the benefit of
his constituents and others in similar circumstances.
According to the minority staff director of Education and Labor,
Perkins generally treated the minority generously. He gave them their own
budget and their own staff and worked cooperatively with them. While this
more equitable treatment was begun during the Powell years, Perkins
expanded it greatly. Majority members complained in many instances that
Perkins was too fair to the Republicans. He allowed them to ask all the
questions they wanted, let all their witnesses be heard, and gave them many
concessions. Majority members considered him too closely in cahoots with
ranking minority member Albert Quie (R-MN) on many occasions (inter-
views, members and staff).
Perkins was the first Education and Labor chairman to give the minor-
ity adequate funding and staff allowances. He saw no need to haggle with
the minority over nonpolicy matters as his predecessor had done. Under
Powell, one Republican had boarded himself into his office to protect the
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minority's office space (Jewell and Patterson 1966, 242-43, 254; Lewis
1963, 97-98;Fenno 1973, 87). Perkins, in contrast, gave the minority a large
portion of the committee perquisites.
Nevertheless, the Republicans did not regard him as fair all the time.
They often objected strenuously to his conduct of committee meetings
when he packed the witness list with people favorable to his cause and
forced the committee to listen (or at least to be present) for the duration of
their testimony. They also accused Perkins of fostering extreme par-
tisanship on occasion. Like many other members, he often manipulated the
questioning to his advantage. In the hearings on the funding reauthoriza-
tion for the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Representative William
Steiger (R-WI) was quoted as complaining that "Perkins led witnesses
'down the primrose path' in an attempt to prove the Nixon Administration
was bent on bombing the poverty war" (Edstrom 1969). A journalist
accused the chairman of bringing on "partisan wrangling" as the committee
opened hearings on the future of the antipoverty programs, saying, "He
attacked Republican committee members with zest, and they fought back"
(Burks 1969). One Democrat commenting on Barden's treatment of the
minority said, "When the battle lines were clear, he ran right over them. So
does Perkins" (interview, staff).
Under Perkins, Education and Labor continued to be one of the most
partisan committees on the Hill, but not nearly as partisan as it had been
under its previous chairman. Perkins manipulated the partisanship to his
advantage. On many occasions he contributed to the partisan atmosphere
by refusing to compromise on legislation affecting his district. He resented
the Republicans' trying to cut federal spending at the expense of his
constituents. By focusing so much attention on big social welfare programs
and their reauthorizations, he repeatedly alienated Republicans. On the
other hand, many of the Republicans who had been on the committee for
years had a stake in maintaining these policies too. Education and Labor
programs had been implemented in their districts and had created constitu-
encies and jobs. Consequently, it was hard for the Republicans to vote
against reauthorizations or to vote for funding cuts.
By and large, Perkins got along well with the minority members of the
committee. There were a few whom he thought were unduly nasty or
partisan, but he was friends with most of those who had been on the
committee for a while. Occasionally he looked to Republicans to tell him
how to vote on noncommittee matters.10
The chairmanship also offers influence in the form of control over
certain rewards and sanctions. The chairman has several tools at his dis-
posal, although not as critical as agenda control, including scheduling,
appointment powers, and authority over travel money and other per-
quisites. As John Manley noted, by themselves the rewards available for
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the chairman to dispense are of little significance, and some are even trivial,
"but cumulatively, they are of inestimable importance to the functioning of
the Committee" and to the chairman's place in it (1967, 136). They can be of
major importance to members as well, since they might generate favorable
publicity, constituency approval, or other desirable opportunities. By the
time Perkins became chairman, the institutional prerogatives that governed
his ability to dispense rewards and sanctions had been curtailed. Never-
theless, Perkins took advantage of other options that his predecessors had
not. He utilized his ability to help members in electoral campaigns and his
influence with the leadership and other committee chairmen.
With rare exceptions, Perkins used rewards almost to the exclusion of
sanctions. His son said, "He preferred the carrot to the stick" (interview).
This practice became standard operating procedure on Education and
Labor, although it did not apply to all committees.1' In part, his reliance on
rewards perhaps was the result of constraints imposed by the committee
rules that left him little authority to deny perquisites or positions of power
to committee members who did not go along with him. On the other hand,
it was not his nature to use sanctions. When someone had gone back on his
word to the chairman or had done something to displease him, Perkins
never retaliated, although he could have. On several occasions, members of
his staff encouraged him to strike back at some member for undercutting his
authority or for reneging on a promise. Perkins refused, realizing that he
might need that member's vote on legislation in the future, and opted not to
start a fight. He was not confrontational.
The scheduling authority provides the chairman with control over
certain rewards and penalties that members respect. If a member does not
comply with the chairman's wishes, there is the implicit threat that legisla-
tion important to that member will be left by the wayside or will be
scheduled at a time when passage is not likely. Implicit in the scheduling
power is the authority to choose when to refer bills to subcommittees,
which subcommittees to send them to, and when to take up legislation re-
ported back to the full committee.
On Education and Labor, the committee rules adopted in 1966 cur-
tailed both the timing of consideration and the referral aspects of the
chairman's scheduling power. For the most part, Perkins abided by the
stipulations requiring bills to be sent to the appropriate subcommittees,
whose jurisdictions were set out specifically in the rules. The rules also
required that the full committee consider bills reported by the subcommit-
tees in the order that they were reported. Few people, however, wanted to
challenge the chairman when he sought to rearrange the agenda. More-
over, he usually went along when other members wanted to change the
order of consideration. Consequently, the chairman retained his influence
over the order of bills taken up in committee as well as over favorable
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scheduling of committee bills in the House, a prerogative that never was
questioned.
Although the chairman's appointment powers also were constrained
by the rules, he still had some influence over subcommittee and conference
committee assignments. He was allowed to appoint members to ad hoc
subcommittees and extra members to conference committees. The rules
also did not specify the size of the conference delegations, leaving that up to
him to recommend to the Speaker. Perkins followed the committee rules
concerning various appointments, letting the majority members do the
appointing of subcommittees until the bidding system was imposed by the
House Democratic Caucus in 1973 in the 93d Congress. He also complied
with the committee rule directing the chairman to designate subcommittee
members as members of conference committees in order of seniority. He
used these appointments as a reward, exceeding the requirements by
appointing more members than was necessary. In many instances he
designated the entire subcommittee although he need have appointed only
the two or three most senior members. He remembered how he had felt
when he had worked hard on a bill and Barden had refused to appoint him
as a conferee: "It cuts you deep when you get yourself prepared and can't go
to conference" (interview). Perkins and the ranking minority member
always attended conferences.
As directed by the rules, Perkins also let the subcommittee chairmen
appoint their own staff members. And although Chairman Perkins retained
control over the appointment and duties of the full committee staff, he
allowed several committee members to put their own people on the full
committee staff. One member said: "The committee was enthusiastic about
having Perkins as chairman. He lets the subcommittees run. He holds a
tight, but proper, rein. He knows how to go about discipline.. . . Subcom-
mittee chairmen can hire whomever they want. Total freedom. And there
is greater full committee staff input under Perkins. He lets other members
be privy to selection of staff. Lots of committee chairmen give their
subcommittee chairmen problems when staffing their subcommittees—
likeTeague, Staggers, and Sullivan. Perkins never did" (interview). Repre-
sentatives Frank Thompson, Jr., James G. O'Hara, John Dent, Edith
Green, and William Lehman all chose full committee staff members,
including some of the chairman's top advisers. In addition, they decided
who would be on their subcommittee staffs. Perkins, however, generally
controlled most full committee staff appointments.
He also maintained control over staff activities. As chairman, Perkins
was the despair of the staff because staff titles on the organizational chart
remained something of a mystery to him. When he had something on his
mind, he unloaded on the first staff member who came into view. Once,
when he believed the staff was getting a little ahead of its authority under
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Chief Clerk Robert McCord, he declared, "Bob McCord thinks he's
a-gonna run that committee. But as long as I'm chief clerk, I'm a-gonna run
that committee" (interview, staff). The committee staff answered to the
chairman, although several had close ties to other members.
Perkins also used travel as a reward, although he did not withhold it as a
sanction, as he could have. He was not averse, however, to making people
sweat for it every once in a while. On one occasion, a new committee
Democrat voted against the budget resolutions from all the committees,
including Education and Labor. The next year, when he asked Perkins to
authorize the money for him to travel to the southwestern United States to
investigate Indian education, Perkins hesitated, saying, "I don't know. We
don't have a lot of money to work with." The member did not find out until
the last minute that Perkins had approved his travels (interview, member).
A staff member said that Perkins never turned down anyone's request for
money: "He never held up anything, but he did quarrel around with some
things wanted to do; he thought they were right at the edge of
propriety" (interview).
Another tool Perkins relied on as a reward was campaign assistance.
In many instances he traveled to a member's district, making campaign
speeches and talking to people. Moreover, although he accepted few cam-
paign contributions himself (and none for years), he was not above suggest-
ing to lobbyists that they might want to give money to a particular member.
He wrote letters to the teachers' unions in various places, urging them to
"help a great friend of education, Congressman ." He campaigned
for committee member Ike Andrews (D-NC), among others. Another
committee Democrat said that Perkins had gone to his district and "made
me look like the most brilliant man in Congress. The news media had
enough sound bites for three or four days of news. Perkins was very good to
his members" (interview). Perkins also contributed time to members who
were not on Education and Labor. He went to North Carolina to make
speeches in support of Governor Terry Sanford's campaign for the U.S.
Senate. He also provided campaign help to Andrew Jacobs, Jr., (D-IN) and
Robert Edgar (D-PA).
Committee chairmen usually go along with other chairmen (inter-
views, members and staff). As a member of the elite group of House
leaders, Perkins used his influence with other chairmen and with the House
leadership as a reward or as a method of banking political favors. Not
uncommonly, he would confer with the Speaker or some other House
leader on behalf of one of his members. He also helped his committee
members with their bills in other committees. He was glad to talk to Ways
and Means chairman Wilbur Mills or Appropriations chairman Jamie
Whitten or Appropriations subcommittee chairman Tom Bevill for the
benefit of an ally or a committee member. In addition, many other mem-
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bers owed him favors. Perkins had helped many members when he served
on the Committee on House Administration. Furthermore, he supported
other members' public works projects and appreciated their support for his.
Perkins refused to campaign against members who usually opposed
him. He was loyal to his committee members of both parties. He became
angry when an opponent of Representative Philip Crane, a committee
Republican from Illinois, came to his office and asked for support in his race
to unseat the incumbent. Perkins easily could have worked to undermine
Crane's support. Instead, according to a staff member, Crane's opponent
nearly ran from the office (interview). Perkins even took positive action to
help some of the Republican members of Education and Labor. He went to
one young member's district for hearings, and in front of his Democratic
opponent, a labor leader, Perkins told the audience, "You have sent a great
representative. He's very effective" (interview, member).
In sum, Perkins avoided sanctions. He was loyal to those members who
helped him and rarely punished those who crossed him. He used his
influence in the House to work for members' bills, he rewarded members
with travel money, and he campaigned for his friends. He used the few
official prerogatives available to him as chairman to help those who helped
him.
The chairman can facilitate or hinder the committee's business. Barden
had used every tactic available to prevent the enactment of liberal legisla-
tion. By his hands-off manner, Powell had facilitated the passage of many
of the Great Society social welfare programs that were on the agenda during
his tenure as chairman. He lacked, however, the stature in the House to be a
driving force. Perkins, on the other hand, did not just facilitate; he pushed.
And he pushed tirelessly. He fought for the programs that would help the
people of his district and other disadvantaged areas.
As chairman, Perkins wanted to get the legislation out of committee
and to the House with dispatch. One member compared him to the sausage
factory employee assigned to stuff the sausage into the casings: "The
chairman wanted to stuff as much legislation through the committee as
possible and move it on to the next stage" (interview). Although Perkins let
everyone have his say, he wasted little time in his efforts to grind out the
legislation and put it into the appropriate casing. Such actions greatly
affected the committee operations.
The conference on the Education Amendments of 1972 provides an
example of the chairman's leadership. More than anything, Perkins wanted
to emerge from the conference with a bill in hand. He was quoted by several
people as saying repeatedly, "We gotta get a bill." With his reputation
riding on whether a bill was reported or not, he brought his sausage-
stuffing mentality to bear on the conference. One of his staff members said:
"When Carl Perkins undertakes to do something, he generates phenomenal
psychological drive to get it done. This is his Baptist-Calvinist-Puritan
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ethic. He drives and drives and drives. If there are frustrations and road-
blocks, far from defeating him, they just energize him even more" (Gla-
dieux and Wolanin 1976, 170). When Perkins had the gavel in his hand, he
would not let members quit negotiating until an agreement was reached. A
staff member commented, "No one wants to adjourn the conference if the
chairman wants to forge ahead" (interview). The same held true for Educa-
tion and Labor meetings.
Perkins wielded the gavel power effectively. It allowed him to stop the
proceedings if he wished and to allow his constituents to testify on some
completely different issue (such as black lung, which was taken up in the
middle of education hearings because some of the chairman's constituents
showed up and wanted to talk). It also enabled him to keep members
negotiating at all hours of the night if he thought that was the best strategy.
He could wear down the opposition with his gavel and routinely did. The
gavel also proved useful to Perkins because it helped him structure the
issues. As presiding officer, he could set the course for the debate. He could
decide whether to proceed on a technical or a philosophical basis. He could
decide what to bring up first and what to skip. He used these assets
effectively to satisfy his legislative goals.
When Perkins assumed the chairmanship, he was subject to a spate of
committee rules concerning the budget. Even though the rules had been
enacted in the previous session, no budget had been adopted. Given the
abuses of the past chairman and some of his staff, Perkins was careful to
convey the appearance of propriety in all of his operations, particularly the
financial aspects. He hired one adviser to "come tell me where the money's
a-goin' to" and appointed another staff member to oversee the committee's
budget (interview, staff). The committee budget officer, Marian Wyman,
was so strict with the money that several members complained that she had
too much influence with the chairman over committee funds. Although
Perkins himself never withheld committee funds, his money manager
sometimes did. In effect, he had someone to do the dirty work for him. On
the other hand, Wyman's decisions were not based on punishment or on the
denial of rewards. When she denied a member's request, it usually was
because of a question of legality or propriety.12 Since Perkins always
supported her position on why she denied some member the funds he
requested, most members gave up asking him to overrule her. With Wy-
man in charge of the money, every penny was accounted for and docu-
mented. One member commented that "Marian Wyman was protective of
the chairman. Powell had run the committee so loosely. Perkins wanted a
tightly run committee, and he did it very well" (interview).
Some chairmen freely authorize their staff members to travel on com-
mittee business with the members. Perkins would have none of that. Few
Education and Labor staff members under Perkins went on the "junkets"
that other committee staff (and Powell's staff) had the opportunities to take,
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particularly the trips abroad. Nor did the chairman go himself. He did send
some of his top committee staff to investigate coal mine disasters or to
attend meetings where the committee needed to be represented. Most of
those trips were not of the glamorous variety.
Another aspect of the chairman's budgetary duties concerns allotments
for committee operations. Perkins commonly asked for two or three times
the amount he needed to run the committee and always received adequate
funds. The committee never was short of money toward the end of the
fiscal year. On other committees, such as Judiciary, the chairman had a
tight-fisted attitude and did not ask for funds sufficient to carry out the
committee's business. As a result, Judiciary did not have adequate staff
support for its work load (Schuck 1975, 53-54). Its chairman used his small
budget as a tool for failing to consider and thereby obstructing legislation he
opposed. Perkins did no such thing, always requesting money so that his
subcommittees could operate effectively and be adequately staffed.
Only occasionally does a chairman have to rely on manipulation of the
rules to achieve his goals within his committee. In anticipation of potential
rewards or sanctions, as well as for other reasons, most members will try to
find ways to accommodate him. More than one committee member said,
"Most members don't want to confront the chairman."13 He has the
resources, diminished though they may be, and the influence with other
members to make their lives easier or more difficult if they run up against
him too often. When forced to make a choice between voting his conscience
and voting with Perkins, one member said that he went to the doctor and
avoided the vote rather than opposing his committee chairman on the floor
(interview). Since many of the chairman's prerogatives had been stripped
by the 1966 rules enacted to control Adam Clayton Powell, Perkins had to
rely largely on unstated advantages often formulated as the occasion arose.
In general, the majority party members concurred in his exercise of infor-
mal institutional prerogatives.
The other major component of a chairman's leadership is his reliance
on personal resources, including his expertise on the rules and on the
subject matter, his reputation among his constituents and peers, and any
other personal traits or leanings that may affect how he operates the
committee. The chairman's reliance on personal resources interacts with
his reliance on institutional prerogatives to determine how he leads.
Expertise on rules and subject matter and reputation are elements of
leadership because they are among the tools with which people gain influ-
ence. Some members are considered leaders because of their knowledge or
their ability to manipulate the rules.14 This was not true of Chairman
Perkins. Although Perkins had more expertise on the committee rules than
most Education and Labor committee members, he rarely used this knowl-
edge for leadership purposes. He was more likely to employ his skill as a
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deal maker and his tenacity to achieve his ends than to outmaneuver his
opponents by manipulating the rules. On occasion, however, he was crafty
in designing parliamentary maneuvers to steer his legislation through the
House or conference committees.
Perkins also did not draw on a wellspring of knowledge about the
committee's subject matter as a source of leadership strength. His expertise
apparently was spotty. Over the years he came to know a good deal about
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title I in particular.
Title I concerned education for disadvantaged children, a great many of
whom were in his district. He did not know much about labor legislation,
with the possible exception of coal mine labor laws, and relied on his staff to
help him on labor issues. Several other committee members were perceived
as more expert than Perkins on education or on labor legislation. Edith
Green (D-OR) and John Brademas (D-IN) were regarded as more expert on
education matters, while Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-NJ) and John Dent
(D-PA) outshone him on knowledge of labor laws. Nevertheless, Perkins
was acknowledged as a near genius on the formulas that best would benefit
the Seventh District of Kentucky.
Although he was an attorney himself, Perkins did not write the legisla-
tion that bore his name. Much of the education legislation he sponsored
was prepared by his committee staff attorneys in collaboration with the
education lobbies, such as the National Education Association, the old
American Federation of Teachers, or the Association of Land-Grant Col-
leges. Labor legislation frequently came from the Department of Labor or
from Perkins's friends at AFL-CIO, who worked closely with committee
attorneys. Andrew Biemiller, the chief lobbyist for AFL-CIO, and Ken-
neth Young, Biemiller's second in command, had tremendous influence
with the chairman. Hartwell Reed, a committee attorney, wrote a large
part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and Donald
Baker, another committee attorney, was largely responsible for the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, the antipoverty program.
According to some of his staff members, Perkins paid little attention to
the details of legislation unless he could manipulate them to the benefit of
his constituents. He quickly lost interest in the details of a bill if he thought
they were not going to have any effect on his district or on Kentucky. On
what benefited his people, one of his colleagues referred to him as "a master
legislative mechanic" (interview, member).
Perkins had two distinct reputations among his peers in Congress. One
of his staff members described them aptly: "Among new members without
much exposure to him, he was thought of as a hayseed. Those who had
been around and had had their pockets picked two or three times by him
took him seriously" (interview). Some members considered him to be
stupid, a belief that worked to his advantage in most fields. Because of his
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mountain accent and his disheveled appearance, people who did not know
him frequently assumed him to be a polite but unsophisticated hillbilly. He
did nothing to change their attitudes. In fact, he worked to enhance this
reputation and laughed about it, saying, "The papers were a-wondering
whether I could handle the chairmanship" (interview).
Among veteran members and his friends, Perkins also had a reputation
of being honest; he was honest and gave the appearance of absolute integ-
rity. He also was regarded as politically astute in predicting political
developments. Even though members may not have liked what they heard,
when he told them what he thought politically, they knew it was the truth.
He would not steer someone in the wrong direction intentionally. Those
who knew him also considered the chairman to be crafty but reliable. He
earned this reputation by making deals with everyone he could and always
following through on his end of the agreement. Expressing a sentiment
echoed by many members and staff, a former employee said, "I don't
believe in the thirty-six years he was there that anybody could outscheme,
outmaneuver, or outdeal him" (interview).
One of the most pronounced aspects of his reputation among his peers
was his tenacity—particularly in getting money for his district. In compar-
ing him with Powell, one member said that the two were totally opposite.
He said that whereas Powell lacked persistence, "Perkins digs and digs and
digs and hangs in there" (interview). A former assistant to the chairman
remarked: "When it came to getting legislation passed, nobody was willing
to work as hard as Perkins. He didn't embarrass. He was willing to go back
time after time until it was easier to give in than to have an arm grabbed one
more time" (interview).
Late one afternoon, when Indianapolis mayor Richard Lugar came by
Perkins's office on his way to the airport and home, Perkins saw an
opportunity to get expert testimony on the reauthorization of the poverty
bill at hearings the next morning. Acting as though he did not hear Lugar's
repeated protests that he had important meetings scheduled, Perkins just
assumed the mayor would come. Unable to get his refusal accepted, Lugar
reluctantly appeared before the committee at nine o'clock the next morning
(interview, staff). When the poverty bill reauthorization had cleared the
House late one Friday night, Perkins called Senator Joseph Clark, chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, at 6:00 A.M. on
Saturday to say, "That little bill passed the House last night. Can you be
ready to go to conference at about nine o'clock this morning?" (interview,
staff).
Perkins also was widely known for getting everything he could for the
Seventh District of Kentucky. A New York Times obituary stated: "Even
before becoming chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, Mr.
Perkins gained the reputation in Congress of being highly adept at dipping
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into what is called the Federal 'pork barrel' to aid his 2 3-county district, one
of the poorest in the nation, gaining Federal money for a variety of projects"
(Hunter 1984).
Although Chairman Perkins's reputation among his peers was a useful
instrument of leadership on occasion, his manipulation of it in shaping an
image probably was more important. A reputation for honesty assures
colleagues. A reputation as an astute judge of politics generates confidence
in predictions. A reputation for following through on bargains makes
others more willing to trade. And a reputation for tenacity makes others less
willing to challenge leadership. Perkins's colleagues' view of him as a
possessor of all these qualities probably contributed to his ability to lead.
Perkins's canny political skills and sense of timing constituted an
outstanding characteristic of his leadership. He was renowned as one of the
greatest political bankers of the House, storing and trading political credit
with other members. He continually did favors and traded votes on a
variety of issues. Frequently he would trade a promise made to him by one
member to another member in exchange for another promise. When he
called in his chits, he generally had substantial support for his cause.
Perkins could be crafty in getting his legislation passed. When bills
important to him were scheduled for House consideration, the chairman
usually arranged with the Speaker to have a friend, often William Natcher
(D-KY), presiding over the House. When Perkins lacked the parliamentary
expertise himself, he could count on numerous friends for help in using or
manipulating the chamber rules to his advantage.
Two incidents aptly illustrate Perkins's political acumen. On one
occasion, one of his major bills had been amended and passed by the
Senate. Committee Republicans and others were waiting for it to be
reported back to the House so they could sabotage it. At a time early in the
day when the House was passing routine measures by unanimous consent,
Perkins arranged for his old friend Frank Albert Stubblefield (D-KY), a
renowned mumbler, to have the bill taken from the clerk's desk and passed.
With one of Perkins's friends acting as Speaker, Stubblefield stood up and
mumbled something intelligible only to the clerk, who had a copy of the
motion on his desk. Because no one could understand the motion, the bill
passed without objection. Later, when the chairman's staff members came
to warn Perkins that there would be trouble when his bill came up on the
floor, he grinned and said, "Oh, that already passed. I had Frank Albert
bring that up this morning" (interview, staff).
On another occasion, an important committee bill concerning formulas
for money to disadvantaged children had reached the conference stage.
Several House members and senators with large urban constituencies
formed alliances to manipulate the formulas so that their constituencies
would benefit most, at the expense of Kentucky's Seventh District and
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other districts like it. At about eleven o'clock at night, after the conference
had gone on for hours, the first vote on the matter was tied. Perkins asked
that the second vote be postponed because he had some other business to
do. He then rounded up Sam Gibbons (D-FL) and arranged for the Speaker
to appoint him to the conference. When Perkins returned to the conference
with the tie-breaking vote in tow, he announced, "Now we can have a vote
on this" (interview, member).
Perkins reportedly employed another shrewd tactic on more than one
occasion. When an Education and Labor bill was scheduled to come up in
the House on the consent calendar, Perkins looked around the floor for
members who were likely to object. When he found one, he rushed over to
him, put an arm around him, and physically "got right in his face" to
prevent the member from objecting (interview, member).
Along with his political shrewdness, Perkins also had an uncanny sense
of timing. He knew what would be acceptable and when to raise the issue.
His chairmanship of conference committees provides several examples. In
an understanding between the House and Senate committees with jurisdic-
tion over education and labor issues, conference committee chairmanship
alternated between the chambers on education and labor. By this arrange-
ment, the House chairman would preside over one labor bill, and the
Senate chairman would preside over the next labor bill to go to conference.
The same arrangement would hold for education. Part of Perkins's strategy
was to make sure that he presided over the conference that dealt with bills
important to him. If necessary, he would ensure that a minor bill would go
to conference ahead of his major bill so that his turn would come on House
bills.
When his turn came, Perkins exercised his political skills and sense of
timing effectively. The conference committee that considered the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 provides a striking example.15 At the beginning
of the conference, Perkins established the tone and the order of procedure
by starting on page 1 of the "Blue Books" instead of by focusing on the
widely known philosophical differences between the House and Senate
versions.16 By first addressing the bill line by line in a technical manner
instead of arguing about the big philosophical issues, Perkins facilitated
compromise instead of conflict. When members could not reach agreement
with relative ease, the chairman moved on to the next issue and saved the
controversies for later, thus avoiding deadlocks early in the process. By
working on the smaller differences first, members established a rapport
with one another. In addition, many members attended sporadically.
Perkins curried favor by arranging to consider issues important to them
when they found time to attend. Since by this time most people had in-
vested a considerable amount of time in the bill, they wanted to reach an ac-
ceptable compromise. They also had particular programs that they wanted
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to see approved. What is more, the ability to reach an acceptable compro-
mise on a major bill was a source of pride to many members.
Another episode from the same conference also illustrates Perkins's
political acumen. Shortly after the conference began, Edith Green (D-OR)
complained on the House floor that the Senate was "rolling" the House in
the conference. Her speech was tantamount to saying that Perkins was not
doing his job and was knuckling under to the Senate. The House then
instructed its conferees on the actions they should take, another insult to the
chairman. Green's implied criticisms and the resulting instructions led
Perkins to declare, "That God-damned lady is no gentleman!" (interviews,
staff). The next day Perkins brought up the issue of sex discrimination and
put Green, an emphatic advocate of women's rights, in an awkward posi-
tion because she had to fight against the stronger anti-sex discrimination
provisions in the Senate bill (Gladieux and Wolanin 1976, 170-71). Perkins
called on some of the anti-Green forces, notably Frank Thompson and John
Brademas, and garnered the support to "roll" Green. This episode was the
only specific instance that anyone interviewed for this study could remem-
ber of Perkins's retaliating for anyone's actions against him.
As chairman of Education and Labor, Perkins could decide when to
call votes. He always had his votes counted before he brought a proposal to
a vote or asked for a roll call. If he opposed something, he would order a roll
call to defeat it. One Republican member recalled a relatively minor
amendment that he had introduced one day in a mark-up session. Shortly
after he began his explanation of why he was offering such a proposal,
Perkins interrupted, "Will the gentleman yield?" Thinking that the chair-
man wanted to ask him a question, he yielded, whereupon, much to his
surprise, Perkins called for the yeas and nays on the amendment (interview,
member).
In a way, Perkins's strategy was similar to that of Chairman Barden,
who, according to Perkins, never called a meeting until he had the votes.
Perkins, however, made sure that he never thwarted the will of the major-
ity. He kept a little notebook with the vote tally in it. He would go to
different delegations and canvass his votes. He said that he held up bringing
the amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
to the floor until he had the votes to approve it. He said, "I was my own
whip. I relied on my own count. When we got in good shape, we moved
along" (interview).
Perkins's Leadership in Retrospect
Since the chairman's institutional prerogatives largely had been curtailed
by 1967, Carl Perkins had little choice but to rely primarily on his personal
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resources for the bulk of his leadership strength. His task was made easier
by the fact that he generally agreed with a majority of the majority party
and acted to preserve the members' trust, thereby precluding a revolt
similar to the ones both of his predecessors had endured. In spirit he played
by their rules, and for the most part, they did not challenge him.
Perkins's leadership can be characterized as strategic, calculating, and
manipulative. A former staff member described him as "strategically
scheming" (interview). He used his institutional and personal resources
selectively to enhance his attainment of goals. He was a driving force
behind committee legislation, particularly his own. His canny sense of
politics and timing and his colleagues' recognition of it enabled him to get
legislation adopted that otherwise might have failed.
All of this was accomplished by a man who often appeared to be
bungling and disorganized but who, at the same time, was wily and
sometimes brash. Many of his colleagues respected his honesty, his political
judgment, and his tenacity. Those who thought him to be a bumbling
farmer or a hayseed were ripe for his picking. In whichever light his
colleagues pictured him, Perkins took advantage of it. After listening to
Perkins bellow a campaign speech in a crowded stadium one night, a
reporter lamented: "That's the unspeakenest poor son of a bitch that ever
tried to speak" (William "Snooks" Crutcher, publisher of the Morehead
News, Morehead, Ky, 1955). Perkins went out of his way not to dissuade
anyone from this impression. He used it effectively and persuasively,
appearing to be so inept that people rushed to help him and to give in to
him. He took advantage of the wealth of opportunities this impression
afforded him. "Dumb like a fox" was a simile frequently used to describe
him.17 He used his gentlemanliness and country image to run rings around
those who considered him slow.
His strategic operation of the committee contributed to its integration.
He granted free rein to his subcommittee chairmen to work on legislation
important to them. Moreover, he supported them in their efforts. The
subcommittee chairmen were grateful for a minimum of interference from
the full committee chairman. He granted almost all the requests his mem-
bers made and let them do what they wanted as long as he was able to
achieve his goals. In committee meetings and in hearings, Perkins let
everyone voice an opinion. He believed that all members ought to have a
chance to be heard, although not all ideas deserved equal weight. He made
his members, particularly the minority, feel better by affording them a
hearing before the Democrats "rolled" them. Moreover, he called all the
hearings anyone wanted and let everyone's witnesses testify.
Having resented Chairman Barden's blocking techniques and Powell's
lack of concentration, Perkins found rewards a better strategy than sanc-
tions in eliciting support from his members. He chose to make resources
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available to members of the committee and to keep his members apprised of
what was going on in the areas under their jurisdiction. Some chairmen
keep the information to themselves; Perkins shared it with his colleagues.
He rarely used sanctions; in fact, other than the maneuver to retaliate for
Edith Green's criticism on the House floor, it was difficult to find an
example of his punishing anyone. Personally nonconfrontational, Perkins
often avoided controversy by delegating authority to staff members, in
particular to his budget officer, thus remaining on good terms with every-
one.
The chairman dealt with the committee members on a personal basis
rather than by relying on inspirational oratory to motivate them. He
concentrated his efforts on making individuals happy and beholden to him.
He did not hesitate to use his political prowess and influence with the
House leadership to advance his own agenda or to aid his committee
members on their legislation.
Although in one way Perkins's strategic leadership and his tendency to
accommodate members of both parties contributed to bipartisan committee
integration, in another way his generally pro-Democratic stances detracted
from it, enhancing committee partisanship. His continuous efforts on
behalf of his constituents usually led him to vote with the Democrats.
Nevertheless, in setting the tone for committee deliberations, he seemed to
be conciliatory to the minority, particularly on education issues. Labor
issues evoked more fundamental differences between the parties.
Perkins was a master of political bargaining. His political timing and
skills were unsurpassed. Although strongly partisan, on numerous occa-
sions he managed to elicit the support of minority committee members and
others who opposed his programs. He maneuvered to his advantage with-
out making enemies of his opponents. At the same time Perkins operated
with integrity and loyalty in his dealings with other members. A combina-
tion of integrity and political prowess made him one of the most effective
political bankers and bargainers in Congress.
When he took over as chairman of Education and Labor, most mem-
bers thought that neither the poverty program nor the elementary and
secondary education bill had a remote chance of being reauthorized. Per-
kins said, "I had to bring through those two bills to show I wasn't a weak
chairman" (interview). When the Economic Opportunity Act was under
consideration, Perkins went around to all the southerners and said, "Now
look here, I'm a southern chairman, and it would look like hell if I got beat
on my first time out as a chairman with a major bill." He managed to
persuade nearly all of them to help him. The Republicans were flab-
bergasted when the normally conservative southern Democrats lined up
behind Perkins. Even L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC), the conservtive chairman
of Armed Services, marched down the aisle to vote with Perkins. When the
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Republicans asked him why, he quipped, "It's a new coalition—southern
Democrats and northern Democrats" (interview, Perkins and staff). The
southern Democrats cast their ballots with the chairman on all of the
amendments, and when he had amassed the votes for passage of the re-
authorization, they voted against it on final passage, lest it be held against
them back home in their districts. Perkins had a better rapport with the
southerners after he became chairman than he had before, frequently
having referred to them privately in the past as "them Ku Kluxers" (inter-
views, staff). According to a former staff member, when Perkins became
chairman, he rose in stature in southern eyes. He had more influence in the
House and thereby more to trade. He also "played up his southernness to
the southern committee chairmen," an important element of House lead-
ership (interview, staff).
With the help of a few friends, Perkins also managed to get the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 reauthorized. The tide
of public opinion had turned against it by the time Perkins became chair-
man. He succeeded in getting it reauthorized by his doggedness and by his
reminders to his colleagues that "I'm talking about my little people down
there" (interviews, members and staff). A former committee staff member
said that after public opinion turned against the education program, "it was
the legislative know-how and the whining, begging, and pulling at elbows"
that led to the reauthorization of that bill (interview). Regarding his maneu-
vering on poverty legislation, Perkins said, "None of the rest of them could
have passed the Poverty Bill in 1967 when it came up for renewal" (inter-
view).
A hallmark of Perkins's leadership was his perseverance. It benefited
him on several pieces of legislation, including the elementary and second-
ary education and the poverty bills, which had poured money into his
district; these bills were tailor-made for districts like Kentucky's Seventh.
His persistence paid off time and again. It was one of his most successful
leadership resources. He just wore down the oppostion.
Largely on the basis of his personal resources, Perkins built a base of
political support so strong that he was nearly unbeatable. Most of the
younger members, as well as the old and influential friends he had accumu-
lated throughout the years, would have supported him. Despite the rules
imposed on him because of the abuses of his predecessors, Perkins managed
to operate effectively and to use his committee as a tool to facilitate social
programs aimed at helping the disadvantaged. A former staff member
noted that "on paper, they took away his power. But they knew that if they
wanted to fight him on the floor, they wouldn't have a chance in hell"
(interview).
Leadership and Development
on Education and Labor
The prevailing view of institutional leadership is that individual leaders
have minimal influence on the organizations they head and that organiza-
tions are shaped by their environments. To determine if this view is correct
as it relates to chairmen of congressional committees, this study examined
the leadership of three disparate chairmen—Graham Barden (1950-52,
1955-60), Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (1961-66), and Carl D. Perkins (1967-
84)—who headed the Committee on Education and Labor for most of its
existence. This study has demonstrated that as far as this committee and its
chairmen were concerned, the prevailing view was incorrect. As each
chairman conducted committee business in a markedly different manner,
he contributed to changes in committee operations and to alterations in
committee structure, function, and output. He helped shape the commit-
tee's metamorphosis to an extent not ordinarily attributed to chairmen in
studies of congressional committees or leadership. The influence of each,
along with other factors, made the committee a different organization at
various stages in its development. The study also showed that the commit-
tee developed in stages roughly equivalent to each chairman's tenure rather
than evolving smoothly.
The findings here do not suggest that a chairman's leadership is the
only factor in committee development or that the environment is unimpor-
tant. They highlight the impact of the chairman as committee leader, a
leader whose actions directly contribute to alterations in the committee.
What is more, each chairman generated changes not only in the committee
but in its environment—the House of Representatives.
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The Role of Committee Chairmen
The first question posed in the introduction dealt with the role of the
chairmen in shaping the structure, operations, function, and outputs of the
committee and the extent to which each chairman was a unique leader and
had a different impact. This study provides substantial evidence that the
chairman had an important influence on the committee. It also reveals that
each chairman exercised leadership differently. In reliance on institutional
prerogatives—use of subcommittees, management of committee meetings,
control over the agenda, treatment of the minority, employment of rewards
and sanctions—and dependence on personal resources, each made a dif-
ference. The result was dramatic change in the committee from Barden to
Powell to Perkins. The chairmen's impacts were not uniform, however;
each chairman did not have an effect of equal magnitude on the same
aspects of the committee as his fellows had. Because of his orientation and
leadership, modified by the environmental constraints under which he
operated, each left a unique imprint on the committee.
The degree of reliance on institutional prerogatives—those available
by virtue of a leadership postion—varied among the three chairmen and
progressively deteriorated. Barden had an abundance of formal resources
and made full use of them as chairman. In his early years he had seemingly
unlimited power over the committee. There were no written rules other
than those enacted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
Eventually, Barden's unwillingness to respond to members' concerns re-
sulted in his institutionally derived prerogatives being taken away from him
by an angry majority.
Powell, to whom a little of the discretion (over bill referral) was
restored, used his institutional prerogatives in a positive manner for most of
his tenure, facilitating the passage of the Great Society legislation. Late in
his service, however, when the House refused to act to his satisfaction on
antidiscrimination measures (and on his committee operating budget), he
began using his chairman's authority against the committee majority and
against the House. The committee reacted by removing those resources
from the hands of the chairman. The House reacted by stripping him of his
seniority and, thus, his chairmanship. When Perkins succeeded Powell
shortly thereafter, he was left with few formal prerogatives and relied on
them to a substantially lesser extent than did his predecessors.
In Education and Labor, each chairman's conduct made a substantial
difference in the formal resources available to successive chairmen. Such
developments emphasize not only the importance of a leader's personal
attributes but the necessity of maintaining majority support. They could
serve as a lesson for present and future chairmen who may be tempted to
ignore their fellow committee members.
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The three chairmen employed subcommittees to varying degrees, but
in general, the use of subcommittees increased over time. Barden relied
little on subcommittees. Until the committee revolted in 1957 and adopted
written rules, there were no standing subcommittees, only ad hoc units.
Most of the committee's work was done in full committee, where Barden
could watch over it closely. He called few meetings, appointed few sub-
committees, and referred little legislation to those he did appoint.
When Powell took the chair, the committee relaxed controls it had
imposed on Barden. Although the rules maintained the standing subcom-
mittees, provisions were deleted that specified subcommittee jurisdictions
and required that bills be referred to the appropriate subcommittee. Con-
trary to the actions of his predecessor, Powell relied on the subcommittees
fully. For the most part, he referred bills to the subcommittees where their
sponsors or promoters served. He also established some ad hoc subcommit-
tees and chaired a few dealing with issues of particular interest to him, such
as de facto school segregation. In addition, he chaired the Subcommittee on
the War on Poverty Program, which considered the major domestic legisla-
tion of the 88th Congress (1963-64) and let other members chair subcom-
mittees of special interest to them.
Perkins had little discretion over whether he used subcommittees. By
the time he became chairman, rules mandating the use of subcommittees
were in place. Because of the actions of his predecessors, he was required to
refer all bills to the appropriate subcommittees, whose jurisdictions were
defined in the rules. He had to take up bills in the full committee in the
order in which they were reported. Although he generally followed these
stipulations, for the first few terms Perkins kept some of the major legisla-
tion at the full committee level, effectively using the full committee as his
subcommittee. There were few outright objections to this practice, because
Perkins did not chair a subcommittee himself and all members could par-
ticipate in the full committee mark-ups. Moreover, few members wanted to
challenge the chairman. Because of his general agreement with the major-
ity, he was able to exercise substantial influence inside and outside the
committee. Even without the formal authority granted to an earlier chair-
man, Perkins skillfully used his personal resources to influence committee
operations. His actions illustrate that personality and leadership often can
overcome formal requirements without detrimental consequences to the
leader's influence.
Nowhere is the difference among the three chairmen more apparent
than in their convening, attending, and conducting sessions of the commit-
tee. Perkins differed from his predecessors by attending and voting at
regularly scheduled committee meetings. He was absent occasionally, but
absence was not the norm as it had been under Barden and Powell. Barden
had absented himself regularly so members could not have meetings,
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resulting in the adoption of committee rules requiring regularly scheduled
sessions. Nevertheless, when Powell became chairman, he missed many of
the meetings that were held.
As presiding officers, the three chairmen also differed markedly. Ac-
cording to members and staff, Powell was an excellent presiding officer.
He was smooth and articulate. He moved things along and tolerated no
dilatory tactics from his members. He was not always fair to the minority,
but even they admitted that he presided over meetings and hearings effec-
tively. Barden, too, used his prerogatives as presiding officer skillfully,
although less frequently. He tailored the situation so that it usually came
out to his benefit. He stacked the witness lists at hearings and manipulated
the time that witnesses had to speak. He managed to have little time to hear
the opposition. In other instances, he recognized his allies and used other
dilatory tactics to prevent his opponents from bringing up legislation.
According to members and staff, Perkins also could be an effective presid-
ing officer at times, but often he appeared to be fumbling. Generally, he
enforced the five-minute rule; however, if a member wanted to speak on a
subject for longer than the allotted five minutes, he could arrange with the
chairman to do so.
Barden's unwillingness to call regular meetings and his biased conduct
of what sessions there were frustrated members, thwarting their expecta-
tions of participation. It diminished their influence in the policy process,
possibly depriving them of the opportunity for taking credit for programs at
election time. Consequently, they reacted by depriving Barden of control
over the scheduling of meetings, a deprivation that constrained future
chairmen. Powell's absences undermined his leadership. After a while
members adopted rules enabling them to proceed without him. In contrast,
Perkins's faithfulness enhanced his reputation for reliability. Members
possibly felt less need to circumvent him on committee matters since he
demonstrated commitment to committee goals. Moreover, his willingness
as presiding officer to accommodate members increased his capacity to
bargain.
Even after the rules substantially diminished the chairman's authority,
all three chairmen managed to find ways to exert their influence over the
agenda. Previously, Barden had had complete control over what the com-
mittee considered. He decided which bills the committee would take up,
which he would refer to subcommittees, and which would languish un-
touched. After the committee rules were adopted, Barden's authority
declined, but he still managed to decide which bills would get favorable
treatment. He created ad hoc subcommittees for particular legislation, such
as the joint subcommittee on labor reform legislation established to keep
labor ally Carl Perkins from having complete jurisdiction over it. Barden
also decided which bills the full committee would consider after the sub-
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committees had reported the legislation. Moreover, he determined the
timing of bills sent to the House. He still had friends on the Rules
Committee who were more than willing to accommodate him.
Powell managed the agenda to some extent because of his broad
discretion over bill referrals. He could keep the ones he wanted in the full
committee and direct the others to subcommittees. In addition, he could
establish ad hoc units to consider particular items. At the same time, the
administration's interest in Education and Labor programs overshadowed
Powell's discretion somewhat. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson pres-
sured him to move their legislation forward. Ultimately, in his third term
as chairman, Powell exercised control over the agenda by holding some
legislation hostage until certain conditions were met. Sometimes these
conditions included the enactment of other legislation by the House and
by the Senate.
As a consequence of the actions of his two predecessors, Perkins had
less control over the committee's agenda via his institutional prerogatives.
But he too managed to maintain a substantial amount of influence over it.
Until he took a subcommittee in the 93d Congress (1973-74), he kept much
of the important legislation at the full committee level—to protect rather
than to defeat it. Beginning in 1973 he assumed the chairmanship of a
subcommittee that considered much of the most important legislation and
was the most active. Perkins also influenced the agenda by bringing public
attention to the committee's bills or deliberations. He allowed the media
into mark-up sessions in 1967 and was one of the few chairmen to permit
such access prior to the House reforms of the 1970s. He also molded the
agenda by holding numerous hearings on issues important to his constitu-
ents and by allowing other members to do the same. Perkins used his
influence with the leadership as another agenda-shaping tool. He often
argued effectively that certain bills should be referred to Educaton and
Labor, particularly after the advent of split, sequential, and multiple
referral. He diligently protected his committee's turf.
The behavior of these three chairmen illustrates the ability of leaders to
employ personal skills to advance particular aspects of an organization's
agenda. In his own way, each chairman shaped the committee's agenda at
one of its three stages.
Another aspect of the chairman's leadership is reflected in his treat-
ment of the minority. Barden had been allied closely with the minority. For
the most part, he treated the Republicans better than he did the Democrats,
although he disparaged their ability to run the government. But since they
agreed with him concerning labor and several aspects of federal aid to
education, he was inclined to make deals with them for support of his
positions. Barden voted with the Republicans more often than he did with
his own party.
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Powell, on the other hand, paid little heed to the minority. He gave
them staff allowances but evicted them from their committee offices (Fenno
1973; Lewis 1963; interviews). In the 88th Congress he locked the minority
members out of the committee room while the Democrats marked up the
poverty bill. He rarely voted with the Republicans against the majority
members.
Perkins accommodated the minority more than Powell did. According
to minority members and staff, Perkins treated them fairly. He went out of
his way to let everyone be heard, although it may not have made a
difference in the outcome. An examination of the rules shows that he may
have been too fair for the tastes of the majority. Members adopted a rule
requiring him to recognize two Democrats for every one Republican to
question hearing witnesses. Also, Perkins counted a few committee Repub-
licans among his good friends. He even voted with them occasionally.
The three chairmen of Education and Labor between 1951 and 1984
differed dramatically in their dispensation of rewards and sanctions. Of the
three chairmen, Barden, who had the most formal powers at his disposal,
relied the least on rewards. Every once in a while he favored his allies with
the sponsorship of important legislation. The Landrum-Griffin Act, for
which two junior colleagues (one Democrat and one Republican) got credit
for sponsorship, is the prime example. Occasionally he appointed his
friends to subcommittee chairmanships. During one session, Cleveland
Bailey (D-WV) chaired three subcommittees, and Carl Elliott (D-AL)
headed two.
Powell's position was such that he had to rely on rewards to get what he
wanted. One of his tactics was to use bill sponsorship as a basis and as a
reward for support. He had made enough enemies during his years in the
House that his name on a bill was tantamount to poison. By letting the more
junior members have their names on major legislation, he looked mag-
nanimous at no personal cost.
Perkins adopted rewards as a leadership strategy with regularity. In
addition, he used a different variety of rewards from his predecessors. He
had few subcommittee chairs to give away, so he had to find something else.
He employed many tactics to achieve his goals: scheduling bill considera-
tion at the most propitious time; distributing travel funds generously;
appointing to a conference committee all members of the subcommittee
concerned rather than just a few senior members; appointing other majority
members' patronage to the full committee staff, sometimes in senior posi-
tions; sharing information so that all members looked good to their col-
leagues as well as to their constituents; and providing campaign assistance
to members, sometimes even to the minority, by appearing in their districts
and directing contributions their way. Perkins used any legal and honest
means that he could think of to help his fellow members (interview, staff).
Leadership and Development 219
Barden's use of sanctions consisted mainly of withholding rewards.
The most notable example was his refusal to appoint his second-ranking
member, Powell, to a subcommittee chairmanship to which his seniority
entitled him. Nor would he allow Powell to speak in committee meetings
and hearings on a number of occasions. He skipped Powell and recognized
third-ranking Cleveland Bailey and others (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 184).
Barden also withheld travel vouchers as sanctions, although he is said to
have given Powell all the vouchers he wanted so he would go away.
Powell, too, used sanctions. A principal one related to bill referral.
Although he reportedly offered Phil Landrum a subcommittee chairman-
ship, Landrum declined because of a well-founded belief that it was un-
likely that any significant legislation would have been referred to him
(Lewis 1963, 94). Powell also used his discretion over bill referral to assign
bills without regard to tradition or interest despite an understanding with
his members that he would refer legislation to the sponsor's or the pro-
moter's subcommittee. Moreover, knowing the difficulties of securing a
rule for Education and Labor bills, he manipulated the scheduling of
legislation to be reported (interview, staff).
Perkins relied on rewards and incentives largely to the exclusion of
sanctions. Part of this emphasis on favors may have resulted from con-
straints placed on his ability to use sanctions or to deny perquisites. On the
other hand, it was not in his nature to punish. He rarely used sanctions
when he had the opportunity, not wanting to jeopardize future alliances.
In sum, the three chairmen's reliance on institutional resources varied
markedly. Barden, who had the most tools, used them, for the most part, in
a negative manner. Powell, who had fewer tools but increased discretion
over bill referral, also used some of his authority in a negative manner,
although on the whole he facilitated the passage of legislation. Perkins, who
had the fewest institutional prerogatives, relied on other means to accom-
plish his goals. Barden worked against the system. Powell let the system
work itself for a while and then worked against the system. Perkins worked
through the system.
Galloway referred to committee chairmen as "lord proprietors" (1953a,
289), and Smith and Deering termed the period between 1947 and 1964 as
"the era of strong committee chairs" (1984). Both Barden and Powell fit
these classifications. Because the rules placed fewer constraints on them,
they relied on the institutional resources available to chairmen to a much
greater extent than Perkins was able to do later. Perkins, however, was
effective because of his superior strategic use of personal resources.
Froman (1967), Hinckley (1971), and Smith and Deering (1984) con-
tended that a chairman's views usually correspond with those of his major-
ity members, thereby negating the need to resort to "strong-arm tactics"
(Smith and Deering, 1984, 27). Barden deviated in this respect; he did not
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agree with his majority much of the time, particularly after the Speaker had
liberalized the committee, and he persisted in "strong-arm tactics." When
Barden's almost exclusive reliance on institutional prerogatives put him on
a collision course with his committee majority, members rebelled, adopting
rules limiting his institutional prerogatives. He maintained his effectiveness
by relying on his personal reserve of political prowess and a bountiful
supply of conservative friends, such as Carl Elliott (D-AL) and Rules
Committee chairman Howard W. Smith (D-VA). On the rare occasion
when Barden could not prevent his committee from reporting a bill, he
looked to his friends on other committees, notably Rules, to block it. He
would ask the Committee on Rules not to issue a rule or, if it did, to allow an
open rule permitting unlimited floor amendments. Still, until the last two
terms of his chairmanship, he relied heavily on institutional resources.
When Powell took the chair, he was saddled with most of the con-
straints the committee had placed on Barden, although he had discretion
over the referral of bills. His abuse of his formal powers led to his downfall.
Had he not been stripped of his chairmanship or barred from his seat, he too
would have had to look to his personal resources for help. But in some ways,
partly because of racial prejudice against him, Powell had fewer personal
resources at his disposal than did Barden and Perkins. He had few friends to
help him among House members, and he had been deprived of some of his
patronage and office space because of his support for Eisenhower in the
1956 elections (Hickey and Edwin 1965, 136). Moreover, he had not built a
reputation for himself based on diligence and knowledge of the subject
matter, thus diminishing his effectiveness. Additional detracting factors
were his penchant for accusing his opponents of being racist and for
injecting race into every issue. On the other hand, his considerable personal
attractiveness and magnetism, his ability to think on his feet, and his
oratorical skills worked in his favor.
Perkins took the chair under Powell's legacy—an "institutionally
weak" chairmanship (Fenno 1973, 288). Most of the official prerogatives
had gone down the drain with Powell. Perkins had little choice but to rely
on personal resources, which included his reputation for honesty, tenacity,
and political acumen and his de facto honesty, tenacity, influence, and
political acumen. Although he held the chair more than twice as long as
each of his predecessors, he had few problems because he generally agreed
with the committee majority.
Perhaps not realizing what a wily chairman they would have and seeing
that he would not fight them, the members responsible earlier for initiating
the rules changes may have thought that they could manipulate Perkins and
have the committee operate to their advantage. He appeared to let them
have the run of the committee, as long as he accrued as many benefits as
possible for his district. Several of these members acknowledged that
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Perkins substantially influenced the legislation reported from subcommit-
tees. They noted later that unlike Powell, Perkins had his fingerprints on
almost all the legislation that came out of Education and Labor during his
chairmanship (interviews).
At the onset of his chairmanship in 1967, many members underesti-
mated him, an opinion that Perkins turned into a political asset. They did
not consider him sophisticated enough to handle the leadership of such an
important committee (Barnes 1984).l Some thought he was stupid and then
had the misfortune of finding out the truth about Carl Perkins. Part of his
strength was that his foes thought they were smarter than he was. One
Kentuckian who had frequent dealings with Perkins for many years said,
"The political graveyards of East Kentucky are full of people who thought
they were smarter than Carl Perkins."2 Several members of Congress
found themselves inadvertently in his debt because they had underesti-
mated him. Among those who knew him, he had a reputation for being wily
and crafty. One former committee member said, "When you talk to Carl,
check for your wristwatch. He'll have it. Your wallet, too. He's good at
legislating" (interview). Another member was quoted as saying, "When
you get into a conference with Carl Perkins, you may end up not having any
furniture in your office. He is awesome" (in Fenno 1989).
Although the institutional resources largely were gone, Perkins main-
tained considerable respect. He still had influence with other chairmen and
with the leadership, and he continued to control committee travel money.
In addition, he retained a good deal of his authority over the scheduling of
committee business, and when he violated a rule on the sequence of bill
consideration, few members challenged him. He was a master at timing
consideration of measures on the House floor. He would ensure that a bill
would not come up unless he had the votes. When the bill reached the
conference stage, he would maneuver so that it was his turn in the rotation
with the Senate to chair the conference committee, even if it meant report-
ing another bill slightly different from the Senate version.
Like Barden, Perkins relied heavily on his friends in the House. He
used them to move bills through the House, unbeknownst to his political
opponents. Representative Frank Albert Stubblefield's (D-KY) mumbled
motion to suspend the rules and pass one of Perkins's bills before anyone
realized what it was is a prime example. Perkins's recessing a conference
with the Senate until he could get an additional conferee appointed to
secure a vote for his position is another. When committee bills were
scheduled to be taken up in the House, Perkins frequently arranged to have
one of his friends acting as Speaker so as to have an ally with the gavel. In
addition, he could depend on a host of other friends he had accumulated
over the years. He had a kindly, ingratiating way about him. He spent a
great deal of time on the floor of the House, cultivating friendships among
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members, old and new. He particularly worked on new members whom he
thought he might be able to attract to his committee. Many members of
both chambers were quite fond of him and thus were willing to support him
on many occasions.
One of Perkins's most valuable personal resources was his tenacity. He
secured passage of many bills by sheer perseverance. Unlike Powell, who
reputedly had a fleeting attention span (Boiling 1966, 98), Perkins wore
down his opponents by sheer persistence. He snatched several major
programs from the jaws of defeat by not knowing when to quit. He earned
the respect of his members and of others for his relentless pursuit of passage
of Education and Labor bills. In the process, he gained a reputation for
being one of the great bargainers of the House and one of its most effective
members. He traded chits all over the House.
These three chairmen used their resources in different ways to get the
committee to do what they wanted, and their actions resulted in three
different committees. Within the institutional context and guided by shifts
in the salience of the committee's jurisdiction, the committee leadership
was responsible for many of the changes in the committee. Barden's use of
his formal powers to achieve his ends overshadowed his use of personal
resources. His leadership was characterized by his use of his institutional
prerogatives in a negative, obstructionist manner. His refusal to call meet-
ings, his refusal to appoint standing subcommittees, his refusal to appoint
Powell as a subcommittee chairman, his actions in declaring the lack of
quorum for meetings when he knew that in a matter of minutes one would
be present, his weak reliance on rewards, and his conspiracies with his
conservative friends on the Rules Committee all amounted to negative
exertions of authority or influence. His actions in contravention of the
majority's will produced negative reaction and sharp curtailment of the
institutional prerogatives of the chairman.
For the most part, Powell's use of his institutional and personal re-
sources resulted in a permissive and facilitative leadership that contributed
to a committee more productive than it had ever been. Members worked
out compromises and reached agreements that would not have been possi-
ble under Barden, who rarely let the committee meet and thus avoided
considering legislation. For most of Powell's tenure, the negative exercise of
power came at the expense of the Republicans, whom the chairman locked
out of the poverty bill mark-up, evicted from their staff offices, and
routinely "rolled" on committee votes. He might have wanted to be au-
thoritarian toward the majority, but he did not have the leadership backing
or popularity among other House members to carry it off. A staff member
said that Powell had a "siege mentality." He thought that his majority
members were out to get him (interview). In many ways, he was correct. A
former member said, "We wanted the committee to be immunized from
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Powell. He was uneven. It was easy to take advantage of his status in the
House" (interview). According to former members, Powell had an implicit
agreement with his members: he gave the subcommittees free rein, and
they allowed him to retain the perquisites of the chairmanship and to do
largely what he wished, as long as he did not interfere with the will of the
majority. In Powell's third term as chairman, his imperious ways got
the better of him. He reneged on his end of the agreement to refer bills to
the subcommittees of the sponsor or promoter. In addition, his expen-
ditures of committee funds were excessive and embarrassing. But the
catalyst in his downfall was his decision to impede the progress of three
major pieces of legislation. Powell shifted from a permissive and facilitative
leadership to a high-handed one.
Perkins combined his institutional and personal resources to produce a
strategic, calculating leadership that was the driving force behind commit-
tee legislation. In Barber's terms (1972), Perkins could be characterized as
an "active-positive" chairman. His son described him as "activist in the
things he believed in" (interview). He stayed well within the bounds of his
majority's approval on most issues, and he worked diligently to see that
committee programs were reauthorized and adequately appropriated. He
worked at building coalitions in the committee and on the floor. He used
rewards almost to the exclusion of sanctions.
While Barden and Powell had their strongest impacts on the structure
and operations of the committee, Perkins's impact was most pronounced on
the committee product, the legislation it reported. That is not to say that
Barden's obstruction had no effect on legislation; it did. It prevented it.
And as Fenno(1973, 130) noted, Powell's primary contribution to decision
making was his movement of legislation through the committee and to the
floor as rapidly as possible. Both Barden and Powell violated the trust and
will of the majority, deeds that resulted in structural and operational
changes. The committee never returned to its old ways. In every Congress
after 1957 the committee adopted written rules. In all of those terms there
were standing subcommittees. Staff sizes grew, along with the size of the
membership. The number, scope, and complexity of the committee rules
also increased dramatically. For example, whereas there were twelve rules
beginning in 1957, by 1984 there were twenty-four. Moreover, the first
rules could be printed on one page. Subsequently, they have been pub-
lished in booklets; the committee rules for the 98th Congress (1983-84) ran
to nineteen pages.
The actions of both Barden and Powell resulted in a more democratic
and decentralized operation, not because the chairmen aspired to demo-
cratic goals but because of their thwarting of the committee majority. The
participatory practices became institutionalized over the years. Power was
fractionalized and dispersed among the majority members. The majority
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preempted some of the chairman's prerogatives as well. Others were exer-
cised jointly by the chairman and his colleagues. The subcommittee chair-
men shared in this dispersion of authority and had greater influence under
Perkins than they had under the two previous chairmen. In the 1970s,
when the House and the House Democratic caucus adopted many of these
reforms and procedures became institutionalized in other committees as
well, Education and Labor was in the forefront, largely because of the
actions of its chairmen.
The extent to which the committee reflected the chairman's leader-
ship may be inferred from alterations in the committee's function, which
changed dramatically over the three periods under scrutiny. That it shifted
under each chairman is shown by the amount and the different types of
legislation produced under each chairman, although he was not the only
influential factor. The function by and large coincided with the chairman's
agenda, although the committee was more productive and harmonious
when the chairman's agenda melded with the majority will. During the
Barden years, little legislation at all, and particularly not any that favored
organized labor, was reported by the committee. Under Powell, the com-
mittee produced much new, progressive social legislation. After Perkins
became chairman, national public policy emphasis shifted to defense and
economics, thereby forcing the committee to concentrate on maintaining
the gains of the past.
During the Barden years, the committee's function was to prevent so-
called liberal legislation from being enacted. Liberal legislation included
anything favorable to organized labor and any federal aid to education
measures that would penalize states allowing segregated schools. In addi-
tion, federal aid to religious institutions was on the verboten list. Chairman
Barden effectively used the committee as a vehicle for preventing passage of
such bills. By refusing to call meetings, to appoint subcommittees, to assign
legislation to subcommittees, and to allow the committee to act, Barden
blocked consideration, and thus passage, of progressive or liberal legisla-
tion.
Under Powell, the committee came into its own. It was charged with
laying the groundwork for large portions of the administrations' domestic
agendas in the Kennedy and Johnson years. Fortunately, for the most part,
these agendas coincided with that of Chairman Powell, who did not inter-
cede to prevent most bills from passing. In fact, he helped immensely by
not interfering with his subcommittee chairmen and by keeping his name
off the legislation. The committee's function was to consider, report, and
see enacted large parts of the Great Society programs.
Under Perkins, the situation shifted away from enacting new programs
toward preserving the gains already made. Vietnam had deflected attention
and funds away from the poverty program and federal aid to education
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issues. Other than the war in Indochina, the economy became the top
priority. With a few exceptions, the committee enacted little new, far-
reaching legislation. Its mission became to safeguard the liberal gains made
in the Powell years. This mission became more difficult by the 1980s, when
President Reagan's budget-cutting operations were in full swing and the
president had little sympathy for Education and Labor programs. The
committee, however, was bent on amending and extending its programs—
in the words of one staff member, trying to "reinvent the wheel"—and it
had to protect existing funding from being cut completely.
Not only did the chairmen of Education and Labor affect the commit-
tee, they left long-term legacies in the House. Some reforms, particularly
the financial restrictions, were applied to the House in part as a result of the
actions of the chairmen of this committee. Education and Labor's account-
ing procedures, begun under Chairman Perkins to track where "the
money's a-goin' to" after he took over from Powell, were adopted for most
committees. Powell also was the catalyst in the 1970 establishment of the
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, commonly known in
the 1980s and 1990s as the House Ethics Committee. Proponents had been
worried about previous violations in ethics, and the Powell affair precipi-
tated action (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1966, 524). In addition, the
public disclosure of private interests was an offshoot of Powell's actions.
Other committees now routinely have open meetings and bill mark-ups (a
Perkins contribution), standing subcommittees with fixed jurisdictions (an
anti-Barden legacy), and bill referral to subcommittees (a reaction to Bar-
den) largely thanks to the chairmen of Education and Labor.
Shifts in Committee Composition and Policy Outputs
A second question addressed by this study concerned the relationship
between shifts in regional and ideological composition of the committee and
policy outputs. Brady (1978) advanced the thesis that major shifts in the
composition of Congress produced major changes in policy output. The
present study examined whether his argument is applicable to committees
as well. Data on members' districts and interest group scores and informa-
tion on the amount and scope of the committee's legislative actions and
output support the thesis that major shifts in committee membership pro-
duce major policy changes. Education and Labor's policy output changed
when its composition changed. Other factors, such as a new chairman
anxious to benefit a national constituency of blacks and a president who
placed education and labor issues high on his agenda, undoubtedly also
contributed to the shift in the committee's output.
Although patterns in the committee's seniority and proportions of new
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members did not change substantially, the committee increased in size over
the years, and its regional and ideological composition shifted dramatically.
In the Barden era its membership came principally from southern and
Middle Atlantic states. In contrast, by 1960 the committee was dominated
by northern, urban liberals, particularly by those in the North and East. A
number of members from large urban areas in Illinois, Michigan, and Cali-
fornia also joined the committee. Few new southerners were appointed.
In the early Barden years, the committee was a bastion of conserva-
tism. Ultimately, the Speaker interfered and gradually stacked the commit-
tee with liberal Democrats, thus changing its ideological complexion. The
Republicans sent some of their most conservative members to Education
and Labor in the 1950s and early 1960s, but after 1964 most Republicans on
the committee were no longer envoys of the extreme right wing of the
party. Their average interest group scores were more liberal than those of
all House Republicans after 1964 for the duration of the period under
study. There were a few archconservatives, such as John Ashbrook of
Ohio, but they were counterbalanced by more moderate Republicans, such
as Ogden Reid, Charles Goodell, and Peter Peyser, all of New York. Reid
and Peyser later became Democrats. As a result of the regional and ideo-
logical shifts, the committee membership no longer reflected House mem-
bership.
The metamorphosis of the committee from an ideological microcosm of
the House into a committee with a strong liberal bias resulted from several
factors, some external and some internal. First, the Speaker's refusal to
appoint conservative Democrats, and southerners in particular, and the
influence of organized labor in getting assigned only those members who
were sympathetic to unions accounted for part of the pattern. Second,
according to several persons interviewed, the fact that the committee
chairman in the early 1960s was black probably kept a number of southern-
ers off the committee. Third, by the time the Great Society's programs
were in full swing, the committee was known for its liberalism, and
conservatives had little incentive to be a part of it. Fourth, the members on
this committee built up constituencies through program benefits that ema-
nated from Education and Labor and thus felt obliged to defend them.
Finally, the nature of the jurisdiction of this committee also attracted the
more liberal members, particularly those from urban constituencies that
would benefit most from its programs.
A shift in the composition of the committee was one of several factors
that contributed to changes in committee output. The chairman, the
president, and the general salience of the committee's issues had varied
impacts. The committee output changed markedly when Barden left the
committee in Powell's hands; the scope and quantity of Education and
Labor legislation increased. The number of bills reported rose dramat-
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ically, and federal aid to education legislation and other liberal proposals
finally had a chance. The composition of the committee was tailor-made for
this. The House leadership had stacked the committee, thus enabling the
liberals to keep an effective majority and facilitate the passage of legislation,
much of it of major significance.
Also indicative of a relationship between committee composition and
policy outputs were the experiences during the Perkins years. The actual
composition of the committee changed, but the regional and ideological
makeup remained comparatively stable. Subsequently, there were few
major policy shifts, thereby lending support to Brady's theory and high-
lighting the role of the committee composition. Most of the legislation
considered amended or reauthorized existing programs.
Committee Development
A third question of this study concerned whether, in its efforts to adapt to
internal and external pressures, the committee developed in stages or in
smooth, incremental transitions. The evidence shows that it developed in
stages. The committee during its first stage—one that might be compared
with childhood—was small, uncomplicated, and relatively unproductive,
and it operated under a strict patriarch. In its adolescence, it rebelled. As it
matured it took control of its own affairs and contributed substantially to
congressional output and long-term policies. In its old age it tries to
maintain its vigor and status by adding new areas of activity, fearing all the
while that its glory days are largely in the past.
As organization theory predicts, the structure of the committee became
more complex, more formalized, and more decentralized over the years.
Evidence supporting this conclusion includes a more complex configura-
tion reflecting more members, increased and permanent subunits, and a
rise in the number of committee and subcommittee staff members. Mem-
bership grew from twenty-four during Barden's first term as chairman to
forty in the 94th Congress (1975-76), declining slightly thereafter. Subcom-
mittees were ad hoc until 1957, when standing subcommittees were in-
stituted. Subsequently, the number of standing subcommittees grew from
five to eight under Perkins. Data on staff size are imprecise; nonetheless, it
is apparent that staff size fluctuated and expanded dramatically overall.
There were ten staff members in 1951 under Barden and more than a
hundred later under Perkins. The addition of subcommittee and minority
staffs as well as the growth of oversight activities accounted for a significant
portion of the increase.
The institution and subsequent institutionalization of rules indicate
that the committee became more formalized. Until late in Barden's chair-
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manship no written committee rules existed, and the chairman almost
entirely controlled committee activities. Rules adopted in 1957 required
weekly meetings, the establishment of standing subcommittees with fixed
jurisdictions, and referral of all legislation to the standing subcommittees.
These units were empowered to hold hearings, receive exhibits, take
testimony, and report to the full committee. The next term, members
refined the rules to required, among other things, that every committee
member be appointed to at least one subcommittee. Rules changes adopted
in 1966 preempted most of the remaining prerogatives of the chairman. The
adoption and expansion of rules institutionalized their application and
produced a more formalized committee.
Greater decentralization is reflected in the fractionalization of power—
subcommittees gaining a voice in committee decision making and opera-
tions. They did most of the work, held most of the hearings, and considered
most of the bills. Subcommittee chairmen were given control of their staffs,
some responsibilities for budget preparation, and an expanded work load.
Standing subcommittees, which had been nonexistent under most of Bar-
den's chairmanship, took on new importance under Powell and continued
to be major components under Perkins.
The impact of the 1970s House and caucus reforms on this committee's
structure were mitigated by actions of the committee membership itself.
The committee's "naughty child" orientation generated internal reforms
that accomplished most of what House and caucus reforms later did. By
and large, most requirements already were in place on Education and Labor
by the time they were applied to other committees. Standing subcommit-
tees had been established for more than a decade, although reforms altered
the method of appointing chairmen and members. In addition, subcommit-
tees considered most legislation, except that held in the full committee by
implicit agreement between the chairman and his majority. The committee
instituted accounting procedures after Powell's troubles. Committee meet-
ings had been open to the public for several years before the reforms. All in
all, Education and Labor was affected only mildly by the 1970s House and
caucus reforms that undoubtedly were precipitated in part by committee
problems and solutions.
Some aspects of the committee's operations, such as procedures, work
load, and voting behavior, changed while others remained stable. Pro-
cedures became much more democratic. Both the expanded member par-
ticipation in the decision-making process and several rules changes are
evidence of greater democracy. The new rules diffused power previously
belonging to the chairman by delegating authority to establish subcommit-
tees to majority members, authorizing minority questioning of witnesses,
and requiring the assignment of every member to a standing subcommittee,
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among other things. Thus, each member became more influential in the
Education and Labor policy-making process.
The committee work load increased over the three periods. The num-
ber of bills assigned to the committee grew, the number of hearings
increased, and more bills were reported. Bill referrals generally rose until
multiple sponsorship was allowed in 1975. The number of hearings went
up as well. Moreover, more bills were reported by the committee, passed
by the House, and eventually enacted. Many of these increases largely
resulted from external forces, such as the general growth of the congres-
sional work load and the renewed emphasis on oversight. But increases in a
few of the indicators, such as the rise in the number of hearings or in the
number of bills reported, also were influenced by internal committee
factors. Powell's and Perkins's permissiveness with subcommittees contrib-
uted to the rise in output and hearings.
Stability and change in committee operations is reflected in patterns of
full committee and party cohesion on committee roll calls. Full committee
voting cohesion remained stable and low, and partisanship remained stable
and high. There was little full committee cohesion under Barden, par-
ticularly during his last term as chairman. In fact, as the number of
committee roll calls went up, voting cohesion decreased. During the Powell
years, the average full committee Rice Index Scores rose, although they still
indicated a fairly divisive committee. In addition, the percentage of mini-
mally cohesive votes (70-percent cohesion) grew as well. When Perkins
assumed the chair, the mean cohesion scores and percentages of minimally
cohesive votes rose further, although by no means could Education and
Labor be considered a unified voting bloc.
Several factors may have affected the rise of voting cohesion on Educa-
tion and Labor during the Perkins years. First, Chairman Perkins probably
had some mitigating effect on the controversies surrounding the issues. He
worked hard at building coalitions. Second, the membership of the com-
mittee was not as philosophically extreme as it had been in earlier years.
The Republicans were more liberal than their House counterparts, and the
Democrats were becoming more representative of theirs. Third, by the
time Perkins became chairman, most of the great fights had been fought.
The degree of controversy may have subsided as the salience of the issues
declined. Also, some of the Republicans had an interest in maintaining the
committee's programs. Their constituents benefited, and thus they may
have been inclined to vote with the Democrats a bit more often.
Party voting was moderate during the Barden years. It increased
markedly when Powell took the chairmanship and stayed high throughout
his tenure and into the beginning of the Perkins years. The percentage of
party votes generally decreased somewhat from Powell to Perkins. After
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the 90th Congress (1967-68), levels of party voting decreased until 1980, a
presidential election year, when the proportions rose to more than 70
percent.
Party voting cohesion was moderate for both parties in the 1950s and
high in the 1960s. It began to decrease for both parties in the 92d Congress
(1971-72), although levels remained fairly high for the duration of the
Perkins years. Democrats were particularly unified in the 96th, 97th, and
98th Congresses (1979-84). The decrease in party cohesion scores coincided
with increases in the average full committee cohesion scores from the
Barden and Powell years.
For the most part, the extent of party voting in Education and Labor
bore little relation to the degree of party voting in the House. Nor did mean
party-unity scores appear to resemble party cohesion or party voting in the
committee. The exceptions were the 96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses. The
relatively high rates of party voting in the committee during these Con-
gresses correspond to higher levels of party voting in the House found by
Dodd and Oppenheimer (1989).
Party voting on the committee was at its highest during the period that
Education and Labor was the vehicle for a large part of the president's
domestic agenda. When the issues were at the peak of salience, members
fought for their interests. The legislation that incited most of the partisan
differences in the 87th Congress (1961-62) related to school construction,
NDEA, and impacted areas policies. The high number of roll calls indi-
cates conflict, albeit not necessarily along partisan lines. In the 88th Con-
gress (1963-64), the War on Poverty legislation generated a substantial
amount of partisan controversy. The Johnson administration threw its
weight behind the Democrats, almost forcing the issues to be partisan.
Moreover, the fact that the committee had jurisdiction over such salient and
visible issues contributed to the divisiveness. Party voting was somewhat
less prevalent, although still present, in the 89th Congress (1965-66), when
the committee emphasized education legislation. Members were able to
work out compromises on aid to elementary and secondary schools that had
been a highly partisan issue in the past.
Partisanship also was high in the last part of the Perkins years. Be-
ginning in the Carter administration, Education and Labor programs
increasingly were threatened with large budget cuts or with abolition,
exacerbating controversies already present on the committee. Democrats
fought to keep the gains they had made in the early and mid-1960s. About
the same time, the country was in the midst of a rising tide of conservatism
that brought Ronald Reagan to the White House. The conservatives con-
tinued with renewed vigor the budget cutting begun in the Carter adminis-
tration. Although there was no discernible pattern of partisanship on the
issues themselves, the committee and subcommittee recommendations to
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the Budget Committee for financing programs under the committee's
jurisdiction split along party lines on every vote.
Other Findings
Certain other findings of interest emerged from this study concerning the
salience of the issues before the committee, the degree of specificity in the
committee structures and rules, the role of the chairman in committee
decentralization, and committee integration. The issues before the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor have waxed and waned in salience. They
did not become prominent until the early and mid-1960s, when there was
enough impetus in the environment for making major policy changes, at
least insofar as the issues before this committee were concerned. The added
salience of Education and Labor issues lasted into the early 1970s, when
social welfare concerns were replaced or supplanted by more pressing
needs. Many of the problems confronted during the 1950s and 1960s were
no longer issues. They were solved in some sense or another. There was no
major disagreement anymore over whether the federal government should
provide aid to education or whether schools should be segregated or inte-
grated. The problem of whether to aid public schools only or to include
parochial schools faded as a pertinent issue, although it is unlikely to stay
faded. What is more, federal aid became an even smaller percentage of the
money spent on education than it was when the ESEA was enacted. Nor
was poverty any longer a prominent issue. Bargaining and minimum wage
concerns were not at the forefront of the public agenda. Curtailment of
labor unions belonged to an era of the past. The salient labor issues fell
under the jurisdiction of other committees, such as Ways and Means, as
tariffs, import quotas, and cheap labor superseded the fights over situs
picketing, secondary boycotts, and minimum wage.
In the latter part of the Perkins era, the committee was the victim of the
double whammy—a less salient issue jurisdiction and the threat of reduced
program funding. Its main constituents, organized labor and the poor,
declined as political forces. At the same time, the committee as an organiza-
tion became institutionalized and continued to maintain itself in the face of
less salient issues of narrower scope. Led by its chairman, it fought not only
dying interest in its issues but budget limitations and cuts.
The problems of Education and Labor are symptomatic of those faced
by most of the authorizing committees. The committees concerned with
financial and defense issues have taken precedence over most of the others.
One pair of researchers has termed it the new "committee oligarchy,"
consisting of the money committees, Rules, Armed Services, and Energy
and Commerce (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1989, 48-50). This oligarchy
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arose out of a need for centralization of the decentralized subcommittee
government created by the 1970s House and caucus reforms combined
with attention to the enormous federal deficit, forcing a reduction in new
programs and old funding levels. The agendas of the authorizing commit-
tees have been forced to fit into the budget projections. The budget and its
reconciliations are the major domestic legislation considered by Congress.
Education and Labor was hit hard by the emphasis on budget cutting.
Chairman Perkins complained bitterly about not being able to "help poor
people." He was angry that the programs authorized by the committee
were not fully funded and that their very existence was threatened. His job
as the guardian of the 1960s social welfare and education gains became
increasingly frustrating (interview). In addition, since a large part of the
power on Capitol Hill is vested in the "committee oligarchy," the authoriz-
ing committees, including full committee chairmen and subcommittee
chairmen, have less authority.
Contrary to what Smith and Deering (1984, 168) argued, when com-
mittee structures and rules were vaguely defined, as in the Barden era, the
chairman tended to rely more on his institutional prerogatives than on his
personal resources for influencing the committee structure, operations,
function, and outputs. Where the structures were clearly specified, as
when Powell presided, the chairman had little choice but to rely on his
personal resources, since his institutional prerogatives had been preempted
by the committee majority. On Education and Labor, when structural
arrangements were loosely defined, the chairman could establish the struc-
ture and operations, within limits, according to his view of the world.
Institutional prerogatives offered the most efficient and least risky ways of
being effective. If the structures and procedures were defined clearly, the
chairman had little discretion over their shape. He had to depend on his
personal arsenal to work within or around existing structures or operations.
Another finding that emerged from this study is that the actions of the
chairmen of this committee largely were responsible for its decentraliza-
tion. The reforms were adopted primarily at the end of Barden's and
Powell's tenures as chairman. Most were instituted because the chairman
had flouted the will of the majority. They supplanted the will of the chair-
man with the will of the majority. They fractionalized and diffused the
power to ensure that the majority would have a voice in committee opera-
tions and structure. These reforms were adopted years before they were
applied to the standing committees at large. Education and Labor members
had more influence over what went on in their committee long before
members of most other committees could claim such influence.
An unsurprising finding was that Education and Labor was not highly
integrated. A number of studies have characterized Education and Labor as
one of the least integrated committees in Congress. Most conceptualize
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integration in Fenno's (1966, 191) terms as a "meshing" among its subunits
and roles or as the minimization of conflict. Several arrived at their opinions
on the basis of some form of measurement of voting cohesion (Unekis and
Rieselbach 1984; Dyson and Soule 1970). Others based their conclusions
concerning this committee on interview data (Munger and Fenno 1962;
Fenno 1962, 1966, 1973; Manley 1965). This study has done both. If the
standard for integration is full committee cohesion, this study supports
judgments that Education and Labor was not highly integrated, although
the degree of cohesive voting increased during the Perkins years. The
aforementioned authors did not consider, however, that parties and rules
are integrating mechanisms, both of which were in abundance on Educa-
tion and Labor.
Several factors contribute to the relatively low cohesion levels on
Education and Labor compared with some other committees. Fenno (1966)
discussed those facilitating integration on the Committee on Appropria-
tions. First, the money men apparently place a high value on internal
integration in the committee. This value is conveyed via the norms of
reciprocity, unity, minimal partisanship, and compromise. Second, mem-
bers of Appropriations have a consensus on committee goals, particularly in
protecting the power of the purse. Third, Appropriations makes decisions
in dollars and cents instead of in philosophical terms.
None of these conditions prevailed on Education and Labor, which
practiced none of the listed norms. In fact, members did almost exactly the
opposite. Compromise, unity, and minimal partisanship were infrequent
visitors. There was no cross-party consensus on goals. Democrats tended to
support government aid or intervention in labor matters and in education,
whereas Republicans tried to protect the Treasury and keep federal in-
volvement in education to a minimum. In labor relations, Republicans al-
most always sided with management and voted to restrict unions, whereas
many Democrats were union men. Third, the decisions made on Education
and Labor were at the very heart of the philosophical differences between
the parties, subjects that divide by their very nature instead of unifying and
promoting integration. Some of the great philosophical battles, such as that
over federal aid to education, were fought in Education and Labor.
Fenno (1966) mentioned a few other conditions that contributed to
smooth operating conditions on the Appropriations Committee. First, the
chairman and the ranking minority member served as ex officio members of
every subcommittee and worked closely together in the process. On Educa-
tion and Labor, although the chairman and ranking minority member were
ex officio members of all subcommittees, unless they were particularly
interested in an issue under consideration they generally stayed out of
subcommittee affairs. While this practice may have promoted integration
on Appropriations, it added little to Education and Labor, other than an
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extra vote when needed. Fenno (1966) also commented on the minimization
of conflict on Appropriations. While all conflict cannot be eliminated in
Congress, it can be contained. The containment of conflict on Appropria-
tions was aided by the practice of reporting bills with no minority reports,
which were seen as visible symbols of committee disunity (Fenno 1966,
203). In Education and Labor, on the contrary, there was no effort to
contain the conflict. Committee rules included a provision specifically
allowing members to file minority, individual, or supplemental reports
along with committee reports, beginning in 1971. The signs of conflict
were published for all to see. Many members wanted their constituents to
know that they had opposed these big-spending bills.
An apprenticeship period may have contributed to integration in some
committees, but there was no such apprenticeship in Education and Labor.
New members could begin their service square in the middle of the
committee's disputes. When Perkins assumed the chairmanship, he began
assigning freshmen and other subcommittee members to conference com-
mittees. The appointment of freshmen or low-ranking subcommittee mem-
bers to conference committees would have been a rarity on Appropriations.
The lack of apprenticeship on Education and Labor contributed to minimal
integration. That lack could make each member feel more competent and
thereby more assertive, since he would gain experience early in his commit-
tee career, while members on other committees watched instead of par-
ticipating. Immediate participation also removed potential rewards from
the hands of the chairman, such as appointments to conference committees
as rewards for biding time. If subcommittee members automatically were
designated as the conferees, the chairman had little discretion over whom to
appoint. Moreover, it removed incentives for members to cooperate with
the chairman, since they likely could serve anyway.
In addition to the integration problems faced by Education and Labor,
it had some integration strengths. Conflict structured along party lines
enabled the committee to carry out its functions successfully, particularly
when the majority was large. Also, the committee had numerous rules to
contain the conflict. In the words of a former staff member, "Rules are a
way to organize conflict and keep it civil. If everything is civil already, rules
are a way to structure business" (interview). Further, even though Educa-
tion and Labor was not highly integrated under any of its chairmen, all
seemed to have ways of making it work to their satisfaction. The fact that
the Republicans did not filibuster the committee also testifies to some
degree of integration. True, they offered numerous amendments to Demo-
cratic legislation, but they did not work against the process, an indication
that the committee could work together.
Each chairman's leadership contributed to integration, as well as de-
tracting from it. Education and Labor was integrated sufficiently to be able
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to survive several threats to its existence as one committee instead of two
and to accomplish its work. If it continually reported legislation that was
too extreme for the House to approve, it would have been "reorganized" to
suit the needs of the House. But it adapted to the pressures and demands
from its environment.
Understanding Congressional Committees
The aim of this study was two-pronged. First, its goal was to enhance the
understanding of how committees operate and what effects certain internal
and external environmental influences have on their operations, outputs,
and development. Second, and integral to the first goal, this study was
directed at narrowing the gap in knowledge of committee leadership. For
decades scholars and others have pointed to committee chairmen as among
the most powerful members on the Hill. But few have carried the torch in
their research. This study highlights the importance of and the abilities of
individuals in affecting the structures, operations, and outputs of congres-
sional committees.
In recent years, many congressional scholars have emphasized the
institutional context in determining how committees and their leaders act.
But that picture is not complete. Although the institutional context is
significant, the current study underscores the importance of individual
chairmen in the actions and development of congressional committees.
Moreover, not only can chairmen affect the committee, but they also can
affect the House, as was illustrated by the three chairmen studied here.
More attention might profitably be paid to the proactive influences of
committee chairmen.
This study also has implications for the selection of committee leaders.
One might expect a different modus operandi from a chairman who is held
accountable by election or by implicit threat of removal than one who
ascends to the office by virtue of seniority and assumes himself safely
ensconced. The former would be more responsive to the wishes of the
majority caucus as well as to committee members. Committee leadership
determined by seniority lacks accountability to the membership by virtue
of its universalistic character. Minus a threat of overthrow, the committee
chairman has little incentive, other than some quirk of personality, to cater
to the wishes or goals of committee members except to further his aspira-
tions.
Also important for understanding congressional committees is the
impact of the committee's historical development on the current commit-
tee. Care should be taken in selecting aspects to be compared, because two
committees may not be in the same stage of development. Committee A
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might be in its infancy, whereas Committee B might be in a relatively
mature stage, with institutionalized traditions, structures, and operations.
One may not understand certain norms or ways of doing things without a
good idea of how the committee developed and why it developed the way
it did.
Another implication of this study is the importance of the committee
composition—of the individuals who make up the committee. Drawing on
Brady's thesis (1978) that major policy shifts result only from major shifts in
the composition of Congress, this study suggests that changes in mem-
bership composition can affect committee output. The individuals on a
committee, including the chairman, can have a marked effect on its output.
Another important factor in understanding congressional committees
is the salience and divisiveness of the issues in a committee's jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of Education and Labor was relatively unimportant in the
early stages of its development; then it peaked during its teenage years
under Powell and waned under Perkins, although the latter did everything
in his power to maintain the gains made in the early 1960s. Other commit-
tees undoubtedly endure cycles of salience, something that should be
considered when studying them.
Like many organizations created to serve this broad and diverse coun-
try, Congress is a multifaceted and, indeed, a many-splendored thing. The
more we understand the pieces that tessellate that grand mosaic, the greater
will be our appreciation of the entire institution. The author hopes that this
study of the Committee on Education and Labor and its three disparate
chairmen has illuminated one facet of this mosaic in a way that limns the
whole Congress.
Notes
Chapter 1. The Committee during the Barden Years
1. For example, in 1952 the Senate held hearings pertaining to Communists in
labor unions. The Communist Control Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-637) prohibited Commu-
nist party members from holding union offices or from representing an employer
before the National Labor Relations Board (Congress and the Nation 1965, 598). In 1954
Senator McCarthy held hearings in the Senate Government Operations Committee to
investigate possible Communist infiltration of the State Department, the Voice of
America, and the army. Education and Labor considered the issue of loyalty oaths on
several occasions during the decade,including in the 1958 National Defense Education
Act, in the Landrum-Griffin Act, and in several other efforts to repeal the latter. See
Congress and the Nation 1965, 1669-70; and Puryear (1979, 133-34).
2. The Taft-Haitley Act formally is entitled "The Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947" (P.L. 80-101).
3. The act is formally entitled "The Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959" (P.L. 86-257).
4. Interviews; also documented by a number of new members to Education and
Labor who also held seats on other committees, such as Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Interior and Insular Affairs, Banking and Currency, Public Works, and
Agriculture. The chairman of Government Operations also sat on Education and
Labor.
5. The number of times each member voted for and against each group's
position was printed in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report at various times
throughout the decade.
6. For example, if a member voted correctly on twenty of the twenty-seven roll
calls chosen by the AFL, he would rate a support score of 74.0. Whether he voted
against the AFL position or did not vote at all is irrelevant, since neither action would
constitute support for the AFL's position. One drawback to this measure is that it
penalizes members who were not in Congress in all of the terms in question; however,
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if they were not in Congress, they could not support that pressure group's position on
the selected roll calls.
7. See Fenno (1969, 292-93, 296). This assertion was also substantiated by the
author in interviews with former members and Education and Labor staff. Boiling
remarked that the Democratic Study Group helped change the composition of com-
mittees by working to persuade the party leadership to fill vacancies with liberals from
time to time: "Notable success has been achieved in changing the complexion of the
Education and Labor Committee from deep conservative to liberal" (1966, 57).
8. See Fenno (1969) for a discussion of the effect of membership changes on
federal aid to education legislation.
9. Until now, no one has been able to document systematically these allegations
because the roll-call records were not available for the early years of the committee's
existence. The staff of the Committee on Education and Labor was kind enough to
allow this author access to all the committee minutes and roll calls taken since Barden
assumed the chairmanship in 1950. Records for 1953, 1954, and 1957 are missing.
10. Party-unity scores represent the percentage of party-unity roll calls on which
each member voted with his party against a majority of the other party on House floor
votes.
11. The Rice Index of Cohesion (Rice 1928) represents the absolute difference
between the percentage of yea votes and the percentage of nay votes. Scores on
individual roll calls can be averaged to yield mean scores. This index can be applied to
voting with parties as well as voting between parties. See Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox
(1966, 32-35).
12. See Fenno (1969, 292-93, 296) and Cater (1964, 160). The assertion regarding
stacking the committee was also supported in several interviews.
Chapter 2. The Chairmanship of Graham Barden
1. This section draws heavily on a thorough biography of Barden by Elmer
Puryear(1979).
2. The constituency information is drawn largely from Puryear (1979).
3. Much of the following information was drawn from interviews with members
of Congress and with staff members of the Committee on Education and Labor. In ad-
dition, Puryear (1979) provided many of the details about Barden's attitudes and the
reasons for them.
4. These tallies were printed in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report at various
times throughout the 1950s.
5. Party-unity scores are printed in each year's Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
6. See Jones (1981) for a discussion of contextual versus personal perspectives on
leadership.
7. Another way to approach leadership is through classifications of leaders into
categories. For some notable examples, refer to Barber (1972) for classifications of
presidents, March and Simon (1967) for modes of conflict resolution, Unekis and
Rieselbach (1984) for the voting patterns of House committee chairmen, Manley (1967)
for a discussion of task-oriented versus affective leadership, and Burns (1978) for a
discussion of transactional versus transforming leadership.
8. A notable exception was the creation of a subcommittee on staffing matters by
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the majority of Education and Labor in response to "Chairman John Lesinski's
highhandedness" in the 81st Congress; see Goodwin (1970, 145).
Chapter 3. The Committee during the Powell Years
1. Much of the information in this section can be found in various Congressional
Quarterly publications. Committee prints of the House Committee on Education and
Labor also provided much of the information on committee accomplishments and
activities.
2. Scott's ADA scores ranged from 0 to 12 from 1960 to 1966, his COPE scores
from 0 to 2 7, and his AC A scores from 60 to 8 3. His party-unity scores ranged from 4 to
29 for the same period.
Gibbons had COPE scores of 73 in 1963-64 and 77 in 1965-66 and comparatively
high party-unity scores: 76 in 1963 and 93 in 1966. He really did not fit the stereotype
of the southern congressman. He was younger and more progressive than many of his
colleagues and came from Tampa, an urban instead of a rural area. Voting for federal
aid to education and other "progressive" measures did not appear to be as much of a
hardship for Gibbons as for some other members, such as Scott.
3. The ideological composition of the committee throughout the Powell years is
inferred both from interest group scores and from the impressions of members and
observers of the committee. Whereas for most of the 1950s Congressional Quarterly
printed the number of "right" and "wrong" votes cast by each member according to the
particular interest group, the 1960s scores were calculated by the interest groups.
4. The questionable travel expenses include sixty-five trips to Miami or San Juan,
Puerto Rico, that were all billed as "official travel." One trip to San Juan was scheduled
in the name of Leon Abramson, the committee's chief counsel for labor management,
and the other was charged to Michael Schwartz, the assistant counsel to die Antipov-
erty Subcommittee. See Loftus 1966b. Several other staff members were subpoenaed
to provide information on trips that were billed to the committee in their names but that
they never took (interviews).
5. The chairman's estranged wife, Yvette Marjorie Flores, who lived in Puerto
Rico, was one. See Jacobs (1973, 250) for the specifics.
6. Now the House Stationery Store will not pay cash for returned merchandise.
7. Various statements made in interviews conducted for this study conveyed that
impression.
Chapter 4. The Chairmanship o f Adam Clayton Powell , Jr.
1. For a more thorough treatment of Powell's background, see Hamilton (1991)
and Gunther(1985).
2. Overall, as chairman, Powell missed 26 percent of Education and Labor's
meetings. His attendance ranged from 36 to 88 percent of the committee's meetings
between 1961 and 1966. From 1951 to 1960 he attended between 9 and 39 percent of
the meetings. Compiled from Committee on Education and Labor, Minutes 1951-66.
There are no data for 1953-54 and 1957.
3. This count excludes the twenty-two days Powell was in Europe at a meeting of
the International Labor Organization.
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4. See Committee on Education and Labor, Activities and Accomplishments, 87th-
89th Cong. These committee publications contain lists of all subcommittees and
discussions of what each accomplished in each session.
5. See Hickey and Edwin (1965, 285-88) for a  more thorough discussion of
Powell's delaying tactics.
6. See Sorenson (1965, 340); Hardeman and Bacon (1987, 455); Powell (1971,
Chap. 10); and Puryear (1979, 132).
7. This incident was described to the author in an interview with a former
committee member. It is also cited by Hickey and Edwin (1965, 133), MacNeil (1963,
311-12), and Puryear (1979, 110). Puryear cited the Greensboro Daily News, July 22,
1955, as one of his sources.
8. Unless otherwise noted, information in this section was drawn from the
following sources: Powell (1971, 159-84); In re Adam Clayton Powell 1967; Congressional
Quarterly Almanac (\966, 519-24);Jacobs(1973); and Hickey and Ed win(1965, 280-85).
Hamilton (1991, 313-25, 406-45) also treats Powell's legal difficulties in detail.
9. See Jacobs 1973 for a discussion of the contemplated proceedings against
Powell.
Chapter 5. The Committee during the Perkins Years
1. Representative William Clay (D-MO) was an exception from this region,
coming from an urban, labor district in St. Louis.
2. Statements to this effect surfaced in several interviews conducted for this
study. That the committee is a hardship post for Republicans was not necessarily true
in 1989. In an interview, a Republican member said that Representative Thomas J.
Tauke (R-IA) transferred to another committee and had to fight to get back on
Education and Labor. The Democrats, however, were having trouble filling their
vacancies. They resorted to using temporary appointees in recent years and had eight
in the 100th Congress (1987-88). Over the years Chairman Perkins frequently used his
personal influence to recruit new Democrats, who generally were not clamoring for
Education and Labor seats.
3. The Democrats arranged for Representative Timothy J. Penny (D-MN) to be
assigned elsewhere in the 101st Congress because he consistently voted with the
Republicans. This strategy was recounted by a member in an interview and was
supported by subsequent interviews with other members and staff.
4. According to committee staff members interviewed for this study, the major-
ity leader sat on the committee as a temporary, allegedly to counteract the influence of
Edith Green (D-OR), who was acting more and more like a Republican in those days
and aggravating the more liberal Democrats.
5. The 1973 Democratic Caucus rules limited party members to service on one
exclusive committee (Rules, Appropriations, or Ways and Means), or one major and
one nonmajor committee, or two nonmajor committees. See Congress and the Nation
4:752; and Sheppard (1985, 236).
6. The "Subcommittee Bill of Rights" allowed each committee's majority mem-
bers to choose subcommittee chairmen, to establish subcommittee jurisdictions and set
the party ratios to reflect that of the full House, to provide subcommittee budgets, and
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to set the number of subcommittees the full committee would have. See Congress and the
Nation 4:746; and Smith and Deering (1990).
7. Committees had been directed to exercise "continuing watchfulness" over
administrative agency execution of the laws under their jurisdiction by the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601). See Congress and the Nation 1965, 1418.
8. Housemate 1979, rule 11 cl. 2 (m) (1), H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., p. 34470.
Previously, only a few committees were permitted to issue subpoenas.
9. The data on House and caucus reforms are drawn from Deering and Smith
(1981, 264; Congress and the Nation vols. 3 and 4; and Sheppard (1985). Education and
Labor reform data are drawn from the printed rules of the committee. The dates refer
to the time of enactment of similar rules (or practices), if applicable, on the committee if
different from the year of the House or caucus reforms.
Chapter 6. The Chairmanship o f Carl Perkins
1. This remark was made in the author's presence at Chairman Perkins's funeral
by Connie Frederick Crosby.
2. The amount of the fee was printed in Perkins's obituary in the New York
Times, written by Marjorie Hunter. The story came from staff members who heard it
told often.
3. Glickman (1972) gave the salary as $59.60 per month.
4. This comment about Perkins's academic record was made by a later president
of Lees Junior College to a committee staff member.
5. The description of Perkins as a bumpkin surfaced repeatedly in interviews
conducted with members and staff as part of this study. Gladieux and Wolanin also
describe his image as "something of a country bumpkin" (1976, 170).
6. This incident was recounted many times to Education and Labor staff
members by Sam Ezelle, former secretary-treasurer of the Kentucky AFL-CIO.
7. Andrew Jackson May, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee,
and John Langley both represented Floyd County, Kentucky, an area in Perkins's
Seventh District.
8. The author overheard remarks to this effect at Perkins's funeral on Aug. 7,
1984.
9. He did lose in 1984 on portions of a bill to ensure "equal access" to public
school facilities by religious groups. The leadership, not in favor of the bill, sent it
instead to Judiciary, where it was certain to be defeated.
10. According to staff, before he had made up his mind on how to vote on some
issues, Perkins had his office staff call the office of Representative M. Caldwell Butler
(R-VA), in whose judgment Perkins put great stock, to find out how he was going to
vote (interviews).
11. Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-AR) of Ways and Means was another who
avoided sanctions for the most part. See Manley (1967, 1969).
12. For example, she denied one member's request for travel money because she
suspected that he wanted to conduct official business for another committee.
13. Some variant of this comment surfaced repeatedly in interviews with mem-
bers and staff.
14. For example, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed
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Services Committee, and former representative Wilbur Mills (D-AR), chairman of
Ways and Means, each is an expert based on his knowledge of the subject matter under
his committee's jurisdiction. See Manley (1967, 1969) for a discussion of "expert
power" as it applied to Chairman Mills.
15. This conference is treated in great detail in Gladieux and Wolanin (1976,
161-205). Some of the strategies were summarized in an interview for this study with
one of the authors.
16. The "Blue Books" are the prints of the legislation taken to conference. They
include the House bill beside the Senate bill and the differences between the two
versions.
17. Some variant of this expression surfaced in several interviews with members
and staff.
Chapter 7. Leadership and Development on Education and Labor
1. The opinion that others thought he was not sophisticated enough was ex-
pressed several times in interviews with other members and with staff members. Most
people who knew him knew better.
2. Dr. Robert Martin, former president of Eastern Kentucky University and
former state official (commissioner of finance, superintendent of state public instruc-
tion, and state senator) told this several years ago to Benjamin F. Reeves, assistant to the
chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, who related it to the author.
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